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The Dialectics of Modernity - Recognizing Globalization

Studies on the Theoretical Perspectives of
Globalization

Edited by

Endre Kiss

Budapest, 2014.
Arisztotelész Kiadó

**The Dialectics of Modernity-
Recognizing Globalization
Studies on the Theoretical Perspectives of
Globalization**

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Introduction

The volume *The Dialectics of Modernity - Recognizing Globalization. Studies on the Theoretical Perspectives of Globalization* is the product of a work of that quarter of the century, which has been continuing, since 1989 up today, the true beginning of the globalization.

Therefore, because that concept was not existing at that time, the work is not yet directed, in the first years, on the globalization itself. As it can be seen, this concept pushed through only in the second half of the nineties, when the concept could also be already statistically revealed in the world press.

How a group of researchers from Hungary was enquiring during the nineties, according to partners of conversation at home and abroad, with whom one could talk about how the new world emerging with 1989 can actually be described, is a long story, the theory of which consists in the fact, that we apparently live in a world, where the most part of the people, even worse, even most of the intellectuals are hardly interested in how this one really looks like.

On looking for partners, the circle of the authors of this volume was created. In Hungary, we quickly reached our limit (which much later did not prevent us from appearing, such as if we had always been living in the theoretically worked globalization). The French group around Jacques *Poulain* reacted the fastest way (and later around Francois *de Bernard*, with his particularly valuable homepage www.mondialisations.org), not much later the contact with the Russian colleagues around Alexandr *Shumakov* was created, in which *Encyclopedia of the Globalization* our contribution could already appear in 2003. On these traces, we came to the productive relationship with Leonid *Grinin* and Andrey *Korotayev*.

Finally, we mention the Fürstenfeld's initiative, founded since 2009 with Melitta *Becker's* help in the framework of the *Centre for the Interdisciplinary Research* in this Austrian city. A relevant part of the author / inside this book participated from the beginning in the work of the group.

The individual contributions to this volume are linked together by a common interest in knowledge. This is the *theoretical* view of the phenomenon of the globalization. From the beginning, it was not further defined or limited to certain approaches, particularly an independent theory of the globalization was not intended. We started from the fact, that every legitimately revealed theoretical approach can contribute legitimately to a later theory of the globalization.

In this way, the further contacts with Nico *Stehr* and the members of the Dresden group for the investigation of the security problems arose, mainly with Ernst *Woit*.

Hegel defined the philosophy as the flight of the Owl of Minerva, which "begins its flight only with the falling twilight". Through the theoretical investigation of the globalization always becoming interdisciplinary, we wanted by no means to debate about this incomparable aphorism. We simply started from the conviction, that a new reality should not remain without any description.

Budapest, October 2014

Endre *Kiss*

Introduction

Le volume *Dialectique de la Modernisation, à propos de la Théorie de la Globalisation*, est le produit d'un travail de ce quart de siècle, qui poursuit, depuis 1989 jusqu'à aujourd'hui, le véritable commencement de la globalisation.

C'est donc pourquoi, ce concept n'existant pas à cette époque, le travail n'est pas dirigé, dans les premières années, vers la globalisation elle-même. Comme on peut le voir, ce concept s'imposa seulement dans la seconde moitié des années quatre-vingt dix, lorsque le concept put aussi être déjà statistiquement être révélé dans la presse mondiale.

Comment un groupe de chercheurs de Hongrie s'enquérirait durant les années quatre-vingt-dix, selon des partenaires de conversations du pays et de l'étranger, avec lesquels on pouvait parler de comment le nouveau monde émergeant avec 1989 peut être vraiment décrit, est une longue histoire, dont la théorie consiste dans le fait, que nous vivons apparemment dans un monde, où la plupart des gens, bien pire, la plupart des intellectuels ne sont guère intéressés par ce à quoi celui-ci ressemble réellement.

Cherchant des partenaires, le cercle des auteurs de ce volume fut créé. En Hongrie, nous atteignîmes rapidement notre limite (ce qui beaucoup plus tard ne nous empêcha pas d'apparaître comme si nous avions toujours vécu dans la globalisation théoriquement travaillée). Le groupe français autour de Jacques *Poulain* réagit au plus vite (et plus tard autour de François *de Bernard* avec sa homepage particulièrement de grande valeur www.mondialisations.org), pas beaucoup plus tard le contact avec les collègues russes autour d'Alexandr *Shumakov* fut créé, dans *l'Encyclopédie de la Globalisation* duquel notre contribution put déjà apparaître en 2003. Sur ces traces, nous en arrivâmes à la productive relation avec Leonid *Grinin* et Andrey *Korotayev*.

Finalement, nous mentionnons l'initiative de Fürstenfeld, fondée depuis 2009 avec l'aide de Melitta *Becker* dans le cadre du *centre de recherche interdisciplinaire* de la ville autrichienne. Une partie pertinente de l'auteur/dans ce volume participa depuis le début au travail du groupe.

Les contributions individuelles à ce volume sont liées ensemble par un intérêt commun au savoir. C'est la vue *théorique* du phénomène de la globalisation. Depuis le début, il ne fut pas davantage défini ou limité à certaines approches, en particulier une théorie indépendante de la globalisation ne fut pas envisagée. Nous sommes partis du fait, que toute approche théorique légitimement révélée peut légitimement contribuer à une théorie ultérieure de la globalisation.

De cette façon, les autres contacts avec Nico *Stehr* et les membres du groupe de Dresde pour l'investigation des problèmes de sécurité apparurent, surtout avec Ernst *Woit*.

Hegel définit la philosophie comme le vol de la Chouette de Minerve, qui "commence son vol seulement au crépuscule tombant". Par l'investigation théorique de la globalisation devenant toujours interdisciplinaire, nous ne voulions en aucun cas débattre à propos de cet incomparable aphorisme. Nous sommes simplement partis de la conviction, qu'une nouvelle réalité ne devrait pas demeurer sans description.

Budapest, Octobre 2014

Endre *Kiss*

Einleitung

Der Band *Dialektik der Modernisation. Über die Theorie der Globalisation* ist das Produkt einer Arbeit von jenem Jahrhundertviertel, das seit 1989, dem wahren Anfang der Globalisation, bis heute andauert.

Die Arbeit richtete sich in den ersten Jahren noch deshalb nicht auf die Globalisation selbst, weil dieser Begriff damals noch nicht existierte. Wie ersichtlich, setzte sich dieser Begriff erst in der zweiten Hälfte der neunziger Jahre durch, als der Begriff in der Weltpresse sich auch schon statistisch nachweisen liess.

Wie eine Forschergruppe aus Ungarn im Laufe der neunziger Jahre nach Gesprächspartnern im In- und Ausland umschaute, mit denen man darüber reden konnte, wie die mit 1989 aufkommende neue Welt überhaupt beschrieben werden kann, ist eine lange Geschichte, deren Lehre darin besteht, dass wir scheinbar in einer Welt leben, in welcher die meisten Menschen, schlimmer noch, auch noch die meisten Intellektuellen sich kaum dafür interessieren, wie diese wirklich aussieht.

Auf der Suche nach Partnern entstand auch der Autorenkreis dieses Bandes. In Ungarn erreichten wir schnell unsere Grenze (was viele später nicht daran hinderte, so aufzutreten, wie wenn wir seit je schon in der theoretisch durcharbeiteten Globalisation gelebt hätten). Am schnellsten reagierte die französische Gruppe um Jacques Poulain (und später um Francois de Bernard, mit seinem besonders wertvollem Homepage www.mondialisations.org), nicht viel später entstand der Kontakt zu den russischen Kollegen um Alexandr Shumakov, in dessen *Enzyklopädie der Globalisation* unser Beitrag bereits 2003 erscheinen konnte. Auf diesen Spuren kamen wir zu der produktiven Beziehung zu Leonid Grinin und Andrey Korotayev.

Zuletzt erwähnen wir die Fürstenfeld-Initiative, die seit 2009 mit Hilfe von Melitta Becker im Rahmen des *Zentrums für Interdisziplinäre Forschung* in dieser österreichischen Stadt gegründet wurde. Ein relevanter Teil der Autor/innen dieses Bandes nahm von Anfang an an der Arbeit dieser Gruppe teil.

Die einzelnen Beiträge dieses Bandes werden von dem einen, gemeinsamen Erkenntnisinteresse zusammengehalten. Es ist die *theoretische* Sicht auf das Phänomen der Globalisierung. Von Anfang war es nicht näher definiert oder auf bestimmte Ansätze beschränkt, insbesondere war eine selbständige Theorie der Globalisation nicht beabsichtigt. Wir gingen davon aus, dass jeder legitim erwiesene theoretische Ansatz zu einer späteren Theorie der Globalisation legitim beitragen kann.

Auf diesem Wege entstanden die weiteren Kontakte mit Nico *Stehr* und den Mitgliedern der Dresdener Gruppe für die Erforschung der Probleme der Sicherheit, vor allem mit Ernst *Woit*.

Hegel definierte die Philosophie als den Flug von Minervas Eule, die „erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug beginnt“. Durch die theoretische und immer interdisziplinärer werdende Untersuchung der Globalisation wollten wir uns keineswegs mit dieser unvergleichlichen Sentenz auseinandersetzen. Wir gingen einfach von der Überzeugung aus, dass eine neue Wirklichkeit nicht ohne Beschreibung bleiben dürfte.

Budapest, im Oktober 2014

Endre *Kiss*

PART 1

“Global issues, global studies, research on globalization(s) are certainly neither obsolete nor outdated. The more ‘globalisation’ is perceived as a mere ‘fact’ that we should only accommodate, the more it proves a suspect, ambiguous and deceiving concept upon which we need to mobilize all the critical resources of Philosophy and the Humanities. “

François de Bernard

10 Thesis about the Present Meaning and Orientation of Global Research

“...the idea that globalization has been planned and implemented by someone, that it has been initiated by someone, that it can be stopped, reversed and so on, seems to be beyond serious criticism. Such ideas may be found, nevertheless, not only at the level of mass consciousness but also in serious academic books. This only demonstrates that people discussing such issues are nothing but amateurs in the sphere of global studies.”

Alexander N. Chumakov

Recognizing Globalization

“The globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown centre of power, not a world-government, but in principle it is a *qualitatively new system of the relations of all actors*... This fundamental contradiction is also paradoxical: in a global world that is being constituted by a type of universal values that embody universal operation, every particular individual might evidently become an actor. But such dialectics of transformation to independent and monadic actors might become self-destructive. It is because the globalization is only capable of regulating the rules of vindicating particular interests to a limited extent. There might start a new historical era of “wars of every man, against every man”.

Endre Kiss

The Dialectics of Modernity. A Theoretical Interpretation of Globalization

“Although political theory is not yet an ideology or a party program, it defines the framework in which these alternatives can be formulated. A political theory, that would emerge on the basis of Luhmann’s theory, would not provide too many possibilities for forming such alternatives. We can get to know from Luhmann that the functioning of the society is shaped by macro-level, impersonal processes, which are beyond human control. We cannot effectively intervene in the functioning of the society; the negative effects of our attempts can exceed the positive ones.”

Balázs Brunczel

Niklas Luhmann’s Political Theory

“The world history in new ways means the search for an alternative to a Western conceptualisation of the world as a cumulative history of the nations. The question of communication between historians of various civilisations and cultures is crucial... A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in terms of historical conceptualization of the past. A world historiography with a mapping of the variety of methodological entanglements and separations in attempts to conceptualize the past provides the *sine qua non* point of departure for any world history with ambitions to transgress a Western perspective.”

Bo Strath

Towards a Global History. A New History beyond the Cultural Turn : a Master Narrative without a Cause and without a Centre ?

”Complexity globally multiplies via space-time compression and can only be communicated methodically, but it cannot be ‘controlled’ by socio-economic engineering. In addition, global scaling and topological measuring are not logical identities, but are governed by universal natural laws of space, time and energy... Socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor is no solution (private gain = public loss), i.e. organized pockets of wealth vs. disintegrated pools of poverty; the land/natural resource and state/tax monopoly has to be reviewed scientifically, but it is radically more important to rethink the private monetary monopoly of fiat credit (x interest) and public monetary politics.“

Stephen I. Ternyik

Global Wave Compression

“The environmental pollution and the pollution conditions are a global, rather than a local problem, even if the pollution typically results from local processes.”

István Deák

Sustainability is Conditional on Globalization

Francois de Bernard

10 Thesis About the Present Meaning and Orientation of Global Research.
Against the Unending Sleep of “Obviousness”

Introduction

In 2008, as in 1999 (the Seattle WTO’s meeting moment), what we were used to call “globalization” — following Bill Clinton, Mikhail Gorbachev, Arjun Appadurai or Joseph Stiglitz — remains an extraordinarily complex, multi-faceted and confusing issue. The profit and loss account of economic globalization remains fiercely debated by “pro” and “anti”. The major social, cultural, environmental, epidemiologic and financial disasters contemporary of the ongoing globalization wave are widely considered as its “results” or side effects, but other analysts strongly deny such an interpretation. More and more, globalisation is conceived as a “well known” process, phenomenon or subject. More and more, it is used as a striking argument or universal explication: an unlimited source of ready-to-wear “answers”... But less and less, it looks problematic *per se*. On the contrary, the so-called “globalization debate” appears as nothing more than a new realm of obviousness. That is why I would like to propose a critical and trans-disciplinary discussion of the ten following theses.

1st Thesis

Global issues, global studies, research on globalization(s) are certainly neither obsolete nor outdated. The more “globalisation” is perceived as a mere “fact” that we should only accommodate, the more it proves a suspect, ambiguous and deceiving concept upon which we need to mobilize all the critical resources of Philosophy and the Humanities.

2nd Thesis

“The End of Globalization” motto should be heard as the expression by its promoters of the following wish: that with such a “globalisation death”, decree will simultaneously cease every critical investigation, every comparative approach, every philosophical enquiry, every scientific revaluation of *conflicting* globalization figures and processes.

3rd Thesis

On the reverse, we should sustain this standpoint, that the considerable field of “Research and studies on globalization(s)” — field which has been invested by critical thinking for no more than a decade — currently experiments only its initial phase.

4th Thesis

What has been achieved worldwide for about ten years by different individual contributions and collective work — be they academic or not —, is not to be neglected: i.e. an already impressive de-construction work (sub-field by sub-field), associated with a deeply rooted conceptual discussion, completed by a decisive reformulation of the globalization(s) conceptual vocabulary, and therefore of its critical dictionary.

5th Thesis

The limits that have been reached by this multilateral, trans-national, trans-disciplinary movement of critical thinking, weakly organised but lively and performing, were above all: i) an insufficient circulation of concepts and research produced within the media, political and economical spheres; correlatively: ii) a poor capacity to modify normative paradigms on globalisation used by journalists, political and economical leaders — and subsequently also: a poor capacity to generate inflexion of their vision and management of “global affairs”.

6th Thesis

The future of “Research and studies on globalization(s)” is nothing but obvious, first of all due to the point emphasized in Thesis n°2. Not only these research and studies motivate very few people — even within the academic world —, but they are also widely perceived as *useless*, even within the so-called “progressive” groups and parties. Such a statement implies, that the next step should be focussed on a quasi lobbyist strategy, aimed at circulating core ideas developed for the last decade and at convincing more and more people of the pertinence and indispensability of the global research.

7th Thesis

The huge and compulsory trans-disciplinary effort that it requires proves to be a very strong limit to the expansion of such research field. Indeed, we do not live in the times of Diderot, Condorcet, Kant, Hegel and their like, who would have been much better intellectually equipped than we are in order to “think globalization(s)”, due to their multilateral *Bildung*. What appears critical for the advancement of the global research is therefore both i) to become individually more and more “trans-disciplinary”, and ii) to convince usually reluctant universities to change their mind

about trans-disciplinary studies, so that they support such studies particularly concerning the globalizations' field of investigation.

8th Thesis

Emphasis on the multilingualism issue is also critical for a profitable development of the global research out of its normative expansion way. Indeed, it looks daily more dangerous to approach global issues through the sole bias of English, German or French. “Globe”, “Welt”, “monde”, “globalización”, “globalização”, “mondialisation”, aside their translation in other Indo-European languages, need to be confronted with their “equivalent” and their “different” in the Buddhist, Islamic, Guarani, Yoruba or Inuit traditions — a confrontation to be carried out in the long run.

9th Thesis

We should never forget that “globalization” is a cultural issue — i.e. i) it is *first of all* a cultural issue and ii) it is a *cultural* issue. *First of all*, it means that the perception, understanding, description of “globalization” is cultural before being economical, political, social... *Cultural* means that the substance, features or evolution of the “globalization” are intimately linked to cultural references and cultural debates.

10th Thesis

The future of the “Research and Studies on Globalization(s)” is not written. As of now, it may even look “open”. But it will soon be judged on the capacity of such research and studies of modifying the own judgement of non-intellectual leaders about the diverse and contradictory *globalization projects*. And of providing these leaders with objective and serious reasons of privileging the emergence of a true “Cosmopolitical citizen” (*Weltbürger*) rather than of a mere “global consumer”.

Final note

What is and remains at stake in this process would be a shared understanding of the ontological difference existing between, on the one side: i) an authentic “world” (*mundus politicus*) where plural “mondialisations” (*mundializations?*) could be experimented, respectful of human rights, human dignity and cultural diversity, and, on the other side: ii) a pure “globe” where a unique and lethal pattern of globalisation could reign – without alternative.

This paper, written following a friendly request from Professor Endre Kiss, was conceived as a short contribution to the ENG conference to be held in Fürstenfeld on 28th and 29th March 2008

Alexander N. Chumakov

Recognizing Globalization

The term “globalization” was introduced by R. Robertson in 1983. Nevertheless, it remained unnoticed by the philosophical community. Even the database of the Library of the US Congress contained no books using this term in their headlines till 1997. Only in the first half of the 1990s when the new power balance was emerging on the international arena, interest to globalization processes came to the foreground. The number of books and articles about it started to grow quickly and this growth have become uncontrollable by the beginning of the 21st century.

Globalization has become one of the most topical issues of modernity – this statement is confirmed by the fact that last 20 years world philosophical community during its World Congresses was paying extended attention to global problems. For one of the last congress that took place in August 2003 in Istanbul, it was fully dedicated to the topic of «Philosophy Facing World Problems».

Thus, by now both separate countries and humankind as a whole have accumulated significant theoretical and practical material allowing to understand problems common for the whole of humankind. This interest to the issue of globalization remains high. Nevertheless, even now not many scholars are able to provide a precise definition of this complex phenomenon. Most are unable to approach globalization not only as a collision of interests and a struggle of various international actors but as an objective process dating back to past centuries. The latter approach seems more adequate because globalization did not begin in the 20th century when globalization-engendered global problems became a real threat to humankind and attracted universal attention. It began much earlier, at the intersection of the 15th and 16th centuries, in the era of the Great Geographic Discoveries. The first circumnavigation undertaken by Magellan had finally demonstrated that the Earth was orbicular and that man’s living-space was limited. Since that moment the world land and the world ocean had become accessible, first of all, for Europeans and then for all people of the planet. The fact that globalization is a universal phenomenon was rather obscure in the beginning but from the mid-19th century it was becoming more and more visible. The actual force and multifacetedness of globalization have become apparent only by the very beginning of the 20th century. Now this phenomenon is discussed throughout the world.

The first attempts to understand the world as an organic whole may be found already in the second half of the 18th century. Of course, at that moment no one

spoke about globalization. Everything said in this regard was rather premonition than clear understanding of the world's holism and interconnectedness. In the works by Lamarck, Malthus, Kant, Marx, Engels, Danilevskii, Spengler and others one may only find intuitive insights regarding the universal interconnectedness of the animate, the inanimate and the social. They stood at the threshold of the concept of the world as an organic whole.

In this regard one may point to Thomas Malthus' idea of natural regulation of population numbers, to Immanuel Kant's idea of everlasting peace, to Lamarck's concept of biosystemic evolution and man's role in it. Apart from targeting specific problems and separate trends trespassing national borders this period is characterized by the first attempts to represent the whole world history as a self-regulating and progressively evolving process. Such a position was typical for Kant with his universal history concept. However, only Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were able to make full use of this approach in their materialistic historical constructions.

Karl Marx was the first one to undertake an attempt of deeper analysis of economic, political and cultural globalization in various countries and communities. He did it in the period when globalization was not as visible as nowadays and its results impacted separate spheres of social life only indirectly.

Talking about pioneer works in the sphere of global studies, there is no doubt that Karl Marx is, in fact, the first scholar, theorist and systemic thinker who tried to embrace historical process in its wholeness and unity. He studied it from the viewpoint of economic transformations of society. His theory of socio-economic formations is nothing else but the first historical attempt to shape a pattern of social development from its primordial prehistoric forms to the emergence of a united, holistic, planetary society embracing all peoples. Marxism presented this attempt as a theoretical plan of building a Communist society where all countries and peoples would finally make an organic whole free of antagonistic contradictions.

The issue of how realistic this plan was is beyond the scope of this presentation. It is important to emphasize, that as early as in the 19th century Marx and Engels understood not only that economic relations were becoming global but also that international relations and even the sphere of spiritual life were becoming universal. They did not use the very term "global relations" but, in fact, wrote about them. Already in 1848 in the *Communist Manifesto* they stressed the universal nature of capitalist relations: "The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country... In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness

and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.”¹ It took 100 years for this thought revealing the essence of globalization to become evident for broader public consciousness.

The issue of globalization is so controversial now that methodological principles of approaching historical process formulated by Marx and Engels acquire special significance. They urge to understand globalization as, first of all, an objective consistent pattern. Marx mentioned that not human consciousness determines human existence, but human existence determines human consciousness.² Of course, collusion of various interests and struggle of various social forces strongly impacts the nature of globalization and its specific forms. It is important to stress that no efforts and wishes of private citizens (or states, or other social actors) will be able to reverse globalization or to redirect it in accordance with their demands, because globalization is a necessary result of the historical process and an essential feature of social development from the moment of the emergence of capitalist relations.

One may conclude, that globalization is underlined and determined not by the subjective factor, but by the objective trends of world development. They are, of course, influenced by the subjective factor but this influence is not arbitrary and limitless – it occurs within limits determined by given historical and concrete socio-political circumstances. In the other works, globalization is, essentially, no less an objective process than sunrise. When the Sun rises, it makes the one staying in the shadow feel comfortable; the one who happens to be unshaded feels uncomfortable and even bad. Still, no one dares to be “for” or “against” such a development because the celestial body is not responsible for who and why has happened to be in worse or better conditions. These are problems of another type: social problems related to the issue of equality, social justice, etc. Therefore, one should confront not natural developments, but unjust social relations. At the same time, one should have in mind that, in spite of the objective and the subjective to be interconnected into the organic whole, the subjective factor is not able to dominate the natural development. It, nevertheless, play an important, sometimes even decisive role in human destiny.

The role of the subjective factor in the above-mentioned developments is, thus, rather substantial. However, it is performed in different ways and is, at the end, essentially determined by the objective course of natural events, which human beings are not able to reverse arbitrarily. For the same reason, they are not able to reverse globalization.

¹ K.Marx, F.Engels. Sochinenia. Moscow, 1956. Vol. 4. P. 427-428.

² K.Marx, F.Engels. Izbrannie proizvedenia v 3 tomakh. Vol. 1. P. 537-536.

In this regard, the idea that globalization has been planned and implemented by someone, that it has been initiated by someone, that it can be stopped, reversed and so on, seems to be beyond serious criticism. Such ideas may be found, nevertheless, not only at the level of mass consciousness but also in serious academic books. This only demonstrates that people discussing such issues are nothing but amateurs in the sphere of global studies.

What are aims of sunrise, of a lightning, of environmental pollution? There are no aims here, only natural course of events. Aims are formulated by human beings and most of them are tightly connected with the objective reality that becomes transformed, changed as a result of human rational activity. That is why it is so important to define what is a cause and what is a result, what results from human conscious activity and what happens regardless of human will and wishes.

There can be various opinions about Karl Marx himself and about his theory, but in the context of this presentation one may not help recognizing his undeniable merit of being the first one to demonstrate the objectivity of historic development, to show how capitalism becomes a universal (global) phenomenon. He managed to do it in the period when capitalism to a great extent meant small patriarchal businesses. He was the first one to envision the future of humankind as a united, indiscrete whole. Thus, he provided methodological foundations for systematic globalization studies based on understanding the patterns of human development in the past.

It is also worth mentioning that, in accordance to their principle of uniting theory and practice, Marx and Engels wrote in 1848 the *Communist Manifesto* clearly demonstrating the international nature of the communist movement. They ended this document with their famous call: “Workers of the world, unite!” In its form and contents the *Manifesto* was the first attempt to unite a small part of the humankind – those involved into manufacturing labor – but based on a very firm ground. Before no one understood that such unity was now achievable. In spite of this call being essentially destructive because of its intention to unite only the members of a single social class to fight irreconcilably the other social class, it already embraced general trends and contradictions of global processes in the sphere of both economy and politics.

Marxism always called for unity of theory and practice. This unity was realized in the First International initiated by Marx and Engels in 1864. This organization resulted from an imperious need for consolidation of various political and economic actors at the global level. The International was one of the first forerunners of numerous international organizations that would multiply later, especially from the beginning of the 20th century.

Now these organizations are an integral part of the international community and their number continues to grow. Being a product of globalization, they are, at the same time (as well as states), active participants of global relations studied with the framework of a new branch of scientific knowledge – global studies.

Global studies as a specific field of knowledge have emerged within the last 30 years and by the moment they have become a relatively clear-cut and well-defined sphere of knowledge. In the narrowest sense, global studies are an interdisciplinary sphere of scientific research aimed at understanding the meaning of globalization, finding its causes and developmental trends, analyzing globalization-engendered global problems and finding ways to sustain the positive and to overcome the negative circumstances of globalization from the viewpoint of men and biosphere. In a broader sense the term “global studies” refers to the whole complex of scientific, philosophical, cultural and applied research dealing with various aspects of globalization and global studies. It also refers to the results of such a research and to the practical activity aimed at carrying these results into practice in economic, social and political spheres, both at a state level and internationally.

To avoid misleading analogies and methodological confusion, it should be stressed that global studies are not a specific science or scientific discipline like numerous new sciences emerging as a result of differentiation of scientific knowledge or at the intersection of nearby disciplines. It is not a systemic knowledge in the sense, for example, physics, chemistry or mathematics are. Global studies have been born thanks to integrative processes typical for modern science. It is a sphere of research and knowledge where various scientific disciplines and philosophy tightly interconnection with one another analyze various aspects of globalization and problems it engenders (each from the viewpoint of its subject matter and methodology). Global studies should also provide solutions for global problems studied both separately from one another and as a holistic system.

Finally, we should stress that this new interdisciplinary sphere of scientific knowledge is a domain for specialists from all disciplines. This principally differentiates global studies from specific disciplines where “specialists” speak a language often understandable only for a limited group of the like professionals. Under the umbrella of global studies, specialists in various theoretical and practical spheres study world processes and problems engendered by them from the position of such or such natural or human science. This predetermines diversity of opinions about what globalization is. Scholars of natural sciences are often carried away by details and separated facets of this complex process, while scholars of humanities mostly concentrate on subjective factors and struggle of various interests.

Cultural and civilizatorian specifics of various countries also influence our understanding of contemporary world developments. One may distinguish between Western, Eastern, Eurasian, Islamic and other approaches to globalization.

Differences between them may be found in their primary theoretical principles, values, established traditions, etc.

For example, a specific feature of the Western approach is understanding globalization as a positive development, after all. It is explainable because the most developed countries, in comparison with less developed countries, benefit more from the current situation. They dominate practically all spheres of social life. Countries of the East, especially the most prosperous of them, also benefit from globalization and, as a result, do not oppose it. Nevertheless, they are sensitive to events and phenomena undermining their traditional lifestyles.

The Eurasian approach is slightly different. Market relations here are not firm enough and that is why globalization provides many opportunities for illegal business activities, capital outflow, international crime. Attitudes to globalization vary from unequivocal acceptance to full denial. As for the Islamic world, it experiences serious pressure from the mass culture, values and way of life of the Western civilization and has no chance oppose it in the period of information revolution. It considers globalization, first of all, as a source of threats to its values, beliefs and even independence.

This only strengthens interest to what globalization is. Different authors define it in different ways: some as a process, some as a situation, some as a phenomenon; some equalize globalization with modernization, some consider it as a myth. There are numerous discussions between opponents and supporters of globalization.

With regard to the above-said, I define globalization as a multi-aspect natural historical process leading to the emergence of planetary holistic structures and connections. Globalization is immanent to the world community and covers all basic spheres of human life. It becomes the more visible, the more humankind moves along the way of scientific and technological progress and socio-economic development. Globalization is a process having no time limits. It connects the past, the present and the future. Today we are passing through a new stage of globalization. It does not just become visible, but requires corrections made via rational human intervention, i.e. people should take responsibility for the nature and consequences of globalization that remains an objectively evolving process.

Such an intervention, however, requires, at minimum, resolving some principal issues related to the essence of globalization and the nature of its evolution. One should mention that modern scholars are far from common opinion with regard to these issues. For example, some prominent scholars (I.Wallerstein, A.I.Utkin, V.I.Pantin and others) think that the globalization has stages or waves, that it becomes sometimes more and sometimes less intense. This position seems too narrow. The globalization may look like this in case we observe this complex and multi-aspect process from one side only: for example, from the viewpoint of

economic globalization which is, indeed, uneven. Sometimes it becomes more intense (in the periods of economic booms) and sometimes – less intense (during large-scale crises of the majority of national economies). Thus, viewing the globalization exclusively as an economic process, we necessarily find waves, periods and stages.

In reality, however, things are not so simple. The globalization does not only occur during economic booms but also during recessions, when it may seem that it slows down. It does not. During recessions, an additional impulse is given to the other elements of this complex process, such as political, socio-cultural, ecological, informational and the other aspects of the globalization. All of them, taken from different perspectives, make the globalization multi-aspect. Some of them periodically increase and step to the foreground in order then to slow down. Thus, it is not the objective process of the globalization that has waves, but some of its aspects. The globalization as a whole only increases and constantly strengthens.

Humankind was ruminating on the issue of the globalization for a long time. We can point out at several stages of such reflections. Basing on problems being in the focus of attention in a given historical period is on the sphere of life fully dominated by globalization in that period, one may distinguish between five stages in understanding the globalization. Three of them are already over; the fourth stage is taking place at the moment. As for the fifth stage, it has not yet come but is expected to begin in the foreseeable future (to the best of our knowledge).

The first stage was the longest one; each subsequent stage happened to be shorter than the previous one. This fact correlates with the law of acceleration of the socio-economic development that has become most visible during the last two centuries. Concentrating on the most significant distinguishing features of the above-mentioned stages, one may say the following: The first stage covers the period from the second half of the 18th century to the 1920s. It was, first of all, concentrated on understanding social problems of the world that had finally become an organic whole geographically and then (generally speaking) economically and even politically. We have already pointed out that K. Marx and Fr. Engels, as well as Th. Malthus, N.Ia. Danilevskii, O. Spengler and others played the most important part in understanding the globalization at this stage of historical development.

The second stage in understanding global trends took place in 1920s – 1960s. It was characterized by the theoretical focus on the issues of interrelations between society and nature. By that moment the world had been economically and politically “closed” and became to shrink ecologically. Here, one should mention the concepts of biosphere and noosphere worked out by E.Leroit, T. de Chardin and V. Vernandskii, the authors of the famous Manifesto (B. Russell and A. Einstein) and the scholar of civilizational problems, A. Toynbee.

The third stage lasted from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1980s and may be regarded as a period of “discovering” and studying global problems of modernity. At this stage, the world was “closed” ecologically and a trend towards its informational “finalization” emerged. What was the most important were well-publicized reports of the Club of Rome founded by A.Peccei and numerous studies conducted under the aegis of the UN (for example, the report prepared under the leadership of G.H.Brundtland or the report of the Brandt Commission).

The fourth stage began at the end of the 1990s and continues up to now. It is focused on understanding the globalization as a process. By now, the world has already been “closed” informationally. It seems logical to suggest that it will also be “close” in the civilizational sense.

The fifth (hypothetical) stage is still invisible in terms of external symptoms. But it seems justified to theorize that it will also come with time. The term for it already exists: it is “post-globalization”. One may theorize that in this case it would will to become “closed” ideologically, then socio-culturally, morally and, finally, grow into an organic whole as a truly global humankind.

The world will become global in the full sense after it becomes “closed” in terms of all basic spheres of life. Then globalization as a process will “exhaust” itself as well as by the beginning of the 1960s it has exhausted itself geographically. The most important of the above-mentioned spheres of life are: geography, economy, politics, ecology, information, civilization (law), ideology, culture, spirituality (morality and ethics), mentality (globalization of consciousness). In some of these spheres (apart from geography where the globalization is already over) the process of globalization has mostly finalized. In the other spheres this process has a long distance ahead before its finalization.

Of course, there are many other spheres in which the world should finally be “rolled up”, i.e. become united, holistic. It is important to stress that “closing” of the world in such or such sphere of life and real unity of humankind in the same sphere are not the same. “Finalization” refers to spreading over the globe, to embracing the world as a whole regardless of whether it leads to reconciliation of different outlooks, positions and interests of various peoples or to their greater confrontation and collision. Real unity implies true reconciliation or, at least, tolerant co-existence of various outlooks and positions typical for various peoples conditioned by balance of interests and consequent social stability and sustainability. For example, in 1948, after the world had been politically “closed”, K. Jaspers mentioned that political unification of the planet is a question of time. He was right because he took historical reality into consideration.

It also explains why, even after “finalization” of the world, the globalization continues in all spheres of the life, except geography. It provides dynamic transition from formal unification achieved to real unity of humankind. The latter, we should mention, so far may not be found in its final shape in any sphere of material or spiritual existence of the global community. Moreover, while “finalization” of the world is practically beyond doubt (or is a question of time), the possibility of genuine human unity (even in some separated spheres of life) remains disputable. At the moment it would be overoptimistic to suggest that such unity will be necessary achieved in the future.

We would like to stress that the globalization in such or such sphere of the life is not over after “finalization” of the world in the same sphere. It continues to achieve real unification of humankind in a given sphere. One may suggest that, following the achievement of new levels of integration and unity, the intensity of the globalization will exhaust. The more the above-mentioned unity becomes reality, the closer to zero that intensity is.

At the same time, even being an integrated system, the humankind will remain internally contradictory. It will always experience inherent problems and contradictions, conflicts and threats of both external and internal nature.

Nevertheless, humankind as a whole, as well as separate communities or separate individuals, always wants to get rid of its problems (or, at least, to make them less noticeable). If we distract from details and look at the past to find what people always lusted for in the recent 20th century or even earlier, we will find a very simple thing – they always and first of all lusted for Paradise on Earth. Or, otherwise, they lusted for ideal state of society.

Many centuries ago, when people directly felt their dependence on nature, they providently placed their “Golden Age” in the past. Thus they were able to preserve their ideals and not to set a task of bringing them into real life. However, growing achievements of technological civilization have enhanced human self-esteem, our clandestine desire to build Paradise on Earth. From approximately the Renaissance, we see not sporadically emerging social utopias (like in the Antiquity) but a series of ideal constructions of an earthly Paradise presented by Th. More, Th. Campanella, Th. Münzer, etc. Utopias of the period of bourgeois revolutions may be found in the works by J. Meslier, G. Mably, Morelli, A. Saint-Simon, F. Fourier, R. Owen, etc. One may well include into this list the Communist ideas by K. Marx and F. Engels if we do not understand these ideas as a theoretical ideal of social relations but as goals and tasks achievable through revolutions and social cataclysms.

A new outburst of utopian projects may be found in the beginning of the era of “conquering” space. People enthusiastically ruminated on “beautiful and fantastic

worlds” supposed to exist on the other planets, on limitless opportunities for colonization of outer space, etc. Such ideas originate from “Russian Cosmism” represented by N. F. Fedorov, K. E. Tsiolkovskii and others. For example, Fedorov thought that the problem of overpopulation on Earth would be resolved through settling people on the other planets. He believed that outer space might become a source of minerals and energy for the growing population and that Earth would be reshaped into a space ship “Earthmobile”. Tsiolkovskii also thought that outer space is a “bottomless storehouse” of various resources for humankind and that in the future the next generations would be settled there. He believed that having exhausted Earth resources people would “conquer” all perisolar space to build there “islands of ether” or “space colonies”.

So, in spite of many disappointments in the possibility of building Paradise on Earth by human efforts, people always had an illusion of some heavenly, supernatural Paradise or of some pleasant conditions for human life in outer space. Now it is time to acknowledge that humankind has too little historical time left for enjoying fruitless dreams while it needs conscious and responsible actions. We should openly declare that people have always been misled and, moreover, deceived dreaming about better life somewhere outside our planet...

There has never been and never will be in the whole Universe any other Paradise apart from the one we already have on Earth. Our earthly world is that very Paradise – a Paradise for each real, living and not imagined human being. It ideally satisfies all vital human needs (material and spiritual), all human wishes and hopes, caprices and whims, dreams and the most brave fantasies. It is the only world where human beings may feel themselves comfortable and wealthy.

If this world turns out into a hell for people, it is not a problem of nature, but a problem of people. They, intending to build an ideal society, mistreat those who disagree, mistreat natural environment. As a result, the output is something contrary to what they lusted for. The largest philosopher of the 20th century, K. Jaspers mentioned in this regard, that we could look for the heavenly city in the past or in the future, we could call “back to nature” or “forward to the world of love and beauty” but all these things would appeal to our emotions, not to our reason. Even the noblest desire to create Paradise on Earth might turn it into a hell that only people are able to make for their fellow creatures.³

Human beings do not need building Paradise on Earth. It already exists because here, on our planet, even without human creative and transforming activities, we have everything what we need for happy and joyful life: abundance of water and fantastic choice of foods; rich energy and mineral resources and, finally, the

³ K. Popper. Otkritoe obshchestvo i ego vragi. T. 1. – M., 1992, P. 211.

broadest variety of climatic and natural conditions. The latter, if needed, may be maintained at the ideal level for any time needed with the help of modern scientific and technological achievements. What human beings should have done (and what they will have to do, if it is possible in principle) is to sort out their own feelings and their relations with the other people and with the environment to make full use of what earthly nature has given to us so bountifully.

Nowhere in the world, we would find conditions equal to what we have on the Earth, not to mention any better, truly paradisiac conditions, that would allow human beings to fully realize themselves as biological (feeling) and social (thinking) creatures. Human beings are products and children of this nature; they fully correlate with its natural conditions and parameters. And *visé versa*: human beings ideally “fit” the environment. People, “cut out” or “sculptured” of natural material, not only descend from nature but also return to it...

One of the largest modern specialists in global studies E. László mentioned, that the emerging paradigm of social sciences correlates with the newest discoveries in physics and biology. This new paradigm testifies that there are constant connections and communication between cosmic and biospheric objects and that human consciousness is an evolving part of this network of interconnections covering our planet. László suggested that we are inseparable from one another and from the environment. All of us participate in natural activities: interacting with one another we influence the biosphere that, in its turn, is uprooted in the Universe.⁴ Moreover, even here, on the Earth, each person feels most comfortable where he or she was born and grew up, where he or she passed through childhood, maturity, personal growth. For example, for a Bedouin hot climate and desert are much more attractive than frost and snowy winter. At the same time, Northern people prefer chill to warm climate and snow to hot sand.

Any attempt to resettle human beings into “better” environment would mean, in fact, inevitable worsening of the environment that used to be familiar and, thus, comfortable. At best any change of environment should be followed by an adaptation period. As a rule such an adaptation is unwelcome and has some sequels for any living organism; it also has limits beyond which one faces, at minimum, discomfort or degradation, or even death.

Of course, like any other living organism, both separate human beings and whole societies always had, have and will always have problems. Elimination of these problems is only possible at the expense of the life of a living organism. Therefore, the harmonization of human relations with the environment and minimalization of problems and difficulties is the major task for separate individuals and for society

⁴ E. László. Makrosdvig. M., 2004, P. 163-164.

as a whole. It still needs to be studied whether this task is achievable and what is “the golden middle” of human satisfaction.

Today we should not ignore that the human domination on the Earth and the human increasing activity undermine natural foundations of our own existence and of the life on the planet as a whole. This problem is not new. As early as in the 19th century, Fr. Engels has said what is now stated in any textbook on ecology. He wrote, that people who unrooted forests in Mesopotamia, Greece or Asia Minor in order to get arable land never dreamed that they thus laid foundation for current desertification of these areas, because centers of collecting and preserving water had disappeared with the forests. They never understood that by doing this they would for the most of the year leave their mountain springs without water and that as a result these springs in the rain period would pour to valleys fervent streams of water.⁵

Since this had been written a century and a half ago these words were not once repeated and seemingly grasped. Our vision of interaction between nature and society has changed and human ability to transform the nature has substantially increased. However, our attitude to the nature, to those foundations of the life, which may not be restored anywhere apart from the Earth in case of their destruction, has not changed. Or, within this period of prolonged dynamic evolution, the humankind has not made necessary conclusions, has not learnt its lessons. A well-known Russian scholar, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada writes ironically, that “in the course of the human history, up to the latest years, people mostly treated their mother – the earthly nature – as little kids treat an evil step-mother. They were afraid of her, they asked her for mercy but they tried to win a small victory over her wherever it was possible. It is right that nature has not always pampered people with pleasant surprises. Often she mercilessly eliminated whole villages and cities, whole tribes and peoples.”⁶

Concluding this presentation, we should mention that human problems are changing and dynamic. The human evolution, the growing complexity of the social organization and exploration of territories changed the nature of these problems. The population grew, new territories were discovered and involved into the economic activity, the social power grew as well as its technological capabilities. Consequently, the nature of problems changed as well. At the same time, current difficulties and concerns are still here. Moving towards the global condition humankind will by definition have new problems, now of world significance. In the prehistoric times, when people lived separately, they had local problems. Regional problems emerged after social networks and relations had embraced whole regions.

⁵ K. Marx, F.Engels. Sochinenia. T. 20. P. 496.

⁶ I.V.Bestuzhev-Lada. Mir nashego zavtra. M.: Misl, 1986, P. 171.

Now, the global humankind has global problems and to set a task of their elimination as some scholars and politicians still do, does not mean to understand what goes on.

“To overcome global problems”, “to eliminate global problems”, “to get rid of global problems” – these calls are not realistic. These wrong formulas are responsible for the subsequent misunderstanding of the situation and for the insufficient program of practical actions. Finally, this delusion may happen to be not so harmless. It does not just lead to no positive achievements but entails losing precious time, disappointment and loss of belief in ourselves because in this case we set a task having no decision in principle. It is no surprise that many authors who stick to this position often write about a “dead-end” for modern humankind, about a “trap” of global contradictions we should get out of. But it is not the humankind but our consciousness, which has found itself in a dead-end. Our consciousness, nevertheless, is able not only to explain, but to reshape the world making it more or less acceptable for the normal human life. Whatever this world may become, it will never be conflictless, free of contradictions and problems, including universal ones.

These conclusions are based on our analysis and fully correspond with the most important methodological principles formulated by Marxism: a) human beings should not only explain the world but change it as well; b) all social processes, as well as human interactions with the environment, are contradictory by nature; human beings have to acknowledge these contradictions and, at minimum, not to exacerbate them by their thoughtless actions; c) human strength means knowing objective laws and acting in accordance with these laws.

It is important to understand that neither the globalization can be eliminated, nor global problems engendered by the globalization can be resolved once and for all. Having once emerged, they will always accompany the world community and we will have to solve them constantly. We should learn living with them because an insufficient attention to global problems entails great troubles, if not a catastrophe. This is a new reality, a new condition of the transformed humankind (new). Even those who resist need to acknowledge that the global humankind will necessarily deal with various problems including global ones. The point is to make these problems not threatening and not undermining the foundations of the life on the Earth. This is a performable task, but not for separated communities or states but for the humankind as a whole.

Concluding our analysis of the topic in question, we would like to say that the main question for the globalization is not to be or not to be, but what it should be like; who plays and who will play key roles in the globalization.

Endre Kiss

The Dialectics of the Modernity

A Theoretical Interpretation of the Globalization

According to a widely accepted great interpretation, the globalization is a field of the most extensive problems, each of which concerns everyone, and the humanity in general as well, in new, qualitative, and in their tendencies existential ways. In this sense, the legitimate fields of the globalization are e.g. the issues of ecology, raw materials, migration, the global health problems of the world, the global positive or negative tendencies of population, energy, arms trading, the drug crisis, or dilemmas of integration and world economy. There is another huge interpretation as well – and that is what we follow in our present attempt –, which does not bind the problems and phenomena of the globalization to concrete and singularly appearing “global” issues, but examines structural and functional connections of the whole new global situation.

The grades of the process of globalization have always manifested throughout the history of the 20th Century as radical and irrevocable transformations in history and society. The grades of the globalization *before* the 20th century should be taken by their proper value, as for example the telegraph already fulfilled the opportunity of global action and communication, and had immeasurable effects on international politics and finance even before the 20th century. The correctly interpreted history of the globalization is of an extraordinary importance for every scientific and other kind of research, because it might distract the scientific and everyday consciousness from the intellectual forced course according to which every generation, every decade, every world-political turn, or significant step in civilization is the proper victory of the globalization (!) over a “not-yet-global” preceding state.

The above thoughts nevertheless do not contradict our definite starting thesis that says the world-historical turn of 1989 is a unique and *outstanding stage* in the evolving of globalization indeed. The primary cause of this is the fact that up to 1989, the mere existence of the two world regimes restricted the process of globalization in the centre, between concrete, down-to-earth limits.

When analysing the great mutation of the globalization in 1989, we must remember that the *possible* and *future* globalization and Existing Socialism have influenced one another *mutually* right from the beginning. For it was not only that the dynamic forces of the globalization shattered the Iron Curtain more and more violently, but

there was an opposite tendency as well, as members of the elite of the Existing Socialism became more and more anxious about the more and more triumphant achievements of the globalization and they felt that they would irrevocably fall behind if they had not join in these processes.

The image of the globalization mainly appears both for the everyday consciousness and the intelligentsia as *a new system of power and domination*. This fundamental vision is right and appropriate in several aspects, and it is also not a coincidence that the ones who took the first signs of the globalization with the less enthusiasm were the ones who possess some kind of concrete and real power (which of course was not considered 'global'). Yet *the real model of the globalization* is fundamentally different than these visions. The globalization is not a new, rigid and utopian structure of (global) power most of all, but its main point is the fact that the economical, political, cultural and social processes can only take place within the framework of the global reality. The primary consequence of this is not an abstract and unintelligible new system of power and dependence, but *a new world with a new kind of functioning*, a world that is not simply "multi-polar", but straight infinitely polarized (Kiss, 1997.b).

The real globalization creates new social states of affairs in every aspect. *The access to the ocean of globalization is at stake in the fight between subject and subject, subject and group, group and group, or smaller and larger groups* (Schmied-Kowarzik, W. (ed.) 2002). The structuring power of the globalization penetrates *all strata* of the social life.

One of the most important and also most difficult fields of the social-philosophical research of the globalization is the continual way in which its *functional and non-functional elements* and moments are interconnected, like the cogs of a machinery. The more the global processes fulfil their global character, the more obviously they feature "clearly" functional characteristics in their operations (Luhmann, N. 1973). For example, the more obviously "global" the structure of the world economy gets, the more clearly the functional theoretical definitions do prevail. From a theoretical aspect, functional and non-functional elements are *heterogenic*, but from a practical aspect, they fit into one another in an organic and *homogeneous* manner.

The globalization is therefore not a new, yet unknown centre of power, not a world-government, but in principle it is a *qualitatively new system of the relations of all actors*. One of its specific traits is the possibility of access to the global processes and networks in a rather "democratic" way. It would absolutely make sense to describe the fundamental phenomenon of globalization with the criteria of *access* and *accessibility*. But this is also the field where we can find the weakest points of the globalization. The globalization demolishes a whole row of particular differences and limits by ensuring *in principle* the total accessibility. In this sense, it is therefore "democratic": the participation in global processes could even outline

a new concept of “equality”. The globalization, that builds from elements of discrimination in its dynamic progress, would be a contradiction not only in a theoretical, but in a practical sense as well. The world-historical balance of globalization shall prevail in this connection. *This balance will depend on the final proportions between the democracy moreover, the equality of accessibility, and the discriminative moments, i.e. the self-destructive real social processes in the field of the forces of these two tendencies.*

It is however namely only *one side* of the coin that the globalization establishes new relations in a qualitative and manifold sense, while the qualitatively new character of the relations is made up right by the fact that the mediums and strata, that used to separate the individual from global affairs, drop out, and the individual can access to the multi-faceted communication of the global networks directly, just like any other actor. But the *other side* of this coin is the question whether *really* new resources will evolve there on the side of the globalization, which shall be able to fulfil the increasing demands that the accessibility generates. The triumphant breakthrough of the globalization increases the number of resources by itself, but to a much smaller extent than the possible “amount of resources” required for the world of more and more perfect accessibility. The fail of access requirements namely critically deforms the well-built system of global networks. This negative vision resembles the kind of mass-communication that offers a wide variety of TV-channels, while it fails at increasing the “resources” of entertainment and culture in a qualitative sense parallel with the growing accessibility, therefore all it can offer for the increasing demand is low-standard programs.

Understanding the real globalization and its functional (sub-) systems is an exceptional challenge for the human *everyday consciousness* (s. Lefebvre, H, 1972). The representation of the global reality is an immensely huge “extensive” task for the social actors, but secondly, it is also a new, “*qualitative*” task of representing the new functional and abstract qualities of the globalization in the *per definitionem* non-functional and non-abstract dimensions of the social and political communication. The globalization *as a whole*, as a new world order, or a system of new structural relations cannot appear in the global flow of information in the same way than particular global problems (e.g. the drug issue) do it.

The problem of decoding the new codes also divides the society by the capacity of “decoding”. For “decoding” can be interpreted as evolving a capacity to “access” the processes of globalization to some extent, i.e. a capacity to use the opportunities that the information systems offer. At this point, the situation of information systems is exactly like that of the modern art at the time when the modern functional systems appeared. Bertolt *Brecht* expressed this phenomenon by the example that a photo of the building of AEG says nothing about the endless various functional processes that take place inside the building.

Shaping the spatial and temporal structure of the globalization

The globalization is the most extended framework of the interpretation of the present. It is a high-level theoretical generalization, and at the same time also an empirical reality, which anyone can experience. Re-thinking the problem of the historical space and time might be an objective measure of progression (Kaempfer, W. 2005.).

This new, threefold aspect also possesses a *coercive* discursive - logical force. For in the evolutionary systems theory, the total absence of *coercive power* and coherence in each particular connection and statement was really relevant. *“Reality”, “future”, and “progress” do not lie in the intellectually risky cognition of new and unknown facts, but simply in tautologically forcing the evolutionary systems theory upon certain facts or phenomena.*

Many trains of the phenomenon of globalization, but most of its whole *actor* structure is the reason why this extremely coercive and coherent theory and logic have to face the *significant contingency* of future processes, *the strongly limited opportunities of real foresight*, and the *extraordinary measures of some relevant degrees of real existing actorial freedom.*

The present is: a mixture of the space-time-relations of (global) structures, and the space-time-relations of actors. Therefore, the society of globalization in its theoretical and abstract form does not fit into the heuristic space of the traditional theories of democracy or bureaucracy, or even traditional social issues any more, right for this shift in the structure of space-time. Because for example, neither the principle, nor the representations of the liberal and democratic political structure do suffer any harm by the fact that both the urging power of the creation of simultaneities and the possibility of unlimited spatial relocation lead to a devaluation of all spatial factors, or a higher value of all factors that possesses the power of creating total simultaneity in the time or perpetual spatial movement that also converges to simultaneity. Globalization is the final, dynamic form of the (social) temporalization of the (social) space.

Neither the traditional, nor the new problem of the historical-social space-time can be solved by the analogy of sciences. And beside the traditional concepts of space and time, new concepts appear as well, which are becoming more and more decisive from the aspects of the globalization.

We have no intention of making an ontological judgement on the true character of the reality. We would prefer to describe this new kind of reality as one of an “uncertain” character (according to Heisenberg), but we accept the attributes like “chaotic”, “non-linear”, or even “soft” as well. Our concrete accomplishments will not be directly determined by these theoretical considerations, as the functional

systems of the globalization, their dynamic structures and space-time-relations, and most of all, the measure of the latitude of the “actors” gives a sufficient positive explanation in the definitions of this character of “uncertainty”.

The globalization raises a row of alternatives, all of which need to be interpreted, on the field of *ideology as well as the state, society, and culture*. From the aspect of the theory of science, the theory of globalization is a theory of society, and no matter how many unprecedented new definitions are on the phenomenon of globalization, it is neither necessary, nor possible to create a new model of theory building for any of them.

As we have seen, the real globalization is neither a new and unknown centre of power, nor a world government, but a qualitatively new system of the relations of every actor. *The relationship of the East and the West changes in the global world-society; the roles of debtors and creditors, winners and losers get interwoven in this new world order that is based upon new interdependencies*. In respect to social capital, we have to mention the tendency of a “downward spiral”, which was induced by the globalization, and which means that the types of social capital that the society invests into individuals reduce both in quality and quantity. This is mainly the consequence of the crisis of the public sphere, according to which the right interpreted knowledge society could be a remedy for this problem.

The fall of the Existing Socialism put the neo-liberal complex of politics and economy in a hegemonic position, and this led to the theoretically *illegitimate identification of neo-liberalism and liberalism*.

The structural and functional characteristics of the global world are being definitively shaped by this *neo-liberal complex*. In this context, Anthony Giddens’ and Tony Blair’s Third Way appears as the *unequal* relation between neo-liberalism and social democracy.

The globalization gets fulfilled in the universe of *post-modern values* (Kiss, E 2002. b.). We do not attempt to define the main characteristics of the post-modernism by its contrast to the modernism. We break up with the widespread contrast of modernism and post-modernism, because we firmly believe that the essence of the post-modernism can be revealed alone in its relations to structuralism and neo-Marxism. These two streams were emblematic of the philosophy of the sixties. Sometimes they amplified one another, and sometimes they got polemic with each other. By the mid-seventies, the neo-Marxism ceased to exist as abruptly as a natural disaster, and around that time, the structuralism also recognized its failure.

As the post-modernism was born on the ruins of the neo-Marxism and the structuralism, it took over the achievements, but at the same time it also dismissed

their positive aspirations for the intellectual reconstruction. Therefore, the post-modernism is the use of the discourse of cognition without any intention of intellectual reconstruction.

But the post-modernism is not the only hegemonic stream (now in a narrower, *also* philosophical sense) nowadays (Meier, H. (ed.) 1990. and Kiss, E. (ed.) 2003.). By the fall of the neo-Marxism, *the neo-liberal-neo-positivistic philosophical methodology got into a strategically decisive position in politics as well as in economy and philosophical methodology*. Therefore, the today's philosophy is under the twofold hegemony of the post-modernism and the neo-liberalism-neo-positivism. The most important *symmetry*-relation between these two streams is the attempt to re-regulate the whole process of thinking by the recognition and object constitution. Their heuristic strategies are opposite to one another: the neo-liberalism-neo-positivism sets a reductive verification as its chief requirement, while the post-modernism makes the verification legitimate. However, these two streams have one more thing in common: both the limitation of the scope of the rules of the philosophical verification and its total elimination did not get realized through the power-free inter-subjective discourses, but in the medium of the interpersonal power.

There is a simple but so far neglected, however quite decisive fact, namely that *the launch of the processes of globalization and the post-communist regime change took place practically at the same time*. In our opinion this is not a coincidence, but there is a manifold relation behind this simultaneity.

The socio-theoretical concept of *globalization* does not mean a new, rigid structure of the (world) power, but *a new framework and context of social action*, in which economy, politics, culture, and all other actors of society are shaping their relations in a new and unprecedented global context.

The decisive processes of the globalization are part of the development of the modern rationalism. Rationalization, Max Weber's "disenchantment of the world" (Entzauberung der Welt) or even the "Dialectics of Enlightenment" of Adorno and Horkheimer must appear in a new context. All critiques of the modern rationality were stated because of the emancipation that had not taken place, although its necessity was increasing parallel with the progress of rationalization. *The omission of emancipation might put the process of rationalization and globalization into a critical danger*.

The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from the aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive because *in several important aspects, the globalization, which in fact sprung out from the soil of the modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important achievements of the modernity as well*.

The downward spiral of the social capital is also a consequence of this concrete structure of the globalization. And right because this phenomenon is a consequence of the globalization, it is global as well. We are not trying to ignore the numerous impressive civilizing accomplishments, “success stories” of the globalization. But right the actually manifested structural characteristics of the globalization are the cause of the fact that the *upward* spiral of great civilizing accomplishments and the *downward* spiral of social capital for social reproduction do not cross each other. The knowledge component, that operates in the modern production, is part of a broader concept of knowledge capital, while the social capital, which is being invested in successive generations does not reproduce itself on the level of the human civilization. This also means that *the future shall become the field of the new battle of the (global) civilization and the (social) barbarism*, even if none of the definitions of these terms will remind of the concepts of civilization or barbarism that have occurred in the history so far.

While the globalization – for functional and structural reasons – pushes the less versatile and overloaded state backwards and makes the spiral of the social capital move downwards, it *provides the new historical actors with a real space for the action* down to the level of the individual. *Under the circumstances of the globalization, the latitude and freedom of the action of actors can be extreme.*

It is not easy to reconstruct adequately the actor side into the theory of the globalization. First, because it is seemingly extremely trivial; it is often difficult even to make it accepted that the free and seemingly contingent action of singular actors could be a legitimate part of scientific research. Second, because the importance of the actor side is *ab ovo* a less theoretical element. Third, because the actor side in its arbitrariness does not always reveal the dynamic structures and functions behind it, therefore stressing it might even seem a misinterpretation. The actor side underlines the specific “uncertainty” (in Heisenberg’s sense) of the theories of the globalization (and the future), while the functional systems of the globalization, their dynamic structures and space-time relations, and most of all, the extent of the latitude of the actors might provide sufficient objective explanation for a positive and objectively founded description of this “uncertainty” character.

While the globalization provides an enormous latitude for the action of the actors, there are hardly any global actors for the representation of social formations. The problem of missing actors is completed with the problem of missing groups of representation and competence. *The task of global competence does not possess any actors, and the global actor does not possess competence.* Neither traditional forecast, nor traditional consensus-building, nor traditional bureaucracy (administration), nor any traditional “institutions” are appropriate or able to

develop an optimal global competence legitimately. *This increases the possibility that global decisions might be the most irrational.*

Another important element of the new order of the international politics (the “new world order”) is the new interpretation of “identity” and “difference”. By 1989, the logic of neo-liberal identity and difference *exchanged* the basic semantics of identity and difference of socialism, as well as those of the Christianity. This means *that neither the solidarity of the socialism, nor the brotherly love of the Christianity can diminish the brutal power of the difference.* The neo-liberal identity consists in nothing else but the unconditioned respect and guarantee of the freedom and the rights of the individual (which rights might become merely formal at a certain extent of social differences). In such cases, *the difference is not a mere difference, value, or ideology, but it might even become an essential feature of the social existence.*

The exceptionally great importance of the difference-moment is made up by the fact that in our age, a divided world has been replaced by a one-polar one. While in the divided world, the difference was founded by the hidden identity, the concrete contents of the neo-liberal equality of human rights are ensured by no reconciled differences. *The power of the difference is the final character of the difference, and its absolute measure.* The power of the difference over the identity establishes rigid and static states of affairs. If the measure of the difference exceeds a certain extent, the dimensions of mediation are eliminated, therefore the two poles of the difference-relation cannot get into interaction with each other. *The total freedom of every actor and a system of rigid oppositions inapt for communication* – this duality is the most important one of the problems that bind the present to the future.

The bias of the self-destruction

The end of the Soviet World Regime, Gorbachev’s of the Soviet Union as a superpower and its ideology, became not only a *decisive*, but also an *irrevocable fact* of the today’s universal history. As *ultima ratio*, it might appear in a different colour in each different interpretation of historical eras. However, its self-evident final world-historical value could hardly be traced back to any other process. Although this concrete fact of the end of the history has not yet lost its universal quality, it seems like this macroscopic, Gorbachev’s “end of history” (Kojève, A. 1947) itself is a part of a higher and also universal transformation process. With the end of the divided world, which took place in the blink of an eye, all ideological bias disappeared. At the same time, a new vision emerged: *the vision of a self-destructive society.*

Gorbachev’s “end of the history” blasted the “moment of truth” in the society of the Existing Socialism. But it is also a cosmic and colossally ironic gesture, a ruse of the reason (“List der Vernunft”), that this moment of truth has become reality for

Western societies as well. As the Great Enemy bade farewell, the self-image of Western society was also removed from its overall determining framework of *bipolarity*, which had provided the Western part of the world with a position of comfortable and unchallenged superiority.

A fundamental tendency of a self-destructive society is an *extent of state debt* that makes it impossible for the economy to catch up with it even by the most favourable economical growth. *Achilles cannot pass the turtle*. The self-destructive society is therefore a society that is unable to maintain the highly developed welfare level of the civilization. It is originally a question of budget and economy, it is still not simply a question of economy.

Even a bankruptcy in economy is not necessarily self-destructive, while a bankruptcy of institutions that used to be supported by the state is necessarily self-destructive. Therefore the fundamental problem of the self-destructive society is not simply an economic one. *The state debt is not equal to economic recession*. The self-identity of the state, the society and the citizen are seriously questioned from this aspect. Therefore the state, the society, or the citizen either do not have an opportunity to materialize all-human values, or they are even bound to use up, or even directly destroy these values.

On the 31st of March 2004, a Bolivian miner blew up himself in front of the Bolivian parliament. The direct cause of his action was that he got no pension, and his argumentation was flawless. He demanded a sum he had gradually paid as taxes for the state of Bolivia during his working decades, and he did not do it without any rightful ground.

The self-destructive society is the new and extensive reality. The “West”, the developed part of the world should be considered as the winner of Gorbachev’s farewell and it drew profit from the global transformation of the world economy. On the other hand, even this “West” had to struggle against the consequences of self-destructive society, also because of the growing importance of the debt challenge. At the same historical time, the former “second” world did not get the financial support it needed to establish its new political democracy and new competitive market economy. At the same period, the old or new “third” world reached the bottom at mass migration and poverty (Bernard, Fr. de 2002). In this “post-historical” history, a new question has arisen: can the politically hegemonic liberalism *as liberalism* break away from the downward-circling spiral of self-destructive society?

The double function of the post-socialist transformation

The states and societies of the former real socialist part of the world had to solve several, not only different, but straight fundamentally antagonistic problems. First,

they had to evolve a real and reliable democratic political system, with all known problems of this “project”. Second, these states and societies had to take successful and effective measures to reduce or even gradually bridge the critically deepening economic and humanitarian gaps between the West and the East by shaping their own competitive economy on the basis of the self-destructive society. These two, in the major aspects antagonistic tasks have been calling for an international and conscious solution right from the start. The all-time western partners have clearly stated that they did *not* want to think of such a solution. In the post-socialist societies however, these two huge projects (building out a democracy that works, and handling the problem of state debt) remind of the necessity of such an international and conscious solution time after time.

This antagonistic relation *fundamentally re-shapes and reevaluates even the basic functions of post-socialist democracy*. Such a democracy cannot realize the ideal type of the democratic system. So it becomes the most important function of the post-socialist democracy to *bail out* the economic heritage of the Existing Socialism. It becomes the real function of the post-socialist democracy in the circumstances given, to manage the whole debt problem of the former Existing Socialism. The post-socialist democracy loses its privileged and singularly fortunate character of a general liberation and unveils its extraordinary character. Right after this democracy was born to success, it could get into a *Weimar type* crisis; a row of political crises caused by the failing bailout, or – on the contrary – huge humanitarian shocks following successful bailouts.

The two simultaneous and in many aspects antagonistic functions of the post-socialist democracy clash particularly sharply the term *legitimacy*. The post-socialist democracy – as every post-totalitarian democracy – is one of the most legitimate political structures right from the beginning. But it would be foolish to think that *the actual reality that follows from the bailout function of democracy would not have any influence on the legitimacy of the same democracy*. In this pressing tension namely, two concepts of legitimacy outline and turn against one another, i.e. the (immaculate) classical *political-theoretical* concept of legitimacy and the (deficient) *practical problem-solving* legitimacy.

Globalization and politics as a subsystem

Every research of the actual society is starting out from totally new and unprecedented universal characteristics of the *globalization*. *On the other side, contrary to the still unmapped significance and magnitude of these unprecedented new trains stands the concrete appearance of the global everyday life*. This unbelievable distance of a holistic and theoretical approach and the microscopic and particular everyday practice creates a specific space of theory and practice.

In this framework, it would be necessary to analyze also the actual relationship of *globalization and politics*. But we are excused from this task by the fact that politics, the political subsystem, and political classes slowly seem to find their proper new places in the world of the globalization (and the new world of the economy).

The double face of the democracy becomes a fundamental issue of the globalization. On the one side, this is a commonly *functional* and *structural* moment. It is because a global operation can (could) only evolve and operate on the basis of the democratic liberalism or liberal democracy. *In this sense, the liberal democracy is the "modus vivendi" of the globalization*. But, on the other side, its functional and structural foundation shall not make us forget the immanent and original *value components* of the liberal democracy, which used to ensure exceptionally strong legitimacy for the political system even before the functional and structural dimensions were developed or even completely reflected. The fundamentally democratic character of the political face of the globalization got expanded by a row of new functions not yet clarified. *The democratic values left the realm of founding values and became pragmatic and constructive components of concrete structures and functions*.

If we define the liberal democracy by its aspect that the party that wins the elections controls the operation of the state administration and redistribution for a cycle, we can clearly realize a new trend of modern democracies. Possessing the totality of the state power means power of a smaller extent and a narrower scope of action than before the globalization. The dimension of the political power is smaller, yet the role it plays in answering global challenges is more important than before. A state in the hands of the ruling political party can no more possess instruments of production, neither does it produce. It redistributes the taxes of other producers and it tries to fulfil its tasks that no other player was willing to undertake. But contrary to the weakening power and competence of the state stand the (both absolutely and relatively) renewing demands and pretensions of insatiable individuals and groups.

The present model of the world should be considered as *the mature form of the globalization*. Its decisive train is the phenomenon of *state debt*, which phenomenon fundamentally defines the economic and political framework of the globalization for the societies and for the human life. This is the general model, in which the extremely extensive process of accession to the EU is taking place. These multiple functions cause that *even the lack of a theory has its own victims*.

The most important characteristics of the theoretical starting situation created by the globalization can be fully examined in this conflict. The demolition of the welfare state does not basically appear as an economic or political problem in this discourse (although it might still be controversial in this context as well), but as a

humanitarian, modern, cultural, and society-building factor. The context of the globalization does not erase the validity (Gültigkeit) of the individual subsystems, but it positions new, general and painfully concrete “global” i.e. general and universal contexts above their rationality.

Therefore is one of the great challenges of the future made up by problems of the *state*. The starting point is the relationship between the globalization and the nation state. The great problematic dimension of the future (and the row of questions to be decided) springs from the fact that *the state is not a neutral actor that can be characterized solely by functional characteristics*, but since the modern state after 1945 (or even already after Louis Bonaparte or Bismarck!), it undertook social tasks and the challenges of civilization at an extreme measure totally unknown before, which tasks can only be lifted from the bonds of the indebted state shattered by the processes of globalization by destroying huge “areas” in the social network. The states are the losers in this process. But there is also another tendency, which also has its first strong signs already in the today’s global and European processes. There are namely also fortunate (nation) states, which could use the achievements of the globalization and even the integration to *realize their original ends and pretensions as nation states*, or even their long forgotten aspirations to expand as nation states. *They use European resources for national goals*. These nation states are already the winners of the expansion of the EU in multiple aspects, which can also be interpreted as a process of globalization.

The problem of the systemic difference of the political sphere (das Politische) and economy shows also the new quality of the globalization. It is a question of theory of systems (Systemtheorie). If we examined the phenomena solely from the one (the political) or the other (the economical) viewpoint, we would not get to any special conclusion. In this case we would make the new complexes of present phenomena – shaped by globalization – the subject of a past, pre-globalization kind of language and reconstruction. Instead of using the language the new complexes would require, both one-sided approaches (the economical or the political discourse) would use the language of (exceeded and suspending) normality. If we used the traditional *political* terminology as medium of the inquiry of the globalization, we would get to one of idyllic normality. It emanates the vision of the victory of liberal values, and the worldwide spreading triumph of the democratic order. But if we used the traditional *economic* terminology, the image of the globalizing world might no more seem so idyllic, but in any case “normal”. *All details, aspects and dimensions of the economic and political qualities of globalization can be described by the language of normality – except for the fact of the globalization itself.* And it is so, because the philosophical difference between the self-destructive character of globalization and the affirmative character of the language of normality.

The specific problem by the reconstruction on the *micro-level* of the globalization is the fact that while anyone can sense and understand this micro-level directly, one can only acquire models and patterns that make the well-known micro-level recognizable as the *micro-level of the globalization*. There is a set of phenomena, which could be characterized as the micro-sphere of globalization, but its specific micro-sphere can be identified as part of the globalization just after a whole interpretation of the macro- and medium levels of the globalization.

It is the medium sphere that occupies a privileged position in the theoretical reconstruction of globalization. The medium sphere does not simply show a new side of the phenomenon of globalization, but it shows its most relevant new side, because globalization appears in this environment as the decisive determining factor of the whole social life. On this level, the new functional systems of globalization broadly confront with the real social life. It is the virtual, but also physical area, *which system-theoretical functioning penetrates historical frameworks of non-functional nature, like values, contracts or tradition.* As defined earlier, the globalization is a state of exceeding a critical mass of functionally operating systems. Now we can understand, why the most dramatic confrontation takes place in the medium sphere, for here the *functional sphere overlaps the non-functional sphere.*

In the philosophical tradition, the semantics of all decisive terms of political philosophy and political practice was shaped when the real existing political subsystem was far identical to the matters of social theories in general. *In the globalization qualified by functional operation and no more solely by (non-functional, therefore system-theoretically different) politics, the real existing political subsystem is no more identical to the matters of general social theory.* What about the theory of Social Contract or the original Human Rights in a situation when the unconditioned respect towards them although remains, but at the same time, in the real conditions of global monetarism, these rights are obviously violated, while nobody can be made responsible for it either morally or politically!

On this decisive medium-level of globalization, the relative *devaluation of the political subsystem* leads to the revealing of so far *hidden genealogical dimensions*. Who knew on the Earth that the Marxism, starting to decline critically after the 70' – 80's, was still carrying a considerable measure of humanitarian and utopian potential? Who knew on the Earth that it was the framework of the nation state that secretly carried the functions of the welfare state? Who knew that it did it in such a self-evident way that as soon as the nation states shattered financially, the whole future of the institutional framework of social politics shattered? Thus the relative devaluation of the political subsystem has already shown that *the collapse of the political sphere also means the devaluation of the "society"* in connection of shaping the most important relations (N.N. (eds). 1998.). Moreover, there are some

signs that indicate that *the collapse of the political sphere might even lead to the devaluation of the mankind.*

The relative weakening if not decline of the system of politics – despite naive expectations – will not liberate the society from the conventional organization power and repression of the state. This is because it is right another decisive consequence of the globalization-monetarism that the economy, like several other subsystems, can escape from the legal interventions of the state critically impoverished by the omnipresent networks of common debts (Ehrke, M. 2004.). On the one side, the impoverished state will no more be able to control the function of the subsystems within its territory. On the other side, paradoxically, it must use all of its energies to control the functions of which existence and reproduction it can no more influence.

Globalization and Modernization

The fundamental rise of modern rationality cannot be reconstructed without a historical analysis of emancipation. Rationality, “disenchantment” (Entzauberung), “the Dialectic of Enlightenment” must appear in a new context. Thus the phenomenon and the issue of emancipation must appear in the historical and philosophical discourse of the “farewell to the myths” as well. This refers to liberalism as a political concept on a theoretical level and the concretization and manifestation of modern rationality.

Modern liberalism is the political face of *modern rationality*. The *indifference towards various issues of emancipation was the great failure of liberal politics*. As an integrating political concept, it should have integrated the immanent and necessary moments of emancipation in its modern rationality. Instead of having done that, the present neo-liberalism obviously even protests against issues of emancipation with its indifference and ignorance. The lack of emancipation might thrust the whole process of rationalization into critical dangers.

The global world represents the basic dimensions of the problem of universal values. Its political and social triumph is due to the worldwide victory of the neo-liberalism that is based on human rights, and which values it had made universal in a most evident and seemingly natural manner. The functioning new world order embodies universal real dimensions, and it does it in the trivial existentially bounded (seinsverbunden) manner of factuality.

The classically new basic situation, i.e. the “universality of particularities”, the process of every individual and group becoming a global actor is in a sharply antagonistic position to the rule of universal values. Without a doubt, it is a *grave new contradiction* of today’s globalization that this omnipresence of particular universalism makes *the global pretension of particular interests* a horrible near

danger. This fundamental contradiction is also paradoxical: in a global world that is being constituted by a type of universal values that embody universal operation, every particular individual might evidently become an actor. But such dialectics of transformation to independent and monadic actors might become self-destructive. It is because the globalization is only capable of regulating the rules of vindicating particular interests to a limited extent. There might start a new historical era of “wars of every man, against every man”.

Liberalism and Monetarism

In the ‘70s and the ‘80s re-shaped liberal ideas had been defined by special political and ideological characteristics. Existing Socialism was in defensive, and it could not find its proper place among the co-ordinates of a new, already globalizing reality. It was the Real Socialism that shaped the whole political, social and also the hermeneutical horizon, ahead of which classical, human rights-based liberalism and monetarist restriction could and *did* appear as two essentially connected consequences of one and the same theory. *It was namely the “order” of the Existing Socialism itself, in which the “neo-liberalism” of the criticism of the state redistribution did not differ from the human rights idealism of classical liberalism!*

Before the horizon of the Existing Socialism, the really “liberal” description of the modern market economy seemed to be fully isomorphic with its “monetarist” description, which new isomorphism accepted an existing political and economic state (i.e. monetarist restriction) of the continually existing Western capitalism (apprehended from the embedded anti-totalitarian perspective) as “liberalism”. On such a hermeneutical basis, the actual politics of monetarist economy was called “liberalism” *as an opposite of both the Existing Socialism and the Western-type redistribution.*

Therefore that statement “liberalism = monetarism” is not only a wrong use of terminology, but it is extremely harmful and misleading as well (Kiss, E.1999). The economic policy of monetarist restriction was introduced first in England, then in the United States, actually by conservative politicians and parties, as a response to the *Keynesian* policy that was considered in another sense too “liberal” that time. To consider Maggie Thatcher or Ronald Reagan “liberal” from any real aspect of liberalism would be quite an absurd assumption indeed. By this, again, we arrive to the fact that the complex of monetarist restriction is essentially incompatible with any basic vision of liberalism.

In the global context, by monetarism we mean the uniform fundamental complex of the today’s political and fiscal order. It entails the international order of both inwards and outwards indebted states, in which the policy of monetarist restriction prevails both internationally and in the framework of the nation state. This is the

complex we shall call “monetarism” in the following, independent from the strongly different various views whether the state of indebtedness is only temporary or not. In the international political and economic terminology, there is no other special term for this extensive ruling *global* economic system. It is an evidence for the fact that even other important actors consider the today’s world economy and the system of world politics bound to it “normal”. While it cuts back social functions of the state (including several functions that had been *taboo* before), it strengthens the state’s debt-managing forced functions (what is totally anti-liberal), radically redefines politics that had been an intact and most important sphere of society for the fundamental vision of liberalism before.

Monetarism makes – in a functional and system-theoretical sense – a theatre out of the central political environment that should have been the central subsystem from the aspect of the political liberalism. It thrusts the whole system of politics on a course of a programmed failure. The other reason why monetarism is not liberalism is that at certain points of the financial system, it makes regulating and conscious (*state*) intervention possible even into the seemingly most spontaneous processes. It is not only against its own ideology, but it even contradicts its own deeper definition as a system of a *free play of free forces*.

Within the framework of the Existing Socialism, the indebtedness of the state meant necessarily increasing personal freedom – but it is no wonder that so many things were considered progressive in the captivity of the Existing Socialism. The Hungarian financial politics, for example, could manage to take new credits in whatever world political or world economical context, ideological course, or case of emergency. Meanwhile, the Hungarian political class was obviously less resourceful (and what is more important, less successful) at elaborating a concept to mobilize the productive powers of the society. Therefore, there was a point, when the row of credits as a supposed starting point of future constructive economical processes inevitably turned to a destructive phase. But even past the critical point, neither economists, nor politicians could manage to get the economy off the forced course of this vicious circle. Moreover, in the meanwhile, an insightful outsider could not escape the suspicion that neither the political class, nor the opinion-making economists were aware and conscious of the further consequences of the fatal debt problems.

Globalization and its Actors

The actors of the globalization are often missing and it is shown clearly in comparison with the new specific global functions. The case of missing actors occurs when political or other processes of globalization create new and strong functions, but at the same time, there are no equally strong, socially legitimated and responsible actors to fulfil these functions. The empty places and functions of missing actors either remain unrecognized or tricky interest groups push

themselves into this vacuum (Michels, R. 1987). The basic model is simple: *an interest group pushing into the vacuum can only be called an actor in one specific sense, i.e. that it follows solely its own interests*. To achieve this end, it must shape the political space to some extent, but it does not do it as a legitimate and constructive actor, therefore its activity inevitably implies the destruction of the political space.

The actor aspect in general is a theoretically attractive new component of the globalization. Although his term can also be used for the political and social reality of the pre-globalization era, yet the globalization opens a new era in the history of this term, mainly because the globalization liberates individual actors from the organizational and original interconnectedness of bigger political and social integrities, mostly *organizations* and it arranges the universe of the actors in a new way. We are actors both in a theoretical and in a practical sense. Unfortunately, we still identify this new side of the globalization rather with the actually existing “cesarian” components of the actor dimension, than with its also actually existing democratic components. The global competence itself also lacks adequate actor foundation. Neither traditional *forecast*, nor traditional *consensus-making*, nor traditional *administration*, nor any other traditional *institutions* are capable of shaping competence legitimately.

The relation to modernity in a history-philosophical sense is decisive not only from the aspect of potential enemies and enemy images. In a positive sense, it is decisive because *in several important aspects, the globalization, which in fact sprung out from the soil of the modernity intends to eliminate the so far most important achievements of the modernity as well*.

Therefore, on these bases, the sensible consequences of the deeply interdependent relationship of globalization and liberalism/neo-liberalism are getting crystallized around the issue of the state. Now we can clearly see that the state as a “*buffer*” is a central element of the battlefield of the globalization, but of course, only if we consciously insist on the actual achievements of modernity and emancipation. Pointing out these criteria is not an unnecessary theoretical enterprise nowadays. It is namely not included in the expectations concerning morals, society or even good manners that beyond pursuing one’s own particular interests, one had any duties in order to preserve the achievements of civilization, emancipation, or modernization.

The neo-liberalism has arrived to a great change. After its worldwide victory, it remained as the only regulator of the globalization on the political-ideological scene. And past the acme of its exclusive hegemony, it became identical to the whole of the existing social and economic world order in common political consciousness. It is a not yet achieved high-level realization of the present world order, globalization and rationalization that also amplifies the tendencies, that follow from “bidding farewell” to the myths. If the neo-liberalism is really an

outcome of such a height of rationalization in this theoretical framework, it must not pass by the development of new forms of emancipation.

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Balázs Brunczel

Niklas Luhmann's Political Theory

The topic of this paper is Niklas Luhmann's idea on political theory. Luhmann uses the term "political theory" in a quite special sense; thus, before expounding why I deem his ideas problematic, I explore for what this concept stands.

To understand the use of the term of political theory and its reasons in Luhmann, we need to distinguish between two kinds of descriptions of the political system. On the one hand, politics can be described by the scientific system; this is the scientific examination of politics. Science accomplishes this from a position outside politics; this means that this kind of observation of politics has to be adapted to the logic or criteria of science. There is another kind of describing political system, namely the self-description or self-reflection of the political system. As opposed to the scientific one, the self-description of politics does not aim to comply with scientific criteria but with political ones; thus, the key of its success is not scientific truth but applicability in political practice. Luhmann calls this self-reflection of political system political theory (*politische Theorie*), distinguished from the former case, from the theory of politics (*Theorie der Politik*) (Luhmann 1990a: 24–25, 2005a: 329–330; cf. Arato 1994: 135–136; Karácsony 2000: 107–110). Thus, in what follows, we deal with the description of political system based on not scientific but political criteria, that is, with the self-reflection of the political system, with political theory.

The distinction between the two types of description means first of all that Luhmann draws a clear line between science and politics. Scientific results do not automatically and directly become part of the political practice because the two systems deal with different criteria of success. This is also true for the applied research; moreover, it is true for the case when the possibilities of practical applications of scientific research become a subject of research themselves (Luhmann 1990a: 107). By sharply separating the two systems, Luhmann emphasizes, among other things, his opposition in particular to critical theory and in general to theories that define the objective of the scientific research as a criticism and improvement of social conditions. In his view, it is impossible to realize a direct connection between science and politics because they operate according to different criteria.

Another important message of these thoughts is that for the efficient functioning of politics, there is a need for a theory orienting the practice; that is, there is a need for a relatively coherent idea of what constitutes politics. It is not easy to say what is exactly meant by the political theory. The political theory cannot be an explicit theory, that is, expounded in detail and written in studies or books because in this case it would be a scientific theory. Therefore, the name “theory” is a bit misleading because it suggests this kind of explicit and systematized form. By political theory we rather mean ideas on politics, that are not put in a theoretical framework, but provide a coherent notion of the nature of politics and thus determine political processes. According to Luhmann, all the most important constitutional achievements of the modern state — such as the principles of sovereignty and representation, the mechanisms of controlling power, or the human rights — have been realized with the help of such theories (Luhmann 2005a: 330). At the beginning of the modernity, the political theory meant ideas on the absolute state, then conceptions of the constitutional, democratic state, and finally the notion of the welfare state (Luhmann 1990a: 25–27).

This already indicates that the state plays an important role in the political theory (Luhmann 1990b: 141–144, 2005c: 114–116). One of Luhmann’s definitions of the state reads that the state is a self-description of the political system, and we have defined the political theory exactly in the same way. Thus, we can mainly characterize political theories as reflections on the features and functions of the state, reflections that determine the political practice.

Luhmann examines the political theory, because he thinks that today we do not have a theory that could suitably fill this role (Luhmann 2005a: 332). He claims that a proper self-reflection of the welfare state is lacking because the recent ideas ignore the limits of political actions, which lead to the overburdening of politics (Luhmann 1990a: 105).

From this definition and characterization of the political theory it follows that it has to comply with two requirements that can be opposed to each other. The function of the political theory is to orient the political practice; that is, this theory serves as a kind of framework for the political programs. In the democracy, these programs have to compete for the electors’ votes. Consequently, political theories, on the one hand, have to underlie programs that are attractive for the voters. On the other hand, however, these programs have to be realizable and workable; that is, they have to comply with several economic, organizational, and other requirements. While the former requirement can be regarded as popular — both in the positive and the negative senses of this word — the latter is a scientific one. The present situation of the welfare state shows the best that there is a great gap between popularity and feasibility; thus, Luhmann’s statement that a proper political theory is lacking seems to be plausible.

The political theory has a quite paradoxical relation to science. It needs the science in order to be able to provide workable programs, but at the same time, it cannot listen to the advices of the science completely because it has — even if not directly but through political programs —to find favor with the electors, who often do not vote in accordance with scientific criteria. Nevertheless, politics has no choice but to look for “possible advice from science” (Luhmann 1990a: 107). However, what appears as a political theory in politics is never a scientific theory but at the very most — in Luhmann’s words — a “scientifically subvented theory” (Luhmann 1990a: 110). From the point of view of science, we also face the problem of the impossibility of transition between the two systems. The fact that a theory is scientifically prominent is not a guarantee for its success as a political theory. Thus, scientists, however respectable scientific theories they may provide, cannot determine the direction of the political processes. Even in the best possible case, they can only hope that their scientific researches trigger resonances in the political system and initiate or modify certain political processes. But the question of when and how this happens is always decided by the criteria of the politics, which are incalculable for the science (Luhmann 1990a: 107).

Although Luhmann does not broach this topic, I think it is important to distinguish the political theory from another kind of meeting point of politics and science. I mean the cases when politics uses the scientific knowledge to achieve certain political aims. For the economic politics, one obviously needs the branches of economics; for the social politics, the social sciences are necessary; for the administration, the organization theory; and political campaigns are also based on a number of psychological researches. In my opinion, all this does not belong to what Luhmann calls the political theory. In these cases, politics uses scientific theories referring to other societal subsystems, to organizations, or to the people, while the political theory means the self-reflection of politics. The subject of political theory is the whole political system, its characteristics and options; thus, the political theory forms the aims of the politics. Scientific theories used for political aims, however, can rather be regarded as tools to achieve these political aims.

It is also worth touching upon the question of the relationship between political theory and ideologies because the kind of relation existing between them may be unclear. Luhmann does not discuss this question, but we can find some basis in his theory for reconstructing the relationship between the two concepts. In my view, the political theory is, in a certain sense, a wider category than ideology. The political theory provides a conceptual framework in which the opposing alternatives, the different party programs can be formulated. The political theory in itself is not yet a program, a guidance for the political action, but it influences the range of possible political programs through certain conceptual arrangements and suggestions. With the help of the political theory, political alternatives can be shaped more clearly, and ideological standpoints can be separated from one another. Without mentioning ideologies, Luhmann formulates that the politics’

“premises, options and their alternatives appear more clearly” (Luhmann 1990a: 109) with the help of the political theory. If there is no proper political theory, the ideological alternatives are also not clearly distinguishable.

At the same time, Luhmann’s findings suggest a different kind of relationship between the political theory and ideologies as well. According to Luhmann, the achievements of the modern politics, such as democracy or human rights — Luhmann has not mentioned them, but I think we can also classify the social and welfare achievements among them — were able to be realized exclusively with the help of political theories. These achievements, however, can be also attributed to ideologies. Accordingly, there is a close relationship between political theory and certain ideologies, which may be called progressive ones. Their relationship could be conceived in such a way that political theories have been introduced and stabilized in politics by means of certain ideologies. This formulation does not contradict what we said above about the relationship between the political theory and the ideologies. We can say that progressive ideologies have implemented a political theory in the political practice, and from then on this political theory did not serve only as a framework for the ideology that produced it but for other ideologies as well.

Let us now examine the role assigned by Luhmann to his own theory in this context. First, he makes clear — and I think it is obvious — that his own theory observes the society and the politics from the scientific system, so his theory cannot be regarded as a political theory (Luhmann 2005a: 333). From the beginning of his career, Luhmann emphasized that he only endeavoured to describe the society and not to change it. This served, on the one hand, as a demarcation from the critical theory, and on the other hand, for defending his theory from criticisms stating that applying systems theory as a theory of society serves conservative ideological aims. In his answer to Habermas’s criticism of this kind Luhmann mentioned humorously that “systems theory can have a good chance to remain purely academic because it is beyond comprehension” (Luhmann 1971: 403; my translation).

At the same time, however, we cannot say that Luhmann intended his theory exclusively for the scientific sphere. Although his theory is not a political theory, he expected the emersion of a political theory suitable for the recent societal requirements with its help. He is a bit skeptical whether this can succeed because anything he writes would remain a scientific theory, while the political theory has to be created by the politics (Luhmann 1990a: 115). At the same time, he clearly holds that a political theory suitable for the present society has a chance to emerge only if the wider scientific public, inspired by his findings on the theory of the society, changes its views on politics, and then, as a consequence of this change, the political system resonates and creates a political theory complying with the present requirements of the society (Luhmann 1990a: 112–114). In other words, the

aim of Luhmann's work is not only to provide a proper description of the society for the scientific public, but he also holds that his theory of the society is suitable to be a basis for an emerging political theory, that fits the recent challenges and fulfills an orientation function in the political system.

In this light, the opposition between Luhmann's aims and the endeavours of the critical theory seems to be not so sharp. According to both the participants of the debate and the interpreters, one of the most important aspects of this opposition was that while the critical theory, through the construction of a theory of society, endeavoured to change the society, that is, strove to achieve aims outside the science, Luhmann held that the exclusive objective of the theory is to describe the society. Now, however, we can see that Luhmann, in fact, expected his theory to change the political practice and to channel it in the direction he thought to be right. Although in his view this can only happen in an indirect way and beyond the control of the science, this is rather a difference in degree, and I think the adherents of the critical theory would accept this uncertainty of the practical applicability of the theories.

Thus, Luhmann's criticism of researching the possibilities of application of applied researches also loses its radicalism. Although in his theory we can never acquire indisputable knowledge on the practical implementation of scientific theories, his thoughts presented here can be regarded as researches on this topic. The reason of his holding the theory of autopoietic systems to be an important research program is that with its help we can obtain a more exact notion of how scientific theories can be implemented into the practice (Luhmann 2005a: 333–335, 2005b: 383).

Nevertheless, these aspects are not making me consider Luhmann's views on the political theory as problematic. My critical remark refers to Luhmann's idea that his theory can stimulate the birth of a new political theory. In my opinion, his theory is not suitable to be the basis of an emerging new political theory adequate to the recent societal conditions.

Let us first examine what the main characteristics of a political theory based on Luhmann's theory of society would be. On the one hand, Luhmann provides some instructions for this question; on the other hand, this can be deduced from his theory. According to Luhmann, a proper political theory should take into account that the modern society consists in autonomous, closed, and uncontrollable functional subsystems. From the point of view of the politics, this means that it cannot steer the other subsystems. Political intervention will never reach the effects intended because the results of the intervention depend on the regularities of the other subsystems. The most important characteristic of a political theory based on Luhmann's theory of the society should be that it limits the range of politics to the issues in which politics is competent, that is, to the production of collectively binding decisions. Luhmann holds that we need a political theory showing that

politics cannot remedy the problems which solution depends on other subsystems. These problems include, in his view, that the economy exhausts the natural resources, that the education system does not produce suitably motivated people, or that some people have problems with the way of living. He characterizes his own standpoint as approximately coinciding with the liberal views on the roles of the state (Luhmann 1990a: 113–114). In what follows, I examine the question whether this kind of political theory would be operable.

As we have seen above, the political theory has to comply with two requirements: it has to make possible the elaboration of political programs that are, on the one hand, technically realizable and workable, and on the other hand, attractive for the public. In my opinion, Luhmann's theory can only comply with the first requirement. His systems theory thoroughly examines and explains what can and what cannot be realized in the modern society. He, however, does not discuss how a political program declaring that we have to renounce most of our welfare, ecological, or other claims on the state could be presented as attractive.

In his works on the welfare state, Luhmann regards the formation of newer claims on the state as a necessary consequence of modernity and democracy. And now he expects to give them up. How could these claims be silenced? In the democracy, the only possibility is to convince people of the indefensibility of their claims, that is, to expect people to become aware of certain regularities of the modern society and to vote in the elections accordingly. A faith like this in people's rationality, however, would be very contrasting to Luhmann's ideas. As we have seen, when reinterpreting the key concepts of politics, Luhmann endeavoured to replace the explanations based mostly on people's rationality by sociological conceptions. An argument based on the rationality is completely understandable on the part of the liberals because this is one of their most important methodological presuppositions. This argument can be supplemented by the liberals' faith in progress, that is, by the idea that if people have enough freedom, it will result in a development that is advantageous for the whole society.

Liberals can be considered consistent regarding the relation between these presuppositions and their proposals for the political practice. Luhmann, however, does not only reject the ideas on people's rational capacities but also the liberals' faith in progress. He does not think that a free functioning of subsystems would result in a development beneficial to the whole society; for example, he does not hold that the free functioning of the economic system would produce beneficial effects for everyone. Luhmann should reinforce his liberal-style proposals for political practice in such a way that — as opposed to the liberals — he cannot use arguments like people's rationality or the generally advantageous effects of the free functioning of the economy or other subsystems.

The fact that Luhmann's theory is not suitable to be the basis of a proper political theory follows, in my view, from its peculiarity that can be called the "disenchantment" of societal phenomena.⁷ The disenchantment consists in the fact that Luhmann endeavours to demonstrate that our most important political institutions fulfill completely different functions than it is commonly — or even in the scientific discussions — thought. The supposed and the real functions can be described by the two levels or two aspects mentioned in connection with the legitimation process, that is, by distinguishing between symbolic and operative levels. For example, in the case of the procedure of election, the symbolic level is the declaration of the will of the people, but on operative level, one of the functions of election is to ensure the separation of the political system, that is, to ensure that politicians can govern undisturbed while the citizens' discontents are channeled by filling out the ballots in every four years. Or taking another example, on the symbolic level the basic rights embody our unalienable universal rights, while on the operative level they fulfill the function of preventing the ceasing of the autonomy of the functional subsystems. On the symbolic level we can find approximately the same ideas by which the tradition of Enlightenment described the functioning of the modern society, while the operative level consists in sociological explanations complying with Luhmann's program of sociological Enlightenment.

These two levels are not two separate entities but two aspects of one societal phenomenon. Furthermore, neither is the symbolic level less important for the functioning of the society than the operative one. Although the semantic descriptions fulfilling symbolic functions do not describe the real societal mechanisms, the institutions could not work properly without them. Although democracy is not the rule of the people, it would not work without this belief. Thus, according to Luhmann, we are under illusions regarding politics, but these illusions play an important role in the functioning of society.

By the disenchantment of societal phenomena, I mean that Luhmann deconstructs the symbolic aspects of these phenomena, and — what is very important — without creating new symbolic contents instead of them. In the case of a scientific theory, there is no problem with this. Why would it be objectionable for a scientist to prove that our concepts do not describe the reality, and they are only illusions? And why should we expect him to build new meanings in place of the demolished ones? But if Luhmann intends his theory to serve as a basis for the political theory, the lack of these symbolic elements will be all the more conspicuous. When Luhmann lists the achievements that have been established with the help of

⁷ Habermas gave the title "The Sociological Disenchantment of Law" to the section of his book *Between Facts and Norms*, in which he discusses, among others, Luhmann's theory (Habermas 1996: 62–78).

political theories, he, without exception, mentions examples that have very important symbolic aspects. The institutionalization of sovereignty, democracy, or human rights would have been impossible without their symbolic meanings not describing the real mechanisms. If these achievements — as Luhmann claims — owe their institutionalization to the political theories, we can conclude that according to the lessons drawn from the history, those political theories were successful that made possible the formation, acceptance, and stabilization of ideas that, besides the fact that they complied with the operative requirements of society, constituted attractive aims for people in virtue of their symbolic meanings. Political theories, in fact, played the role of a connecting link between the operative and the symbolic levels of the functioning of society.

This characteristic is missing from Luhmann's theory. If he intends his theory to be the basis of a political theory, he can be expected to provide a description of the society on the basis of which certain directions or proposals can be formed for the solution of the actual social problems. Although political theory is not yet an ideology or a party program, it defines the framework in which these alternatives can be formulated. A political theory, that would emerge on the basis of Luhmann's theory, would not provide too many possibilities for forming such alternatives. We can get to know from Luhmann that the functioning of the society is shaped by macro-level, impersonal processes, which are beyond human control. We cannot effectively intervene in the functioning of the society; the negative effects of our attempts can exceed the positive ones. The promise of a commonly accepted moral order is finally over, and neither can our problems be solved by letting the economy work freely. On the basis of these theoretical findings — even if they are scientifically plausible — we can hardly formulate any alternatives, that could compete for the votes of people with a good chance of success.

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Bo Strath

Towards a Global History

A New History beyond the Cultural Turn : a Master Narrative without a Cause and without a Centre ?

This workshop aims at exploring the preconditions of writing the world history in new ways transgressing the methodological nationalism, which has been a hallmark of academic historiography since the nineteenth century. The world history in new ways means the search for an alternative to a Western conceptualisation of the world as a cumulative history of the nations. The question of communication between historians of various civilisations and cultures is crucial. The workshop is explorative and tentative and the aim is to initiate an agenda for the next years rather than providing precise answers. Rather than a presentation of seminar papers in a conventional sense, the meeting will be organised as a number of panels with brief and concise argumentative inputs from the panellists with time for discussions despite a studied schedule.

While recognising the problems of the old type of the macro explanatory social history, which at the end provoked the massive post-modern criticism of the modernisation theories with a global and universal pretension, and drawing on the crucial insights, that the cultural or linguistic turn brought, such as a constructivist perspective and the understanding, that the world can only be described and analyzed through the language, an understanding which opens up for alternative interpretations rather than singular explanations, the focus of this conference is the question of a world history and a global narrative, which would be an alternative to the economic globalisation story, and which would describe the emergence of interpretations and interactive influences of institutional intertwinements in its global variety. The time dimension in this global perspective on the past should be much longer than one that begins with the industrial capitalism.

When we talk about a new narrative, we do so recognizing the scepticism of the today's historians with regard to grand narratives in general and the justified criticism of historians putting themselves as the omniscient force imposing their narrative order upon disorder and the multiplicity of histories ignoring or erasing other narratives and silencing other voices. 1. However, we also raise the question of an alternative world history and global narrative against the backdrop of the fact that the historians kept silent and refused to comment on the unfolding economic globalization narrative.

A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in terms of historical conceptualization of the past. A world historiography with a mapping of the variety of methodological entanglements and separations in attempts to conceptualize the past provides the *sine qua non* point of departure for any world history with ambitions to transgress a Western perspective. The conference will begin by Georg Iggers and Edward Wang presenting their new book on the world historiography.

A new global history must build on the integration of perspectives from all parts of the world. The crucial question is to what extent the European or Western view can be relativized. Dipesh Chakrabarty in his post-colonial criticism seems to argue that this is a rather impossible undertaking. 2. Although he recognizes the Enlightenment values as a European achievement for the world, and that no Indian history can be written without integrating the colonial experience, his prescription for “provincializing Europe” is to reject such a history and write an alternative story independent of Europe, which would mean a communicational rupture. It is easy to agree with Chakrabarty’s view that the colonialism produced a world image, where it became “normal” to think of England as a rich country and India as a poor country. His argument, that he and other historians of Asia (and one could add Africa) must pay attention to the academic production of their European colleagues, who must not consider the scholarly production in Asia and Africa is a serious criticism.

Lynn Hunt has argued that, at least for the US, the fervour of methodological debates has started to fade away in the recent years. However, in the future it might be well, that the world history or trans-cultural history will experience more disputes between rivalizing research approaches, political positions and overall world views than a conventional historiography centred on the national frameworks. The exploration of spaces beyond nation states makes it urgent to critically reconsider the structures and guiding principles of the historiography. Nationally organized scholarly communities may be ill-equipped to handle transnational or global research geographies. The questions of which world history, which perspectives and historiographic traditions are being applied, will become more pertinent than in the case of more localized research orientations. World historians will hardly be able to distance themselves from intellectual and political questions, that may be understood as the great themes of the global civil society in the offing. There will be a need to debate the value-systems, experience bases and research traditions, that underlie the historical research and narratives at a global level. The calls for multi-perspectivity and ecumenical narratives certainly point in that direction, although behind these key words are very complex realities.3.

A crucial problem in any world history is the issue of the Eurocentrism. Arif Dirlik, for instance, has argued that world historical outlooks need to be basically understood as privileged centric perspectives of the past. The purported desire to

develop multi-angled world historical versions cannot overcome this situation since Eurocentrism can rather be described in terms of inclusiveness than exclusiveness.

According to Dirlik, the effort to fit different societies or regions into an overarching narrative is impossible without ranking and filling them according to allegedly universal standards. For example, world histories tend to operate with Western categories such as “nation”, “culture” or “civilisation”, which are implicitly or explicitly presented as the subjects and not the products of the history. As opposed to such views, Jerry Benley has argued, that historians can transcend their original limitations and that rather than being a static set of world visions their fields of construction are dynamic and open with a potential for self-correction. Dominic Sachsenmaier has emphasized, that the “world” in the world history must not necessarily be understood as a Hegelian nexus requiring totalizing narratives, but should rather be seen as an open research field that encourages the pursuit of trans-local themes as much as a comparison of nations and civilisations. He looks for solutions in the direction of an ecumenic historiography. The historical scholarship certainly must become more multi-angled in its confrontation with the challenges of a more global world but this in fact, in the eyes of Sachsenmaier, requires more than a paradigm change. There is a need for new kinds of world historical scholarship, which are more dialogical in nature and which can only be conceivable if new structures and patterns within the global academic landscape are developed. At the moment, world historians theorize a lot about trans-cultural spaces, but in their academic practices and communities, national (or European) boundaries and public spheres remain the main point of reference. From a more long-term perspective, the ecumenical world history is only conceivable within a more ecumenical scholarly community. This, in turn, requires more reflection on the global sociology of academic knowledge production.⁴

Transgressing a Eurocentric view on the world requires a new historical underpinning under a clear demarcation to ideas of linear teleological progression and value continuities over centuries or even millenniums. Such a new history should emphasize the world as permanent redefinition and transgression of borders, and as permanent redefinition of past experiences and their translations into future horizons of expectations.

The excentric definition of Europe, as Rémi Brague sees it, through continuous alienation from its Asian origins, became centric in the end when the look backward and eastward turned forward and westward following the discovery of America. ⁵ In a next step, ever since the American independence three centuries after the discovery, the Eurocentrism became a Western centristism with a complex and ambiguous Euro-American entanglement, which contained extremes, such as the two largest genocides in the history of the mankind, on the native Americans and the Jews, and the intellectual construction of theories on the universal human

rights. A key-question, developed by Vivienne Boon and Gerard Delanty, is how we can again construct a cultural distance and a decentralization.⁶

Europe consists in different civilisational heritages and is not the expression of a single Western civilisation. Europe is a constellation of civilisational traditions, which emerged out of an interaction with each other. The crucial dimension is the interactions and relations rather than any imagined underlying cultural foundations.

The making of Europe in cultural terms can in a long historical perspective be seen as a constellation of constantly changing centres and peripheries under changing relations between Self and Other. Only in such a way can Europe be conceptualized in a world history. The subsequent question is how to conceptualize Europe in the global context.

Rémi Brague argues that Europe is Roman, and that to be Roman means to transmit and assimilate the Jewish and ancient Greek heritages in the form, in which they were incorporated in the Catholic Christianity. This, however, is a narrow understanding of Europe, excluding as it does the East Roman (Orthodox, Byzantine) and Muslim traditions. When he argues that Europe cannot be just a free trade zone but must become Roman again, Brague ends up in a Roman centrism of the kind he wanted to avoid through his perspective of transmission and assimilation of the Asian origin.⁷ The concept of Europe in cultural terms is bound to shift away from its geographical sense towards a more general set of cultural references, which would embrace not only the American side of the Atlantic but also Slavic Orthodoxy and Turkish and Arabic Islam. With Garth Fowden, we can ask whether it will eventually become part of a Euro-Asiatic civilisation where Asia is understood as the continent's mainly Muslim western sector, bordering in the East on China and India with different historical experiences.⁸ Western Asia becomes Europe at the same time as Europe is Asianized. At this point, India and China will begin to exercise a gravitational pull on the European culture and at this point Braque's Roman Catholic understanding of Europe will look like an antiquarian curiosity.

The so far perhaps most systematic attempt to transgress the historical eurocentrism and Enlightenment as the decisive temporal divide is the comparative civilisational analysis in a weberian perspective under the label of multiple modernities with Shmuel Eisenstadt as its protagonist. The arguments, brought forward within this approach to a global history, provide important insights for any more ambitious attempt to relativize Europe and the Occident.

Moving the focus in this long historical view on the world onto the most recent centuries, the question is to what extent widely different experiences of social injustice and attempts to overcome it can be communicated into a global experience, certainly experiences of diversity, experiences in plural, but

nevertheless in some sense globally shared. What prospects are there of a history of social protest, for instance, in industrialising and post-industrialising societies? No doubt that we are living in an era of growing global communication. Which mediating capacity has a growing global public sphere? To what extent is it justified to talk about a global public debate today? Which historical connections can be discerned between market penetration, social protest and political legitimacy? Which are the power relationships in the global debate and which are the prospects to change them? What does the global mean in terms of communication today and historically? The emergence of public spheres in Europe in the wake of the Enlightenment criticism had a clear political dimension and it was this dimension that moulded the nation states, criticism and crisis in the formulation of Reinhart Koselleck. A global public sphere without a world government? Or can the world government emerge through the social criticism?

Questions like those are examples of what could be discussed at the conference. They would transgress the sterile dichotomy between the European capacity to colonize and enslave on the one side, and the narrative of European triumph due to an alleged uniqueness in terms of “work, thrift, honesty, patience [and] tenacity” on the other side. 9. Such questions could be seen as an attempt to decentralize the Western view instead of taking it as the starting point of the debate.

The conference should hopefully contribute to new ways of thinking, to a more encompassing global history going beyond the globalisation rhetoric with place for the social and the political, a global history which cannot mean a return to the positivist approach with images of causative laws. The objective is to think a macro-historical and long-term social development in new ways of global entanglements as well as diversity, under dynamic interactions between the political, the social and the economic, whereby the communicative capacity to intellectualize and mediate these dynamics is crucial.

A new global history should begin by inquiring into the global variety in terms of historical conceptualisation of the past. The workshop will, as mentioned, begin by Georg Iggers and Edward Wang presenting their new book on the world historiography.

The conference will end with a reflection by Hayden White on the tension between post-modern and post-colonial views, which deny the possibility of cohesive narrative structures (Lyotard, Chakrabarty), and attempts to conceptualize the world in an ordered form.

The overall aim of the conference is, as it was stated at the beginning of this outline, to open up a theoretical view on the world in a long historical perspective, which goes beyond the world history as just a Western compilation and accumulation of data into a global aggregate. The envisaged next step will be a

more systematic invitation of academic representatives from other cultures. The conference, also in more specific terms, serves as first theoretical reflection in an enterprise aiming at a socially informed alternative narrative to the globalisation story, an alternative that transgresses the Western centre.

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The aim of the conference is, as it has been mentioned, to contribute to the initiation of a future research agenda. There are therefore no immediate feelings of publication pressure.

REMARKS

1. Barbara Weinstein, "History Without a Cause ? Grand Narratives, World History, and the post-colonial Dilemma" in *International Review of Social History* Nr 50 2005:71-93.
2. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Post-colonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton, N J: Princeton U P 2000.
3. Dominic Sachsenmayer, "World History as Ecumenical History" ? Forthcoming in : *Journal of World History*. Lynn Hunt, "Where Have All the Theories Gone ?" in *Perspectives* March 2002.
4. Dominique Sachsenmaier forthcoming ; Arif Dirik, "History without a Center ? Reflections on Eurocentrism" in: Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey (eds), *Across Cultural Borders : Historiography in Global Perspective*. Lanham 2002; *ibid*, "Confounding Metaphors, Inventions of the World: What is World History For ?" in : Eckhardt Fuchs and Benedikt Stuchtey (eds), *Writing World History, 1800-2000*. Oxford 2003.
5. Rémie Brague, *Eccentric Culture : a Theory of Western Civilisation*. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press 2002. Fr original Europe. *La voie romaine*.
6. Vivienne Boon and Gerard Delanty, "Europe as a Historical Projection: Reinventing Europe and its Histories" in Hans-Ake Persson and Bo Strath (eds), *Reflections on Europe. Defining a Political Order in Time and Space*. Brussels: PIE-Peter Lang 2007.
7. For this critique of Brague, see *ibid*. See also Delanty, Gerard and Chris Rumford, *Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization*. London : Routledge 2005 and Gerard Delanty, "The Cosmopolitan imagination: Critical Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory" in: *The British Journal of Sociology* Vol 57 Issue 1 2006.

8. Garth Fowden, "Beyond Late Antiquity: the First Millenium Globalised". Paper for the conference "Comparative Perspectives on the Roman Empire" 9-10 May, 2005 at the European University Institute, Florence.
9. This latter view is with all clarity formulated by David Landes, *Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are so Rich and Some So Poor*. New York: W W Norton 1998 pp 516-523.

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Outline December 2006

Stephen I. Ternyik

Global Wave Compression

Every major economic crisis of human productivity is also a social reoccurrence of resembling historical events as a psychopathological and political *déjà vu*, leading to extreme income inequality, radical societal conflict, public revolution and imperial inter-state war; the reason for the social disillusionment of the 7 billion people agenda among all existing political systems, including the small number of liberal democracies, is the not to well-known or ignored fact that politics is actually about the distribution of living chances in this earthly realm where death is real and loss is not only an accounting category. An aggressive over-expansion and superdominance of the financial industry sector in a monetary production economy and the resulting progressive collective centralization (1:25%-10:90%) of wealth and income among a low digit (1-10%) of a population are recipes for ethical and economic failure of the human race on a global ecological scale. The big data are showing the same extremes as around 1929, but this time everything appears even a great bit sharper in the process phenomena of curves, diagrams and graphics, but also big data science analytics cannot compute away the mathematical and statistical anomalies of economic production and distribution. The new economy illusion lost its psychological momentum ultimately at the end of 2000, regarding data of real GDP growth, new orders for durable goods, industrial production and non-financial corporate profits; the profits of the Nasdaq-firms collapsed completely. In any case, quantitative economics and quantified data are historical approximations of real events in a *post-mortem* style, but seem to give us in fact very limited insight about the happenings of the future or the immediate present. This methodical type of forecasting is too deterministic and futures research should be about the methodological freedom of human choice; consequently, we are investigating into the basic pattern recognition and prediction of the human socio-economic action ; our social life is about value priorities and time preferences as individuals and as collectives of learning and action.

Furthermore, it is an empirical fact, that most scientifically collected and academically administered knowledge bodies about economic life cycles are directed at the productive maximization of property *via* credit and interest, especially instructing about how to operate profitably in the market of a national politics. At least the professional literature is dealing with this kind of economic inquiry. As stated before, the methodical tools are mainly based on a mathematical hermeneutics that implies strong *a posteriori* power and condenses big data better than linguistic word chains, but a lot of the lacking foresight is caused by this naive belief in numeric modeling. Although the yuppies of the City preferred the Porsche

911 since 1995, it is not reasonable to assume a numerical connection to the terror of 9/11 ; however, the timing of this uncivilized murder act is more frightening the author today than at the actual moment, because of the analyzed criminal sophistication perceived in the retrospectively analysis of the (global) financial data series.

Unfortunately, the economics and management professions have still not arrived at a truly scientific theory and method to integrate the many scattered practical knowledge pieces; this can only be done via a scientific learning process, where dogmatic canonization does not dictate the road of research and development into new economic ideas, that go far beyond the *a posteriori* balance sheets of static accounting and dynamic forecasting. We are following the spiral theory of human history, all social change is cyclical, not merely repetitive and linear projections cannot catch these continuous creative and destructive changes of cyclical hierarchies, from the beginning to the end of this world, pointing to the origin and nature of space, time, energy, matter and organized life itself. In addition, any backward reading of time or temporal re-construction carries the methodical problem, that the cyclical intervals of temporal quanta are becoming shorter with the spiral course of the history, i.e. if we count back from year 2000 to 1950, we get the numerical value of 50, but this does not comply with the physical evidence of modern cosmology and temporology. The mathematical measurement of global wave patterns like Schumpeterian and Kondratieff cycles for a world economic science cannot ignore the socio-dynamic fact of physical space-time compression or spatio-temporal acceleration; the scientific methodical recognition and prediction of socio-economic wave patterns starts with physical evidence, must incorporate psychological preferences and cannot avoid philosophical ethics. Economics is also about the heuristic art to make the best of our lives and there is a definite calculus between personal greed and mutual prosperity; or to compute it into more exact terms: book-keeping techniques 'create' economic facts. The physical entropy of an economic (quantum) system is directly affected by the accounting method (from stones to electronic digits), i.e. there is no economic alchemy or monetary metaphysics; furthermore, there is no natural law that an economy shall or could satisfy all human needs and wants. All that exists in the economic sphere of commercial transactions is physical demand and the monetary power to pay for need and want; it is exactly typical for our economic (quantum) stage, that all human needs are reduced or simplified into the need for money.

The quantitative economic history reveals, that the advent of industrial capitalism led to ever lower reserve requirements on demand deposits (also cash reserve ratio or minimal capital ratio), this monetary practice evolved with Goldsmith and Lombard techniques of economic deposits as precious metals, gems, etc. in combination with written receipts; the most advanced monetary production economies arrived at 0 or 1%, emerging economies like Brazil or China are around 20%. Central banks became planning agencies to control the empty credit

emissions and interest collecting of commercial banks; such a monetary practice is an attack on the growth of the market economy and checks the economic productivity. The economic production quantizes time and money quantizes economic production time, i.e. the empty credit(x interest) emissions are the root cause of the global economic crisis and no monetary agency can check this toll on economic production as money is actually a market replicator.

What makes this economic scenario even worse is the fact that about 70% of the empty emissions are fiat credits for real estate, being propelled by the land value speculation in urban centers, i.e. an eminent mass of future productive capital is directed at a piece of land and housing. Under these financial conditions, the economic production cycle is shortened and a temporal acceleration to point zero is foreseeable. Only a new politics of money can amend this systemic error and methodical mischief as all human needs are reduced or simplified into the need for money as production and distribution mechanism. Thus, we propose some kind of optimal (narrow) reserve banking system for the future, to channel a maximal capital ratio into real economic investment for private entrepreneurship and public infrastructure.

The new economy illusion also led to a misperception and misreading of the electronic informatization of the global village; the computer technology does not signal a new economy, but it can create a perfect information machinery and finalize the industrialization process as a global wave in form of a technological automation and automata. However, such innovations have at first to go through a painful human learning curve and an economic gain in real capitalization is almost a generational learning process of skills, competences and changing life styles, i.e. an investment into people and human capital is a social learning program. In addition, also new management arts and entrepreneurial alertness do not fall from heaven and many people will have human problems with open source learning and knowledge sharing as they are conditioned by the old ways of doing the business (of life and work).

Contrary to the new economy speech, the old natural laws (quantum motion & development) of the economy will govern in the future and this is the reason why it makes sense to recognize and predict the wave patterns of the human economic behavior (time-value-decisions) which must always be guided by explicit ethical principles ('spiritual physics'). It is this existential interaction of the internal state of our minds with physical constraints that makes the economic research so exciting and vitally interesting.

The last century was the century of the greatest inflations of paper money ever seen in the human economic history, while the 19th century was a period of monetary deflations backed by precious metals. Is the quantum of inflation the entropic indicator of an economic system ? We claim that the real causes of this quantum

movements and developments, that direct the degree of socio-economic order or disorder, are scientifically not well understood or precisely researched. The cognitive framework or mental state of the economic mind that tries to explain human progress via the mathematized maximization of property via (fiat) credit (x interest) does simply not allow for such a perception of social systemic processes, i.e. it is a technically competent profession, but not a science. Quantum thought tries to comprehend the human economic action as the dual interplay of micro- and macrokinetic processes of human thermodynamics (macro) and mechanics (micro) that causes meta-cyclical motion; it diagnoses the psychophysiology of the body economic as a hologram. Every single act of payment (micro=mechanical level) directs total production (macro=thermodynamic level); however, these economic actions do happen in a meta-cyclical framework of natural law as progressive space-time compression or spatio-temporal acceleration (Carmeli 2002; and: arXiv:astro-ph/0103008v1 : Lengths of the First days of the Universe). The universal economic clock flows in relative cosmological time (with a special metric of elastic backward motion) and directs the contractive and expansive cybernetics of the open global economic clock and the many closed local clocks, i.e. the universal hologram (4D) records the economic workings of the geometric globe (3D) and the arithmetic locations (1-2D). Consequently, there is a precise methodical distinction between the technical perspective of world economic science and the practiced economist professions; it was Levi-Strauss (1961: 397) who first coined the term entropology for the entropic actions of the human race, a process theory that studies the dynamic disintegration and increasing disorder of highly evolved social systems: it was no coincidence, that these entropo-logical observations were actually formed in the 1930s in the Brazilian rain forest and as visiting research scholar at Sao Paulo University, being together with F.Braudel on a French cultural ‘mission’. In any case, the economic relationship between entropology and money in the last 250 years has to be studied in more scientific depth, but our methodical intuition points to an enigmatic monetary mechanism, concerning the entropy of our human economy. In our perception, entropology is driven by the following core factors:

- A : Population (dynamics),
- B : Innovation (patterns),
- C : Energy (consumption),
- D : Money (reserves),
- E : Complexity (acceleration).

These entropological factors occur in a specific temporal order of events and imply a sequential causal chain; the historical, empirical and prospective reading of these basic quanta is the methodical key to decipher the meaning of the hidden motion in the order of space, time and human action *via* the data science, big analytics and visual modelling. The outcome will not be a world formula or theory of everything, but future economics in application. G. Plekhanov taught, that the criterion of any

human ideal or idea is economic reality and that intellectual beauty cannot be equated with scientific truth; the macro-kinetic order in the cyclical and spiral nature of hierarchical processes is closer to Kondratieff wave theory of innovation than to a Bolshevist end game of history, but the socio-economic evolution and selection procedures move in cybernetic feedback temporality and this objective systemic algorithms do not ask for subjective pain of victims and human suffering as the non-reversibility is the process class.

The instant suspension of the gold reserve standard in WW1 was not a Wallerstein bifurcation; it was a sudden mutual event of the German Kaiser Reich and the United Kingdom of Great Britain on August 4, 1914: only paper money could make for a longer war, postponing all ideal aspirations of universal human emancipation, installing war as a special case of global systems evolution. In the economic reality, the orbit of the market forces deviates extremely from any ideal mathematized equilibriums and only a reasonable politics (of money) can balance the antagonistic market capacities of the competing political economies, i.e. the market can activate the funeral service if the patient is dying and the most expensive economic service is the state funeral. The temporal metaphor of Kondratieff wave motion and development can be understood as statistical hermeneutics of socio-economic systemic processes in the polity and the market; it is the temporal order of sequential factors (population/dynamics, innovation/patterns, energy/consumption, money/reserves and complexity/compression) and their possible fractalization where the methodical rules of empirical statistics are no more applicable in the usual reading of events.

After WW1 it was indeed foolish to restore old gold parities as the economic parameters had forever changed; institutions like the gold commission of the League of Nations and afterwards the Bank of International Settlements were mentally simply not prepared for a methodical shift to new monetary standards. We are sure that this non-reversible event can be studied by the social scientific method and that it can be interpreted statistically *via* the mechanical and thermodynamic entropy of the quantum system of the world economy as fractal stage. Of course, this immediately calls for an applicable theory of bifurcation in extreme income inequality, radical social conflict, public revolution, imperial inter-state war and hopefully world peace for trade and change; it also implies the unavoidable question of human liberty and solidarity and their relatively limited degrees of freedom in social inter-action, i.e. the dynamic and efficient interplay of physical constraint and human economic action (or our internal state of minds).

An ideological overestimation of the human freedom of action in the social world generally finalizes in the unreasonable notion that social science should methodically not be tight to the application or higher order of natural law, to achieve a more exact or precise discipline. We do not think that the socio-economic research and development can be solely built upon hermeneutic interpretation and

mathematized artifacts; on the contrary, we propose to empirically extract abstract information (patterns) and modelling (regularities) from big data science and knowledge discovery in data set bases. Statistical interpretation and data visualization are at the core of this mathematical creativity, concerning the data mining and decision tree learning of regular patterns as discrete classification or continuous regression of events/parameters on a temporal scale.

The quantization and quantification of qualitative entropic tendencies identify the uncertainty and randomness of systemic processes in the order of time; general formulae for data redundancy measurement do exist as social entropy indexes, e.g. for income inequality research. Thus methodical ingenuity can open up new social research ways into the global scientific analysis of economic wave patterns, regularities and space-time. The statistical learning problem of regular inference and prediction in pattern recognition is the background program for the methodical detection of discrete waves and continuous elements on the economic radar of the social evolution in the history and future of the world system.

The empirical intelligence of methodical statistics and probability is field and path dependent; the precise observation of rapid evolutionary change in human social systems is therefore bound to the exact methodical distinction between regular and non-regular statistics, i.e. every form of counting is finite, but different velocities or time-scales do apply for measuring the clock signals of distinct data sets.

Disease, disaster and death are real human bifurcations of order or chaos; E.Schrödinger insisted permanently on the empirical fact, that a rapidly progressing degree of entropy causes the mortal crisis of the organized life. Advancing methodical mathematics beyond intellectual beauty works by heuristic intuition and finally via logical proof; cybernetic signal processing in living social systems can better be researched into by non-deterministic maths and intuitive modelling. In the living case of process-learning, cause and effect are not always proportional; the non-linear relationships may depend on simple initial conditions accompanied by extreme high sensitivity of a process momentum. Pattern recognition is bound to data as vectors of multiple dimensions; data dimensionality estimation models of a mathematical set become therefore empirically crucial. In addition, the statistical and probabilistic interplay of local data samples with whole data sets calls for a methodical integration of topological and global scaling. Consequently, multi-fractal meters of complexity change are always signaling changes in detail and scale at the same time; however, low cardinality and high dimensionality in the same mathematical set of data remain an open measuring problem and more methodical exactness in measuring techniques is still a creative guess. The economic management of physical bifurcation and chaos in a complex social system depends on the precise perception, observation and exact measurement of the appropriate general time-scale and specific 'data clocks'; this is the great methodical challenge

of the social scientific research in our current age of global wave compression in the social economy of the world humanity.

Will we be all buried in Polya's urn? A Chinese restaurant or Indian buffet process is preferable, but what can be done? Any human social system is an open and non-reversible thermodynamic set and the entropic acceleration of the political economy in the world system started in the early 1970s, with the monetary fiat *big bang*. Since then, population dynamics and energy consumption doubled in total terms, the driving innovation pattern became auto-electronic information processing and the monetary reserve requirement ratio points to minus 0, with the exception of some 'emerging' economies.

Complexity globally multiplies via space-time compression and can only be communicated methodically, but it cannot be 'controlled' by socio-economic engineering. In addition, global scaling and topological measuring are not logical identities, but are governed by universal natural laws of space, time and energy. Peace, health and prosperity are dependent on a social balance of liberty and solidarity, i.e. free association and social ethics. Therefore, it is decisive to revive modern liberal thought for political economics and social philosophy.

Socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor is no solution (private gain = public loss), i.e. organized pockets of wealth vs. disintegrated pools of poverty; the land/natural resource and state/tax monopoly has to be reviewed scientifically, but it is radically more important to rethink the private monetary monopoly of fiat credit (x interest) and public monetary politics.

The author has the powerful metaphor in mind, of a triangular formation body of birds, where the strongest flies in front and creates the waves, that carry those behind who are weaker or tired; another natural metaphor is stork thermic: even the carnivore stork knows how to use the thermodynamic waves, where every organism can realize his full potential and where great group cooperation is of more evolutionary benefit than unnatural over-competition.

ABSTRACT

The universal clock reading in the topological measuring and global scaling of socio-economic data is a methodical problem-generation of pattern recognition and prediction. The key factors and indicators of global wave compression are identified, with special attention to global monetary wave theory and quantum economic science as world historic bifurcation. Decision tree learning and data science strategies are discussed for dynamic communication with the natural hierarchy, sequence and temporality of entropic order or chaos, pointing to a distinction between 'general' and 'specific' statistical learning. The role of the

entropology as a natural metaphor for the integrated perception, observation and measurement of the psychophysical body of the human social economy is exactly defined and a precise methodical thought is elaborated for the economic theory and management practice.

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István Deák

Sustainability is Conditional on Globalization.

Globalization does not apply for a visa

The “globalization” is one of the most frequently used terms nowadays; some see it as the way out; others define it as a dark tunnel terminating in a dead-end. There are few thinkers without an opinion on or a definition of the globalization. It is often linked to the emergence of the demographic problems of overpopulation, the deteriorating conditions of the environment, and the constantly decreasing – still extractable – fossil fuel reserves on the Earth. Globalization is not a modern phenomenon: such endeavours already appeared in the ancient times. In 2001, the Encarta Encyclopaedia defined the globalisation as follows: “The integration and democratization of the culture, economy and infrastructure of the world through the impact of transnational investments, the rapid spread of information and communication technologies, and the free market on local, regional, and national economies.”⁸

The globalisation does not apply for a visa when, after crossing a developed country, it arrives at the border of a developing or undeveloped country. It does not even slow down, ask any questions, or care about the direction of the changes its arrival will cause. It brings the message of the globalized world and begins colonization using its tools for uniformization. The question of convergence to the vanguard of the world is a very important issue and ambition; however, local interests also exist, and success may depend on recognizing, accepting, and respecting those. The waves of globalization, that reach our country, will most likely not adjust to (and carry forward) our tried and tested systems and processes, or only to a marginal extent – it is (or would be) our task to incorporate elements, achievements, and innovations, that arrive from the outside and are positive for us into our everyday operation.

The globalisation distributes developed technologies and innovations as products, most of which are aimed at improving the efficiency of the human life, relieving its burdens, or making it more comfortable. These values and products take control of our lives and reorganize them without we notice it, and we usually only become aware of this when suddenly they are unable to fulfil their previous functions and

⁸ “Globalization”. Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2001 <http://encarta.msn.com> (19 Aug. 2001)

perform their tasks. Just think of the annoyance and problems that a broken mobile phone can cause us. It carries half of our life !

I think that the duality mentioned above definitely exists in connection with the globalization and its effects (consequences), partly due to the complexity of this process or phenomenon, and partly due to heterogeneous conditions in the material world. The advance of the globalization as a worldwide phenomenon is highly visible; we generally also notice its fruits and achievements – the part that is harder to see and is less tangible consists in the latent impact of the latter on our lives and the points of connection. What initially simplifies our life and relieves our burden can, over time and in extreme cases, directly or indirectly lead to the development of dependencies. The globalization accelerates our life.

The globalisation is a necessary (and inevitable) process, which can have both positive and negative consequences. Trying to stop the spread of the fruits of technology, inventions, innovations, etc. created and realised as a result of diverse experiments and research – with the aim of stopping or slowing down the globalization – is a collection of useless efforts all in vain, and also goes straight against the idea of progress. The key to the spread and rate of the globalization is the development and change of technologies. The globalization changes the life and living conditions of people and their communities, often re- or overwriting established value systems. The emergence of a global shift in priorities from productive activities towards services offers objective evidence of the paradigm shift on the globalization. The globalization can lead to the formation of so-called transnational dependencies between the countries of the world, which could result in more intensive – cross-border – mutual dependence between various countries.

Our efforts have always carried the intention of making the world and its processes transparent; these, however, have become virtual in the meanwhile. Our opinion about values has changed, and so have our value systems. Dimensions, scales, and index numbers have also changed. In former times, the total wealth of the world would have filled dozens of airplane hangars; today, it would all fit onto a plastic card (bank card). Virtuality also provides a certain kind of discretion, as for example we are unable to tell about two bank cards placed next to each other which one has funds and which one is “empty”. Coins rattling in our pockets and wrinkled banknotes are being completely replaced by electronic signals, while merry social gatherings are substituted by electronic transactions and interactions launched simultaneously from diverse geographic locations and areas. It is as if we needed this weightlessness and intangibility! Reality has become bipolar, building from light and darkness.

The link between sustainability and environmental protection

According to the definition given by the ancient Romans, the sustainability can be described as the existence without interruption or diminution, a never-ending, stable condition.

The UN World Commission on Environment and Development, led by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland defined the sustainable development in the following way in its report entitled “Our Common Future”, published in 1987: “The sustainable development is a development (of land, cities, businesses, societies, etc.) that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”⁹ The report outlined a possible new era of economic growth, which relies to a great extent on the global implementation of a sustainable development, while also keeping a sharp focus on the importance of preserving natural resources. This could be the recipe for success, which at the same time offers hope of winning the battle against ever-growing poverty in the majority of developing and undeveloped countries. Another important issue, still to be tackled, is the wear of the environment; this, however, must be realized without forsaking the economic growth and without damaging or distorting the principles of social equality and justice. The continuity must not be broken: the conditions that ensure the survival of future generations must be created in the present. The today’s mankind actively shapes the fate of the coming generations, who could become passive sufferers of wrong decisions or irresponsible behaviour in the present.

As the Declaration of the World Academies of Science defined it: "The sustainability is meeting the present needs of the mankind, while simultaneously preserving the environment and natural resources for future generations."¹⁰ Here too, the emphasis is on continuity; in addition to preserving natural resources, I would consider their renewal and the search for alternative sources of energy important as well. I believe that the sustainability is more than simply preserving the present conditions for future generations. There must be a potential, a reserve in the system, which can ensure the survival of the generations that follow us. All scientific research the result and outcome of which is still unknown at present constitutes such reserves. If we start feverish research when there is already a burning need for a solution, it is usually too late. Just as we must start saving, when we still have money.

⁹ "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". (UNITED, N. (1987). *World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 43.)

¹⁰ Transition towards sustainability ; Declaration of the World Academies of Science, Tokyo, 2000.

Herman Daly defined this as follows: "sustainable development is attaining permanent social welfare without growth beyond the capacity of the ecological sustainability". The growth is an important issue: since we cannot increase the size of the Earth, and so the quantity of its natural treasures, either, we must inevitably become more efficient. The constantly increasing population and the consumption it generates can only be sustained by increasing efficiency or introducing new technologies, always assuming that no one wants to make an ascetic change to their consumption habits.

The three fundamental pillars of the sustainable development relate to social, economic, and environmental aspects. If we wish to elaborate any sort of development strategy or program, we must examine these pillars jointly and assess the relations and interactions between them. Only after this, we can (could) develop specific programs and measures.

According to the Dalai Lama : ***“a clean environment is a human right like any other. It is therefore part of our responsibility towards others to ensure that the world we pass on is as healthy, if not healthier, as we found it.”***¹¹ (Piburn 1990: 107). The socialization of burdens and privatization of benefits make sustainability into more of a moral issue, which is one more reason why we should not examine the questions about sustainability solely from environmental and economic aspects.

As a result of the changes caused by its activities that pollute and destroy the environment, the mankind, too, became more vulnerable. It is not possible to pollute the environment without consequences, as by contaminating it we are making ourselves ill. The harmful human impact on the environment is constantly intensifying; initially, nature responds at a local level, for example in the form of acid rain or undrinkable water supplies, and over time the constantly escalating burden on the environment could lead to the emergence of global phenomena such as climate change. Humans are organic creatures, who obtain from the environment the materials and resources required for the survival. Polluted or poisoned environment can also make man fall ill – both the environment and humans possess an immune system that is capable of absorbing the unwanted by-products of various activities to a certain extent. Just like in the case of man, the capacity of the nature to absorb and transform pollutants is limited and finite. If these are overloaded, the ecosystem becomes damaged, potentially exposing the species that live in it – including the mankind – to the risk of harm. Severe harm to any of the elements of the water-air-soil triumvirate will quickly damage the other two, and man itself, as well. Healthy soil watered with polluted water becomes polluted, and

¹¹ The Dalai Lama. “A Question of Our Own Survival” 12. An Ethical Approach To Environmental Protection p. 107.

if we inhale polluted air into our lungs, healthy water and soil will not save us. The extent and probability of the mankind's vulnerability is directly proportional to the increase in environmental pollution. The more polluting elements surround us in greater quantities, the more likely it becomes that we will lose our health.

The population growth can be regarded as the root of the environmental pollution as a global problem, since the principle of "more people consume more" can offer a rational explanation. This, however, is not the sole explanation, as the mankind's irresponsible behaviour, hedonistic desire for more assets, and irresponsible, short-sighted, "carpe diem" type of decisions have greatly contributed to the present situation. Pointing fingers at each other and engaging in fancy-sounding, grandiose campaigns based on "hooray optimism" without a real desire to act, are of no help anymore.

Since man is usually considered tiny in terms of both scale and opportunities in comparison with society and the world, he can only start environmentally a friendly consumption and attitude on a small scale. However, it is not certain that the small contributions will add up and amount to a large one. "Each single everyday act of ours that serves the interest of environmentally friendly consumption is an important manifestation of a 'conscious lifestyle'. On a daily basis, they remind us of precious things, but also of the tasks ahead of us that are becoming increasingly more difficult. Despite this, these individual acts are dwarfed by future challenges, and cannot result in the change that is already so sorely needed."¹² (Maniates 2012 : 245). Feelings of either "I am too small for this and cannot do it" or "what does it matter on a universal scale what I do" could easily overcome us, and either of them places a burden on the individual that blocks his initiatives or stops those before they could even start. Environmentally friendly consumption and change are favoured as long as they are "wallet-friendly".

The spread of environmental awareness and of an environmentally friendly attitude are extremely important, as they can take us in the desired direction on both the short- and long runs. However, environmental pollution cannot be eliminated from one day to the next, even if every single person in the world suddenly became environmentally conscious. This is impossible due to modern-day technology and the consumption by the mankind necessary for the survival.

Covering geographical distances, heating homes, and producing the basic tools necessary for life are largely based on fossil fuels. The meaning and importance of the environmentally friendly attitude of an individual is not that it will completely eliminate pollution, but that the individual will undergo a change of philosophy, as a result of which he will value develop a conscious and economical relation with

¹² from 2012, available at www.storyofchange.org (downloaded on: 03.03.2014, 23:37)

the environment. It is this change of attitude that an individual can achieve in his own environment, and that can have a positive impact in the future. The value of this is more than simply recycling newspapers instead of throwing them in the rubbish. Countering global pollution requires techniques and tools that work on a global scale. Everyone must be conscious in their attempt to protect the environment. The point is not simply ensuring that people return empty bottles to the bottle bank and throw empty aluminium cans in the recycling machine – although these, too, are important and significant.

The optimal situation would be, if they realized, that they must act because the planet Earth can no longer bear their wasteful ways. An important aspect in the return of bottles is the change in attitude, which must be global; that is, it must take extend to an ever larger area – and the globalization, that has taken place, provides an opportunity for this. For this reason, too, the view that the individual is just a grain of sand in the world, and so it makes no difference if they return a few bottles, as this will not help with anything and is without significance is unacceptable. It is unacceptable that they do not do it because they consider themselves and their acts too small and too marginal compared to the whole (the world).

This means that the problems caused during the globalization through ignoring the environment must be limited and resolved within the framework of and using the opportunities provided by the globalization.

The environmental pollution and the pollution conditions are a global, rather than a local problem, even if the pollution typically results from local processes. Controls, methods, techniques, technologies, and consequences, however, point far beyond a specific location. Similarly to the energy problems of the world, the question of the environmental pollution cannot be resolved globally. Local initiatives and measures are necessary for their efficient and effective operation. According to the most recent relevant research, the monetary value of the current environmental damage amounts to approx. 6.7% of the global GDP.

The mass spread of motorisation has led to an increase in the number of cars on the roads, and since more cars consume more fuel, the burden they place on the environment is also increasing. It is also easy to see that, if these cars travel everywhere, they will also pollute the air everywhere. This, however, is only true in theory, as thanks to technical and technological advances, vehicles on the roads are increasingly more economical and environmentally friendly, so despite their larger number, harmful emissions may decrease. The emission of harmful substances of a modern truck is lower than that of a less modern scooter, despite the fact that the cylinder capacity of the first is nearly 300 (!) times that of the second, and in terms of horsepower, too, there is a factor of at least 100 between them. And we have not yet mentioned the size and weight of the load they transport. We need them: at

present there is no alternative or solution that could fully replace them. The issue of reducing the environmental pollution cannot be tackled by banning vehicles with internal combustion engines. Just as we cannot close nuclear power plants from one day to the next claiming that they are dangerous and that their waste materials represent a huge burden on the environment – although this is true, currently we do not possess the technology or an alternative that would allow us to produce the amount of energy generated by nuclear power plants. And then we have not yet discussed other political issues (e.g. reducing the energy dependency), which further limit our options. As a result of the explosive spread of electronic, entertainment, household, computer and other IT devices and appliances there is hardly a household today where we would not find these. Due to the ever faster innovation and efficient marketing, the life cycle of products is decreasing, that is, we are replacing our TVs, mobile phones, washing machines, computers, etc. with increasing frequency. Parts of these can be recycled, while other parts end up as waste. More and more people are buying such devices or appliances, which leads to the generation of a vast amount of waste even with the most efficient recycling methods.

Naturally, the solution cannot be a ban. It is not possible to forbid people to drive cars, to shut nuclear power plants immediately, and to declare that no one may buy a new mobile phone.

The spread of cars, nuclear power plants, televisions, mobile phones, washing machines, computers, etc. can all be linked to the globalization; accordingly the answer related to them in terms of limiting environmental pollution will also be provided by the globalization. The spread of electric and hybrid cars also attests this, and the vehicles of the future will (perhaps) run on hydrogen and/or nitrogen. Serious research is being conducted in connection with the utilisation of alternative sources of energy; the use of hydro/wind/solar etc. energy will eventually replace nuclear power plants. Renewable and other alternative sources of energy will gain ground, overtaking fissile and fossil fuels. The question of reusability is already a primary consideration in the production of televisions, mobile phones, washing machines, computers, etc. – as a result, these products contain an increasing number of parts made from recycled materials and the percentage of the products that can be recycled is also increasing.

According to Einstein: “We cannot solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.”

The examples given above show that the cause of the problem is not the globalization itself, even if, simplifying connections, we often like to blame it for this process. What has actually happened is that a widespread lifestyle, which has become the norm under different circumstances, or in other cases a particular philosophy or value system did not have a positive impact in the new globalized world, and in fact made a certain kind of waste evident. This mistake can only be

regarded as natural as long as we do not accept it, since adapting to the economic and technological changes is a slow process, and man is only capable of changing his value system slowly. However, we cannot ruin the next generations with our slowness and our insistence on an unsuitable value system - we must heed the words of Einstein and change our attitude.

A difficult question concerns the extent to which the problems caused by the globalization can be solved within the framework of the globalization, or perhaps through the new situation. What determines whether a problem can be solved, and which are those problems? Is there a general rule?

The globalization is firstly integration, secondly a system of mutual dependencies, and thirdly a process that organizes social, political, and economic players into networks. Local initiatives and changes can be part of the globalization as much as changes on a global scale, and are often equivalent to the latter, which can be traced back to the revaluation of the role of geographic locations.

Positive results/prospects of the globalization can include:

A united and strong global governance could emerge more efficient adaptation to climate change through market mechanisms use of alternative/renewable sources of energy, decrease in the use of fossil fuels change of paradigm - the so-called “techno-optimistic”¹³ school of thought gaining ground.

These would not hinder the economic growth; on the contrary, the achievements, solutions, and results of the globalization promote the growth of processes.

The principal driving force of development is the competition and the economic growth; the world is transforming into a global society.

Negative results/prospects of the globalization in a specific society could be:

Extreme climatic conditions; the mankind will be unable to cope with extreme weather and its consequences:

- unsustainability, decreasing biodiversity,
- decelerating economic growth, “escaping” capital,
- deteriorating living standards and conditions,

¹³ The techno-optimistic viewpoint, which holds that technology is not neutral, but essentially beneficial and good, was born in the modern era and industrial societies, in conjunction with the mechanistic world view.

- anarchy in national governments,
- collapse of supply systems,
- re-drawing the map of the world (conflicts, riots, armed clashes),
- social and environmental obstacles to finding a technical solution to various problems,
- serious difficulty in finding a solution,
- lack of an alternative or technology that could replace or fully substitute fossil fuels once they are exhausted.

David Held defines three groups of thoughts on globalisation:

- (Hyper)globalist: the globalization is a fundamentally new and radical series of changes, which will eventually lead to the creation of a global society and economy, that encompass the entire world. A global society, in which nation-states, national economies, and national cultures no longer have a place.
- Sceptical: the strengthening of internationalisation – not on a global scale, though. Neither nation-states nor national economies and cultures will disappear. What is happening today is in fact triadization, that is, increasing integration between the three large regional blocks of the world economy. It is about increasingly closer cooperation between three major regions, not about social and economic integration on a global scale.
- Transformational viewpoint: it lies between the two extremist viewpoints, and holds that the globalization will lead to a host of economic, social, and cultural changes and transformations, which will create a new system of conditions for economic, social, and political players, with each player creating a new role for themselves according to the new rules of the game.

Globalization, localization, glocalization

Through the figurative dissolution and transparency of political borders, the boundaries of social and cultural systems, too, became virtual, which led to the acceleration and increase of the speed and number of interactions between different nations. The new, computerized industries and production cultures created by innovation and technological development represent the (new) centres of gravity of the world economy.

It may seem that the globalization will create new opportunities for global economic growth, and thereby for attaining a higher standard of living, fostering the convergence and integration of poorer countries. In reality, however, poorer countries suffering setbacks is the more frequent scenario.

According to Bakonyi, “Instead, the glocalization refers to the fact that people’s identity has already changed: they see their own situation and themselves differently, and react to an external impact, namely, the process of globalization in the spirit of post-national citizenship, rather than national sovereignty.” (Bakonyi 2005: 96) This may also mean that people and their communities are no longer passive participants in the process of glocalization, not passive “victims” of these events, but are shapers and makers of their own lives. “If every member of every community carefully strives to find a human, democratic, and global solution to their own local problems, we can expect to see significant changes in the areas of preserving the environment and preventing famine, natural disasters, diseases and other global and local catastrophes, and we may even count on finding solutions to certain problems.” (Tóth 2001: 89) In its reply to the challenges of the future, the mankind must find the united and well-functioning role of the global and the local, must embrace global and local contents together and at the same time. At present, the global is usually in contrast to the local.

According to glocalization, which lies behind the slogan of “think globally, act locally”, global problems or the risk that such will emerge can be greatly reduced through correct local decisions. This, too, shows that the activities of local communities and the developments coordinated by them have a major role and importance.

The localization and the globalization are not mutually exclusive expressions: even though their effects are opposite, they shape the life and latitude of local societies jointly.

The localization is the totality of processes “that can offer powerful protection to regions that form an autonomous part of the world against processes that homogenize everything, be they integration, colonization or globalization.” (Tóth 2001: 88-89). The glocalization as a concept and goal does not mean replacing the local values eliminated with global ones, but offers a proposal for solving local problems with a global frame of mind.

The glocalization was born from the harmonization/juxtaposition of the globalization and the localization, and involves global governance in affairs, that concern all of the mankind, but leaves the freedom of decision and measures at the local level. As a result of two partial processes – globalization and localization – the glocalization, on the one hand, refers to the global nature of products created

locally and used worldwide, and on the other hand, shows the process of adaptation, as a result of which the globally circulated product is adjusted to the expectations of the local cultural environment, becoming once again local in the process. In a narrower sense, the globalization can be defined as a marketing strategy, the main task of which is to customize global products to local markets. In a wider sense, it is a strategy for developing the society and the economy, that build on the interaction between local and global resources, and result in an opportunity for combining those.

The role of the individual and of technology in sustainability and environmental protection.

In terms of the existence and functioning of the globalization, productive activities and technologies are extremely important factors. Without them, there would be nothing to globalize and no tools that could carry out the globalization. Another very important aspect is morality, which, however, is insufficient in itself – technical solutions are necessary. Without technology there is no globalization. If the globalization is based on the technology, then the environmental pollution is also global.

The fruits of the technology and the innovation are in most cases attractive to the individual, and most people are generally inclined to purchase them. The intention is therefore usually present, and if it is coupled with the purchasing power, the innovation can become practically self-supporting, with functioning automatic mechanisms. Just as long as there is someone to invent new things...

An integral part of the issue of the sustainability concerns the wasteful use of raw materials, such as the widespread use of cars, which in our age is virtually the first tool of the globalization, also in the sense that it causes pollution globally. We live in a society of information; therefore, we must not underrate the polluting power of the information either.

The average person – although her role is crucial – is typically inexperienced with regard to the issues of the sustainability and environmental protection. Most people try to buy a car with lower fuel consumption, and can understand and accept the importance of selective waste collection. They consider the use of recyclable or bulk packaging materials important, and buy natural products instead of artificial ones, if they can. These decisions are still mostly based on economic aspects; it is often cost-effectiveness that makes the individual environmentally conscious. They favour environmental awareness as long as it is economically advantageous to them, but face a dilemma when they would already have to make a sacrifice for the sustainability and environment. A simple and clear situation, a series of simple decisions.

A shift in attitude, which will most likely happen slowly and gradually (if at all) is very important, and so is a direction of the technological development that must and will act against the environmental pollution. There is no other solution. To take the example of the internal combustion engine, we must find those methods, techniques, and technologies that can solve the global problem of pollution from exhaust gases on a global level. Until revolutionary techniques and technologies (electric, hybrid, hydrogen, nitrogen, helium, etc. drives) become widespread and force out classic, internal combustion vehicles from the markets, an invention is needed to reduce the environmental damage caused by exhaust gases. A new fuel type or composition or a new method of filtering out pollutants must be invented. However, this invention or new tool will then have an impact everywhere, because people will need it to keep using their cars. It is true that pollution occurs at specific locations. Making busy stretches of one-way roads could be a local solution, as it could even halve traffic and the environmental burden. However, these local solutions only treat the symptoms (these are important in this respect), and do not tackle the roots of the problem. The ultimate solution could be a technique or technology that will result in cars in their present form no longer polluting our environment.

“We must therefore recognize, that it is the technological development that globalizes the world in the sense that every society uses the same tools, regardless of its structure. Through this, they connect to the operating system of the world.” (Tóth 2001: 82)

The globalization will also bring the latest technological achievements to the poorer countries and regions of the world, if there is a demand for this. This demand is simply the desire of less developed regions to integrate with and become alike to more developed ones. A shepherd in a poor (disadvantaged) country may use the same ultramodern, premium category mobile phone as a hotshot banker on Wall Street. The globalization is not selective, it will not refuse to enter somewhere saying that nobody there needs what it is offering. It offers the opportunity to obtain goods, and can therefore play an important role in realizing the convergence – the fact that masses of people cannot obtain those due to internal or external obstacles is a different matter.

“Certain types of political and economic systems are more likely to aggravate environmental problems, while others react better to an emerging or present environmental crisis.” (Stover–Vinck 2008: 729). Just think of the difference in the reaction to a natural disaster and the crisis situation it creates and the tools available for tackling these between the governments of the United States of America and that of a poor country. Due to its extensive and developed industrial activity the first is more likely to cause a natural disaster than the latter, and therefore will more likely be able to solve it, as well. It is prepared, with crisis plans, connections, capital, and tools. The globalization creates the possibility of

environmental pollution, but pollution is committed by man, who therefore bears the primary responsibility for it.

It is not enough if a single country or region attempts to find a solution to the pollution that threatens our entire world and its further spread. Since pollution knows no borders, the solution must also transcend them. The globalization provides a basis for such a new form of collective thinking and cooperation.

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What is Sustainable Development? Environmental, economic and social well-being for today and tomorrow.

PART 2

„Im Gegensatz zu den Erwartungen und der Überzeugung, die aus der Vorannahme totaler Kommunikationstransparenz das Nonplusultra des Geschichtsbewusstseins gemacht hatten, sollte sich das konsensuelle Bewusstsein als genauso erblindet herausstellen, wie das der am Zusammenbruch des Konsenses beteiligten Individuen. Das Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein sieht sich genauso wenig in der Lage, bedingungslos seine Rechte geltend zu machen, wie das Gerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, von dem die Legitimation der Programmierung sozialer Entwicklung erwartet wurde. Denn eines entpuppte sich als zunehmend verdächtig: die Richtigkeit dieser kollektiven Faszination, die das Gerechtigkeitsideal ausübt.“

Jacques Poulain

Das globalisierte Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein und die Grenzen des modernen Gerechtigkeitsideals

« Le paradoxe dévoilé se résout ainsi dans la mise en tension entre des projets (celui de « la globalisation » et celui des mondialisations) dont *le rapport aux droits de l'Homme constitue comme la ligne de démarcation.* »

François de Bernard

Le paradoxe de « la globalisation », des mondialisations et des droits de l'Homme

“The ability to lose elections, to acknowledge the value of rules of the democratic game irrespective of who comes to power, to wait for consequent elections and work hard to win – these are actually the essential signs of social readiness for democracy.”

Leonid E. Grinin and Andrey V. Korotayev

Revolution and Democracy in the Context of Globalization

“...since the globalization is uneven, the majority of the traditional societies react defensively against it in the form of counteracting the process of integration as well as conducting the politics of localization and support to local cultures in every possible way.”

Alexander N. Chumakov

Social Aspects of Globalization

“A social enterprise is a business that can hardly be sold later as a business. At this early stage, there is no calculable market value of it, only its goodwill and other intangibles, at least – quite beyond of accounting, as yet. Its value-added is hidden in its network it helps animating...No purchaser can animate that – say proprietary – network. Social capital is not transferable. Ironically enough, the proven availability of a usable personal network usually qualifies one for a bank credit to the tune of micro financing. Because social entrepreneurs operate within a social context rather than the weak-bonds interwoven business world, they have limited access to other means of raising capital. Social capital is therefore – to this limited extent - convertible to capital without strings.”

András Kelen

The Distinctive Role of Collaborative Networks in the Social Economy. Towards a More Operational Definition of Social Entrepreneurship

Jacques Poulain

Das globalisierte Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein und die Grenzen des modernen Gerechtigkeitsideals

Als Wahrzeichen der neuen – und ebenso der alten – Weltunordnung zeigt die Globalisierung, ohne sie verbergen zu können, die Schwierigkeiten einer Umstrukturierung der Gesellschaft, die sich um die Achtung der Gerechtigkeit bemüht, um die proportionalen Verteilungsverhältnisse von Aufgaben und Gütern allein auf der Basis einer Ethik der Solidarität, der Verantwortung und des gemeinschaftlichen Einvernehmens zu regulieren.

Zwar haben die Menschenrechte in fast allen Ländern der Welt tatsächlich Eingang in die Verfassung gefunden, und sie scheinen über den politischen Kräfteverhältnissen zu stehen. Doch hat sich die eigentliche Umsetzung dieser Rechte zunehmend als von der realen Fähigkeit der Länder abhängig erwiesen, sich als Schiedsrichter zwischen den politischen Kräften und den multinationalen Unternehmen zu bewähren. Mit dem zunehmenden Einfluss des ökonomischen Experimentierens zu Lasten der politischen Regulierung der ökonomischen Beziehungen ist es den Staaten faktisch unmöglich geworden, die unter dem Rentabilitätskriterium entstandenen, bzw. verstärkten Ungerechtigkeiten zu kompensieren. Indem so viele Bürger wie nur möglich von der Sozial- und Krankenversicherung und vom Bezug von Arbeitslosengeld ausgeschlossen und so Vielen wie nur möglich die Mittel entzogen werden, sich Bildung und Wohnung verschaffen zu können, haben die Staaten zahlreiche Nicht-Bürger erzeugt, d.h. Menschen, die der realen Ausübung ihrer privaten und bürgerlichen Rechte beraubt sind.

Demnach hat die kapitalistische Dynamik der Unterwerfung das letzte Wort bekommen, und zwar allen liberalen Ansprüchen zum Trotz, die Gleichheit von jedem im Respekt seiner Meinungsfreiheit und im Horizont einer brüderlichen Solidarität zu garantieren. Wie kann aber unter diesen Umständen die Basis eines liberalen Rechtsstaates errichtet und zugleich diese politisch-wirtschaftliche Organisationsform als die einzige theoretisch rechtfertigt werden, die fähig ist, den Benachteiligten so zu dienen, wie es sich Rawls wünschte?

Die Rückkehr der Nationalismen und der interethnischen Konflikte im Europa und Afrika der 1980er und 1990er Jahren, die Ausbrüche von Rassenhass in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und in Afrika, sowie, zeitnäher, der erneuerte Rückfall in religiöse oder politische Fundamentalismen sind nichts anderes als ein irrationaler Versuch, Nation, Rasse, Staat oder Religion zu verabsolutieren, um die

Krisen der sozialen und ökonomischen Ungerechtigkeit wie durch Zauberei über einen Konsens, der zum Garanten des Fortbestandes der Völker gemacht wird, zu meistern. Die von der Moderne geerbten juristischen, moralischen und politischen Organe erscheinen unfähig, diesen Rückfall in den archaischen Totemismus aufzuhalten. Weil er die erzwungenen Befriedungspakte zu Papierleichen macht und radikal genug ist, den Streitparteien erteilte Ratschläge und Drohungen nichtig zu machen, hebt dieser Rückfall die Vernunft aus, indem er ihr ganzes Selbstvertrauen, sowie ihr Vertrauen darauf zerstört, Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit vorzubringen.

Im Gegensatz zu den Erwartungen und der Überzeugung, die aus der Vorannahme totaler Kommunikationstransparenz das Nonplusultra des Geschichtsbewusstseins gemacht hatten, sollte sich das konsensuelle Bewusstsein als genauso erblindet herausstellen, wie das der am Zusammenbruch des Konsenses beteiligten Individuen. Das Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein sieht sich genauso wenig in der Lage, bedingungslos seine Rechte geltend zu machen, wie das Gerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, von dem die Legitimation der Programmierung sozialer Entwicklung erwartet wurde. Denn eines entpuppte sich als zunehmend verdächtig: die Richtigkeit dieser kollektiven Faszination, die das Gerechtigkeitsideal ausübt. Hat man der Menschheit nicht die größtmögliche Ungerechtigkeit angetan, die ihr angetan werden konnte, als man ihr Heilsideal in eine Instanz sozialen Glücks verwandelte, in ein moralisches Urteil, wonach jeder seinen Vorteil erkennen musste, glücklich zu sein: glücklich darüber, sein Glücksgefühl mit dem durch die Erfüllung seiner sozialen Pflichten und Rollen verdienten Glück harmonisiert zu sehen? Setzt nicht diese Verkettung jedes Einzelnen mit den Wünschen aller, um sich zu legitimieren, ein kollektives Wissen der Bedürfnisse, der Normen und des Glücks voraus, ein zwar gemeinschaftlich geteiltes Wissen, aber dennoch ein Wissen, von dem keiner behaupten könnte, es für sich zu besitzen?

Wenn es dieses kollektive Wissen nicht gibt, bleibt kaum mehr übrig als das allgegenwärtige Ungerechtigkeitsbewusstsein, das gegenüber der Geschichte empfunden wird. Es stellte sich dann heraus, dass diese Verkettung aller mit der Handlung seit jeher nur eine kollektive Versklavung unter eine als allgemein angenommene Wahrnehmung war, die Wissenschaft genannt wurde, unter eine undurchschaubare Verteilung der sozialen Aufgaben und Rollen, sowie unter die Suche nach einem willkürlich festgesetzten privaten oder kollektiven Konsumverhalten.

Die Idee der Gerechtigkeit an sich wäre nur immer gewesen und sollte immer nur ein ideologisches gemeinschaftliches Verkettungsmittel zur Erschaffung eines an sich selbst und durch sich angeketteten Menschen sein. Die Menschheit hätte ihren Glauben an die Geschichte mit dem Opfer ihrer Freiheit an dieses Ideal der gemeinschaftlichen Verkettung erbracht: durch eine Heteronomie, die vor der Handlung, vor der Wahrnehmung und dem darin empfundenen Glück das Denken

selbst befallen hätte. Diese Heteronomie des Denkens hätte damit jeden gezwungen, sein eigenes Urteil den theoretischen und praktischen Vorurteilen der Gemeinschaft und ihrer Konsumgewohnheiten zu unterwerfen.

Nötigen dieses massive Scheitern der politischen Vernunft und die Wiederkehr dieser Zivilisationsübel, die man als überholt ansah, dazu, das moderne Bestreben nach Rationalisierung von Kräfteverhältnissen mittels eines die Autonomie der Individuen und Gruppen achtenden Gerechtigkeitsideals als irrational zu verwerfen? Reicht es aus, die herbeigerufene internationale militärische Gewalt der Nationalstaaten umsichtig zu organisieren, um jegliche Gewalt zwischen Ethnien oder Gemeinschaften zu neutralisieren und eine friedliche Koexistenz zwischen den Gesellschaftsklassen und Rassen, sowie eine Begrenzung des Immigrationsrechts zu erzwingen, gerade so, als wäre der Mensch bereits der Feind seiner selbst, den jeder in seinem eigenen Inneren zu bekämpfen hätte? Sollte man dieses von der modernen Religionsphilosophie der allmächtigen Götter ererbte Bestreben nach rationaler Macht aufgeben? Bezeugen nicht tatsächlich die nationalistischen, rassistischen und fundamentalistischen Phänomene, dass das moderne Bild des Menschen insofern falsch war, als es ihm einen Kampf gegen seine Begierden und die Suche nach Selbstbeherrschung verschrieb, anstatt die Objektivität seiner Wünsche abzuwägen?

Das distributive Gerechtigkeitskonzept, auf dem die nordamerikanischen Rechts- und Politik-Institutionen beruhen, ist einem objektiven Honorierungsmodell im Tausch entlehnt, das im Rahmen des Paradigmas des Kommunikationsaustauschs und am Beispiel des Vertrags zwischen freiwilligen freien Individuen entworfen wurde. Ausgerechnet in dem Bestreben, das im Vertrag enthaltene Gerechtigkeitsideal zu verwirklichen, wird die Schwäche des Begriffs eines gemeinschaftlichen Engagements offensichtlich, dessen Scheitern den unvermeidbaren und zugleich irrationalen Charakter der Forderungen nach sich zieht. Die Reduzierung der Gerechtigkeitsfragen auf formale prozedurale Fragen ist nämlich dem anthropologischen, dem Subjektkonzept zugrunde liegenden Modell innewohnend.

Das Subjekt kann sich nur darin als freies Subjekt wiedererkennen, wenn es seine Strategien der Aneignung der Welt, des Selbst und des anderen im Kontext einer gemeinschaftlichen, im Verhältnis der Zustimmung von Rechten und Pflichten gegebenen Befriedigung der Billigung von politischen Dritten unterwirft.

Dieser Versuch der Regulierung der von Individuen und Gruppen angeeigneten Taten und Güter erscheint im Ergebnis ebenso willkürlich wie der individuelle Wille, den er zu regulieren beabsichtigt. Die Beschwörung des Konsensus als eine für die Individuen transzendente Instanz, wie sie die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von Rawls und Habermas anpriesen, bildet hier keine Ausnahme. Anstatt darin eine Lösung zu sehen, sollte angenommen werden, dass die kontraktualistischen und

konsensualistischen Theorien in Sackgassen geführt haben, denen entkommen zu helfen sie behaupten.

Was im Kern dieser kulturellen Katastrophe zu Tage tritt und auf dem Spiel steht, ist, für das Denken eines dritten Weges Raum zu schaffen und die Falschheit der Menschenbilder offenzulegen, die eben dieser Gerechtigkeit den Anschein gegeben hatten, der einzige glaubwürdige säkulare Heilersatz zu sein. Es ist notwendig, hinter dem Scheitern der modernen Gerechtigkeitsidee die Ursache dieser Autonomie zu erkennen: die Urteilsfähigkeit von jedem und allen, um der Autonomie die ganze Motivationskraft zurückzugeben, deren Abstumpfen durch die Heuchelei von Staaten, Nationen, Religionen und Völkern geglückt war. Hat nicht die allgegenwärtige Fähigkeit, über Lebensbedingungen zu urteilen, den öffentlichen Raum der Existenz aller bereits erschaffen? Ist sie es nicht, die sich wieder einmal selbst in die Lage versetzt, hinter dieser fundamentalen, dem Gerechtigkeitskonzept selbst innewohnenden Ungerechtigkeit, die im Lichte der ökonomischen Globalisierung offen ausbricht, die realen Bedingungen von Gerechtigkeit zu erkennen, die es immer ermöglicht haben, die Bedingungen von sozialer und historischer Ungerechtigkeit zu überwinden? Hat sich nicht bereits diese politische Verteilung der Urteilsfähigkeit als fähig erwiesen, die Mängel dieses Gerechtigkeitsideals auszugleichen?

Die Unfähigkeit, das Rechtsmodell der universellen Pragmatik auf den Kontext der neuen deutschen Länder zu übertragen, wurde durch die Ignoranz offengelegt, die in dem vorausgesetzten dualistischen Wissen liegt, das aus dem Menschen 'ein Mischwesen aus Geist und Leib' machte und als Basis der moralischen und politischen Rechtssysteme der Modernität fungierte. Dort fand die Verteilung der Rechte, Pflichten und Güter in der Respektierung der spirituellen Essenz des Menschen und vor dem Horizont der jedem Einzelnen gewährten Vollmacht statt, sich eigenmächtig über das angenommene ihm frei verfügbare Wissen zu verwandeln, das er von den zwischen freien Menschen notwendigen Verhältnissen besaß. Als ob er in der Lage wäre, sich diese Freiheit zuzugestehen, ohne über die Objektivität der Lebensbedingungen urteilen zu müssen, die diesen Verhältnissen innewohnen, als ob diese Geistesfreiheit, in diesem Fall das Bewusstsein dieser Verhältnisse, nur die eine Funktion hätte: die Verpflichtung aller, die bedingungslose Beachtung jener Imperative und Verbote, welche die soziale Ethik der Solidarität mit diesen Rechten, Pflichten und Gütern verbinden, ein für alle Mal zu rechtfertigen.

Das Zugeständnis dieser Geistesfreiheit gewährleistete folglich die Möglichkeit, die körperliche, dem Geist feindliche Natur von vornherein zu bezwingen, indem ihr vorab die Fähigkeit verliehen wurde, die Feindschaft zwischen den sozialen Partnern aufzuheben und die agonistische Natur der 'ungeselligen Geselligkeit' (Kant) des Menschen zu neutralisieren, die in seinen Verteidigungs- und Aggressionstrieben verwurzelt ist. Dieses von Hobbes wie auch von Kant und

Hegel übernommene anthropologische Modell preist die vermeintliche Überlegenheit des Geistes gegenüber dem Leib und übersieht zugleich großzügig, wie dieser Geist in diesem Leib entstehen können hat. So widerlegt sich das Modell selbst, denn dass es in beiden Fällen die Widerlegung seines Gerechtigkeitsideals hervorruft, ist heute unübersehbar.

Tatsächlich bezwecken diese Modelle die bloße Verwandlung des Menschen in ein gerechtes Tier, das so gründlich abgerichtet ist, dass es ausreichen würde, die juristische Wahrnehmung der ihm eigenen sozialen Welt mit dem unfehlbaren moralischen Bewusstsein seines Geistes in Beziehung zu bringen, um ihm dazu zu verhelfen, aus sich selbst die vollkommenste Gerechtigkeitsmaschine zu machen, die er zwanghaft zu sein träumt. Dieser Dualismus kann allerdings das moralische Bewusstsein des Einzelnen als unfehlbarer Richter nur auf das Leugnen der Möglichkeit des anderen und der Wahrhaftigkeit seiner Urteile stützen, wie wenn beide die einzigen Hindernisse wären, die den perfekten individuellen und kollektiven Zusammenschluss von Trieben und Gerechtigkeitsinn gefährdeten.

Das Habermas'sche Modell der universellen Pragmatik hat dem liberalen Modell nur eine geringfügige Modifikation hinzugefügt. Sie besteht darin, den Dritten als das die quasi-göttliche öffentliche Meinung bewegende argumentative Bewusstsein/Gewissen vom Konsensus auszuschließen, um die Vorahnung, die man vom glücklichen Ausgang der sozialen Erprobung des Menschen durch den Konsensus haben muss, im theoretischen Diskurs wieder einzusetzen. Zwar greift diese Modifikation der Verwirklichung eines Gerechtigkeitsideals in der Kommunikationsontologie und in der entworfenen Rechtsausübung der öffentlichen Meinung vor, indem sie eine allgemeine Achtung der Bedingungen ihrer Autarkie aufzwingt. Aber sie ist nicht nur unfähig, die wechselseitige Heterogenisierung der Individuen umzukehren und ihre gegenseitige Ablehnung von Existenzbedingungen zu hemmen, sondern sie ist ebenso unfähig, aus dem Wechsel zwischen Sender- und Empfängerrolle, die sie eingehalten sehen möchte, ein beliebiges Kriterium abzuleiten, das ein Unterscheiden zwischen reellem Einklang der Verständigung und Pseudo-Konsensus ermöglicht.

Bei der Bewährungsprobe scheinen beide Modelle zwangsläufig dazu zu führen, die Kraft des kritischen Urteils, das beide voranbringen wollen, zu neutralisieren.

So scheinen sie dazu bestimmt, die von ihnen heftig bekämpfte soziale Ungerechtigkeit gegen ihren Willen zu verstärken. Sie verwandeln sie faktisch in eine Ungerechtigkeit im Denken, das die Individuen und Gruppen nur dort heimsucht, wo sie glaubten, der Entfremdung ihrer materiellen Bedingungen noch entkommen zu können: in ihrem Urteilsvermögen.

Der Ausschluss der Benachteiligten und die Ausblendung der konsensuellen Denkfähigkeit entstehen tatsächlich beide aus dem doppelten Leugnen, das es dem

Bewusstseins des Gerechtigkeitsideals ermöglichte, an diesem Ideal Gefallen zu finden und sich mit diesem Bild des sozialen gerechten Glücks, dem eine Kraft der Selbstbeglaubigung und Selbstgratifikation innewohnt, zufrieden zu geben. Man versuchte, das psychische Leben nach dem Modell des griechischen Polytheismus zu erfassen – als einen inneren Konflikt jedes Einzelnen mit seinen Begierden – und das soziale Leben als einen durch den Gesellschaftsvertrag und die juristischen und politischen Konventionen meta-stabilisierten Konflikt zwischen Individuen und Gruppen zu verstehen. Man nahm ein allgemein vorhandenes Wissen an, das jeden Einzelnen in die Lage brächte, aus der Summe seiner Begierden die allgemein geteilten Begierden und aus der Summe der Normen diejenigen herauszufiltrieren, die ihn dazu zwangen, alles zu tun, was getan werden müsste, um alle in den Genuss einer fairen Verteilung der Güter kommen zu lassen, die auf Kompetenzen und Verdiensten beruhte. Diese Verteilung und die Betrachtung eines solchen gerechten Ausgleiches waren dank der Offenbarung der Gerechtigkeit, die sie errichteten und sicherten, als Geburtshelfer eines sozialen wie privaten Glücks gedacht. So war diese Gerechtigkeit das Λ und Ω des psychischen wie des sozialen Lebens, in dem diese Gerechtigkeit das Maß dessen, was es zu wissen und zu tun galt, sowie des erreichbaren ethischen Glücks darstellte. Sie war Ursprung, Mittel und Zweck des menschlichen Lebens selbst.

Das Recht erschien nur als sozialer Inkarnationsort der Gerechtigkeit, indem es jenen notwendigen Beziehungen zwischen freien Menschen Gesetzeskraft verlieh, die als frei in den äußeren und wahrnehmbaren Beziehungen zu den Dingen galten, welche die geistige Prägung des Leibes dieser freien Menschen zu pflegen bestimmte. Auf diese Weise determinierte das moralische Vorwissen die menschlichen Lebensbedingungen, und es wurde deshalb angenommen, dass dieses Vorwissen den Menschen als Wesen bestimmte, dem es gebühre, seine instinkthaften Begierden zu beherrschen und dem Geist unterzuordnen.

Der Ausschluss der Benachteiligten und die Beraubung der Macht, über eine dritte politische Instanz zu richten, würde nur jene Leugnung des Selbst als Begierde-Wesen auf den sozialen Plan übertragen, die dieses moralische Konzept des Menschen und eine Leugnung des Urteils des anderen beinhalten, von dem ebenfalls angenommen wurde, unser Feind zu sein, der im voraus und gemäß dem sozialen Neodarwinismus des Kapitalismus mit seiner instinkthaften Begierde gleichgesetzt wird. Das eigentliche politische Organ galt nur, solange es das Gewaltmonopol besaß und als einzige legitimierte Gewalt dazu ermächtigt war, die 'naturgegebene' zwischenmenschliche Gewalt zu bezwingen. Nur das politische Organ galt folglich als fähig, das Irrationale dem Geist zu unterwerfen.

Eine philosophische Distanzierung gegenüber der Anziehungskraft, die ein sich selbst genügendes, unabhängig von seiner Umsetzung gebilligtes Rechtsideal ausübt, ist nur über die Unterscheidung der Idee der Gerechtigkeit von derjenigen des Rechts zu erreichen: man muss aus ihm alles das tilgen, was es ermöglicht

hatte, aus dem Recht diesen *deus ex machina* zu machen, der fähig war, die natürlichen Kräfteverhältnisse wie durch Zauber in Vernunftkräfte umzuwandeln, der die Gerechtigkeit ins ethisch-politische Leben hineinzwang und es damit unweigerlich zum Verderb brachte.

Die demokratische Grundlage des Rechtsstaates reicht tatsächlich nicht aus, zu garantieren, dass sich das Gerechtigkeitsideal und das öffentliche Wohl für jeden erfüllen. Weil die demokratische Grundlage ihnen aber ein vermeintlicher Garant ist, gewährleistet der juristische Bürgerstatus einerseits allen sozialen Partnern von vornherein den gleichen Zugang zu einer autarken Freiheit und zur Achtung ihrer Gleichstellung und regt andererseits zur Beschwörung einer brüderlichen Solidarität an, um die faktischen Ungerechtigkeiten zu mindern. Der prinzipielle Zugang zu einer autarken Freiheit muss auch hier wieder mit dem Opfer des individuellen Urteils bezahlt werden, das auf einen Begierden- und Rechtsträger, sowie auf den Vollstrecker der zu ihrer Erfüllung notwendigen Handlungen reduziert wird. Diese selbstverständliche Geltung wurde der politischen Gewalt zugeschrieben, ohne dass die eigentliche Verteilung der Rechte, Pflichten und Güter anders als allgemein und prinzipiell beurteilt werden konnte, da die Individuen und das soziale Leben nur Orte der Umsetzung dieser sozialen und juristischen Verträge sein konnten, von denen angenommen wurde, dass sie bereits das Wissen der notwendigen Beziehungen zwischen freien Menschen beinhalteten.

Das Rechtssystem ist nur mittels der Fragestellung, ob es dem Gerechtigkeitsideal entspricht, das dieses System zu erfüllen behauptete, zum Eigentum des modernen, zum Rechtsstaat verwandelten Staates geworden. Die Gerechtigkeitsfrage geistert durch das moderne Recht und verlangt für diese Änderungen eine ständige Legitimation, die den Durchbruch des juristischen Positivismus Benthams und Kelsens verhindert, und somit die Durchsetzung der reinen formalen Macht einer performativen Selbstlegitimation, die den juristischen Erklärungen eigen ist. Wenn dies so ist, gehört die Gerechtigkeit nur unter der Bedingung zum Recht, dass die Gesetze der Gerechtigkeitsidee entsprechen. Diese zweckmäßige Bedingung ist wiederum alles andere als formal, denn sie beruht, wie R. Dworkin betont hat, auf jener ethischen Forderung, die den Glauben an eine Rationalität des Rechts nährt. In schwierigen Fällen (hard cases) impliziert die Annahme, dass es trotz allem sehr wohl eine juristische Lösung für unlösbare Fälle gibt, einen ethischen Glauben an die Existenz einer gerechten Lösung. Die Rechtsprechung beruht demnach auf einer seltsamen juristischen Ethik : sie zwingt den Richter dazu, von der Existenz dieser im Rechtssystem gegebenen Lösung zu wissen und sie gleichzeitig identifizieren zu müssen. Diese ethische Vernunft erweist sich aus diesem Grund als handelnde Rechtsvernunft.

Die verfahrensrechtliche Institutionalisierung des zwangslosen Dialogs, die J. Habermas befürwortet, kann nur die Legalisierung der Moral erreichen, sowie die Umwandlung der Forderung nach einem ethischen Wissen um die faire Natur des

Rechts in apriorisches kognitives Eigentum der rechtsetzenden und rechtsprechenden Argumentationsgemeinschaft. Und sie kann diese Argumentationsgemeinschaft in einen heiligen Kommunikationsraum verwandeln, ja sogar in eine Vernunftinstanz, die sich in ihrer rechtsgebenden und rechtsprechenden Fähigkeit verkörpert, die juristischen Formen zuverlässig zu erkennen, welche die Gerechtigkeit anzunehmen hat.

All diese aus der ethischen Dogmatik des Rechts entstammenden rechtlichen, ethischen und politischen Schlussforderungen vermehren nur von vornherein die bereits über die Praktiken transportierte Rechtfertigung des Ausschlusses der wegen sozialer, technischer und wissenschaftlicher Inkompetenz in Sachen Lebensbedingungen Ausgeschlossenen auf der Ebene der Selbstbegründung der juristischen Praktiken und ihrer theoretischen Meta-Beschreibungen.

So lassen sie nicht diese 'Anderen' der liberalen Gesellschaft sprechen und berauben sie – mit dem Segen der juristischen Ethik – aller Rechte zum Ungehorsam, nämlich des Rechts, die Ungerechtigkeitsdiagnose gegenüber jedem Recht zu vertreten. Denn jedes Rechtssystem schafft es, die Beziehungen, die das Wissen des anderen berücksichtigen, von vornherein der Forderung nach juristischen Vertragsverhältnissen zu unterstellen. Es zwingt damit diese 'Anderen', ihre Urteilskraft gegen ihre Produktionsfähigkeit einzutauschen. Es fragt sich, ob sie nicht konform werden müssen mit dem, was von ihnen als Produktionskraft erwartet wird, um das Recht zu erlangen, sich selber und den anderen als konform, bzw. nicht-konform mit dem Entwurf zu beurteilen, den die demokratische Programmierung des Rechts von ihm entworfen hat.

Genau dieses Opfer ihrer bürgerlichen Urteilsfähigkeit wird ihnen abverlangt, damit sie dazu berechtigt werden, an der demokratischen Gerechtigkeit teilzuhaben. So erlaubt wiederum dieses Opfer, dass man all diejenigen, die in dieser Gerechtigkeit keine gerechten Bedingungen für ihr Leben finden, einer Gerechtigkeit opfert, von der angenommen wird, dass sie für die Funktionalität der Verfassung, der gesetzgebenden Macht und des Rechtssystems notwendig ist. Gesichert ist hier nur die Ungerechtigkeit, die darin besteht, das Ungerechte als dem Recht inhärent anzuerkennen. So erlaubt diese Gewissheit die Aufopferung aller derjenigen, die vom Gegenteil überzeugt sind, nämlich von den Opfern des pragmatischen Liberalismus.

Dennoch sind sie es, die die Wahrheit über das abwendbare Schicksal einer vermeintlichen Gerechtigkeit der Rechtssysteme aussprechen. Denn diese Gerechtigkeit ist nur ethisch, solange sie nicht diejenigen hervorbringt, die ihre Taten, Wünsche und Wissen dem gebeugt haben, was die Legitimität von Arbeitsverträgen jedem zu sein erlaubt, und weil diese Rechtssysteme selber von vornherein diejenigen mit Ausschluss bestrafen, die es wagen, sie zu kritisieren.

In letzter Analyse erzwingt also dieses Opfern der Urteilskraft nur das Opfern der Gerechtigkeit an den politischen Rechtsbetrieb, der uns das Urteil aufnötigt, dass es, um an der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit teilzuhaben, nur gerecht und ehrbar sei, seine Produktions- und Urteilskraft zu verkaufen.

Nur dann kann man von der politischen Verkrampfung geheilt werden, die angesichts einer gerechten Verteilung der Rechte, Pflichten und Güter nach einer Lösung der Probleme strebt, wenn man sich dessen bewusst wird, dass es ja gar nicht um eine Heilung im eigentlichen Sinne geht. Vielmehr geht es darum zu erkennen, dass das politische Leben nur deshalb eine Krankheit, ein Unglück oder eine Wahnvorstellung entwickelt, weil es als Krankheit oder als notwendige Wahnvorstellung, in jedem Falle aber als Entfremdung diagnostiziert wird, die *a priori* oder von vornherein schon als Selbstverneinung der Vernunft bestanden hat.

Die antagonistischen Beziehungen zwischen den gesellschaftlich wahrnehmbaren Begierden, die eine Reproduktion der ewigen Antagonismen zwischen den griechischen Göttern darstellen, sind seit Platon auf großzügige Weise als das an die Menschen verteilt worden, was ihre 'Natur' bestimme. Diese Ansicht aber ist nichts als eine Unwahrheit und als eine philosophische Ungerechtigkeit dem Menschen gegenüber. Sie beruht sowohl in der Antike, als auch in der Moderne auf der Unwissenheit dessen, wie im Menschen selbst die Beziehung zu seinen Begierden erzeugt wird, nämlich als eine *a priori* kommunikative vernünftige, nicht aber unvernünftige Beziehung. Angesichts dieser ursprünglichen Beziehung wäre es durchaus unangebracht, als Schutz ein philosophisches, bzw. politisches Verteidigungssystem zu erfinden, gegen das man sich nicht wehren könnte.

Vielmehr heißt es, diese kommunikative und vernünftige Beziehung unserem Wahrheitsurteil zu unterstellen.

Erkennt man diese Notwendigkeit an, dann ist man auch gezwungen, an die Stelle des Primats der praktischen Vernunft, das seit Kant betont wird, dasjenige der theoretischen Vernunft zu setzen, und dies sogar im Bereich der ethisch-politischen Beziehungen. Nur eines befreit tatsächlich von den ethisch-politischen Beziehungen, die man zu sein anerkennt und die man im Leben und in der Erfahrung so zu sein beurteilt, wie man sich auch in der Kommunikation zu sein anerkennt: man muss das, von dem im Leben, in der Erfahrung und in der Kommunikation gesagt wird, dass man es sei, auch als die einzig existierende Wirklichkeit in den ethisch-politischen Beziehungen anerkennen können.

Die Ausübung des politischen Wahrheitsurteils besteht in der Tat ausschließlich darin, nur das zu verwirklichen, bzw. verwirklichen zu lassen, von dem man gedacht hat, dass man es sei oder dass der andere es sei; denn man hat es ja nur deshalb so denken können, weil man es bereits als wahr gedacht hat, und zwar als sein eigenes Wesen und als das Wesen des anderen. Nur so lässt sich der

philosophische Empirismus der neuen Moderne in der Wirklichkeit unseres Selbst und unserer Welt anwenden.

Die transkulturelle Philosophie der neuen Moderne

Die sich als fortgeschritten verstehenden Industriegesellschaften rühmen sich bekanntlich, unter ihrem Dach die unterschiedlichsten Völkerschaften zu vereinigen. Sie sichern ihnen ihre Existenz, ihr Überleben zu, indem sie ihnen unter dem Banner von Liberalismus, Toleranz und demokratischem Pluralismus Schutz und reibungslose Koexistenz versprechen.

Dieser Multikulturalismus ist jedoch nicht mit den Kulturen selbst verbunden. Er ist ja als solcher global und kann daher nicht die spezifische Substanz, die Einmaligkeit, die unverwechselbaren Physiognomien der Kulturen einbeziehen.

Als global auslegen und verstehen aber kann er sich allein aufgrund eines Paradoxes. Seine weltweite Verbreitung stützt sich auf ein Denken, das zwar alle Mauern mühelos durchdringt, in die sich die Kulturen eingeschlossen haben mögen, aber nur, weil er ihnen genau das nimmt, was sie zu Kulturen macht: die Eigenart, die Einzigartigkeit des Urteilsvermögens, das sich in der Kultur ausdrückt.

Das liberale Denken zwingt allen Partikularitäten, allen kulturellen Besonderheiten die eigenen Gesetze auf, und diese sind die Gesetze des Marktes, die sie systematisch den Regulativen von Angebot und Nachfrage unterwerfen. Gleichsam treten die Menschen in den Rahmen einer Versuchsanordnung ein, innerhalb derer die einzelne Kultur aufs 'kulturelle Erbe' reduziert wird, in dem sie zum austauschbaren Markenartikel verdinglicht worden ist.

Der Multikulturalismus gleicht einem kulturellen Niemandsland; er verurteilt die einzelne Kultur zu derselben Art von Autismus wie der, der den Spätkapitalismus auszeichnet, der das 'interkulturelle Gespräch' nur unter der Bedingung zulässt, dass das neutralisierende und relativierende Denkmodell des Liberalismus übernommen worden ist.

Die eigentümliche Kraft seiner Verbreitung und Durchsetzung verdankt der Liberalismus dem Umstand, dass er auf gewisse Weise seinerseits 'kulturalisierend' tätig ist. Er stellte ein logisches und dynamisches Denkmodell bereit, bevor er sich noch zur politischen Ökonomie entwickelt hat.

Insofern sich der liberale Kapitalismus unserer Tage auf ein soziales Kalkül stützt, das die wechselseitige Befriedigung der Wünsche und Bedürfnisse der Menschen propagiert, versucht er, die Menschen dazu zu bewegen, ein Maximum an Befriedigung ihrer Wünsche und Bedürfnisse einzufordern – darunter viele, die er

überhaupt erst produziert – und ihnen zugleich zu suggerieren, dass sie Herr und Meister ihrer Wünsche und Begierden sind und mithin autonom.

Deshalb hört man die ständige Predigt einer Moral, die den Verbrauchern Autonomie, Selbstständigkeit und Selbstmächtigkeit verheißt, bzw. unterstellt. Die politisch-ökonomischen Strategien zielen darauf ab, die mögliche oder wirkliche ‘Triebbefriedigung’ der Menschen einerseits unausgesetzt zu bestätigen und ihnen andererseits in allen ihren Handlungen und zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen uneingeschränkte Autonomie zu bescheinigen. Das politische Leben muss den Menschen transformieren, um diese pleonaxische Befriedigung aller seiner Wünsche und diese Autarkie sichtbar zu machen, ganz wie der Experimentalwissenschaftler sich die gegenständliche Welt so zuzurichten sucht, dass sie die Wahrheit seiner Hypothesen bestätigen kann und diese Wahrheit sichtbar macht.

Der experimentierende Pragmatismus sozialer Gerechtigkeit, den der fortgeschrittene Kapitalismus praktiziert, hat die Logik der Experimentalwissenschaften auf die Ebene der Sozialbeziehungen übertragen, und so sucht er wie diese eine Übereinstimmung der realen Welt mit der vorausgesetzten Hypothese zu erzielen – und damit notwendig auch die Übereinstimmung der einzelnen menschlichen Monaden untereinander. Der auf diese Weise hergestellte scheinbare Konsensus der Menschen kann sich dann so unauffällig wie allmählich zu einer Instanz verfestigen, die die Menschen unauffällig ‘transzendiert’, die sich ihren trivialen Wünschen und Begierden vorgeschaltet hat und sie entsprechend reguliert.

Es scheint, als habe sich die ‘provisionelle Moral’, die dem cartesianischen System zugrunde liegt – ihrer eigenen Tendenz nach müsste sie ja alles einschließen, was sich etwa künftig noch erwarten lassen könnte –, auch auf sozialer Ebene durchgesetzt und zu jener ‘totalen Experimentierung’ geführt, die der Mensch nunmehr mit sich selbst anstellt.

Die Suche nach einer die soziale Gerechtigkeit betreffenden Gewissheit ist offensichtlich der Gewissheit analog, nach der auch die Experimentalwissenschaften streben. Sie hat die ‘totale Experimentierung’, die der liberale Kapitalismus durchführt, ohne sich Rechenschaft darüber abzulegen, in ein Forschungsunternehmen transformiert, dessen Ziel so etwas wie die permanente Selbstvergewisserung kapitalistischer Sozialität zu sein scheint. Im Kontext dieser Serie von Experimenten experimentiert die einzelne Monade sowohl beständig mit sich selbst als auch mit dem jeweils anderen.

Deshalb intendiert der beabsichtigte Konsensus mit dem jeweiligen Ansprechpartner, diesen davon zu überzeugen, dass die ihm in jeder Äußerung vorgeschlagene Hypothese über das Leben richtig ist (bzw. zu sein scheint), so dass

er sie mittels der abstrakten Handlung der Kommunikation teilen kann. Das Sprachspiel der Wissenschaften konnte sich auf diese Weise verallgemeinern und die Menschen ihrerseits zum experimentellen Umgang mit Menschen und zum Selbstexperiment antreiben.

Diese Universalisierung scheint sowohl für das soziale als auch für das individuelle Leben der Menschen zu gelten. Sie hat uns zu der Entdeckung verholfen, dass die Hirnprozesse selbst nichts anderes sind als Versuche, die Kommunikation bzw. Selbstkommunikation aufrecht zu erhalten. Das monadologische Ich führt dadurch eine Art von permanentem Dialog mit sich selbst. Es kann die erforderliche Selbstregulierung nur über die sensorischen, affektiven, kognitiven und kommunikativen Zeichen und Impulse erreichen, indem es diese Regulierung zugleich in Harmonie mit den Dialogen zu setzen trachtet, die es mit seinen realen Ansprechpartnern führt.

Seit dem Untergang der totalitären Regime des Ostblocks sind dem Liberalismus und dem freien Unternehmertum – und mithin demselben kapitalistisch-liberalen Denkmodell, das von den Vereinigten Staaten als Vorbild repräsentiert wird – offensichtlich keine Grenzen mehr gesetzt. Es hat sich auf den ganzen Planeten ausgedehnt und scheint mehr denn je dazu legitimiert, die einzige universale Form des Lebens anzubieten.

Dass sich diesem historischen Triumph niemand mehr entziehen kann, hat offenbar einen einzigen plausiblen Grund: die liberale Demokratie kann sich auf die Errungenschaften der europäischen Aufklärung berufen, auf die Freiheit und Gleichheit der Sozialpartner. Sie konnte im 20. Jahrhundert endlich von den Vorzügen profitieren, die ihr einst A. de Tocqueville – und in jüngerer Zeit L. Hartz – attestiert haben.

So schrieb etwa der letztere, die Amerikaner hätten den Europäern voraus, unter demokratischen Verhältnissen zu leben, ohne dass sie sie durch eine Revolution hätten erkämpfen müssen. Sie seien schon als Gleiche zur Welt gekommen; sie hätten es nicht erst werden müssen. Die Überquerung des Atlantiks hätte es ihnen gestattet, auf neuem Boden die Ideale der gerechten Verteilung – und damit der christlichen Heilsbotschaft – zu etablieren, ohne den ererbten Feudalismus umwälzen zu müssen.

Die gemeinsame Erfahrung der Krisen, wie sie das ökonomische und kulturelle Wachstum mit sich brachte, hätte einen Konsensus herbeigeführt, der es erlaubte, die durch das ungebremste Selbst- und Privatinteresse entstandenen Antagonismen auch auf alle übrigen Bereiche des sozialen Lebens auszudehnen und dabei die Anwendung von Gewaltmaßnahmen auf ein Minimum zu beschränken.

Die Unterwerfung unter den Konsensus sei nicht allein die Folge, die aus dem Gesetz des ökonomischen und sozialen Fortschritts abgeleitet werden müsse ; vielmehr sei der Fortschritt zugleich als Motor für den wissenschaftlichen und technischen Fortschritt angesehen worden, der auch jedem Einzelnen zugute komme und dazu beitrage, den dem Liberalismus eigentümlichen Prozess der Rationalisierung von Mensch und Universum zu vollenden. Mit ihm gelange die Menschheit zu ihrer philosophischen Bestimmung.

Aber diese uns von der jüngeren Geschichte Nordamerikas nahegelegte Hyperlegitimierung der amerikanischen Demokratie bleibt fragwürdig, selbst wenn wir berücksichtigen, dass es ihr gelang, die überdimensionalen Engpässe und Krisen, die die Universalisierung des 'blinden' Konsensus begleiteten, zu verdrängen, bzw. zu vergessen. Sie entlastete in der Tat den Einzelnen von der Pflicht, sich über die wahren Resultate der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung Rechenschaft abzulegen.

Wie die Analysen S. Wolins in seiner Zeitschrift *Democracy* gezeigt haben, war der amerikanische Expansionswille in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren von der Intention bestimmt, vom allgemeinen Versagen des Staates nach Kräften abzulenken.

Dieser Staat war ja ursprünglich entstanden, um im Interesse der Minoritäten und der Individuen die Macht der Korporationen und später der multinationalen Unternehmen einzudämmen. Aber das Anwachsen der sozialen Ungleichheiten und ihr Export in die Beziehungen der USA zu den Ländern der Dritten Welt, die Ausbrüche von Rassenhass, Integritismus und Nationalismus, der rasante Anstieg der Gewaltbereitschaft und die mit ihm entstehende zivile Unsicherheit – all das trat nur um so greller an den Tag in den zynischen Äußerungen der Politiker, in ihrer schamlosen, parasitären Berufung auf die internationale Legitimation Amerikas und im Neoliberalismus, sowie in der Resignation all derer, die vom Zugang zu den gesellschaftlichen Gütern ausgeschlossen worden waren.

Der kapitalistische Geist erweist sich damit als eine kulturelle globale Katastrophe, die imstande ist, auch noch die bestehenden Kulturen vollends zu erschüttern.

Die ökonomische Mondialisierung schwingt sich heute, so scheint es, nicht nur zur 'Globalisierung' auf, wobei sie allen Ländern das kulturelle Gesetz des freien Marktes und die Deregulierung des sozialen Lebens aufzwingt, sondern sie zielt zunehmend auch darauf ab, sich zum Prinzip anderer Mondialisierungen, d.h. zu 'kulturellen Mondialisierungen' zu machen, die unabhängig von ihr bestehen, bzw. die ihr vorausgingen und sie als ökonomische Mondialisierung erst hervorgebracht haben: dies gilt etwa für die kulturelle Mondialisierung des politischen Liberalismus, der okzidentalen und orientalen Kulturen, der Religionen oder Säkularismen, für die kulturelle Mondialisierung der NGOs, die kulturelle

Mondialisierung der Kunst, der Wissenschaft und der Technik und ganz allgemein für alle kulturellen Mondialisierungen.

Aber auch wenn diese ökonomische Mondialisierung als Globalisierung das denkbar effizienteste System von Verarmung und Ausschluss hervorgebracht hat, ist mit ihr und durch sie eine dazu im Gegensatz stehende kulturelle Welt entstanden: obwohl sie die Entwicklungsdynamik dieser kulturellen Welt auch diktiert, sieht es so aus, als ob sie imstande wäre, eine nicht dagewesene internationale Öffentlichkeit entstehen zu lassen, die einen Prozess des weltumspannenden Austauschs antreibt und eine Delokalisierung des Kulturellen mit dem Effekt, Kreativität und Kritik jenseits staatlicher Regulation zu einer emanzipativen Kraft werden zu lassen. Die auf diese Weise gewonnene Unabhängigkeit kultureller Mondialisierungen von nationalstaatlichen Strukturen scheint das Gegengift gegen 'die Globalisierung' im Sinne einer vereinheitlichenden Etablierung des Marktprinzips zu sein.

François de Bernard

Le paradoxe de «la globalisation», des mondialisations et des droits de l'Homme

Je partirai d'un double constat paradoxal. Le premier volet de ce constat, que l'on peut faire sur un plan aussi bien métaphysique qu'anthropologique et pratique, est que « la globalisation » (technologique, informationnelle, économique, financière...) s'est progressivement dévoilée dans les faits comme une négation des droits de l'Homme. Le second aspect, à la fois « éloigné » et cependant lié, est que *les mondialisations* (de l'éducation, de la recherche, des informations, des luttes...) se sont au contraire et déjà révélées être des leviers majeurs pour défendre, promouvoir et développer dans toutes leurs conséquences les mêmes droits de l'Homme.

Comment *entendre* véritablement ce paradoxe et le résoudre de manière rationnelle fait l'objet de la présente analyse.

La globalisation ne s'intéresse pas aux droits de l'Homme, et ce en divers sens. Par « globalisation », j'entends ici la vague de globalisation contemporaine à l'œuvre dans les domaines technologique, informationnel, économique et financier (liste non limitative). Une vague de globalisation qu'il s'agit aussi d'entendre, non pas comme un « phénomène naturel » (comme la marée) sur lequel le politique n'aurait pas de pouvoir, mais bien comme un projet, qui a été préfiguré, conçu et débattu comme tel par exemple à l'hôtel Fairmont de San Francisco en 1995¹⁴, puis mis en œuvre progressivement depuis la fin des Années 1980 avec le concours de tous ceux — leaders politiques et économiques, en particulier — qui ont saisi les avantages qu'ils pourraient en tirer pour eux-mêmes et pour leurs affidés, ou qui y ont même parfois souscrit « malgré eux ».

En premier lieu, la globalisation ne s'intéresse ni à l'Homme ni au citoyen, ni au « sujet de droit ». Son intérêt est strictement focalisé sur le consommateur: ainsi « l'homme » ne peut-il l'intéresser, à titre accessoire, *que* comme consommateur de biens, de services, d'images, de recettes, de potions et aussi de coulevres! Le « globe » de la « globalisation » se distingue d'un « monde » authentique en ceci qu'il ne doit être peuplé *que* de consommateurs, dont la vocation principale est de

¹⁴ À l'occasion du premier *State of the World Forum*, censé préfigurer et analyser le monde à venir, et où étaient réunis Margaret Thatcher, George Bush n°1, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Vaclav Havel, George Schulz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Bill Gates, Ted Turner, etc.

consommer (avoir, posséder, acquérir, louer, vendre, gérer...), et non pas d'*être* (un homme, un humain, une personne, un citoyen, un électeur, un sujet de droit...).

En deuxième lieu, la globalisation ne s'intéresse que très peu au droit en général, ou alors seulement à ce que l'on pourrait nommer le droit de globaliser sans souci... avec le moins de « droit normatif » possible, le moins d'« instruments juridiques », de conventions, de traités, sans parler de ces « déclarations universelles » et autres bizarreries superfétatoires marquées du sceau de l'inutilité... À l'inverse, c'est plutôt le « non-droit » qui apparaît comme le royaume d'élection de la globalisation car, moins il y en va, du droit, et de son respect, de son application, plus il est aisé et loisible de globaliser en ayant les coudées franches.

En troisième lieu, et pour entendre un aspect distinct de leurs relations, on soulignera que la globalisation a « d'autres priorités que les droits de l'Homme », et que, même si ses zélotes laissent parfois croire qu'elle ne leur est pas indifférente (ce qui a des avantages « en termes marketing »), le projet qui la porte estime que les droits de l'Homme ne doivent pas être posés au commencement, c'est-à-dire comme des « principes fondateurs », mais plutôt à la fin, c'est-à-dire envisagés comme conséquence éventuelle (ou « cerise sur le gâteau ») de la réussite escomptée d'un processus de globalisation dont on rêve « l'achèvement »... En bref, si vous voulez avoir les droits de l'Homme, leur reconnaissance, leur avènement, leur triomphe, il vous est suggéré d'en *passer par la globalisation*, de vous en remettre à elle comme moyen ou moteur desdits droits, plutôt que d'en réclamer la réalisation préalable, ce qui ne saurait être possible...

Toute la démarche du *projet de globalisation* (puisque'il faut bien l'appeler ainsi) va même à l'encontre de la reconnaissance, de la défense et de la promotion des droits de l'Homme. Les droits de l'Homme, leur revendication sont en effet autant d'obstacles sur le chemin radieux d'une globalisation dont tout le mouvement s'efforce précisément et de manière obstinée... d'*abolir les obstacles* politiques, juridiques, fiscaux, réglementaires, supposés entraver sa course à l'uniformisation des fabrications, des consommations, des échanges, des discours et, finalement, des pensées et des œuvres!

S'il fallait résumer d'un trait le jugement que les concepteurs, animateurs et promoteurs (à divers titres) du projet de globalisation peuvent se faire des droits de l'Homme dans le globe globalisé et globalisant actuel, ce serait que ces droits sont des « empêcheurs de globaliser en rond » et, selon la vulgate gestionnaire, que leurs « avantages compétitifs » éventuels (« restant à prouver ») sont sans commune mesure avec leurs inconvénients effectifs.

Si l'on poursuit même un degré au-delà de l'idée que *projet de globalisation* et projet des droits de l'Homme¹⁵ sont contraires, opposés, voire, et de manière plus spéculative, intrinsèquement *contradictaires*, on est fondé à se demander si l'un des ressorts essentiels du projet contemporain de globalisation (ce jeune homme d'un quart de siècle) n'est pas, d'une certaine façon (et cela réclame d'être évalué sous ses différents aspects), une authentique *négation* du projet des droits de l'Homme, déjà « vieux » de deux siècles et demi.

Par « négation », je ne suggère pas d'entendre forcément ici une démarche volontaire d'annihilation¹⁶, mais plutôt cette dérive insidieuse qui est celle des prétendus « changements d'agenda » d'une époque prenant pour parangon (encore une fois, hélas !) une fausse « nouveauté » qui est, par essence, anhistorique et aphosphique. La « négation des droits de l'Homme » ne se limite pas, en effet (ce serait trop simple) aux figures multipliées et répétées de la tyrannie, de la barbarie, du génocide, que le XX^{ème} siècle et le début du XXI^{ème} ont fait défiler sans relâche et selon un rythme accéléré...

De fait, la négation, cela peut être aussi (sur un mode presque indolore) cette procession de discours (avec tous les actes possibles pouvant en résulter) selon lesquels « *les droits de l'Homme ne sont plus la priorité* », ou bien « *la priorité, c'est la croissance, c'est le chômage!* » (comprendre au détriment d'autres choses, telles que les droits de l'Homme, précisément), ou bien « *il ne faut pas se tromper sur les priorités* » (discours encore plus pervers qui fait du « défenseur des droits de l'Homme » un coupable d'irresponsabilité), et une foule d'autres discours aussi retors et profondément destructeurs de la valeur et du sens mêmes du concept de « droits de l'Homme ».

Cependant, malgré ce constat inquiétant, le paysage concerné offre des nuances de taille, qu'il serait regrettable d'ignorer, d'autant qu'elles permettent d'espérer un sort plus enviable à la problématique des droits de l'Homme, aux combats soutenus en leur faveur de longue date sur les fronts les plus divers, enfin à leur « actualité » et à leur « priorité ».

La première « nuance » contraint à rappeler la distinction (aussi peu médiatique qu'elle est essentielle) entre « la globalisation » et « les mondialisations », et à mesurer la différence décisive (et même ontologique) que l'une et les autres

¹⁵ Un projet des droits de l'Homme, que l'on peut aussi nommer « projet des Lumières », dans la mesure où il n'est pas séparable de l'idéal cosmopolitique plus généralement théorisé et discuté par les intellectuels et les artistes de la seconde moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle.

¹⁶ Cf. à cet égard, le slogan « en finir avec le *droitdelhommisme* », qui s'entend de manière croissante chez des intellectuels organiques haineux, chantres du néolibéralisme, du racisme et de l'ethnocentrisme...

entretiennent avec « les droits de l'Homme ». La difficulté vient du fait que « la globalisation » (technologique, économique, monétaire, informationnelle) a été présentée dès son avènement médiatique et politique (vers la fin des Années 1980) sous la forme d'un paradigme unique, sans équivalent historique et, par voie de conséquence, excluant. La globalisation fut ainsi désirée par ses promoteurs comme auto-suffisante, auto-explicative¹⁷, incommensurable. Dans ces conditions, il n'était bien sûr alors pas question de laisser place à des mondialisations plurielles¹⁸, comme nous l'avons requis dès 1999, *des mondialisations* permettant le dévoilement d'analyses (du monde contemporain et de ses figures conflictuelles), d'interprétations et de projets tout à fait différents (quand ils ne s'opposent pas frontalement) de ceux de la globalisation capitaliste, gestionnaire et impériale.

Or, que cela soit reconnu ou non par les chantres de la globalisation exclusive, *les mondialisations* ont désormais (depuis une dizaine d'années) gagné droit de cité et dignité non seulement dans les milieux académiques, les acteurs sociaux et la société civile internationale, mais aussi, bien que plus timidement, dans les milieux politiques, économiques et médiatiques. Car ces mondialisations que l'on ne peut réduire à « la globalisation », ce sont aussi, par exemple et avec une importance croissante, la mondialisation des luttes pour l'abolition de la peine de mort et de meilleures conditions de vie pour tous les prisonniers; la mondialisation des politiques multilatérales visant à permettre à chacun de « *vivre dans une égale dignité* », avec une nourriture, des conditions sanitaires et environnementales convenables ; la mondialisation des campagnes de lutte pour le développement ou le rétablissement de la liberté d'expression ; la mondialisation des échanges d'opinions et de pratiques sur les questions environnementales et énergétiques, etc.

¹⁷ Une « self-fulfilling prophecy » de plus...

¹⁸ Que le collectif transdisciplinaire et transnational du GERM s'efforce avec constance d'étudier et d'analyser depuis le lancement de ses travaux lors de l'année 2000. Cf. l'explicitation formulée sur son site Internet à l'adresse <http://www.mondialisations.org/php/public/art.php?id=14433&lan=FR> : « "La mondialisation" et "la globalisation" sont des expressions désignant un processus qui étend les principes de l'économie de marché à l'ensemble de la planète. Mais elles ne prennent en compte que la figure économique d'un mouvement plus complexe. Le concept de "mondialisations" (au pluriel) s'efforce, au contraire, de rendre compte de la diversité et de la singularité des différents processus de mondialisation à l'œuvre dans tous les champs d'activité. (...) "Les mondialisations" sont l'ensemble des processus culturels, informationnels, sociaux, économiques et politiques "mondialisés", c'est-à-dire : 1) diffusés à l'échelle du monde humain, en dépit des barrières d'origine nationale, géographique, technologique, linguistique, etc. ; 2) mettant à la disposition des hommes, de toute origine, culture et pays, des idées, des contenus, des services et des produits semblables ; enfin, 3) susceptibles d'avoir un impact "mondial" sur les activités humaines, quelle que soit leur nature. » Cf. également l'article « Le GERM : un laboratoire de la diversité culturelle pour comprendre «la globalisation» et *les mondialisations* » et « les mondialisations » » (<http://www.mondialisations.org/php/public/art.php?id=2218&lan=FR>, novembre 2001).

Plus généralement encore, on ne peut éviter de constater le paradoxe d'une mondialisation croissante des efforts, des luttes, des mobilisations en faveur d'une prise en compte toujours plus importante des droits de l'Homme dans les systèmes de gouvernement et de « gouvernance » : une mondialisation qui entre en conflit avec le slogan de la globalisation économique, lequel s'efforce, de son côté, de faire valoir le caractère prétendument secondaire ou accessoire de ses droits par rapport aux « véritables enjeux économiques » et à la prétendue « Realpolitik »...

La situation actuelle sur le front des droits de l'Homme, de « la globalisation »¹⁹ et des autres formes de mondialisation se caractérise donc par une contradiction interne aussi intéressante que problématique. En effet, ce qui se présente sous l'espèce monolithique de « la globalisation » inévitable et indispensable manifeste à tous égards (par ses actes, par les théories et les pratiques qui accompagnent son projet chrématistique) que les droits de l'Homme sont devenus contingents par rapport aux impératifs propres d'une extension sans limites de son phénomène (au sens précisément phénoménologique). Simultanément, en ayant recours à et en prenant appui sur des moyens de facilitation et de diffusion semblables²⁰, 'autres mondialisations que l'on repère à l'œuvre dans tous les champs d'activité de la société civile, académique, sociale, culturelle, médicale, environnementale, mais aussi économique et politique, mettent au contraire en évidence que le projet des droits de l'Homme peut être relancé, poursuivi et accompli de manière plus rapide et « performante » (sinon « efficiente », en langue gestionnaire) par le déploiement même dans toutes les sphères d'activité humaine de ces mondialisations plurielles qui ne prétendent, à l'inverse, à aucune exclusivité ou inévitabilité.

La différence essentielle entre ces deux projets et phénomènes²¹ ne tient peut-être, à la vérité, qu'à une question de volonté, de détermination et de choix, et le paradoxe soulevé n'est peut-être, au fond, qu'une affaire d'idéologies²² et de priorités.

De fait, les uns (qui sont bien des hommes, et non pas des processus, même s'ils se dissimulent derrière leur simulacre) considèrent que les droits de l'Homme, leur sens et leur réalisation peuvent se révéler au mieux comme sous-produits et conséquences ultimes d'une « globalisation achevée » sur les plans économique,

¹⁹ Autocentrée, exclusive, prétendument nécessaire et suffisante.

²⁰ Les fameuses « TIC », soit les technologies contemporaines de l'information et de la communication, qui étaient dites « nouvelles » il y a encore peu (« NTIC ») et ont perdu cet adjectif de par leur massification.

²¹ Car il faut effectivement les nommer « projets » et « phénomènes », ce qui s'oppose à la vulgate dominante, qui ne discerne pour sa part que des « faits », des « processus », des dynamiques sans sujet ni désir *humains* aux manettes des faits et des processus concernés...

²² On prétend souvent « les idéologies mortes » avec la chute du Mur de Berlin, mais cette « thèse » est plus que fragile, elle est primesautière.

financier, informationnel, de même que l'éventuelle généralisation du paradigme démocratique à l'ensemble de la planète. Mais, à leurs yeux, droits de l'Homme et démocratie ne sauraient être posés au principe et comme priorités susceptibles de perturber le bon déroulement du cycle et l'accomplissement du phénomène de globalisation. Car, pour eux, c'est la globalisation même qui est seule prioritaire, et pour des motifs nullement « originaux » ou « nouveaux », puisqu'ils restent ceux explicités par Aristote lorsqu'il souligne²³, dans ses *Politiques* en particulier, la distinction à opérer entre l'économie (l'*Oikonomia* juste, normale, « soutenable », comme on aime à le dire aujourd'hui) et l'*économie chrématistique*, dont la dernière incarnation est celle observée aujourd'hui sous la forme de la globalisation financière, monétaire et boursière en cours. Une « économie » qui n'est en fait plus du tout une *Oikonomia*²⁴, mais qui a basculé du côté pathologique de l'économie pour l'économie, l'économie qui se prend pour fin d'elle-même, et, surtout, une fausse « économie » qui ne vise qu'à un enrichissement sans fin, illimité, toujours plus dénué de cause ou de motif justes... L'*économie spéculative* dépouillée de la prudence, de l'équité et de la raison inhérentes à ce que doit être une économie authentique, et inséparables d'elle.

Pour les autres (qui sont aussi des hommes et des femmes, et non de purs mécanismes économiques et technologiques), le choix est clairement différent, affiché comme tel et présent dans toutes les dimensions des mondialisations concernées²⁵. Pour eux, les droits de l'Homme, conçus et approchés tant au niveau de leurs principes philosophiques et de leurs énoncés déclaratifs que de leur mise en œuvre pratique, apparaissent au contraire et de fait comme inséparables du projet même de mondialisation. Ces droits ne sauraient en être un résultat éventuel et différé dans le temps. Ils en sont la condition et le sens principaux. De ce point de vue, il apparaît même souhaitable de soutenir, que toute mondialisation n'a de sens que de promouvoir et de réaliser une partie du projet des droits de l'Homme, que, sans cet alpha et oméga, elle serait vide de sens et de contenu.

Ce qui advient ici est la question sous-jacente, et largement ignorée, de *l'utilité* des phénomènes de mondialisation. En effet, si l'on aborde notre problématique sous cet angle, force est de reconnaître, dans un premier temps, que la seule utilité véritable du projet de globalisation serait de nature chrématistique. Elle se résumerait à *l'enrichissement sans fin et sans cause* au sein d'un « globe », où il

²³ *Politiques*, Livre I, 8-10, en particulier 1256 sqq.. Cf. aussi le Livre V de l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*.

²⁴ Une administration prudente et intelligente des ressources du « foyer », que celui-ci soit une famille, une maisonnée, un village, une cité, un état ou une *cosmopolis*...

²⁵ Des mondialisations, que l'on perçoit trop souvent encore comme « alternatives » (cf. « *Un autre monde est possible* ») sinon « marginales », alors que l'on devrait plutôt estimer qu'elles constituent le cœur et l'essence du *projet de mondialisation* en général et entendu comme lien vivant entre le projet des Lumières et les conditions objectives de sa possible réalisation présente dans le contexte des Années 2000.

n'y aurait plus comme sujets que des « consommateurs ». De manière non pas seulement opposée, mais absolument éloignée, les mondialisations différentes de la globalisation exclusive et chrématistique ne dévoilent pas d'autre justification ou objectif que l'Homme lui-même, la reconnaissance et la mise en œuvre de ses droits dans des conditions historiques et en fonction d'un certain état de la technique qui permettent (ou facilitent) cette reconnaissance et cette mise en œuvre précisément mondialisées.

Le paradoxe dévoilé se résout ainsi dans la mise en tension entre des projets (celui de « la globalisation » et celui des mondialisations) dont *le rapport aux droits de l'Homme constitue comme la ligne de démarcation*.

Pour la globalisation et ses promoteurs, les droits de l'Homme constituent bien moins qu'une variable d'ajustement ou un hypothétique « effet dérivé » (qu'il soit désiré ou non). Ils sont en réalité perçus comme *un obstacle majeur* sur son chemin et dans sa course triomphale.

Pour les mondialisations positives tissées au jour le jour, en particulier par la société civile, la communauté académique, les acteurs sociaux et culturels dans le monde entier, les mêmes droits de l'Homme sont à l'inverse placés au centre et cœur de leur projet. Cela signifie qu'il ne saurait y avoir de « mondialisation soutenable »²⁶, qui omettrait de réserver la place la plus éminente au respect et à la réalisation effective des droits de l'Homme. Et cela désigne aussi, que les droits de l'Homme apparaissent, d'une certaine façon, comme la vérité authentique et intrinsèque de tout projet de mondialisation.

²⁶ En un temps, où le marketing politique réclame en un leitmotiv aussi obstiné qu'il est impensé, et comme s'il s'agissait d'une martingale absolue, que tout doit être ou devenir « durable » et « soutenable » (*sustainable, sostenible, sustentable*)...

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Revolution and Democracy in the Context of the Globalization

The article studies the issue of the democratization of countries within the globalization context, it points to the unreasonably high economic and social costs of a rapid transition to the democracy as a result of revolutions or of similar large-scale events for those countries, that are unprepared for this. The authors believe, that in a number of cases the authoritarian regimes turn out to be more effective in economic and social terms in comparison with emerging democracies especially of the revolutionary type, which are often incapable to insure a social order and may have a swing to authoritarianism. Effective authoritarian regimes can also be a suitable form of a transition to an efficient and stable democracy.

The article investigates various correlations between revolutionary events and possibilities of establishing the democracy in a society using historical and contemporary examples and, especially, analyzing the recent events in Egypt. The authors demonstrate, that one should take into account a country's degree of sociopolitical and cultural preparedness for democratic institutions. In case of a favorable background, the revolutions can proceed smoothly ("velvet revolutions") with efficient outcomes. On the contrary, the democracy is established with a lot of difficulties, throwbacks, return to totalitarianism, and with outbreaks of violence and military takeovers in the countries with high illiteracy rate and large rural population share, with low female status, with widespread religious fundamentalist ideology, where they hardly ever hear of democracy while the liberal intellectuals idealize this form, where the opposing parties are not willing to respect the rules of the democratic game when defeated at elections.

Keywords : globalization, Near East, Egypt, democracy, revolution, reaction, extremists, counterrevolution, Islamists, totalitarianism, excessive expectations, military takeover, economic efficiency.

There is a widespread opinion, that the globalization contributes to the spread of the democracy. Besides, there is a conviction, which is more widespread among the politicians and ideologists than among the scholars, that democracy contributes to a faster and/or more adequate economic growth. The following quotation passionately expresses this conviction: 'For the past three decades, globalization, human rights, and democracy have been marching forward together, haltingly, not always and everywhere in step, but in a way that unmistakably shows they are interconnected. By encouraging the globalization in less developed countries, we

not only help to raise growth rates and incomes, promote higher standards, and feed, clothe, and house the poor; we also spread political and civil freedoms' (Griswold 2006).

In this context, many supporters of the democracy consider as extremely disappointing, that sometimes the democracy does not work properly and the waves of the democratization get weaker. Samuel Huntington (1993) called the period of a fast spread of the democracy in the 1970s – early 1990s 'the third wave of the democratization'. On the threshold of the twenty-first century, many researchers note that the number of democratic regimes ceases to grow and that it would be a dangerous intellectual temptation for the democrats to consider that the world is inevitably moving towards some final natural democratic state (see Diamond 1999, 2004; 2008). In this situation, the trend has strengthened, which promotes the democracy in all countries with non-democratic or partially democratic regimes. This trend, on the one hand, is based on the global geopolitical goals of the USA and the West (see Brzezinski 1998; Baranov 2006), and on the other hand, it relies upon an active support of a broad ideological and informal movement. And this justifies the efforts to support the democracy and to encourage a democratic opposition for the purpose of increasing chances of victory of the democracy in case of the crisis of authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2000). Intensive efforts led to a number of interventions and color revolutions.

Undoubtedly, the globalization trend is anyway connected with the growth of the number of democratic regimes. One can hardly object that, in the recent decades, the general vector was moving towards the expansion of the democracy. However, the connection between democratization and economic success is not that evident as many new democratic regimes failed to advance either in an economic or social sphere. That is why the intervention and propagation of the democracy arouses much criticism. Besides, an increasing number of people support the idea that people should create their own democratic models, which can significantly differ from the Western model (Weinstein 2001: 414).

Thus, we suppose that some delay in the spread of the democracy in the 2000s was due to the formation of rather successful economic models of development, which do not require any democracy and even contradict it.

Thus, in practice, it is not all that simple as the political philosophers, political scientists and politicians used to think. First of all, an explicit connection between a democratic regime and an economic success is not always present; one would even say, that it is present in the minority of the cases. There are scarce studies, which clearly demonstrate such a connection especially with respect to emerging democracies but at the same time there are abundant works, that prove the opposite

(see Polterovich, Popov 2007).²⁷ On the contrary, in most cases, it is precisely the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes that achieve much economic success as they can better concentrate resources and invest (Ibid). Of course, the most telling example here is China, where the authoritarian rule is the basis for the economic progress. Such countries as Vietnam, Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, and Kazakhstan are rather illustrative examples, as well as Egypt and Tunisia before the recent events. There is a peculiar enclave of monarchy regimes of the Gulf region, that also achieved a great economic success.²⁸

“In the past two decades, a number of economies have followed the path of economic and trade reform leading to political reform. South Korea and Taiwan as recently as the 1980s were governed by authoritarian regimes that did not permit much open dissent. Today, after years of expanding trade and rising incomes, both are multiparty democracies with full political and civil liberties. Other countries, that have most aggressively followed those twin tracks of reform, include Chile, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Portugal, and Tanzania”, claims Daniel Griswold (2006).

In fact, such transitions from the authoritarianism to the democracy did occur. But one can hardly define their way to the democracy as a quick and easy one. Besides, it is important to keep in mind that such countries as Taiwan, South Korea and Chile achieved the main economic success right under authoritarian regimes. And it is far from certain, that if a political democracy had been immediately established there (or preserved as in case with Chile) these countries would have shown the outstanding results at the onset of their rise (we can even suppose that this would not have come true). Finally, there are many examples when a rapid transition to the democracy leads to an economic and often social decline, to hard times in countries' history. Rather tragic events occurred in the development of the former USSR and a number of socialist countries, among which Rumania and Bulgaria, still remain in a difficult situation. The revolutions in Ukraine under the banner of a great enhancement of the democracy also have exacerbated economic difficulties. Here, we can conclude that the ideology aimed at introducing the democracy in countries with a non-democratic or partly democratic regime can bring drastic consequences for the populations of those countries; it does not bring prosperity but on the contrary, can cost the country great and useless sacrifices. “Democracy

²⁷ Even the UN Report stated that there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic growth (UNDP 2002). It is also noted that the total effect of democracy on the economic growth can be characterized as weakly negative (see Barro 1996).

²⁸ On the other hand, the weakening of the economic engine in traditional democratic countries of Europe also leads to a certain distrust to democratic institutions (see Lowi 1999). And what can be the result of the process, which has already been considered, in particular by Robert Dahl, who argues that extending the sphere of a supranational activity reduces the citizens' opportunities to control their vital problems through the national means of rule (Dahl 1989).

above all” is a dangerous slogan, and the politics supporting the radicals and revolutionaries does not hold true from the point of welfare for those countries to which the revolution is exported or where it is introduced.

Thus, one may conclude that quite a long transitional period to the democracy is needed there; and moreover, it may often turn that an authoritarian or semi authoritarian regime is capable of such a transitional function. So, to evaluate a regime positively, one should estimate it not in terms of its concordance with democratic values, but in terms of its economic success and social orientation, as well as the efficiency of its state institutions contributing to the order, stability, secure and consistent politics implementation (on the particular importance of a strong order, state institutions efficiency see among others Liew 2001; Barro 2000; Polterovich, Popov 2007). With a country's advancement toward larger opportunities for people, such regimes will inevitably move toward a larger liberalization. Here, it is sufficient to encourage the regime's actions contributing to the liberalization but not to rely on the radical forces, that can overthrow the regime, and, under the banner of the “democracy”, hurl a country into the chaos.

One should note that the globalization context with a general recognition of the people's rights and condemnation of the violation of justice and law, with a demand for legitimacy (that is electivity) of government can by itself build a positive trend and, in certain respects, restrain authoritarian rulers. With a decreasing illiteracy and with the growing population's self-consciousness necessarily accompanied with an enlarging personal political experience, a transition to the democracy may proceed much easier, smoother and more effectively than the attempts to establish the democracy through revolutionary ways.

The present article makes an attempt to show different versions of the transition to the democracy (from time to time using the example of the recent events in Egypt), to show the costs and political, economic and social perils of the striving to establish the democracy quickly and by radical means.

The general mood in Egypt in July 2013 was exultant, the revolutionaries were exultant either demanding a true democracy. They were exultant because the Egyptian military had ousted the legitimately, publicly and democratically elected President.

Why were the revolutionaries excited with the overthrow of the legitimately elected President? What was this? An absurd, a paradox, a peculiarity of Egypt? No, it is just a common and quite expected outcome of revolutionary events. So, the major issue to be discussed in the present article is whether the revolution and the democracy are always closely related.

“Every revolution ends in reaction. It is inevitable, it is a law”, wrote the famous Russian thinker Nikolay Berdyaev (1990 : 29), who elaborated this profound idea through hard intellectual efforts and a personal political experience. Of course, Berdyaev was limited by the historical background of the early 20th century. The past and the present century have shown, that the stability of the democratic accomplishments of a revolution depends, to a huge degree, on the phase of a society’s modernization transition, on its cultural traditions, environment and a number of other factors. So, revolutions (or the reforms of a revolutionary kind) quite regularly happen in countries with a high level of socio-cultural and economic development, and where a long period of fascination and disappointment in the democracy as well as the cycles of democracy and authoritarianism are already over; after such revolutions, a rather stable democratic regime is often established. One can set here the examples of “the Carnation Revolution” in Portugal in 1974 or “the Velvet Revolution” in what was then Czechoslovakia in 1989. Besides, such successful revolutions – ‘glorious’, ‘velvet’ and usually non-violent – would proceed quite quickly. 29

The history of such political overthrows starts from the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England, but the recent decades of the human history have witnessed a large number of them. If a society is not properly modernized (also in terms of demography 30), there are many illiterate people, non-urban population constitute a large share, a strong influence of the traditionalists is present and so on, then “Berdyaev’s law” of a revolution transforming into reaction has large chances to come true. After some time, the idea of the democracy can again start generating a new revolutionary explosion. There are still historical precedents, when the democracy and the authoritarianism alternated many times. Besides, one should point that, in such societies, a revolution faces really large-scale challenges, and respectively its intensity can provoke a strong resistance. Extending his idea, Berdyaev wrote: “The more violent and rigorous is a revolution, the stronger is the reaction. The alternation of revolutions and reactions makes a mysterious circle” (Berdyaev 1990: 29). Rather a typical example here is China that, after its first democratic Xinhai Revolution of 1911, yielded to Yuan Shikai’s dictatorship.

²⁹ In a certain sense, even the French Revolution of 1870–1871 fits this model if we exclude the episode with the Paris Commune. At the same time, the experience of a number of successful countries, in particular of South Korea and Indonesia (to the degree it can be considered successful at present) show that, at a certain stage of modernization, the authoritarianism may contribute to its expansion. However, just in this case, it objectively paves the way for its own limitation and consequent political democratization (for detail, see Prosorovsky 2009). One should still note, that the authoritarian stage often becomes an extremely important and necessary one.

³⁰ Structural-demographic factors regularly generating social explosions in the modernization process have been already analyzed in sufficient detail in our previous publications (see, e.g., Korotayev, Zinkina 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Korotayev, Grinin et al. 2011; Korotayev *et al.* 2011, Korotayev *et al.* 2012; Grinin 2011, Grinin 2012a, Grinin 2012b; Grinin, Korotayev 2012a) and will not be described here.

Many times they tried to restore democratic institutions, but China eventually plunged into a long-lasting anarchy and civil war.

The path to a stable and sustainable democracy is rather long and complicated. 31 In any case, it requires a certain level of society's economic, social and cultural development. Let us emphasize again that the liberal democracy, as a rule (which still has some known exceptions), will no longer endure in the countries with large illiterate cohorts, considerable share of rural population, and with low living standards. The modernization in (more or less large) countries always proceeds unevenly. As a result in modernizing countries, a rather modernized "core" is formed while the periphery remains rather weakly modernized and prone to conservatism with the majority of the population ("the people") living there. In this context, it turns out that the revolutionaries (who claim to "care for the people") regularly get disappointed in "the people" and the people's conservatism, and in that, at some point, the people start voting in a way different from the liberals and radicals' expectations and would prefer an order and stability, and also familiar and clear forms to some unfamiliar political and ideological appeals; moreover, the people would prefer something material to superficially ethereal freedoms. One should go a long way, to gain own political experience of several generations, to gradually emancipate the consciousness, to support the cultural-humanitarian development, so that freedoms and the democracy would get the status of the values that are precious to the majority.³² One should also realize that the stability of the democracy does not depend on to what extent a constitution is democratic but on how political institutions and actors fit each other and are ready to play the game. An outstanding French sociologist Raymond Aron fairly notes in his profound study *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, that "the stability and efficiency are not supported by the constitutional rules as such, but by their harmony with the party system, with the nature of parties, their programs, and political conceptions" (Aron 1993 : 125). This naturally takes much time to achieve. The similar ideas on high requirements to the society, its leaders and bureaucracy, were also pronounced by Joseph Schumpeter (1995 : 378–385). In particular, he argues that, for a

³¹ Both in a particular country and in the world in general. It may seem paradoxical but in 1990, democratic regimes were established in approximately 45.4 per cent of independent countries in the world, that is almost the same rate as it was seventy years earlier in 1922 (Huntington 1993).

³² This means that one should first achieve the cultural-humanitarian level allowing a true democratic transformation, namely, an intellectual stratum should be present there, a certain level of borrowings from the world culture, and certain political forms. But to establish the democracy, an even higher cultural-humanitarian level is needed as well as a dramatic change in the social situation. Besides, the democracy is not just an idea, but a mode of life; and to take the root it should become a really important part of the everyday life. But since in newly democratic states, the idea of the democracy is quickly discredited, thus it fails to become a really important constituent of the everyday life. Here, we observe a vicious circle, which can be broken only after several attempts and under certain social-economic conditions.

successful functioning of the democratic system, “the human material of politics” (that is people who operate the party machines, work in the executive branch, and take part in broader political life) “should be of sufficiently high quality”; it is necessary that the bureaucracy should be of high quality either and have a developed sense of duty and esprit (this notion will naturally exclude corruption and nepotism). In addition a certain degree of “democratic self-control” is also very essential (Ibid.).

Thus, the people (or their majority) can eventually and unconsciously betray the ideas of the revolution and the very notion of democracy. On the other hand, the population’s sensible pragmatism can prove to be wiser than the educated radical and revolutionary minority’s lofty ideals and aspirations. Then people, by intuition, choose a leader who (with all his drawbacks, vices and egoism) will generally choose for the country a moderate and more appropriate course (diverging in the most important aspects from the previous pre-revolutionary politics but, at the same time, not longing to implement at all accounts the revolutionary slogans). Napoleon III’s activity serves a quite typical example here.

But at the same time (as we witness it today in some Near Eastern countries), it can happen that even the revolutionary minority itself, that has previously strived for power under the banner of establishing the democracy, can give up the democratic principles. Thus, the conservative majority can turn out to be more democratically-oriented. And this is not surprising. As already stated, in the process of modernization, the core is modernized quicker and thus, the “liberal-revolutionary” minority in “capitals” turns out to be surrounded by the conservative, not to say “counterrevolutionary”, majority of provinces. Against this background, the increasing adherence to the democracy on the side of the conservative (“reactionary”) majority is quite natural and with fair election, they have good chances to come to power through an absolutely democratic procedure. Meanwhile, among the revolutionary (“progressive”) minority, the adherence to democratic ideals can be undermined as, for them, the fair elections are likely to end with defeat.

Even with an election falsification in the societies where the democracy appears restricted through the manipulation of the “party in power”, quite a large share of the society or even its majority may be loyal to power (even if they are discontented with something) and, consequently, be conservative. The rulers can win even fair elections but certainly with less advantage than with the faked vote (with 80–90 per cent of votes). Put another way, in theory they could do without falsification but here the system of “controlled democracy” starts operating in its own way and forces the local authorities to demonstrate their loyalty because an unconvincing majority at the elections is considered as a motion of no confidence to the dictator.

Returning to the issue of a correlation between revolution and democracy, one can remember that the brilliant politician Vladimir Lenin emphasized that “the key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power” (Lenin 1958: 145). At the early stages of the modernization, the revolutionaries who are too devoted to their initial slogans inevitably fail because their appeals, although being attractive and inspiring for the masses, are still unrealizable under the existing conditions. That is why the logics of the revolution either makes the revolutionaries in power ignore the democracy and even suppress it (as it happened when the Bolsheviks dismissed the Russian Constituent Assembly), thus continuing the escalation of violence; or those who are too devoted to democratic revolutionary ideals are substituted (in a non-democratic and less frequently, in a democratic way) by those who are less democracy-driven but are more prone to the radicalism, to the deepening of forced changes and to reinforcing the power and themselves in power. The history of the Great French Revolution of 1789–1794 and Napoleon serves here as a classical example.

Pitirim Sorokin, who studied the history and the typology of multiple revolutions in the ancient world (note that in Greek polis and Roman Republic, an intense socio-political struggle between citizens for power and rights was much more frequent than peaceful periods), pointed that the famine and/or a war often trigger a revolution (Sorokin 1992a, 1992b, 1994). Lenin also considered the deterioration of the masses’ distress beyond usual level as one of the main attributes of a revolutionary situation. However, the current studies demonstrate something different: revolutions are often preceded by a rather long period of growth of living standards (see, e.g., Davies 1969 ; on the Egyptian revolution, see Korotayev, Zinkina 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). But such a growth often combines with exactly the same and sometimes with an even larger increase of social inequality and stratification. This increases social tensions in the society and brings to life the idea that the living standard achieved by a part of the population should become the majority’s property. At the same time, the modernization of the society brings the formation of a more or less large stratum of intellectuals (and students as its vanguard), who strive for higher (adequate to their education level) living standards but, naturally, the number of profitable positions is always limited.

It is of utmost importance that excessive expectations emerge there, when the growth of living standards fails to meet the expectations of the majority of the population; besides, the increasing inequality and violent breach of common justice on the part of the men in power “fuel” the discontent. Here the most volatile situation occurs when, after a period of sustainable growth, an interruption happens there (which is often not the country authorities’ real fault; after all, who can smoothly pass the modernization transition? Nobody can). In this case, the people’s expectations (as well as those of the elite) continue to grow by inertia, while the real satisfaction level decreases (the so-called Davies’ J-Curve [Davies 1969; see also: Grinin and Korotayev 2012b]). As a result, the gap between expectations and

their satisfaction reaches a critical level and triggers a social explosion. With respect to Egypt, this refers both to Mubarak and to Morsi – it is just after the January 25 Revolution, that the metropolitan citizens' expectations radically grew, while their satisfaction drastically declined, that brought the “difference of potentials”, which in many ways defined the dismissal of the first democratically elected President of Egypt. But the same “difference of potentials” may also turn fatal for new Egyptian regimes.

In what way is the above-discussed related to democracy? First of all, the democracy can become the opposition's key idea, a magic wand, that is thought to help solving the social problems (naturally implying that democracy is a system, which will inevitably bring the right leaders, that is to say the oppositionists, to power). And since a rigid regime is in power (principally non-democratic or usurping the power) and naturally resists a quick establishment of the democracy, then overthrowing this regime becomes a goal in and of itself. This regime embodies society's every evil (which is expected to disappear with the collapse of the regime). The regime is claimed to have no positive, valuable, and advanced characteristics (everything made by the regime is supposed to happen all by itself or it is even spoiled by the regime without which this good would have been even better).

However, in spite of the frustration widespread in the society, the ideas of the democracy actually only penetrate the minds of some, that often represent neither the society's majority nor even its significant minority. For most people, who have a limited cultural intelligence and relatively narrow vital problems, the democracy is a mere word (or something established by someone, but not necessary for the population to take part in).³³ Under certain circumstances, the ideology-driven minority attracts the majority, which is indifferent to the democracy (to the democracy but not to personal problems) and in this case, a revolutionary situation can arise there. But from here, it is a long way to a strong democracy.

³³ The voting abstention in Russia even when the mass voter turnout could be decisive is quite a typical example. Moreover, a large number of voters (especially among the young) almost simultaneously with the right of voting get a steady ideological skepticism. Why voting? What is its use? Nothing will ever change. My vote means nothing. However, it seems easy to go and vote. But probably it is difficult as one should make a choice. On the other hand, there is some truth in this scepticism. The other part of the Russian population is accustomed to vote “they say we should, then we will vote” but also not for the sake of a reasonable voting. In any case, it is out of question that the skepticism of one part of the population and the promptness of the other part have been to the advantage of the party in power and of different kind of political chancers. This example explains how a political apathy may in a democratic way support certain forces in power. Karl Kautsky called such masses involved in voting ‘the political flock of sheep’.

It appears appropriate at this point to reflect on the correlation between the revolutionary minority and the majority within different contexts. The revolutionary minority is strong in its activity, persistence, ability to self-organize for joint actions, etc. That is what brings it to the front of the political stage of the revolution; it is ahead and at first seems to represent the whole society. Besides, the radicals/liberals genuinely believe that they are the society, their aspirations are necessary for the society.³⁴ If the revolutions are “superficial” and do not establish the universal democracy (as it used to be in Latin America or Spain), then the majority of the population stays out of the politics. The revolutions are made by rather many but still a minority. Here, by the way, one of the most important causes of instability of the revolutionary governments originates, since the masses would quite indifferently witness their overthrow. But if a fair (without falsifications) suffrage is immediately introduced, then the correlation between the revolutionary minority and the majority of the population can significantly change. In such a new situation, the latter may become democratically minded. The example of Egypt proved this rather well. Against the background of meetings and exultation, one can really think that all people are expecting radical changes in the spirit of the Western democratic and liberal ideology, but it turns out that the major or a great part of the population has rather different values. But in a certain situation the democratic system can actually turn profitable to the conservative (“reactionary”) majority and thus it becomes more popular amidst them; meanwhile it loses supporters among the revolutionary (“progressive”) minority, which strived for power under democratic slogans.

There can be no doubt that the revolutionaries’ activity, their good organization, propaganda and persistence also play a great part in the elections, but still it is less than it used to be when organizing meetings and actions. Outcries will not lead to an easy victory. The defeat of revolutionaries is caused, to a great extent, by their internal disagreements (seeming quite unimportant for an external observer but crucial for the parties themselves).

As a result of such a turn, the democratic elections, for which sake revolutions are actually undertaken, seem to bring the victory to the conservative forces and here the moment of truth is coming. What is more important for revolutionaries: the democratic ideals (which make join the opposition and work hard for many years before coming to power at the next elections) or a revolution proper, that is a constant overthrow and escalation of changes in society? The challenge is solved in different ways by different parties in different countries and situations. Some political forces are unable to reconsider the situation and diverge from their absolutes. Thus, the Mensheviks during the Civil War in Russia hesitated to join

³⁴ Here works the logics that the one against is the enemy of revolution, who is not with us is against us.

either the Whites or the Bolsheviks, and disappeared as a political force by 1922. But quite frequently, it is just the revolutionism (for the sake of rather vague revolutionary principles but with an ultimate urge for power) which becomes of utmost importance. In recent decades, one considers as faked votes any defeat at elections of the radicals who previously overthrew the government (or forced it to conduct free elections) but failed to win the elections (when the hated government actually gives them such an opportunity). The examples of the color revolutions at post-Soviet territory, in Serbia and other countries prove this rather well. Thereafter, the revolutionaries insist on the solution by force. The logic is that it is not democracy proper that is of utmost importance but the opponent defeated at any cost.³⁵ This logic is quite clear and explicable. But this is the point where revolution and democracy are diverging.

In short, in a society with uncertain democratic values, the following principle works: "We will support the democracy if our candidate wins elections. If he does not, we do not need such a democracy"³⁶. The ability to lose elections, to acknowledge the value of rules of the democratic game irrespective of who comes to power, to wait for consequent elections and work hard to win – these are actually the essential signs of social readiness for democracy.

Since the revolutions often occur in societies unprepared for democracy, it often happens that at early and intermediate stages of the modernization the pathways of democracy and revolution eventually diverge. Their conjunction at relatively early stages is an exception rather than a rule. Of course, as we said above, we remember the Velvet Revolutions in Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries, the Glorious Revolution in England, the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, etc. Of course, it is highly desirable that all revolutions follow the same scenario. However, at initial stages of the modernization, it can be hardly realized, as "velvet" revolutions are already the end of a long-lasting social and political development.

Political opponents can make more or less active attempts to turn the revolution to their advantage through reduction, renunciation or abolition of democratic

³⁵ The revolution as any politics is hardly a fair contest, in this or that way one uses provocations, disinformation, deceit, and backstage dealings. The provocations often imply stirring up enmity towards government and opponents through direct or indirect murders (shooting from within crowd or something of this kind; with respect to the Revolutions of 1848 and other see Nefedov [2008]; the recent examples are in Brazil) which evoke the escalation of violence, formation of military guards etc. Thus, the violence and other rather precarious means become normal. Consequently, the violation of the democracy is not considered as something terrible.

³⁶ The elections in such Caucasian territories as Karachay-Cherkessia and South Ossetia, when the opponents renounce the win of the other party and thus trigger the political crisis, is a very illustrative example.

procedures and institutions established during the revolution. Sometimes they succeed; in any case the attempts produce a certain effect. It often provokes a dramatic aggravation of the conflict especially within a considerable social rift. This seems to be the case in Egypt. In this respect, it appears that the new Egyptian authorities chose a rather risky tactic when, in early August, they delivered a firm ultimatum to the Society of the Muslim Brothers to stop sit-ins. Did they really hope that the Muslim Brotherhood would just go and break up ? Did they not realize that the solution by force would cause hundreds of victims (and all foreign observers warned against that)? Do they really hope that the repressive politics against Muslim Brothers will work without putting in a great danger the fate of the whole great country? Even after Nasser and Mubarak have failed with this? Before August 14, 2013, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood Gehad El-Haddad said about his organization: “This organization has been built for 83 years under oppressive regimes. That is the nature of the organization and our comfort zone. They just pushed us back into it...” (Fick 2013).

Let us dwell on the question why the pathways of revolution and democracy in countries with unstable democracy should inevitably diverge? In addition to the above mentioned reasons (the unpreparedness of society, idealization of democracy etc.) there is a variety of causes.

Firstly, it appears that democracy by itself is insufficient to accomplish the purposes of revolution; you cannot do with democracy alone. Theoretically, democracy is a mean to replace a bad government by a good one which is supposed to automatically assure the county's prosperity. In reality it is certainly impossible. The arrangement of particular matters requires a specific and effective management. But revolutionaries as a rule do not possess such skills. They should either retain old functionaries and managers (who are anyway professional), but then the situation to a large extent remains the same with same abuses; or substitute them, and thus worsen the situation as revolutionary reforms usually aggravate economic situation.

Secondly, since a rapid miracle and general improvement do not happen, and revolutionary actions and ample promises aggravate the situation, it is absolutely essential to find someone to blame and thus, to draw attention away. But then does the respect for democracy really count for? Will the revolutionaries (or radicals, if the moderate revolutionaries come to power) wait for several years to win the next election? Certainly, they will not. The revolutionary epoch is not the time for a quiet life. Everyone wants to obtain the targeted results immediately and without any compromises. If the radicals wait they will lose their influence, their common followers will start asking hard questions and so on. In this case the democratically elected or a transitional (provisional) government finds itself between the hammer and the anvil (i.e. between the radicals, discontent with the worsening situation, and the conservatives displeased with changes and disorders).

Thirdly, the masses, whose main concerns are their concrete and immediate problems (e.g., food for children, etc.) become disenchanted with democracy. In general, people gradually cease to connect the solution of acute social problems with an abstract idea of democracy, and instead they associate it with the struggle against enemies of the revolution, the Nation, the President, the Party, Islam, Socialism or something else, as well as against wealthy former functionaries, etc. It is clearer and more concrete. As a result, conditions for radicalization and broadening of revolution emerge. However, as we remember, the more radical is a revolution, the more probably it will transform into reaction.³⁷ Among other important terms of stability of liberal regime, Raymond Aron points out the necessity to limit people's demands in the initial period of development of a constitutional regime (Aron 1993: 141). He writes: "Let us study the situation in France in 1848. The substitution of monarchy by a republic did not increase the society's resources and economic production. For the masses' income to grow it is insufficient to call the regime republican or democratic. The revolutionary changes naturally evoke hopes and demands. And the regime falls victim to discontent". However, it is obvious that the revolutionary masses support revolution not to level down their demands and to wait for something. They think that they have already been waiting for too long. But since the rapid and excessive demands are difficult to satisfy, the country can slide into economic disaster while the democratic regime risks of being overthrown.

Fourthly, in this context it turns out that the number of the genuinely democracy-oriented people is very small in comparison with those who strive for power or welfare. In a modernizing, rather poor, narrow-minded and suffering from drawbacks society it cannot be otherwise. In an illegitimate and undemocratic society everybody abuses the law (although, perhaps, a bad law that often complicates life) and accuses of this everyone except for oneself. Everyone thinks in an undemocratic way, even those who struggle for democracy. Only a few people can stick to their principles, but they have little influence. However, one should realize that globalization can really strengthen the people's strive to change the political regime, but nothing can make up for the people's peculiar political

³⁷ The 'reaction' is usually considered to be a definitely negative phenomenon (while revolution is associated, though not so unambiguously, with something positive, among other things because it is supposed to lead to democracy). But such an interpretation is not always reasonable. The reaction often plays a rather positive role preventing the aggravation of revolutionary upheavals and thus establishing more balanced and viable political institutions. Sometimes positive aspects of political reaction's processes are more pronounced, than the negative ones. For example, the Thermidorian reaction of 1794 can be considered just as an attempt of the French political leaders to mitigate rampage of the Jacobin Terror, which caused the fierce civil war in many provinces and to form a new more viable social and political system. One can also point a positive component in the Bonapartist reaction to the French revolution in 1848. History gives numerous examples.

experience which helps to transform political mistakes into political wisdom. This refers not only to insufficiently politically aware masses but also to the intellectuals who need much time to strip away their illusions. Thus, globalization increases the gap between the rate of getting information and ideological attitudes from outside, on the one hand, and the accumulation of experience and creation of a necessary economic basis for a transition to stable democracy.

Fifthly, democracy as a political system, when people accept their defeat and work peacefully in opposition, has a generally limited social base. It can persist in one form or another, but reduced and misrepresented, though for a society such a substitution proceeds unnoticeable for some time.

Sixthly, genuine democratic institutions do not meet the purposes of revolution. Quite frequently the radical revolutionary changes are realized through constituent assemblies, parliament, etc. It works well in the beginning and with respect to the most urgent or consensual changes. But revolution is often a radical, drastic, grave and always impetuous destruction. Common parliamentary procedures with their long discussions, procrastination and respect for minorities do not satisfy the society. That is why assemblies, parliaments, councils, majālis can issue laws and decrees to launch radical changes, but it is the dictatorial authority (a party, central committee, executive committee, leader, etc.), relying on revolutionary source of power and, therefore, independent from the parliament, that should run the state. It is those authorities that solve the major problems and then submit the decision for approval. The democratic and pseudo-democratic decision-making process is quite often used to approve determining and fundamental documents and to consolidate the winning party's power. That is what Morsi did with the Constitution. The new authorities have done the same to adopt their own Constitution.

It is not surprising that dictators so like referenda, which consolidate their power. In fact, the democratic institutions turn out to be subsidiary.

Thus, a genuine and full-scale democracy, that revolution strives to formalize, soon enough starts to contradict both the real purposes of revolution and other political (party, group and private) goals and conditions.

Democratically elected authorities (or even a transitional pro-democratic government) is either overthrown or separated in full or in part from democracy (i.e. transforms into a pseudo-democratic organization like the Long Parliament of England). As said above, we speak about societies that have not completed modernization; meanwhile, the more culturally developed and advanced societies can frequently transform a post-revolutionary regime in a firmly liberal one.

Keep in mind that the key issue of revolution is always the one of power, so democracy is acceptable as long as it supports the domination of the most powerful group, party, social stratum, etc.

Since large-scale and omnipotent democracy does not fit the revolutionary transformations, and due to the lack of necessary institutions and ability to live according to democratic laws as well as the fact that revolution is always a struggle (sometimes illegal) between opposing forces, involving huge masses of people, in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period a pure democracy is reduced and transformed to a degree and in different ways depending on society's peculiarities, results of political struggle and other factors. In societies, which are ready for democracy and where modernization has been completed, this can be an insignificant reduction (similar to the prohibition to propose a candidate from among the former members of communist parties, etc.). It is worth noting that universal suffrage, taken as a model today, was not legalized in a day, there often were applied voting qualifications. Even in the USA, whose comprehensive democracy fascinated Alexis de Tocqueville (1830), democracy was not perfect. The Indians, Afro-Americans, women and a considerable part of men (who acquired the right during Jackson's presidency) were deprived of electoral right. Moreover, the presidential elections were a staged procedure (quite real at that time). In the cradle of democracy, Great Britain, in 1830 only a small percentage of population had the voting right. In 1789, in France the part of the Estates-General, which at first declared themselves the National Assembly and then the National Constituent Assembly, passed many well-known laws. But one should remember that the election rules there had little, if anything, to do with the current notion of democracy. It is noteworthy that women participation in elections in such countries as Egypt (with rather low literacy rate, especially among women) strengthens conservative political forces and sometimes this can produce a stabilizing effect. Just as embryo passes certain development stages, the non-democratic societies, striving for democracy, go through stages of evolution of democracy associated with its limitation. But in many cases democracy is limited because it fails to function to the full just due to the above-mentioned reasons.

In the course of revolution, the restrictions can be associated with attempts to secure political advantages, and also with revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence (we can observe both in Egypt), with activity of a powerful ideological or any other center (as for example, in Iran), with a dictatorial body, with an introduction of property or political qualifications, with assassination or arrests of the opposition's leaders (what has happened in Egypt recently), with curtailment of free speech and associations, formation of unconstitutional repressive bodies, etc.

The post-revolutionary regime also restricts democracy or just imitates it. In contemporary world the most widespread forms of limitation of universal democracy (without which only a few governments perceive themselves legitimate)

are different kinds of falsification of election results, which often combine with repressions of political opponents (the recent example is Ukraine, where one of the opposition political leader was imprisoned), and constitutional and legal tricks (Russia shows remarkable examples). There are some peculiar cases when there is an unconstitutional or constitutional, but non-democratic, force, which enjoys authority (Iran). Other forms are possible as well. The most widespread one is still the military coup or attempts to conduct a revolutionary overthrow (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan provide numerous examples). The military forces step in, when a democratic government decays or degrades or when a state reaches an impasse. Anyway, the course of democracy development is corrected. On the other hand, the military also cannot remain in power endlessly or even for too long without legalizing the regime, so they have to hand over authority to the civilian community and hold elections.

Thus, the general political course of modernizing societies follows the democratic trend (increasingly approaching the ideal), but the fluctuation along this trend can be severe and painful. The development can remain incomplete, oscillating within the controlled democratic system.

In Egypt, the new presidential elections are likely to be held rather soon (if the situation does not get worse). However, this election seems to be less democratic (even in comparison with the previous events) because the Muslim Brotherhood was proclaimed “a terrorist organization”. The path to genuine democracy is very long (it is necessary to eliminate illiteracy along with solving other problems), but the chance is rather good that there will be established a new dictatorship in the form of controlled democracy and military power, supporting the authorities.

Another important point explains why democracy cannot be established in a post-revolutionary society or quickly degrades there. “Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others”, said Winston Churchill. For the societies that just enter this path, the first part of the phrase is of utmost importance. Democracy (just as free market and private property) has numerous drawbacks. Mature democratic societies, among other things, have found some means to mitigate them. But in young democracies these drawbacks get excessive forms. And acquiring immunity against such “infantile diseases” of democracy is a long and painful process. As a result, a society can turn out to be abnormal (as in the case with lack of immunity against private property and free market – actually, rather egoistic institutes if not restricted). It is clear that an introduction of formally democratic institutions is absolutely insufficient, since although including multi-party elections, they often conceal and even legitimate an actual dominance of authoritarian rule (Diamond, Linz, Lipset 1995: 8; see also Diamond 1999).

In conclusion, we should note that the transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy can occur in three main ways: through a revolution (quickly from

below), a military takeover or *coup d'état* and a reformation (gradually from above). In previous epochs the reformative way was almost impossible, so the path to democracy was paved by revolutions and counterrevolutions. Still some rather successful examples of reformative transition to democracy (or just a step in this direction) can be observed as early as in the 19th century. For example, the Japanese authorities started the “democratization from above” by the establishment of the parliament in 1889. In Germany Otto Bismarck introduced from above the full male suffrage in 1867, while in Prussia the election system proper was established “from below” by the Revolution of 1848. Some Latin American states experienced transitions from military dictatorship to democracy, but the latter could not be firmly established in this region, with a few exceptions. However, in the 20th century, especially its last decades, due largely to globalization, we can find numerous examples of voluntary dismantling of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes by the very military or other dictatorship (in Spain, Chile and other Latin American countries, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, lastly the USSR). Some significant steps towards democratization were also made by the Arab monarchic states. Paradoxical at first sight, but on the eve of the Arab Spring most Arab monarchies appeared much more democratic, than the majority of the Arab republics (see, e.g., Truettsev 2011).

Such a non-revolutionary transition to democracy, *ceteris paribus*, can turn out to be more direct and secure.

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Thus, the revolutionary events often assume a paradoxical character. For example, we sometimes get across such revolutions that the revolutionaries did not expect. The revolutionary repressions may often turn against those who were actually meant to benefit revolution. And those whose names were on the banners when overthrowing the old power join on a mass-scale the counter-revolutionary camp. The zealous monarchists or the henchmen of authoritarianism suddenly turn into democrats, while those who considered democracy as the highest value get ready to establish a dictatorship. The Egyptian revolution has revealed its own additional paradoxes. Thus, gaining a victory unexpectedly becomes disadvantageous in political terms, while “losing the battle” turns beneficial. For example, just the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in November and December of 2012 (when they succeeded to rush quite an unconstitutional “Constitutional declaration”, as well as the Constitution they worked out and, thus, to obtain the full power in the country) caused a consolidation of the “liberal” camp, a rapid growth of its popularity and the Muslim Brotherhood’s drastic falling into disfavor. Up to the late June – early July, the Muslim Brothers rapidly lost their popularity (see, e.g., Zogby et al. 2013), until the secularists and the military “came to their rescue”. After the July 3 military coup, the Muslim Brotherhood and their opponents reversed the roles. Now the Ikhwan started to “score points”.

Paradoxical, but the Muslim Brotherhood's post-revolutionary political rhetoric sounded incomparably more advanced, than their opponents' archaic political rhetoric. The secularists (as well as the military, supporting them) in an absolutely archaic manner identified the people with the crowd in Tahrir Square, the Brotherhood, in turn, appealed to the formal legitimate democratic procedures. We would not exclude entirely such a scenario of Egypt events, within which the Muslim Brotherhood would come to power again. But the sooner they will get it, the sooner they lose it. In sum, the paradoxes of revolution will not long in coming.

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Alexander N. Chumakov

Social Aspects of the Globalization

The contemporary process of globalization is not only a concern to the lives and interests of the humankind in general but also of the individuals, independently of their social or racial status. That is why there is now a reason to add one more concept to the multitude of philosophies and scientific theories, where man and his problems occupy priority positions connected with the philosophical understanding of the nature and the trends of the globalization. We already have a corresponding sphere of interdisciplinary fields of knowledge that emerged in the last quarter of the last century, collectively termed global studies. As a result, the contemporary world is seen as a complex dynamic system, where human economic activities based on achievements of the science and the technology (but not the nature and the development laws of the biosphere) became the main acting force.

Besides the growing understanding of how the scientific and technological progress is changing our living conditions, we are also becoming aware of the many dangers it poses, not only for the human health but for the existence of the life in general. The times have passed when science could be regarded as value-neutral and an indisputable human good, beyond good and evil. Of course, the science is giving people the fruits of its revolutionary discoveries and attracts them by the new perspectives, but it also causes a deep trouble for their future, demanding timely and adequate actions of scholars, philosophers and politicians. Having the ability to complexly study the world, the society and the human beings, the contemporary science orientates politicians and scholars towards a “dialogue”, the co-evolution of the society and the nature. This is the science way, where it acquires a new –human – dimension, when the interests of the people are directly connected with the sustainable development of the biosphere and an analysis of the human activity begins to occupy a priority position in the understanding of the contemporary world and its most important characteristic – globalization.

It is important to note that the globalization is a result of centuries-old quantitative and qualitative transformations, both in the social development and in the system “society-nature”. That is why, trying to understand the essence of the contemporary globalization, many scholars connect it with cultural and civilizational changes; through this, the terms “culture” and “civilization” find themselves in line with the term “globalization”. Being the most important categories of the social philosophy, these terms are links of one chain, trends of the developing living language, when it tries to reflect the human mental and material world, an endless diversity and essence of social relations as well as relations of the society with the nature.

Supplementing one another from various sides, they describe social organisms and reveal the most important stages of their historical development.

The concept of “culture” occupies a special position in this line, since it first emerged back in the Ancient Rome, to distinguish the artificial and the natural; the term “civilization” is of later origin, dating back to early Modern Times, when more complex social practices developed and internal and external links of the emergent nation-states demanded a more correct language and, respectively, a new notion for their description. The deep understanding of the phenomenon of civilization started later, at the end of the nineteenth century, when the processes of the globalization started to become more and more defined. They were not realized directly but guessed at in the theoretical works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Soloviev, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Vladimir Vernadsky, Karl Jaspers, etc.

The globalization fully revealed itself only in the mid-1990s, having generated an additional interest in the phenomenon of culture and civilization. It is important to emphasize, that the globalization leads to the formation of one culture and one civilization which, however, does not cancel either the cultural diversity or the peculiarities of the civilizatorian development of this or that region. The notion of “culture” expresses the internal, essential characteristics of a society ; in its turn, the civilization is a form, an external framework of culture, representing a society from the viewpoint of the mechanism of its management, its functional links and relations. Since the civilizatorian unity and cultural diversity are immanent for the humankind, we could propose a new synthetic category called “cultural-civilizatorian systems” to designate the contemporary realities: this would provide an integral vision of the different social systems (national, local, regional) as well as the world community as a whole and give understanding of the dynamics of their development as a necessary process.³⁸ Then, considering the globalization and the global problems as an objective historical process, into which all the really existing cultural-civilizatorian systems are included (objectively involved), one may say about the formation, that from the middle of the twentieth century both the all-human culture and the united world civilization revealed themselves only on local and regional levels.

The culture embraces – more precisely, penetrates – all the spheres of the mental and material life of a society and so it finds itself this or that way to be involved into the process of the globalization. In this connection, a lot of the cultural

³⁸ Alexander Chumakov, *Metafizika globalizatsii. Kul'turno-tsvilizatsionnyi kontekst* [The Metaphysics of Globalization. The Cultural-Civilizational Context] (Moscow : Kanon+, 2006) ; Alexander Chumakov, *Globalizatsiya : kontury tselostnogo mira* [Globalization : The Outlines of the Integral World] (Moscow : Prospect, 2005).

problems are arising there, which adopt more and more an international and even global character. As examples of that, the difficulties and contradictions are generated by the increase of the influence and the broad expansion of the “mass culture”, periodically emerging crises of morality, the growth of the apathy, the sense of abandonment or defenselessness, etc.

The influence of the globalization on the culture begins in the epoch of the great geographic discoveries when, for the first time in the human history, cultural communications reached a planetary level, although they were in the beginning fragmentary, limited to contacts with sailors, traders, and conquerors. From that time, we see the first signs, if not of unification then of borrowing and global spreading of material and spiritual values, as well as cultural achievements, which, as a result of expansionist aspirations of the Europeans and through the increasing world trade throughout the world. Together with the items of the material culture, the broad opportunities for spreading throughout the world were given to various elements of spiritual, mostly European culture, such as, for example, the language: first of all Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, and religions – Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, the missionaries of which came to previously unknown regions and corners of the world.

Even greater opportunities for the wide spread of material and spiritual values emerged at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, when new means of transportation were actively developed: railway, automobiles, and aviation. The contemporary means of the mass communication were also invented during this period: telephone, radio, cinema, television. As a result, the mutual penetration and assimilation of various cultures, being an objective and a necessary sequence of the globalization, have in the twentieth century led to the formation of the all-human, planetary culture, the outlines of which are rather clearly seen today in all countries and continents.

The globalization of the culture is not revealing itself through this only in the fact that, while keeping their original traditions, living standards and peculiarities of their everyday life, different populations, at the same time, use the same cell-phones, radio, television, transportation means, etc. It reveals itself also in the fact that, for instance, the design of this or that car, item of clothing or home appliance, as far as external qualities and composition are concerned, as a rule do not bear the seal of the national culture of those who made the products – they differ from the design of other examples only by the label indicating the manufacturing country.

In the conditions of globalization of the culture, there are practically no borders for spreading the mutual influence of the various ideas, doctrines, beliefs, etc. In fact, all the most significant scientific discoveries and outstanding literary works are immediately translated into many languages of the world, popular songs and melodies; the best examples of fashion and dramatic art expand with an amazing

speed across the planet. Most are easily subsumed into the context of traditional cultures, which accept and assimilate such elements of the world culture and at the same time give it new impulses: for instance, it was officially reflected in the 1990s slogan “China for the world and the world for China”.

In the context of globalization of the culture, one can point to the increasing spread in the world community of the unified norms of behavior, which are free of religious and other ideological foundations. Such conduct may be found in airports, railway stations, supermarkets and other public places, where individuals behave “like everyone else”, independently of their beliefs, ethnic and cultural origins, etc. In this sense, the youth is the best environment for the spread of the global culture, because the youth is less grounded than the elder generations in the influence of traditional cultures and stereotypes of thinking and behavior formed in a community.

Due to this, the youth also becomes a main object of manipulation by mass media, political, religious, criminal and other groups, which, under the conditions of the globalization, acquire additional opportunities for influencing both separate groups and the mass consciousness as a whole. Pointing out this fact, one of the leaders of “the new left” – the mass social movement of the end of the 1960 - Theodore Roszak wrote that politics, education, leisure, entertainment, culture as a whole, subconscious symbols and even the protest against the very technocracy become an object of a purely technical control and purely technical manipulation.³⁹

Now, in the conditions of the total globalization, the problem of the ability to manage the world processes, including the world culture and the world public opinion, becomes one of the central objectives of the humankind. The examples of the Turkish immigrants in Germany or the Africans and Muslims, who became a part of the French society, show very well how the actual task of finding generality in separate national cultures, as well as defining the points of their interaction, where they mutually assimilate, becomes impossible. In this connection, the question arises: to which culture should one relate the assimilated emigrants and their children, whose biographies do not take place in the accepted categories? The problem is that the new waves of immigrants, although they try to stick to the norms and principles of behavior established for the society they are entering, nevertheless, in the everyday life and in their customs they reveal and reproduce as a rule the traditions and stereotypes of the way of life adopted from their childhoods in previous cultures. And although at the meeting point of these different cultures some opportunities emerge for mutual understanding and mutual action, first of all, due to the globalization and unification of the culture,

³⁹ Theodore Roszak, *The Making of a Counter Culture : Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, NY : Anchor Books, 1969), 7.

nevertheless, a state of conflict and contradiction increases – which specialists pay particular attention to, both in the West and in the developing countries.

Here it should be mentioned that, although the globalization has at first sight economic forms and political consequences, it is in fact increasingly revealing the primary place of the culture at the global level. Due to this fact, the influence of the culture on the globalization and of the globalization on the culture, as well as a combination of the global and the local, become the subject of special attention for many scholars. Previously, this led to the coining of a new term – glocalization, which was created by means of superposing the words “globalization” and “localization” and became widespread as a word reflecting a complex process of binding the local peculiarities of the separate nation cultural development and the global trends in the world community development.

Thus, the cultural globalization exerts an increasing influence on the human world outlook, thereby provoking serious trouble, first of all for the representatives of underdeveloped and developing countries. Understanding the globalization more as the “Americanization of the culture,” as the imposition of Western standards and customs, and, finally, as a modern form of cultural colonialism, they see it as a means of transformation and destruction of the traditional values, of changes of the traditional way of life and, hence, as a threat to the national identity and cultural diversity. In other words, since the globalization is uneven, the majority of the traditional societies react defensively against it in the form of counteracting the process of integration as well as conducting the politics of localization and support to local cultures in every possible way.

Some scholars, especially from Islamic, Arab and other countries of the Third World, consider the globalization as a specially designed plan or a strategy aimed at invading other parts of the world threatening local cultures through their unification. By this, the main threat to the cultural identity is, as a rule, seen in the expansion of the influence sphere of mass media, the activity of international foundations, transnational corporations, etc. Such concerns are not entirely groundless since the globalization is indeed not only the flows of goods or shortening of distances, deletion of the borders or unification of the production processes. This also tends to the formation of a single system of values, to the creation of a universal culture, which are called to provide effectiveness in world economics, openness and objectivity of information and, at last, tolerance in the world politics and the intercultural communications. Thus, the changes and transformations in the sphere of the culture, adequate to the globalization, acquire priority, while the economic factors turn out to be less meaningful.

Here arises the question of the trends of the global processes and of the human future. We already have the term post-globalization, which is used with regard to the future condition of the global world. Also, a fully new term may possibly

emerge to provide a name for the future world, when the theme of globalization will be replaced by another, more actual topic. Now, we can make the following suppositions. In about 10 to 15 years “a stratum of scientific researches” under the title “globalization” will be entirely “worked out” and an intellectual and emotional discussion of the topic will become fatigued. As a result, the creative interests of the scholars in global studies will be transmitted to the sphere of the world constitution and search of practical steps of building the really new world order. This follows directly from the fact, that global studies objectively play an integrative role, making many scholars, politicians, public figures and the broader population take a new look at the contemporary world, stimulating them to understand themselves as a part of the integral world. That is why the transition from understanding global problems to the real processes of globalization, which we now observe, must, it seems to me, sooner or later be replaced by the primary interest in the question of how to form a new international order in the integral interdependent world in order to make it at last safe and stable. However, the solution or even right setting of this task is ahead, since it is interlinked with another much more difficult task – the problem of the human being and the “new humanism”.

Thus, the further development of global studies will have to end sooner or later in understanding the nature and essence of man himself as the main cause of all his problems and difficulties, what in the history of the philosophy has not been mentioned once, in the works of all the great humanists from Antiquity to modernity. As Nikolai Berdyayev remarked, “Philosophers constantly returned to the understanding that to unriddle a mystery of man means to unriddle a mystery of being. Know thyself, and through this you will know the world. All attempts of external understanding of the world, without dipping into the depth of man, gave just knowledge of the surface of things. If we come from man to the outside, we will never reach the meaning of things, for the understanding of the meaning is concealed in the very man.”⁴⁰

Recalling in this connection Protagoras’ words “homo mensura est”, one should note that man is also the main cause of increase and escalation of the global problems of modernity.

From here it follows that the human reason alone is the single hope to overcome the mentioned contradiction, for the human thinking and creativity are not genetic but cultural properties. People have no other way but to carefully build and insistently form a new thinking, a way of life and an appropriate strategy and tactics of action, for, as some scholars believe it, the future evolution will not be

⁴⁰ Nikolai Berdyayev, “Smysl tvorchestva” [“The Meaning of Creation”], in *The Philosophy of Freedom. The Meaning of Creation* (Moscow : The Pravda Press, 1989), 293.

determined by the survival of the strongest but by the wisest. This fact provides a reason to consider the human nature and essence as a main theme, which with time should take the first place in the global studies.

András Kelen

The Distinctive Role of Collaborative Networks in the Social Economy - Towards a More Operational Definition of the Social Entrepreneurship

When outlining the difference in the approach between the "Third Sector Research" and the "Social Economy", we see in the US both scientific approaches prevailing simultaneously. In Europe however, the paradigm of the social economy is emerging and seems to engulf the conventional notion of civil society and nonprofit sector. This study delineates concepts trying to contribute to a clearer-cut definition. The social economy's concise definition is predicated on a sustainable *business model* paired with a *social aim*. This somewhat reductionist approach conveys, that the nonprofit constraint does not apply here. By social aim, it is the employment incubating function that is most frequently understood but green, welfarist, integrative and other societal purposes are also often meant. Bowing to expectations to show due citizenship, every corporation boasts of pursuing social aims, of revealing a degree of social responsibility. Unfortunately, when it comes then to count the social economy, degrees are not really measurable : our existing theory – based on the concise “social aim” criterion – starts stuttering. In order to help to overcome this difficulty in the empirical research, this study recommends applying a proxy variable as a substitute for the problematic “social aim” quality. A substitute, which can well discriminate the collaborative social economy from (1) business, from (2) state-owned companies and (3) nonprofits alike. To lay foundations for constructing a proper proxy, this study puts the emphasis on the self-governing nature of social enterprises. The study also provides background and definition of the notion of bottom-up networks and describes where and how they fit into the social enterprise. The existing literature on the social economy has amply treated networks as supporting structures. I recommend taking them rather as constitutive factors that give rise to this distinctive sort of entrepreneurship instead of merely supporting it. This functional change – amounting to a paradigm shift – modifies the concise definition to claiming a sustainable business model paired with anything but a business-like structure of collaborative network in management. Although there is a thirst for information on how social enterprises might be better managed, there has been little written to enable empirical research to do their work in measuring the social economy as distinguished from the civil society and the nonprofit sector.

Keywords : civil society, the nonprofit sector, solidaristic and social economy, bottom-up networks, co-operatives, ceded income, entrepreneurship.

In the beginnings, when looking at the edge between the market and the state, the economic sociology delineated the independent voluntary sector including associations, foundations, civic groups and a few other forms of organizations. Later, in the nineties, the concepts of the social economy and social enterprises evolved, depicting the value-driven entrepreneurial activity. This term comprises all the economic organizations irrespective of their ownership where the structure is self-governing and the profit maximalization yields other functions such as the case with co-operatives⁴¹ and mutuals.⁴² Although heuristic, this subsequent set of private organisations is clear-cut, their discerning concept – the teleological factor inherent in the “social aim” - is not operationalisable.

Most succinctly, social entrepreneurs are defined as a working business model coupled with a social mission. This latter criterion of finality – vague, as authors themselves always admit it – is always included in one form or another whatever the definition approach we take from the existing literature on the social economy.⁴³

Let us take the pioneering five economic and social characteristics of the duly recognized EMES-definition: “An explicit objective of benefits to the community: one of the main objectives of the social enterprises is to serve the community or a specific group of people. In this sense, one of the characteristics of the social enterprises is the desire to promote a sense of social responsibility at the local level.”

Or, there is what I am inclined to dub the Spreckley-Southcombe definition⁴⁴ putting the social mission into the very centre as a distinctive feature of social enterprises in the social economy. Jacques Defourny then, in his significant dictionary entry defines as a combination of a special mode of production (private or collective) with the lack of an eminent profit motivation.⁴⁵ There is then the

⁴¹ A co-operative is a company where owners’ rights are distributed equally, independent of equity stake. In addition to this fundamental criterion, coops usually also provide something for members’ welfare.

⁴² A mutual is a non-profit organization without a public service function. Instead of serving the public benefit they build a civil society by providing something for their members’ welfare.

⁴³ Under the venerable category of the *informal economy* there have always been scattered examples of social enterprise. The same applies to *online businesses* which often match all criteria of the social economy. The first accounts of businesses with an explicit community interest date back to research in CIRIEC and the writings of the UK Small Business Service. Until nowadays, an inbred social economy has emerged spontaneously and has developed into a *sui generis* sphere of the economy.

⁴⁴ This is the Wikipedia article on social enterprises.

⁴⁵ J. Defourny, *Économie sociale*, in J-L Laville, A.D. Cattani (2005), *Dictionnaire de l'autre économie*, Brouwer, p.233

minimalistic definition also frequently seen in texts all over the higher education and research: “the main aim of a social entrepreneurship as well as social enterprises is to further social and environmental goals...Social enterprises are for more-than-profit”.

These approaches – although not capable to resist scrutiny in all aspect - are appropriate in focussing many more trading bodies beyond the conventional voluntary sector criteria (a third sector between business and state with the non-distribution constraint based on *ceded income* as the principal source of operation). These approaches all have an underlying dichotomy as a constitutive element predicating that there were financial returns on investment (ROI – an index of financial profitability that measures the net result of operations as a percentage of funds invested; an indicator of business success) and social returns on investment (SROI – the non-financial outcomes created by a social enterprise, measured in terms of mission and impact, e.g. people served or jobs created, average salaries paid, foregone dole, amount of local authority transfer payments eliminated, etc).

We all know that when it comes to entrepreneurs, then competition, efficiency and the so-called Schumpeterian “creative destruction” come necessarily to mind. But what is then the core meaning of being “social”? In my interpretation, a social enterprise will not be social because (1) this issue was social politics-related. Not (2) that these entrepreneurs or project managers are all aiming at recipients of some social politics scheme. Not even that (3) the project belongs to a social responsibility framework of a company whereby business leaders exert their corporate citizenship. Nor (4) that they embody features like transparent reporting, environmental awareness, community service, contribution of profits to the common good. Having excluded all these factors, let us see what remains sticking under the adjective “social”.

Social aims are all too often but captured public interest. Because of this and also because finality is always difficult to operationalize, I am looking for a methodological bypass: a bypass that omits all teleological setting as a criterion. While I have no basic problem (only contributing notes) with the vertical axis⁴⁶, I

⁴⁶ For Boulding (1973), the grants economy (the welfarist ecosystem of one-way money transfers) as a whole belongs to the *ceded* part of income: contributed and not earned. But grants can partly also be interpreted as earned income! This is the case with grants when exchanged against some pre-determined performance such as the outcomes of a project. This type of grant making – by far not one-way anymore - is the modern tool of *planning* where articulated social aims precede economics. Otherwise a bank credit would have it made. The many grant makers in modern market economies exercise the same function what the Central Planning Bureau tried to do alone in the command economies (relegated to economic history): to channel resources along values. If such grants are then appropriated in a competitive tender, this source is then a full-fledged *earned* income (quid pro quo) for the winner.

am convinced that while this approach may be conducive at a state servant or journalistic level, it is certainly not yet applicable for empirical research, let alone comparative studies. So my critic aims at the deployment of the finality scale at levels deeper than information dissemination. I recommend substituting it with a mode of operation dimension.

There is a way to operationalize the „social aim” criterion: in some European countries, public servants apply a community interest test or public service test before registering applicants as social enterprises or granting nonprofits a tax sheltered status. These tests are usually rudimentary and substantive at the same time – as opposed to being universally formal and restricting themselves to examining the incidence of community roots. The measure of the public service is also all too often a laxative list instead of a minimalistic formal criterion gauging the public support.⁴⁷ Last but not least, a test like these is necessarily country-specific without a feasible option to harmonize them at an all-European level.

I recommend retaining the „trading for a social purpose” approach but espousing another (related but underlying) concept. This complementing concept is expected to go beyond the mentioned pre-existing dichotomy of public service. This notion of ours is intended to enable students of the social economy to arrive at a measurable proxy variable other than the primacy of mission, responsibility or finality whatsoever.

I set out to interpret self-helping networks – instead of a social aim – as *sine qua non* of the social economy, as their second constitutive factor. As an outcome, the underlying definition – omitting the rather nebulous criterion of social responsibility, social mission – ought to convey that social enterprises, in addition to producing or servicing, necessarily also contribute to a community’s welfare production in a self-reliance manner. If not more, they at least offer useful activity and part of a livelihood for their members to the tune of their being a collectivity. Thus, there is little sense in prescribing them to be value-driven or to carry additional communitarian objective, let alone bearing some explicit philanthropic purpose.

The role of reconnecting networks in the social economy

Due to their more vulnerable character, all social enterprises are predicated on the existence of a sustaining collective. If the entrepreneurs here could carve out a

⁴⁷ When ascertaining the strength of the public support, a project with one single big donor ought to be attributed a lower status in the public service whereas as another project boasting of several although smaller donors should be deemed more as public service. Still, these criteria are nowhere applied.

living from anonymous market transactions alone, if they could do without the enabling hand of others, without being embedded in a closely knit helping set of connections, then they would not go for being linked in a social enterprise, they would definitely opt for an unplugged sole tradership (who can contribute by *sweat equity* alone) or a limited company.⁴⁸ This inexorably connected status has consequences on at least two counts.

Initially, the market value of a social enterprise is difficult to gauge, because the network behind it cannot be operated by anybody else other than the entrepreneur. Initiatives and maintenance all require their leadership. It cannot be outsourced, delegated or sold. Networks do not have an exchange value as they are linked to the person around whom they develop. Nobody else could operate another person's network if it is not standardized (and called human resources) as in business. It is not only the exchange value that does not apply in social enterprises, maximization of profits and labour law are not applicable either – twenty years ago something like this was called a counter-culture. Thus there is no exchange value of the enterprise either!⁴⁹ A social enterprise is a business that can hardly be sold later as a business. At this early stage, there is no calculable market value of it, only its goodwill and other intangibles, at least – quite beyond of accounting, as yet. Its value-added is hidden in its network it helps animating. The links are founded on direct and indirect reciprocity, informal liabilities and a delicate balance of requited favours nobody else. No purchaser can animate that – say proprietary – network. Social capital is not transferable.

Ironically enough, the proven availability of a usable personal network usually qualifies one for a bank credit to the tune of micro financing. Because social entrepreneurs operate within a social context rather than the weak-bonds interwoven business world, they have limited access to other means of raising capital. Social capital is therefore – to this limited extent - convertible to capital without strings.

⁴⁸ As an antipode for a community-curated social enterprise with an enabling network behind, I could evoke the example of a rural hamlet as a family-run farm with its nearly accomplished self-reliance - salt and petroleum as only imports are usually swapped against home-brewed spirit.

⁴⁹ An asset lock as a public guarantee against the improper use of taxpayers' money or against the expropriation of resources by some self-appointed owner is therefore not unconditionally necessary here. One man's social capital is valueless for another man : social capital has no exchange value. My network and your social capital are not interoperable with someone else's. On a different platform (say in another city) my old network is quite useless. Therefore, there is no exchange value of a liaison network. Databases (that is the description of a network) and especially personal data might have their exchange value on the market – but not the live network itself. For instance, the Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists, a global association functioning like a social cooperative keeps on paying out its income to members without endangering their common-pool property.

The collateral outcome of the social entrepreneurship is as a community building and a social capital accumulation, the more diversity the social enterprises can have the more cohesive a neighbourhood's civil society will be. While being businesspeople, social entrepreneurs at the same time carry many traits of a community organizer. They foster community bonds and without any embeddedness no community endeavour can survive.⁵⁰ Their social capital is thus indispensable for them. Some of the entrepreneurs may take off and leave behind their network for the ever-changing clientele of the open market. Others will remain rooted in their network for life.

Social enterprises are mostly collectively owned and – entrepreneurial as they might occasionally be – are characterized by an inclusive management and a participative governance. It is based on their acquaintance or membership network alone that they can muster human resources. As a rule, social economy organisations follow the one-member one-vote pattern of governance. Nonprofits at the same time usually apply curatorial governance or sheer businesslike patterns. Thus, the self-governing feature of network-activated business transactions satisfactorily distinguishes the collective ownership from individual companies or business clusters of privately owned companies.⁵¹ This dimension of inclusive governance based on the absence or prevalence of an own social capital is an easily operational feature that can be recommended to be applied instead of the vague „social aim” criterion.⁵²

Two mini case studies underscoring the role of networks

In the social economy, when exploring the role of being linked-in, I would like to point out, as it is well-known, how much connecting were a suitable tool for revitalizing the inactive, the long-term unemployed and the underemployed. This is an active tool in the implementation of the employment politics. This means the tapping of the unemployed' reservoir potential (as opposed to conventional welfare

⁵⁰ Recommendations, adoptions, endorsements and references are the usual measures of being embedded. In the emerging mathematical science of scale-free networks, equivalents are the density of links and consequent page ranking in search algorithms. As a spillover the so-called links economy has also emerged. Further consequences of being linked-in are popularity and reputation – giving rise to what is called the “attention economy”.

⁵¹ As a further example, I refer to the historical pattern of self-governing companies in the former Titoist Yugoslavia. As to their assets, they were neither state-run nor privately owned. Nevertheless, there is no way of interpreting them as part of the historical social economy, as their workforce and leadership alike were recruited on the open labour market and their governance was in fact anything but inclusive.

⁵² When it comes to a questionnaire of a survey, I could imagine asking respondents for either the pattern of governance or the ownership proportions.

structures such as social assistance or the dole). Networking alone is not yet a social enterprise but the lobby of it. I understand a time bank, for instance, as an unexploited, minimal level network, that can be operated without a pre-existing set of competences as an entrance hall for an entrepreneurship, where the core competences are revealed to the extent of forging an appropriate business model for sustainable operation. In order to substantiate this claim, I come up with two mini case studies.

There are renewing initiatives by established banking institutions (not only non-profit ethical ones but commercial banks, too) to start lending for the poor. Having perhaps learnt and drawn the consequences from the current crisis of decades of lenient lending to “unemployed alcoholics” (the current equivalent of the “Polish plumber” – they still consider offering credit for the poor, *provided they form a co-operative*. A mutual organization, that is a network of long-term unemployed people with impaired work ethics could in fact elevate them to a level (of robustness), where a stable performance can realistically be expected from them (and defaults due to one member’s laziness or tardiness becomes less likely). In a co-op for cleaning founded by the long-term unemployed, it is a serious add-on for these people with their usually impaired work ethics that in case of tardiness and delays they have to reckon with each other instead of a boss. This is what I regard an enabling network.⁵³ The mounting of an incubating time bank in form of a social cooperative or community interest company seems especially appropriate to foster skills in a live network for people who might find their marketable competences in this organization only later on.

As to the incubating role, social entrepreneurs are especially capable to deal with the long-term unemployed, those with vulnerable work ethics. The organisations of the social economy are mostly considered as a bunch of people moving to and from between creating or having a temporary and precarious employment or being for a short time self-employed on the one hand and remissions of being a vulnerable subject of social politics on the other hand. This approach of social mission business ventures goes back as early as 1975 when Gappert and Rose first published their volume on the social economy in America. In case of such transit organizations never leaving behind project phases, the entrepreneurial task is that of a catalyst, who lets those vulnerable employees get together (build community in order to find their core competences) and then work together as a collective. This helping network is needed because individually and alone they are hardly capable of fulfilling what a working environment requires from workers.

⁵³ This does not mean that these ties were necessarily all too strong or were clustering high in these peer-to-peer networks. In Marc Granovetter’s (Granovetter 1973) meaning they belong to the weak ties of social bonds.

The family-managed tourism is an important pattern in the social entrepreneurship. The tourism is always highlighted for being a sector with a potential of expansion on a global scale. For, its growth potential and being a product that can only be consumed *in loco*, the tourism has the prominence role of being a strategy for a local development. In this context, the search for competitiveness is one of the key concerns of companies around the world. Recently it was discovered that an associative cooperation is a competent tool in enhancing local hosts' performance in the regional development. In the Tourism Destination Management (TDM), the best practice nowadays is to let hosts form a mutual organization, mostly an association or co-operative. Their bottom-up networks have a decentralized and less-businesslike governance; the network coordinator is mostly selected by a member of the cluster acting as a kind of service provider such as exerting quality control and development tasks in order to achieve a sort of brand-status for all the touristic products of their destination (a village or touristic region).⁵⁴ Situated mostly in the arch-conservative social environment, such as Bavaria, Tirol or West-Hungary, village tourism houses – as elementary cells of a cluster doing many management functions collectively – foster a few important “alternative” values. The labour law, for instance, yields to paternalism. Otherwise expressed, the *employee satisfaction* is said to be prevailing motivation in labour relations reduced to the realm of an extended family. In a typical family firm, where values of self-employment prevail, the norm of maximizing profits does not apply, either. Last but not least, the technological development mostly aims at job-creation alone as the sole virtue of the entrepreneurship. This formation can certainly be called a value-driven organization, if not a grassroots organization bypassing all bureaucratic encroachment or state supporting schemes.

The participative social economy

Let me come up first with a mini case study on home restaurants.

They usually begin as a pirate restaurant or unlicensed private supper club in a basement apartment, then start going public and losing cachet; they grow as a dinner party network for lovers of fine cooking, cool art and new friends. In a mature form, they can take shape as a "wandering supper club" producing community dining events. Having found their core competence and market niche, such a "dinner party network" is for hospitable and adventurous gourmets to connect, gather and share. At their best, they can attract diners looking to sample high-concept cuisine with an exclusive group of insiders without the usual overhead costs of a fancy restaurant as a reaction against the commercialism of celebrity chefs.

⁵⁴ As to clusters enhancing the competitiveness of a regional industry c.f. : Porter 2000; Rocha 2004.

Having found their new competences as a cult site, alternative restaurants have the option to start a new commercialization (giving up their „password-enabled” entry) or remain within the voluntary constraints as they have evolved. Let me call the attention to the rich opportunities the prevalence or absence of a password offers in sociologically determining the „social” character of an endeavour.

In one sense, the social economy is also a third sector just like the voluntary organizations – but relevant is then a Private/Public divide instead of the Business/State dichotomy which latter usually delineates the independent voluntary sector. Casting a glance on a Private/Public continuum, we discern for-profit and voluntary organizations alike as all constituted under private law, then statutory organizations enacted by some state decree belonging to public law. The third option in this ownership scale of the Private/Public continuum is placed in the intersection space occupied by the *Commons*.

Following the original idea of Van Til (2000), who argues that the voluntary sector’s assets should be interpreted as belonging to the Commons, because these organizations serve the public good, I argue that the asset-locked organizations of the social economy do in fact constitute and enrich the scanty examples of non-traditional, non-environmental, but newly emerging Commons.⁵⁵ Instead of predicating a social aim to organizations here, I imply that the rich historical notion of the Commons should be regarded as the all-encompassing space for the social economy. That is why I speak of *participative social economy* where entrepreneurship means community development, where capital and labour *as traditional factors of production* are complemented by knitting an enabling network.

The Commons, as we know it, embrace :

Self-governance (referring to collectively owned companies) and inclusive management (referring to the manner in which peer production projects are managed) ; Common property (referring to natural monopolies and common-pool resources) and collective property (referring to the new type of licenses, which recognize individual authorship, but not exclusive property rights; historical and revived forms of land tenure, etc).

⁵⁵ The newly emerging Commons such as radiofrequencies or patents is a very special under-set. It should suffice here stating that common-pool resources – other than natural monopolies - are a social construction. One has to sensitize people otherwise they will not attribute them value. They only emerge, as they turn important, just as distinctive items of a bequest may seem for the preying eye worth of handling like a heritage.

Patterns of spontaneously grown common utilization patterns (referring to collective land and forest exploitations) and peer distribution (referring to the manner in which products, particularly peer-produced products, are distributed).⁵⁶

The so-called sharing economy recognizing that, in addition to authors and artists who want to sell their work, there is an amazing creativity by scientists, teachers, authors, artists and the rest who simply wants to share our creativity. Community sites and social media provide this economy of giving an infrastructure to operate. On these enabling platforms millions of creative works have been offered to share and, occasionally, also to profit from the creativity that they share. An artist, for example, can release his work or enable those who want commercial rights to link to a site that can provide those other rights. This is an evolving hybrid economy of creativity.

As a transition between the legacy notion of the Commons and its upcoming rich new applications, and also to denote collaborative projects in general, let us consider the term of commons-based peer production (Benkler 2006). Commons-based peer production is to describe a new model of economic production in which the creative energy of large numbers of people is coordinated into large, meaningful projects mostly without traditional hierarchical management (and often, but not always, without or with decentralized financial compensation). Often used interchangeably with the term social production, commons-based peer production is to be contrasted to firm production (where a centralized decision process decides what has to be done and by whom) and market-based production. The notion of commons-based peer production is recently also being applied on tracing patterns of news consumption on social media (Benkler 2009) with a result that prepares a cautious thesis that many facets of social media activity - news distribution and arts production in the digital variations of the mainstream media - might also belong to the social economy.

For a socially inclusive economy, one of the principal patterns is the poverty reduction and the employment generation. In Central-Eastern Europe this is the salient function for the social entrepreneurship. Its prevalent form is the social co-operative⁵⁷ with an aim to train into employment persons crippled by total absence of private sector jobs and exclusion from the labour market.⁵⁸ These work

⁵⁶ Civilian journalism and the evolving ecosystem of shared news also belong here. These new phenomena are enabled by the changing consumption patterns of news.

⁵⁷ Social co-operatives have an indivisible mutual fund that represents and symbolizes the joint network.

⁵⁸ In Central-Eastern Europe, the inactive strata are so numerous that they really constitute a sort of counter-sphere. For the sake of a parallel, let me cite the example of the American Indians in their reserves where off-shore rules frequently apply to gambling and the proceeds are distributed among members as in a co-operative. In order to usher the Hungarian long-term unemployed from their

integrating social enterprises have as major objective to form and develop a collective that can absorb into work and reconnect into society by some productive activity. As stated before, the collectivity alone can reconnect the non-qualified, long-term unemployed people with their vulnerable work ethics, who run the risk of permanent exclusion from the labour market. This helping network is needed because individually and left alone the long-term unemployed are usually not capable any more of fulfilling what a working environment requires from them. Without being embedded, they would keep on moving to and from between being self-employed and being systemically superfluous as a subject of social politics.

The principal cleavage in traditional societies is that between being socially up or down. In modern societies, the main cleavage is set rather between being in or out, between being drawn in and having some social capital or being socially excluded. When gauging the pivotal role of networking in launching and operating a social enterprise, I point out that collectivities are accruing social capital to members. This is because of their transient, ephemeral character⁵⁹ that brings them occasionally close to a sort of niche in the mainstream business. Last but not least, before anybody would think that networking builds only sympathetic organizations, let me state in unequivocal terms that local networks in the society and parochialism in general are often associated with narrow access, uneven or inequitable services, cultural homogeneity, gender inequality and exclusions. Well, the very essence of networking is that other people do not belong here...

Social economy enterprises are said to encourage the participation of stakeholders in the management and delivery of production or services. In fact, private for-profit companies might at the best manage collaboration between multiple stakeholders but they are never open for sharing in strategy formation or operations. Contrastively, in the social economy, the non-profit sector notwithstanding, we witness the occurrence of some sort of a network that empowers the fringes and facilitates participation. This presupposes a network or rather the creation of a larger organization, that is not of a hierarchical, chain of command type but rather of a peer-to-peer type without a centre. Authority and prestige originate here from the collaborative work (including often the so-called sweat equity that is: toil) and from the collective utilization of their asset-locked common-pool resources.

vestiges of informal work to formal employment, many schemes have been experimented with from part-ownership through shares up to social land programs. Social co-operatives are the last form in this long row. Still, among those between 50-64, some 10 percent less are employed than in the EU-average. The same ratio for the Roma population is only around 20 percent, although in the time of state-socialism employment had reached 70%.

⁵⁹ Family-run boarding houses offering day-care for children are often entitled to receive a statutory and normative allowance in countries with a low fertility rate. Still, their life span is short. Short-lived as they might be, while in business they provide a considerable help to working parents to find a viable balance between raising children and going to work.

Typical qualifying networks are those of membership organizations and mutuals, self-governed organizations, collectively owned organizations, community interest organizations. Also, as to target groups, to work “for them” is not sufficient, to work “with them” is a necessary condition.

Entrepreneurship online

The online entrepreneurship with its user-generated content can be sensibly compared with the social entrepreneurship. User uploaded content – civilian journalism - adds to value in comparison to conventional news or some homepage content. Also, the way value is being added to this online content in a *community-curated manner*, resembles to self-governing or autonomous social enterprises. The social web often acts as an incubator for young talent dabbling in one genre or another of art or literature. A friendly audience that gives feed-back – this is the essence of community portals - is invaluable in the unfolding of their creative potential. In order to prevail in the fields of creative human endeavour, it is traditionally the coincidence of gift and good fortune that can help talents unfold. This latter component of luck is leveraged in the non-scholarized domains of social media since attention alone is what counts. Ivan Illich, the intellectual foe of formal schooling would just rejoice seeing this practice. One can draw eyeballs without any effort as to material resources. Creative content will be noticed due to search, indexing, tagging, etc. Capital is only needed to leave incubating behind and take off.

Social enterprises are typically an entrepreneurship with an idea or a business model. They can be *disruptive* ones that have the potential to extend in an explosive manner. Their extension starts when a reflecting network arises around them – the sprouts of a fledgling clientele. This feedback can help them survive and get confirmed as to the feasibility of their endeavour. Being embedded in a network has therefore the same incubating function as subsidies in case of SMEs. As the community roots always serve as a precondition for grants, online groups can easily substantiate their claims to respond to a larger audience. This feature points out to the fact that a network-rooted organization can operate without a feasible, let alone sustainable business model. This is often the case with online communities, where the size of committed followers alone is sufficient to draw the attention and keep the step going. I could cite innumerable cases⁶⁰, where a young talent finds an

⁶⁰ „My problem is not piracy, it is obscurity, and having put the electronic free version of my novel on a community space, has turned my books into dandelion seeds, able to blow in the wind and find every crack in every sidewalk, sprouting up in unexpected places. Each seed is a possibility, an opportunity for someone out there to buy a physical copy of the book, to commission work from me, to bring me in for a speech. I once sold a reprint of an article of mine to an editor who saw it in a spam message -- the spammer had pasted it into the ‘word salad’ at the bottom of his boner-pill pitch to get past the filters. The editor read the piece, liked it, googled me, and sent me a check. This

audience or constituency with the help of the social media alone. The mode monetization – if any - is usually still to be invented later and can come afterward without compromising the existence and functioning of a co-operative work-together. The community sites and popular applications can operate month after month without the direct prospect of commodification. I argue that the sustainable maintenance of a collectivity or a traffic-attracting network amounts to and compensates for a working business model – as long as they develop their core competence. This online state of affairs is relevant for social entrepreneurs, because it is often advisable to develop a co-operative with means of community work without a direct prospect of market opportunity. They will come later in quite unexpected forms.⁶¹

Incubation for an entrepreneurship means simulating how *amateurs* do sport, how *connoisseurs* deal in paintings, the way *laics* dabble in their hobbies and volunteers act in their civic engagement.

The reflection and feed-back alone can help a young creator to explore ways of collaborating with readers, bloggers, and other generators of ideas, words, news, analysis, pictures, and data - slowly developping towards professionalism. I equalize this network of interested or engaged people around a creative mind with the mentioned enabling network that is the *differentia specifica* of social entrepreneurship. What is feed-back by an audience in the online entrepreneurship, it is *reciprocity and trust* being incubated, developped and practicized in the social economy – reciprocal relations and an ever higher level of mutual trust are the salient factors of competitive advantage in this very special business segment. The experience of online communities casts doubt on the merits of demanding a full-fledged business model from social enterprises instead of satisfying us with mere operability and financial viability.

dissemination allowed my work to spread far and wide, into corners of the world I never could have reached. I hear from sailors on battleships, volunteers working in the developping world, kids in underfunded school-districts, and people who ‘do not usually read this sort of thing’ but found my work because a friend was able to introduce them to it. My readers have made innumerable technical remixes, fan-fic installments, fan-art drawings, songs, translations and other fun and inspiring creative works from mine, each time humbling and inspiring me (and enriching me!).”

⁶¹ As to unexpected forms of market opportunity, let me refer to what happened to the homeless people in Budapest: a creative talent of the advertising industry, an artist in his leisure time, has come to the idea that the homeless might perhaps start distributing the copies of his artistic work to cars stopped by traffic lights. This turned out to be a genuine success; the artist achieved attention and accumulated considerable fame comparable to a vernissage of an exposition, the amateur salesmen received their alms or tips as usual. This case substantiates that (1) a live community is a value in itself that can be converted in work opportunities and (2) the availability of a sustainable business model need not be taken as a constitutive criterion for an organization to belong to the social economy.

There is then the well-known lesson of *open-source software*: When a company churns out an online product, they most likely will give away the source code in order to solicit the collaborative effort of independent software developers to add applications and add value thereby. In a similar vein, I regard co-operatives as platforms of internalized voluntary discipline adherence, mutual knowledge sharing and burgeoning competences where others can join with their skills or labour. The cohesion alone within an unfolding network has an inherent value. Networks are thus an, as yet unrecognized, factor of production such as land, labour or capital.

In order to accentuate my claim that collaborative networks constitute a factor of production in the social economy, I risk a lengthy citation from a recent research: „Young people who are not working or in school, generally characterized as *disconnected*, these youth may also lack strong social networks that provide assistance in the form of employment connections and other supports such as housing and financial assistance. Without attachment to work or school, the disconnected youth may be vulnerable to experiencing negative outcomes as the transition to adulthood. Since the late 1990s, social science research has introduced different definitions of the term disconnected. Across multiple studies of disconnected youth, the ages of the youth and the length of time they are out of school or work for purposes of being considered disconnected differ. In addition, a smaller number of studies has also incorporated incarcerated youth into estimates of the population. Due to these methodological differences, the number of youth who are considered disconnected varies... The factors that are associated with disconnection are not entirely clear, though some studies have shown that parental education and receipt of public assistance are influential. Compared to their peers in the general population, disconnected youth tend to have fewer years of education, and are more likely to live apart from their parents and to have children. Disconnected youth are also twice as likely to be poor than their connected peers... The parents of disconnected youth are more likely than their counterparts to be unemployed and to have lower educational attainment.”⁶²

In the network economy it is the sheer number of interconnections and links that yield added value. The availability of members keeps the network alive. This rule applies more and more as the bigger the network grows.⁶³ The networks are usually organic grown, such as an ethnic purveyor hinterland for a, let us say, Chinese restaurateur.

⁶² A. L. Fernandez and Th. Gabe, *Disconnected Youth : A Look at 16- to 24-Year Olds Who Are Not Working or In School*, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C., 2008

⁶³ The development of a network is described – among others - by the Metcalfe-law: the utility of a (telecommunications) network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system.

Further on, the community is traditionally created by linking to each other under some cause (families alone are no communities under this qualifying constraint). Weak bonds or stronger bonds, but by bonds that have to be cared for and used in order to keep them alive. The density of that sort of network leads to popularity (e.g.: accumulated social capital). Sacrificing the integrity of our privacy, *publicness* alone also brings us comparable collective benefits and helps create a community, too. The community is therefore also being woven by other civic duties such as when members in a social space share their personal information, when they share their offering of skills, when (1) they tag themselves in a qualifying manner as this or that, when (2) they are rating and reviewing something online or when (3) they contribute or share a story or picture under an existing metatag. (What personal information people nowadays proffer on social spaces amounts to an environmental study hitherto executed by police alone on suspects). This *tagging* - the online equivalent of coming together and building community - renders them searchable, visible and retrievable under that description. This voluntarily revealed publicness of their traits renders people to become user-curated objects in a wider dimension – sort of an emerging new Commons - called social intelligence. It is important to point out that social intelligence is yet unregulated by state authorities. Being not regulated does not mean that there is no management of these sometimes private, sometimes common-pool resources.

Sharing of personal information that merges into a wider set of such a collective wisdom (the latest equivalent of a data base) is in itself a generative social act because it forms the basis of ensuing personal connections, let alone business transactions. The density of this sort of virtually knitted network leads to enhanced opportunities for members. (Enhanced opportunity is the latest recurrence of value added in economics). In the beginning there is some sort of content alone. That is enough for generating an attentive audience. That is also enough for this no-cost little online endeavour to operate. For creating an attention-maintained community (virtual at the onset, with the potential of turning into real business) the digital age requires some sort of hands-on reporting or vivid discussing that embrace virtual collaboration, viral dissemination, and feedback loops that inform and deepen original content. Once the community is at hand, an appropriate business model will sooner or later emerge for them.

That is why I speak of networks – online networks and social capital generating collectivities alike - as factor of production. A live network is in itself a value driver: an intangible non-physical claim to future benefits for members. As an antipode, I have evoked the historical case of insulated hermits as people lacking a helping network whatsoever. Most businesses are situated in a continuum between these two antipodes: social enterprises are businesses that cannot manage without a network. For, the profit businesses, at the same time, may have a network of their own or not but their network does not belong to the *core* of their business. (In the

language of management science: not belonging to the *technostructure* but merely to the supporting staff).

The difference between clusters, public utilities' grid and personal networks is that business relationships rarely add on to a personal network. Personal links accumulate into intangible assets, intellectual or social capital whereas business relationships accrue to capital without strings.

By the term collectivities, I do not understand only a working environment. Although by no means, part of the social economy, men's magazines, business and trade magazines, and entertainment magazines - they also have the unique *value of focus* that their publishers can sell to advertisers. What is more, magazines as communities are perfectly positioned for the community-based internet, too. To the extent of a parallel, I can state that these periodicals are also collections of people who are interested in the same well circumscribed stuff. Complementing their paper edition, editors can figure out ways to enable their readers to utilize this plus: to share with each other, to become a platform for that community. Becoming a community platform, to turn into a place of exchange (say of criticism about all forms and tastes in entertainment), can still sustain quite a few high-value titles worldwide – even well after the looming demise of offline journalism⁶⁴.

There is an emerging principle for these organizations reflecting new architecture of (small) business models in our post-industrial age: do what you do best (your core competences) and – as leverage - link outward to the rest.⁶⁵ Linking-in with partners presupposes expertise otherwise your partner would reject you! Your clients might appreciate and use these secondary competences of yours – that is why embedding is definitely leveraging social economy organizations. Links are value. The online content without links is valueless because it is unseen and cannot be monetized. The content with links gains value both because it has an audience that can be monetized and because it gains credence in the page ranking algorithms, which equates links with value. That is the basic precept of the link economy, which also applies offline to small companies and burgeoning collectivities that try to identify their core competences.

⁶⁴ In the minute, their paper edition goes out of business, what remains to be left of these magazines – the online community - will quite necessarily merge into the contemporary social economy.

⁶⁵ As the rule of *preferential attachment* teaches, nodes (member workers) will wish to link themselves to hubs with the most connections (workers with informal prestige, say foremen). As *nodes* arrive and demand on the system increases, the total capacity of the system also increases, whereas in a chain command structure forfeit of flatness contributes to the bureaucracy. At the same time, an unemployed Roma bricklayer will perhaps not join a social co-operative according to the logic of a *citation network*, his choice still follows the very rule of „following” a person (in esteem).

Groups of village hosts or other self-employed, members of cooperatives – perhaps on their online site at that – might try *to use the power of the link to build their reputation* by putting together a sharing network of their consumers, benefactors and stakeholders cutting across departmental and institutional and economic boundaries. What is the social economy equivalent of an outward link (as reflecting non-core competences)? It connects their thrust in building partnerships to local authorities and other more established companies.

Final remarks

The social economy is made up of enterprises, the primary objective of which is to provide their members or a wider community with services. This leads to a so-called hybrid organization, imbued with conflicts in the system of values and business goals. Social economy enterprises, accounting for nearly 8% of the private sector jobs in Europe, are often able to survive and provide quality services in circumstances that ‘investor-driven’ firms would find less lucrative. However, their specific management structures, stakeholder groups and capital structures necessitate adapted skills amongst managers and board officials.⁶⁶ Multiplying effects can be taken for granted here. At the same time, there are no trickling-down effects at all, because growth in the social economy is by definition tantamount to the parallel and proportional income growth of their actors and participants. Social economy organizations are also tantamount to setting up a GATT-conform trade barrier in order to localize and to tap underutilized local skills. This is the “social democracy” of the anticapitalism, opposed to the militancy of hard-core antiglobalists, anarchists and environmentalists.

According to my hypothesis, networks are a good proxy for finality. Looking for signs of networking is operational and statistically also discriminating enough. What is more, instead of presumed altruism (maximizing social aims) it sets upon gratification (that is a constant positive feedback) within a self-governing peer network. That is a network with a topology excluding any centre or chain of command. In sum, it is less the social aim but rather their social fabric that distinguishes best and yields the *differentia specifica* of the social economy as contrasted to other subsets of the non-state and non-business third sector. These features delineate a clear focus at the lowest level of rank-ordered organisations – well below the SME sector with an emphasis on one special subset of the transit organizations, with their incubating function.

⁶⁶ Green Paper on Entrepreneurship in Europe, EU Commission, 2003.

Social economy organizations can all be understood as motivated by collective self-employment.⁶⁷ The all-encompassing definition, without taking recourse to finality and without presuming a sustainable business model, could sound something like this: the social economy is made up of project-level, transitional or already institutionalized initiatives, where either their means of production are collective or their management is founded on values of self-governance. This latter results in an autonomous management, where the hierarchy builds on an informal prestige alone and a decision making is based on principles of participation and empowerment. Such a state of affairs is necessarily conducive to the primacy of personal engagement over capital.

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⁶⁷ Here is the definition given by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), according to which self-employed workers include individual entrepreneurs, members of limited partnerships, regardless of their having employees or not, independent agricultural workers and their family members, students of vocational training employed by the previously mentioned entities, members of producers' cooperatives and casual workers.

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PART3

„Es ist allgemein angenommen, dass das Selbstbild der verschiedenen Völker Europas eindeutig Elemente westlichen Charakters hervorhebt – die Topoi 'christlich-abendländische Zivilisation', ergänzt mit den der 'jüdisch-christlichen Überlieferung' und 'Erbschaft der griechisch-römischen Antiquität' sind ständige Elemente bei der Registration der Grundelemente europäischer Kulturerbe.“

Vilmos Heiszler

Zwischen Ost und West: Elemente des Selbstbildnisses europäischer Nationen
Kurzfassung

„Mit dem Verschwinden des Feindbildes ‚Kommunismus‘, so scheint es, treten die Schwächen des Verfassungstyps ‚westliche Demokratie‘ um so schärfer hervor.“

Richard Saage

Die Demokratie und die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts

“Thus, the very globalization (that was actively imposed by the USA; that is stigmatized by the antiglobalists of all the countries; that is often regarded as the main source of problems for the developing countries) made the trend toward the relative weakening of the rich countries and the relative strengthening of the poor countries inevitable. Consider this point in more detail.”

Leonid Grinin, Andrey Korotayev

Globalization and the Sifting of Global Economic-Political Balance

“The results showed that, among the participants of the study, the globalization is not seen as a major threat, but there is no enthusiasm about it either.”

Márta Fülöp

The Enthusiasm and/or the Fear Concerning the Globalization among the Post-socialist Youth : The Case of the Hungarian University Students

“The imperial conflicts of second line (behind the global cooperation, that constitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear ideological-philosophical forms. This event reminds very clearly (as it has been declared so reluctantly in this attempt) of a state, that Huntington described in 1992 and 1993. These ideologies-philosophies of life are adopting very generally (as it has been once pointed out) a „fundamentalist“ character, what has also to be explained from this competition. It is almost alarming, that this process represents the *counter-movement* toward the development after 1945, while formerly the individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and demanding.“

Endre Kiss

Constructivity and Destructivity in the Globalization. A Background of the Problematic of Peace

Zwischen Ost und West: Elemente des Selbstbildnisses europäischer Nationen
(Kurzfassung)

Es ist allgemein angenommen, dass das Selbstbild der verschiedenen Völker Europas eindeutig Elemente westlichen Charakters hervorhebt – die Topoi „christlich-abendländische Zivilisation“, ergänzt mit den der „jüdisch-christlichen Überlieferung“ und „Erbschaft der griechisch-römischen Antiquität“ sind ständige Elemente bei der Registrierung der Grundelemente europäischer Kulturerbe.

Schon beim ersten Blick wird es klar, dass diese Grundelemente problematische Züge aufweisen: sowohl jüdische, als auch christliche Elemente europäischer Kulturerbe stammen ursprünglich aus dem Gebiet des Nahen Ostens. Die grossen monotheistischen Religionen waren im Schosse semitischer Völker Südwestasiens entstanden („Kinder Abrahams“: Israeliten, Christen, Muslimen), also entscheidende Faktoren europäischer kultureller Identität sind vom aussereuropäischen Ursprung.

Die Zusammensetzung der identitätsbildenden Image einzelner Völker Europas ist auch kompliziert. Einzelne Beispiele:

Russen: auch selbst gefragt, ob sie zu Europa gehören: Kontroverse zwischen Zapadniki (Westler) und Slawophilen; Skythism, eurasische Schule; asiatische Tradition (mongolische Erbe in der russischen politischen Kultur); Bolschewismus zwischen Weltrevolution und „Sozialismus in einem Land“ (Trotzkismus v. Stalinismus).

Polen: überwiegend eindeutige prowestliche Orientation (Katholizismus, ständische und nationale Freiheitsauffassung), mit Betonung nationaler Eigenarten (Sarmatismus).

Ungarn: Fahren-Metapher (Pendeln zwischen Ost und West). Kontroverse über die Rolle asiatischer (steppisch-nomadischer) Kulturerbe und Anpassung zur europäischen (christlichen) Kultur; Diskussionen über Herkunft der Magyaren (türkisch oder finno-ugrisch); orientalisierende künstlerische Richtungen um die Jahrhundertendwende; Turanismus; dabei auch Tradition „Schutzschild Europas“ gegenüber dem Osten.

Finnen: trotz finno-ugrischer Abstammung Hervorhebung westlicher Züge finnischer Kultur, Meidung asiatischer Komponente (Erinnerung an die russische Oberhoheit).

Rumänen: starke Betonung römischer (lateinischer) Abstammung und kultureller Erbe, geschickt harmonisiert mit byzantinisch-orthodoxer (und bis zur Neuzeit slawischsprachiger und griechischer) kirchlichen Tradition. Deshalb keine Kontroverse über Abstammung und kulturelle Zugehörigkeit.

Bulgaren: sehr ausgeglichen, jedes Element harmonisch zusammengebaut: thrakisches Substrat, slawische und steppisch-türkische Volkselemente verschmolzen im Zeichen byzantinisch-christlicher Kultur. Kein Respekt für griechische und türkische kulturelle Einwirkungen, Bekenntnis zum Slawentum.

Griechen: starkes Bewusstsein kultureller und politischer Nachlass der Antike („Begründer der europäischen Kultur“), kombiniert mit Vorbehalten der byzantinischen Tradition gegenüber westlichen Einwirkungen. Dabei starke Zurückweisung asiatischer Kultureinflüsse auf die griechische Entwicklung.

Türken: neben steppisch-nomadischen und islamistischen Traditionen immer stärkere Hervorhebung europäischer Elemente türkischer Entwicklung (Modernisationsbestrebungen der Osmanen und des Kemalismus).

Deutsche: Spezialfall. Keine aussereuropäische Kulturerbe, aber oft starke Abgrenzung, besonders von der römischen Tradition (Germanenkult, Hermann-Heroisierung), später Theorie über den „deutschen Sonderweg“.

Aussereuropäische kulturelle Wirkungen von längerer Zeitdauer :

Islamisch: Iberische Halbinsel, Sizilien, Balkan, Russland: lange nur als fremde Eroberung und Unterdrückung bewertet, in letzter Zeit objektiver beurteilt, als Vermittler anderer Kulturwerte (besonders am Gebiet der Musik, Tanz, Tracht, Gastronomie), in Russland auch als Ursprung grober politischer Handlungs- und Umgangsformen betrachtet (wobei die Tataren nur teilweise als Träger islamischer Kultur zu bezeichnen sind).

Zigeunerisch: Südost- und Mitteleuropa, Spanien, Frankreich: an der Peripherie der Gesellschaft, besonders Unterhaltung (Musik, Tanz, Gauklerkunst).

Jüdisch: wegen dem langen Zusammenleben (2000 Jahre) bestritten, ob als „aussereuropäisch“ zu bezeichnen. In den Anfängen wichtige Rolle in der Verbreitung des Christentums, später Hebräisch als wichtiges komponent theologischer Studien. In der europäischen Kultur gänzlich integriert, die

Wirkungen wechselseitig und nur mit Vorbehalt als „aussereuropäisch“ zu bezeichnen.

Richard Saage

Die Demokratie und die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts⁶⁸

I.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der Gesellschaftsordnungen des sowjetischen Typs in den Jahren 1989 und 1991 hat der amerikanische Politologe Francis Fukuyama angesichts des Versagens der kommunistischen Legitimationsmuster in seinem Buch "Das Ende der Geschichte"⁶⁹ die These vertreten, daß die liberale Demokratie, die seit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen des 17., 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts zahlreiche Metamorphosen durchlief, nun endlich zu *der* politischen Form der Integration der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse in kapitalistischen Staaten gefunden habe, zu der es keine historischen Alternativen mehr gebe. Der dieser Feststellung zugrundeliegende Triumphalismus schlug sich in den bekannten Formeln vom "Ende der Geschichte" oder vom "Ende der Utopie"⁷⁰ nieder. Tatsächlich scheint es so zu sein, daß die liberale Demokratie (parlamentarische und präsidentielle Demokratie) auf der weltpolitischen Agenda keine andere Demokratievariante als Konkurrenz zu fürchten hat, ganz zu schweigen von möglichen diktatorischen Alternativen, seien sie nun kommissarischer, autoritärer oder totalitärer Provenienz. Doch demgegenüber bleibt zu fragen, ob tatsächlich der Niedergang des Realsozialismus in Europa automatisch zu einem Legitimationsgewinn des westlichen Verfassungstyps führte, der ihn gleichsam gegenüber allen Gefährdungen immunisiert.

Wer sich einen Überblick über die Zeitdiagnosen der westlichen Demokratie nach der großen Zäsur von 1989 und 1991 verschafft, könnte zu dem Schluß kommen, das Gegenteil sei der Fall. Mit dem Verschwinden des Feindbildes "Kommunismus", so scheint es, treten die Schwächen des Verfassungstyps "westliche Demokratie" um so schärfer hervor. Gewiß ist die Rede von der Krise der Demokratie so alt wie diese selbst, weil die Ausweitung politischer Teilhabe das Resultat erbitterter politischer Kämpfe schon lange vor der Französischen Revolution war. Auch sind die Gefahren, die der Demokratie von den Bürokratisierungstendenzen etatistischer Verwaltungen und den Oligarchisierungstrends in den großen massendemokratischen Organisationen der

⁶⁸ Die folgenden Ausführungen lehnen sich eng an die einschlägigen Abschnitte meines Buches „Demokratiethorien. Historischer Prozess - Theoretische Entwicklung – Soziotechnische Bedingungen“, Wiesbaden 2005“ an.

⁶⁹Vgl. Fukuyama 1992.

⁷⁰Vgl. Fest 1991, dazu kritisch Saage 1992.

modernen Industriestaaten drohen, seit dem 19. und verstärkt im 20. Jahrhundert immer wieder analysiert worden.⁷¹ Aber die Herausforderungen der liberalen Demokratie seit dem Zusammenbruch der Herrschaftsordnungen sowjetischen Typs' sind offensichtlich neuartig. Genannt werden vor allem die folgenden Problemlagen, mit denen der westliche Verfassungstyp konfrontiert ist, ohne bisher überzeugende Lösungen anbieten zu können :

1. Seit der frühen Neuzeit hätten sich in den westlichen Ländern Marktgesellschaften in einem langwierigen und komplexen Prozess durchgesetzt. Aber der individualistische Nutzenkalkül und das egoistische Konkurrenzverhalten als notwendige Voraussetzung und Folge der Marktökonomie seien, wie Tocqueville in seiner Analyse der amerikanischen Demokratie in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bemerkte, durch "Gewohnheiten des Herzens" korrigiert worden. Er habe damit einen Tatbestand gemeint, der eigentlich bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts in den westlichen Demokratien außer Frage stand: daß nämlich das Prinzip egoistischen Utilitätsdenkens auf die Sphäre der Ökonomie im engeren Sinne weitgehend beschränkt blieb und die anderen Lebensbereiche der ständisch-handwerklichen, sowie bäuerlichen Traditionen, des Familienlebens und der generellen sozialen Orientierung der einzelnen unberührt ließ. Der Triumph der Marktwirtschaft im weltweiten Kontext nach dem Zusammenbruch der Planwirtschaften des Ostens könnte nach dieser Diagnose für die innere Verfassung der westlichen Staaten einen hohen Preis haben⁷²: Marktkonformes Verhalten, durch solidarische Werte nicht mehr korrigiert, treibe eine gesellschaftliche Praxis aus sich hervor, die der ehemalige Bundesverfassungsrichter Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde auf die Formel brachte: Es komme darauf an, "möglichst viel (für sich) herauszuholen, sich teuer zu verkaufen".⁷³ Doch setze sich diese Maxime durch, so sei der liberalen Demokratie ihre wichtigste normative Ressource entzogen: die Bereitschaft der Bürger, sich für sie zu engagieren.

2. Mit dem drohenden Zerfall der normativen Ressourcen des Bürgersinns gehe in den westlichen Staaten ein Modernisierungsschub einher, der ausschließlich seiner eigenen Logik folge, ohne auf die Logiken der anderen Teilbereiche der Gesellschaft Rücksicht zu nehmen. Eine konjunkturunabhängige, auf Dauer gestellte Massenarbeitslosigkeit, aber auch der Verlust humaner sinnstiftender Leitbilder sei die notwendige Folge: sie produziere dadurch massenhaft anomische Bewußtseinslagen, die sich in Gewalt- und Ideologiebereitschaft sowie in der Sehnsucht nach einfachen Lösungen und "starken" Männern äußere.⁷⁴ Die immer

⁷¹Vgl. hierzu Lenk 1991, S. 957-965. Zum Verhältnis von Demokratie und Bürokratisierung vgl. auch Fetscher 1973, S. 50-62.

⁷²Vgl. Dubiel 1995, S. 727-733.

⁷³Böckenförde 1995, S. 723.

⁷⁴Vgl. Fijalkowski 1994, S. 285.

wiederkehrenden Wellen des Fremdenhasses und rechtsextremistischer Gewalttaten seien zwar nicht mit den Entstehungsbedingungen des Faschismus in der Weimarer Republik zu vergleichen. Doch stellten sie dann eine ernsthafte Herausforderung für die liberale Demokratie dar⁷⁵, wenn sie begleitet würden von massiven sozio-kulturellen Fragmentierungen, in deren Gefolge sich innerhalb fundamentalistischer Gruppierungen totalitäre Ideologien durchsetzen können. Der ehemalige Ost-West-Gegensatz sei längst durch einen "Zusammenprall der Zivilisationen" (Huntington) ersetzt worden, der nicht nur an den Grenzen des Geltungsbereichs der westlichen Demokratien, sondern in ihren Metropolen selbst stattfinde.⁷⁶

3. Technologische Entscheidungen mit irreversiblen Konsequenzen drohten das Mehrheitsprinzip außer Kraft zu setzen. Die westliche Demokratie sei aber nur dann wirklich funktionsfähig, wenn die Minderheit zur Mehrheit werden kann und einmal getroffene Entscheidungen wieder zu revidieren sind.⁷⁷ Noch schwerer aber wiege, daß die liberale Demokratie in ihrer jetzigen Form mit dem Nachweis schuldig bleibe, daß sie die Lebensbedingungen der Menschheit im 21. Jahrhundert zu sichern vermag. Dem Druck der nächsten Wahlen ausgesetzt, konzentrierten sich jedoch die Politiker auf unmittelbar anstehende Problemlagen; die längst fälligen ökologischen Strukturentscheidungen blieben aus, weil sie langfristigen Menschheitsinteressen dienten, die im System der Konkurrenzdemokratie nicht mehrheitsfähig und damit auch nicht durchsetzbar seien. Nicht im Parlament, sondern im Radio und im Fernsehen fänden im allgemeinen die sachkundigen Diskussionen über die wichtigsten ökologischen, sozialen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme statt. Das Interesse der Parteien an ihrem Machterhalt entwickle zudem eine solche Eigendynamik, daß der Abstand zwischen der öffentlichen Meinung und den gewählten Volksvertretern ständig wachse. Wir müßten uns bewußt sein, so die Diagnose des Berichts an den Club of Rome von 1992, "Die globale Revolution", "daß die Demokratie heute ausgehöhlt und gefährdet ist und daß sie Grenzen" habe. Die Antwort auf die Frage, ob die Welt, in der wir uns vorfinden, überhaupt regierbar sei, laute: "Wahrscheinlich nicht mit den derzeitig vorhandenen Strukturen und Einstellungen."⁷⁸

4. In dem Maße, wie sich die Individualisierungstendenzen in den westlichen Ländern verstärkten, werde immer unklarer, worin der unverzichtbare gesellschaftliche Basiskonsens als Voraussetzung eines pluralistisch verfaßten Regierungssystems zu sehen sei: alle normativen Ressourcen traditionaler Art, aus denen sich jenseits marktkonformen Verhaltens so etwas wie eine kollektive

⁷⁵Vgl. Gess 1994, S. 340.

⁷⁶Vgl. Tibi 1994, S. 306ff.

⁷⁷Vgl. Bermbach 1994, S. 302.

⁷⁸King/Schneider 1991, S. 69.

Identität ergeben könnte, scheinen erschöpft zu sein.⁷⁹ Aus dieser Entwicklung resultierten zwei Konsequenzen, die sich für die liberale Demokratie gleichermaßen fatal auswirkten. Einerseits, komme es bei vielen Bürgern zur Herausbildung einer Doppelmoral: im Namen individueller Grundrechte würden staatliche Maßnahmen zur Schaffung von Infrastrukturen, die solidarischen Zwecken dienten, blockiert, um den politischen Akteuren gleichzeitig Versagen angesichts dringend zu lösender Strukturprobleme vorzuwerfen.⁸⁰ Andererseits, habe die zunehmende Individualisierung des Lebens schon längst die Frage nach der Integrationsfähigkeit der westlichen Demokratien aufgrund des Wegfalls des kommunistischen Feindbildes auf die politische Tagesordnung gesetzt: es sei keineswegs ausgemacht, so lauten düstere Prognosen, ob nicht die Bürgerkriegsszenarien im ehemaligen Herrschaftsbereich des Realsozialismus die Zukunft der westlichen Demokratie vorwegnehmen.⁸¹

5. Als zwischen 1989 und 1991 die realsozialistischen Staaten in Europa zusammenbrachen, beherrschte eine optimistische, wenn nicht sogar euphorische Europa-Vision die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung. Man sprach vom "Modell Europa", in dem es vielfältige und richtungsweisende Sozialexperimente geben werde, denen nicht länger mehr dogmatisierte Utopien und Ideologien, sondern empiriegesättigte und erprobungsfähige Handlungsentwürfe zugrunde liegen. Europa, so schien es, avancierte zum Hoffnungsträger überhaupt, der auf der Basis einer florierenden Marktwirtschaft wachsenden Wohlstand mit Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, sozialer Sicherheit, sowie einer zivilen politischen Kultur verbinde und so zu einer Erneuerung, bzw. Revitalisierung des westlichen Verfassungstyps führe.⁸² Heute, so scheint es, ist nicht mehr viel von dieser Aufbruchstimmung übrig geblieben. Vor allem werden Zweifel an der ökonomischen Leistungsfähigkeit Europas laut. Diese Prognose geht von der Annahme aus, daß die Wachstumsraten der vergangenen Jahre nicht mehr erreichbar sind, die die Voraussetzung für das Funktionieren unserer Sozialsysteme waren und die zugleich die Löhne in Europa unbezahlbar gemacht hätten. Einerseits, seien die Löhne *brutto* zu hoch; sie raubten den Produzenten die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Andererseits, seien sie jedoch *netto* zu niedrig, weil sich ein allein verdienender Angestellter mit zwei Kindern zunehmend der Armutsgrenze nähere.⁸³ Aus diesem Szenario, werden einige beunruhigende Fragen abgeleitet: stehen wir vor dem Ende unserer bisherigen Lebensweise? Wenn Europa tatsächlich verarmt, verliert dann der Verfassungstyp "westliche Demokratie" nicht eine entscheidende Sinnquelle? Kann es sein, daß der Zusammenbruch des Ostens

⁷⁹Vgl. Bermbach 1994, S. 233.

⁸⁰Vgl. Fijalkowski 1994, S. 286f.

⁸¹Vgl. Eisfeld 1994, S. 352.

⁸²Vgl. Senghaas 1990, S. 148f.

⁸³Vgl. Afheldt 1995.

nicht den Sieg des Westens bedeutet, sondern umgekehrt: das Vorbeben zu einem noch viel größeren Zusammenbruch? Befinden wir uns heute in Europa in einer Situation wie die DDR des Jahres 1985, ohne zu ahnen, wie wenig Zeit uns noch bleibt?

6. Zwar bietet der Trend der Globalisierung der Märkte⁸⁴, der sich mit dem Zusammenbruch der realsozialistischen Diktaturen in Europa und dem Siegeszug der neuen Informationstechnologien ungehemmt durchgesetzt hat, die Perspektive einer "Übereinstimmung des Rechts mit einer Gemeinschaft des Nutzens im globalen Maßstab".⁸⁵ Doch dieser Chance stehen auch Gefahren für die liberale Demokratie gegenüber. Indem sich das Kapital internationalisiert und mittels der Neuen Medien weltweit vernetzt, könnte es sich zunehmend seiner sozialstaatlichen Korrektive entziehen, die durch die allgemeine Kapitalflucht und die Verlagerung ganzer Industrien in sogenannte Billiglohnländer noch weiter geschwächt werden. Da die Globalisierung die Gegenmacht der Gewerkschaften aushebelt und die Verringerung der Arbeitskosten einer der wichtigsten Aspekte der Konkurrenzfähigkeit innerhalb der globalisierten Weltwirtschaft ist, wäre nicht auszuschließen, daß dem wachsenden Heer der Arbeitslosen eine kleine Schicht von Superreichen gegenübersteht. Auf diese Weise könnte die Globalisierung jenes Mindestmaß an sozialer Gerechtigkeit zerstören, ohne das die liberale Demokratie ihre Integrationsfähigkeit verlöre. Der Rest-Staat müßte zunehmend zu autoritären, d.h. antidemokratischen Mitteln greifen, um die Stabilität der Gesellschaft zu sichern. Andererseits, könnten sich die wirklich relevanten gesamtgesellschaftlichen Entscheidungen in den Chefetagen der weltweit agierenden "global players" abspielen, die der demokratischen Kontrolle der Bürger weitgehend entzogen sind.

7. Spätestens seit dem 11. September 2001, ist die liberale Demokratie des Westens mit der Gefahr des weltweiten, gegen sie gerichteten Terrors konfrontiert, der bis dahin unterschätzt worden ist. Ausgehend vom islamischen Fundamentalismus, sind die bisherigen Reaktionsmuster wenig erfolgversprechend. Das kulturalistische Paradigma⁸⁶ sieht das Problem nicht im islamischen Fundamentalismus, sondern im Islam insgesamt. Der westlichen Demokratie wird empfohlen, ihre Reihen zu schließen und sich auf ihre eigenen Werte zu besinnen. Unter dieser Voraussetzung, könnten dann in der Außenpolitik realistische Bündnisse mit anderen Kulturen geschlossen werden, die auf gegenseitigem Nutzen beruhen. Was aber geschieht mit den kulturellen Minoritäten in den westlichen Metropolen? Und wie soll dieser Ansatz funktionieren, wenn der fundamentalistische Islam in seinen eigenen Ursprungsländern mehrheitsfähig

⁸⁴Vgl. hierzu kritisch Ziegler 2003.

⁸⁵Vgl. Merle/Gosepath 2002, S. 8.

⁸⁶Vgl. Huntington 1996.

wird? Das modernisierungstheoretische Muster⁸⁷ geht davon aus, daß der islamische Fundamentalismus eine Ideologie darstellt, die streng vom Islam als Religion zu trennen ist. Die westliche Demokratie habe den islamischen Fundamentalismus zu bekämpfen, aber den Dialog mit dem Islam zu suchen. Als Fernziel gilt die Entstehung einer Weltzivilisation, in der unter dem Zeichen der Demokratie die aufklärerischen Potentiale der islamischen und der westlichen Kultur verschmelzen. Auch diese Konzeption erscheint in einem problematischen Licht, wenn sich - gerade unter dem Eindruck westlicher Militärinterventionen - die Kooperationsbereitschaft der islamischen Staaten auf die ihrer korrumpierten Eliten beschränken sollte.

II.

Hat die liberale Demokratie angesichts dieser Herausforderungen eine Zukunft? Wir sollten nicht vergessen, daß in der bisherigen Geschichte alle diktatorischen und technokratischen Versuche, gegen das anthropologische Veto der Selbstbestimmung stabile Herrschaftsordnungen zu formieren, wenig erfolgreich waren. Der neueste Beleg sind die Ereignisse von 1989 und ihre Folgen: wie schon vor ihnen die faschistischen Diktaturen, so scheiterten auch die politischen Systeme des sowjetischen Typs in letzter Instanz an dem "Protest gegen den fremden Willen, dem sich der eigene beugen muß, gegen die Qual der Heteronomie".⁸⁸ Diese Aussage Hans Kelsens ist im der deutschen Vereinigung der Jahre 1989/90 eindrucksvoll bestätigt worden. So heißt es in der gemeinsamen Erklärung der Bürgerbewegungen der DDR vom 4. Oktober 1989: "Uns verbindet der Wille, Staat und Gesellschaft demokratisch umzugestalten. Es kommt darauf an, einen Zustand zu beenden, in dem Bürgerinnen und Bürger dieser Gesellschaft nicht die Möglichkeit haben, ihre politischen Rechte so auszuüben, wie es die Menschenrechtskonventionen der Vereinten Nationen und die KSZE-Dokumente verlangen. Wir erklären uns solidarisch mit allen, die wegen ihres Einsatzes für diese Ziele verfolgt werden. Wir setzen uns ein für die Freilassung der Inhaftierten, die Aufhebung ergangener Urteile und die Einstellung laufender Ermittlungsverfahren. Wir halten es für vorrangig, in unserem Lande eine Diskussion darüber zu eröffnen, welche Mindestbedingungen für eine demokratische Wahl eingehalten werden müssen".⁸⁹ Aber sicher ist auch, daß die Demokratie in ihrer heutigen Form nicht in traditionalistischer Statik verharren darf. Sie muß sich den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts stellen. Doch die

⁸⁷Vgl. Tibi 1995.

⁸⁸Kelsen 1981, S. 3.

⁸⁹Gemeinsame Erklärung der Bürgerbewegung vom 4. Oktober 1989, in: Volker Gransow/Konrad H. Jarausch (Hrsg.): Die deutsche Vereinigung. Dokumente zu Bürgerbewegung, Annäherung und Beitritt, Köln 1991, S. 69. Zu den aus den Bürgerbewegungen der DDR in der Umbruchphase entstandenen "Runden Tische" vgl. auch Berg 2000 sowie Thaysen 2000.

Frage ist, wie das geschehen soll. Niemand kann an dieser Stelle detaillierte Reformvorschläge der Institutionen unseres politischen Systems erwarten; dazu mögen sich Experten äußern, die auf diesem Gebiet kompetenter sind als der Verfasser. Doch möchte er wenigstens zwei Bedingungen nennen, die für die Zukunft der westlichen Demokratie entscheidend sein können.

Zunächst wird ihre zukünftige Entwicklung davon abhängen, ob es gelingt, dem Denken in Kategorien der individuellen Nutzenmaximierung neue Formen der Bürgersolidarität gegenüberzustellen. Offen kontraproduktiv wäre der Versuch, sie im Zeichen eines "Krieges gegen den weltweiten Terrorismus" durch innen- und außenpolitische Feindbestimmungen zu erzwingen: eine solche ausgrenzende Homogenisierung würde die Demokratie unter sich begraben. Bedenkliche Erosionserscheinungen des normativen Fundaments der liberalen Demokratien sind bereits heute allenthalben sichtbar, wenn in der Öffentlichkeit Versuche unternommen werden, die Folter als legitimes Mittel der Verbrechens- und Terrorismusbekämpfung zu akzeptieren und sich die einzige Supermacht der Welt mit dem Problem auseinanderzusetzen hat, für systematische Mißhandlungen von Kriegsgefangenen unterhalb des Niveaus der Genfer Konvention verantwortlich zu sein. Aber auch der neokonservative Ansatz, Solidarität durch den Rekurs auf traditionale Werte im Bereich der Familien-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik notfalls administrativ zu verordnen, ist ein Irrweg. Längst sind "die traditionellen Polster, auf die sich - bis vor wenigen Jahrzehnten - der Respekt vor der Autorität des Staates, der Gehorsam gegenüber den Gesetzen und eine Ethik der Arbeit stützen konnten"⁹⁰, in dem Maße verschlissen, wie in den westlichen Ländern die zweckrationale, am Markt orientierte Nutzenmaximierung nicht mehr an einer bestimmten Schicht festmachbar, sondern tendenziell zur Handlungsmaxime aller Individuen geworden ist. Die von der Moderne ausgelösten Individualisierungstendenzen sind nur von ihr selbst durch neue Formen der Solidarität in ihrer Dynamik zu bremsen und auf ihr humanes Maß zurückzuführen. Sie kann dabei auf keine andere Quelle zurückgreifen als auf die aufgeklärten Eigeninteressen der Bürger selbst : erst in der zivilgesellschaftlichen Assoziation können die einzelnen wieder lernen, freiwillig solidarische Bindungen einzugehen.

Sodann scheint mir klar zu sein, daß die aufgezeigten Strukturprobleme nur zu bewältigen sind, wenn der westliche Verfassungstyp entschlossen an den - freilich zu reformierenden - Strukturen des Parteiensystems festhält: sie sind keine Fremdkörper, sondern müssen zu einem Zentrum der anzustrebenden Zivilgesellschaft erhoben werden. Für alle Versuche, das tatsächliche oder vermeintliche Versagen der politischen Parteien dadurch zu kompensieren, daß man die Richtlinienkompetenz bei der Antwort auf die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts neu zu schaffenden Institutionen zuordnet, die in einem, angeblich

⁹⁰Dubiel 1995, S. 729.

vom pluralistischen Interessenkampf entlasteten Raum agieren, trifft noch immer zu, was Hans Kelsen über die Parteienfeindschaft in den konstitutionellen Monarchien in Deutschland und Österreich sagte : sie sei - bewußt oder unbewußt - "ein ideologisch maskierter Stoß gegen die Realisierung der Demokratie".⁹¹ Tatsächlich benötigen wir nicht weniger, sondern mehr Pluralismus. "In der gegenwärtig entstehenden Welt", so heißt es im Bericht des Club of Rome von 1992, "kann die Entscheidungsgewalt nicht länger das Monopol von Regierungen und ihren Ministerien sein, die obendrein in einem Vakuum arbeiten". Viele Partner müßten in diesen Prozeß einbezogen werden: "Handel und Industrie, Forschungsinstitute, Wissenschaftler, nichtstaatliche Einrichtungen und private Organisationen".⁹²

Allerdings wird der pluralistische Parteienstaat der Problemlage des 21. Jahrhunderts nur unter der Voraussetzung gewachsen sein, daß er sich in zweierlei Hinsicht reformiert. Auf der einen Seite muß er durch ein fundamentaldemokratisches Korrektiv wirkungsvoll ergänzt werden. Von einer solchen Konstellation könnten das Parlament, die Parteien und die Abgeordneten nur gewinnen, weil sie in einer im Umbruch begriffenen Welt auf einen sensiblen Seismographen an der Basis angewiesen sind: nicht nur um eine Politik zu vermeiden, die sich von den Interessen, Hoffnungen und Ängsten der Bürger löst. Ebenso wichtig ist, daß nur so deren Identifikation mit dem politischen System der parlamentarischen Demokratie möglich erscheint. Auf der anderen Seite wird der pluralistische Parteienstaat des 21. Jahrhunderts um die Erarbeitung der Vision einer zukünftigen Welt, die wir für anstrebenswert halten, nicht herumkommen. Wer ein solches sinnlich konkretes fiktives Szenario, das über den bestehenden Status quo hinausweist, von vornherein als Totalitarismus abtut, hat nicht begriffen, daß die Institutionen des westlichen Verfassungstyps zu leeren Hülsen werden, wenn sie sich auf ihre Funktion der Elitenrekrutierung und der Erzeugung der staatlichen Ordnung beschränken. Das Politische verschwindet dann aus der Politik: sie droht zu einer öffentlichkeitswirksamen Inszenierung von Scheinlösungen zu verkommen, ohne auf die Strukturprobleme des 21. Jahrhunderts wirkliche Antworten zu finden.

III.

Die westliche Demokratie, so kann abschließend festgestellt werden, hat den Herausforderungen linker und rechter Diktaturen im 20. Jahrhundert standgehalten. Ob sie die Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts lösen wird, für die sie selbst mitverantwortlich ist, muss die Zukunft zeigen.

⁹¹Kelsen 1981, S. 20.

⁹²King/Schneider 1991, S. 105

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Globalization and the Sifting of Global Economic-Political Balance

The article offers forecasts of the geopolitical and geo-economic development of the world in the forthcoming decades. One of the main accusations directed toward globalization is that it deepens the gap between the developed and developing countries dooming them to eternal backwardness. The article demonstrates that the actual situation is very different. It is shown that this is due to the globalization that the developing countries are generally growing much faster than the developed states, the World System core starts weakening and its periphery begins to strengthen. At the same time there is a continuing divergence between the main bulk of developing countries and the group of the poorest developing states. The article also explains, why the globalization was bound to lead to the explosive rise of many developing countries and the relative weakening of the developed economies. In the forthcoming decades this trend is likely to continue (though, of course, not without certain interruptions). It is also demonstrated that this convergence constitutes a necessary condition for the next technological breakthrough.

Keywords: developed countries, developing countries, the World System, core, periphery, balance of power, convergence, divergence, world order, global technological breakthrough, weakening of the USA, change of the world leader, global middle class.

Since the end of the 2nd World War one could see in the world a rather unique situation when one country – the USA – became the world hegemon in so many respects: political, military, monetary, economic, technological, cultural, educational, artistic, innovations, and so on. For a rather long period of time this leadership was strengthened by the competition with the world Communism, which unified the West and stimulated a vigorous energy in the United States. After the collapse of the USSR the USA became the absolute hegemon of the world. And this may appear paradoxical, but it was the obtaining of the status of the absolute hegemon, that contributed to the start of the eclipse of the US might. On the one hand, this weakened the country's readiness to sacrifice anything (as was done in the framework of the Cold War); on the other hand, against the background of the apparent omnipotence, the American leaders chose a generally wrong strategy trying to transform internal American tasks into goals of the US foreign policy (Kissinger 2001). As a result, within two decades the US administrations made many mistakes. Through their various actions they dissipated a certain safety factor

that the US had, shook their own might, accumulated exorbitant debts, and created a detonator for the global crisis whose consequences are not clear yet. In the meantime, within less than two decades, between 1991 and 2008, against the background of the weakening of Europe and continuing stagnation of Japan one could see the explosive growth of the Asian giants (China and India) as well as the formation of large group of fast developing countries (from Mexico to Malaysia) that will take leading positions in the world in foreseeable future.

How have the Globalization Weakened the Core and Strengthened the Periphery?

Is the globalization the main cause?

If we consider the situation in retrospective, the decline of the might of the USA and the West was inevitable. The crisis of 2008–2013 just revealed in a rather distinct way the trend that had become rather pronounced well before the crisis, the trend toward the weakening of the main Western economic centers and the inevitability of the loss of the absolute hegemony by the West. We are dealing here with a certain historical logic that, however, has not been completely comprehended yet: *the development of globalization after it had reached its certain phase became incompatible with the well-established model of the American and Western hegemony*. Thus, the very globalization (that was actively imposed by the USA; that is stigmatized by the antiglobalists of all the countries; that is often regarded as the main source of problems for the developing countries) made the trend toward the relative weakening of the rich countries and the relative strengthening of the poor countries inevitable. Consider this point in more detail.

Law of communicating vessels of the world economy

Up to the early 1970s the development of globalization was accompanied by the growth of the gap between the rich and poor countries (especially, if we compare their GDP per capita levels). However, in the recent decades the globalization began to contribute more and more to the closing of this gap. Thus, it appears possible to speak about the “divergent globalization” (approximately up to the 1970s) and the “convergent globalization” (since the 1980s). It appears important to note at this point that a rather pronounced convergence between the First and the Third world was already observed in the 1990s; however, this convergence can be hardly seen when “the West” is compared with “the Rest”, as in this case the convergence between the First and the Third World was obscured by a catastrophic economic decline observed in the early 1990s in the Second World.

Hence, the very essence of the last globalization wave implies that the developing countries must grow faster than the developed.⁹³ This is because the globalization increases the transparency of economic borders and this brings into action what may be called the “law of communicating vessels.” As a result the development of periphery (and, especially, semi-periphery) accelerated, whereas the growth of the countries of the World System core slowed down. There is no doubt that this is one of the main results of the global development in the last two decades.

According to the World Bank, just 20 years ago the share of the most developed countries (= the 1st World = “the West”⁹⁴) in the world GDP (calculated in the constant 2005 international purchasing power parity) was almost twice as high as the one of the rest of the world. It started declining in the 1990s, but these were the 2000s when this decline became precipitous, and by now the share of the Rest already exceeds the one of the West (see Fig. 1):

For the recent years the analysis of the dynamics of the gap between the First and Third World (as regards per capita GDP) on the basis of Maddison’s database (2010) yield results that are very similar to the ones that one obtains on the basis of the World Bank (2014) data. However, this is only Maddison’s database that allows to consider this dynamics in a really deep historical perspective.

In the age of modernization the fastest economic and technological breakthrough was achieved by those countries that had already attained sufficiently high levels of literacy by the beginning of that age. We believe that this point is not coincidental, as it reflects the fact that the development of namely human capital became a crucial factor of economic development in modernization age (see, *e.g.*, Denison 1962; Schultz 1963; Scholing, Timmermann 1988; Lucas 1988, *etc.*). Our earlier research (Korotayev, Malkov, Khaltourina 2006: 87–91) has indicated the presence of a rather strong ($R^2 = 0,86$) and significant correlation between the level

⁹³ This especially relevant for those developing countries that passed a certain threshold level of per capita GDP, which has been identified by Ho Tsung Wu (2006) to be around \$1150 (note that this is rather congruent with the “take-off” theory of W. W. Rostow [1960]). The growth of the convergence rate in the recent decades is directly connected with the fact that during those decades one could observe a very significant growth of the number of those developing countries that passed this threshold level. Indeed, as we have argued on a number of occasions these are medium developed countries that tend to grow faster than either the least developed countries or the most developed ones (see, *e.g.*, Коротаев, Халтурина 2009; Korotayev, Zinkina 2014). It is also very important to stress that at present the majority of the developing countries (with a total population of about 5 billion) belong to the category of the medium developed (“middle income”) countries (World Bank 2014), whereas only the minority of the Third World population (the so-called “bottom billion” [2007]) live now in the least developed countries. Note also that in the recent years the least developed countries tend to grow faster than the most developed ones, but still slower than the medium developed states (Korotayev, Zinkina 2014).

⁹⁴ In this study this notion is operationalized as “High Income OECD Countries” according to the World Bank classification.

of literacy in the early 19th century and per capita GDP values in the late 20th century. This, of course, provides additional support for the point that the diffusion of literacy during the modernization era was one of the most important long-term factors of the acceleration of economic growth.⁹⁵ On the one hand, literate populations have many more opportunities to obtain and utilize the achievements of modernization than illiterate ones. On the other hand, literate people could be characterized by a greater innovative-activity level, which provides opportunities for modernization, technological development, and economic growth. Literacy does not simply facilitate the process of innovation being perceived by an individual. It also changes her or his cognition to a certain extent. This problem was studied by Luria, Vygotsky, and Shemiakin, the famous Soviet psychologists, on the basis of the results of their fieldwork in Central Asia in the 1930s. Their study shows that education has a fundamental effect on the formation of cognitive processes (perception, memory, cognition). The researchers found out that illiterate respondents, unlike literate ones, preferred concrete names for colors to abstract ones, and situative groupings of items to categorical ones (note that abstract thinking is based on category cognition). Furthermore, illiterate respondents could not solve syllogistic problems like the following one – “Precious metals do not get rust. Gold is a precious metal. Can gold get rust or not?”. These syllogistic problems did not make any sense to illiterate respondents because they were out of the sphere of their practical experience. Literate respondents who had at least minimal formal education solved the suggested syllogistic problems easily (Luria 1976; see also, *e.g.*, Ember 1977; Rogof 1981). Therefore, literate workers, soldiers, inventors and so on turn out to be more effective than illiterate ones not only due to their ability to read instructions, manuals, and textbooks, but also because of the developed skills of abstract thinking.

The gap between the developed and developing countries continued to grow up to the late 1960s, in the 1970s it decreased a bit, but it somehow grew again in the 1980s. Paradoxically, these were just the 1990s when Western economists undertook a massive study of the convergence issue (see, *e.g.*, Barro 1991; Bianchi 1997; Canova, Marcet 1995; Desdoigts 1994; Durlauf, Johnson 1995; Lee, Pesaran, and Smith 1997; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Paap, van Dijk 1994; Quah 1996*a*, 1996*b*, 1996*c*, 1997; Sachs *et al.* 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1996). The most widely used method applied in this series was the comparison of the gap in 1950 (or 1960) and the most recent data point (which, naturally, tended to happen sometime around the late 1980s or the early 1990s)⁹⁶. As is easy to understand

⁹⁵ See also, *e.g.*, Barro 1991: 407–443; Coulombe, Tremblay, Marchand 2004; Naudé 2004; UNESCO 2005: 143.

⁹⁶ Note that this comparison tends to be operationalized in the following way – what is the correlation between the per capita GDP in the countries of the world in 1950/1960 *году* and the GDP per capita growth rates in 1950/1960–1990? A significant negative correlation is quite

looking, such an analysis led consistently the Western economists to the conclusion that there is no convergence between the developed and developing countries; what is more, one should rather speak about the continuing (though not very strong) divergence. Note that by that time one could observe the emergence of what looked like a sound theoretical model for such a conclusion – in the form of Romer’s theory of “increasing returns”, which implied rather logically that the developed countries must tend to develop faster than the developing states, and, hence, that the gap between them must tend to increase rather than contract. Indeed, Romer himself maintains that the model of increasing returns “offers an alternative view of long-run prospects for growth” that entirely contradicts the basic assumptions of the convergence theory: “per capita output can grow without bound, possibly at a rate that is monotonically increasing over time. The rate of investment and the rate of return on capital may increase rather than decrease with increases in the capital stock. The level of per capita output in different countries need not converge; growth may be persistently slower in less developed countries and may even fail to take place at all” (Romer 1985: 1003).

In the same time, in a paradoxical way in that very moment when the Western economists came to an almost unanimous conclusion that the Third World would never be able to catch up with the First World, that the developing countries were doomed for ever to lag far behind the developed states, that there is no convergence between them, the process of the Great Convergence was already in its way strengthening more and more every year!⁹⁷

Law of communicating vessels of the world economy and awakening of masses

Many economists of the 1950s and the 1960s did not have much hope that in the forthcoming future there would be much chance to bring the countries of the global South from the obscurity of backwardness. They were right to consider as the main obstacle the absence of the aspirations to improve their lives among the population of those countries. Poverty did not bother people, they did not perceive it as an unbearable state that should be escaped as soon as possible (on this see, *e.g.*, the book by Noble Prize Winner Myrdal [1968]; the same opinion may be also found in the famous book of Braudel [1973]). Such a psychology may still be found

reasonably interpreted as an indicator of the presence of the global convergence; a significant positive correlation is interpreted in a similarly reasonable way as an indicator of the presence of the global divergence, whereas an insignificant correlation is regarded as evidence for the absence of either significant global convergence or significant global divergence.

⁹⁷ We believe that this salient fiasco of the Western economic science was very closely connected with the fact that Western economists tried to apply lineal models to the analysis of highly non-lineal processes.

among some inhabitants of the most underdeveloped areas (especially, in Tropical Africa).⁹⁸

However, in many developing (mostly middle-income) countries the situation has changed, that is why the Third World is transforming from sleeping and apathetic into rather dynamic indeed (see, e.g. Korotayev *et al.* 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Korotayev, Zinkina 2014; Grinin 2011, 2012, 2013). And one of the main changes may be seen just in the change of life priorities of hundreds million, who make more and more active attempts in order to escape from poverty and illiteracy into a new life.

Thus, the most difficult precondition for the breakthrough turns out to awaken this activity in the population of the poor countries (this requires very considerable efforts aimed at the initial modernization of education and health care, that is the initial accumulation of the human capital). However, when the need to enhance the conditions of life emerges at the mass scale, this puts into work a powerful motor. This may produce a qualitative result (though such a “Brownian motion” is almost always connected with various sorts of lawlessness, injustice and so on). When it starts, the movement toward the change of people’s own life to the better tends to generate social energy for many decades. And when we observe a synergy of efforts produced by the population and by the state, the success may be overwhelming. This is what happened in China, India and many other developing countries.

In reach countries (notwithstanding all their achievements in culture and education) this source of development has already dried up. Motivation toward hard work does not only decrease among some groups of immigrants struggling for their (and their children’s) economic status (and, by the way, in the USA this supports the economic dynamism up to a considerable extent).

And taking into consideration the population aging, possibilities for fast development are further shrinking more and more. It appears important to emphasize that *among the causes of the weakening of the relative might of the West an important place belongs to the dramatic slow-down of the population growth rates in the West (whereas in some developed countries those growth rates have*

⁹⁸ It is surprising but even in the 1990s some very important economists (like Jacque Attali, who was the President of the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development at that time) still believed that the overwhelming supremacy of the global North over the global South would only increase in the forthcoming decades and would continue in the foreseeable future. Attali, for example, was sure that in the forthcoming decades many markets of the North would become closed for imports from the impoverished South. He expected the desperate popular masses of the World System periphery to continue observing in painful despair the efflorescence and richness of the World System core (Attali 1991).

even become negative) which is accompanied by its very significant aging (see, e.g., Goldstone 2010; Powell, Khan 2013). This leads to the decline of the working age populations and explosive growth of the number of pensioners.⁹⁹ In the meantime it was the globalization that increased dramatically the demand for the main resource of poor countries – their workforce. What is more, the value of this resource is likely to continue growing further in the forthcoming decades (though for many developing countries in South Asia and, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa this will still be an extremely difficult task to find a productive employment for hundreds million young working hands [see, e.g., Zinkina, Korotayev 2014]).

The openness of economic borders creates a situation when a sort of law of communicating vessels of the world economy begins to act; whereas the above described arrangement of labor incentives and labor resources determine to a considerable extent the work of this system of communicating vessels. In order to make the production cheaper, capitals and production capacities of the developed countries are transferred to the developing countries where one can find hundreds million young women and men looking for a job. Together with this, the motor of the world economic growth is also transferred from the core to the periphery (which implies a significant reconfiguration of the World System). As a result, the role of the developing countries in the world economy (especially, as regards the generation of its growth) is increasing, whereas the gap between them and the developed countries is decreasing (though is still remains very significant).

Thus, by now the globalization of recent decades has worked mostly in favor of developing countries notwithstanding claims that it only increases the gap between the developed and developing countries (see, e.g., Stiglitz 2002). Notwithstanding many just observations made by the critics of globalization, we should maintain that it is Jagdish Bhagwati (2007) who turned out to be right with his vigorous defense of globalization.¹⁰⁰

And could it be the other way? It is not rare when a logic of a certain process remains unclear and contradictory for a long period of time; the attention is attracted by those very features that disappear later, whereas the most important characteristics remain some time blurred. It becomes clear only later that the process was bound to acquire those characteristics. This was what happened with

⁹⁹ Note that the USA has certain advantages here as regards higher fertility and immigration rates, which are among the main factors making the US economy more dynamic than the European economies.

¹⁰⁰ And we do not see sufficiently strong factors that can stop entirely the Great Convergence rather than just to slow it down (as has been mentioned above a certain slowdown is not entirely unlikely against the background of possible successes in the “reindustrialization of the West” and industrial application of robotics).

globalization. Let us consider if the development of globalization had substantial chances to bring significantly different results.

For a rather long period of time (especially during the periods of colonialism and neocolonialism) the expansion and intensification of the economic links in the world proceeded (up to a considerable extent) through the transformation of peripheral economies into agrarian and raw material sources for the developed states.¹⁰¹ That is why many development students (e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein [1974, 1980, 1987, 1988, 2003]) believed that the world-system core (\approx the West) could only exist through the exploitation of the periphery, through its imposition on the developing countries such an economic specialization that would preserve the leadership of the developed countries. It was also rather comfortable ideologically to equate the new globalization wave with a sort of modernized neocolonialism, maintaining that it either conserves the global inequality, or will even increase the gap between the developed and developing countries. There seem to have been certain grounds for such beliefs. However, finally the logic of the globalization process has turned out to be rather different. Why? The point is that that the globalization does not only increase the number of economic ties, it also extends enormously the world economic space. And this means a constant transformation of the international division of labor. Actually this could have only happened in the following way – while advanced countries concentrated on the development of new sectors, the technologies of older generations must have been transferred to less developed countries. One should also take into account the exhaustion of labor resources in the developed countries, and the abundance of such resources in the Third World. Thus, globalization objectively forced those countries that developed postindustrial economy and that could hardly support all the economic sectors to move industrial production to weakly industrialized regions.¹⁰² As a result of such a

¹⁰¹ However, even such a development was rather important for the modernization of the peripheral countries. Note also that in the 19th century ones of the most salient examples of transformation of whole colonies into agrarian and raw material sources for the developed states were represented by Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, by 1913 the average level of life in Canada (estimated through the per capita GDP level, which, in 1913 in Canada, according to Maddison [2010], was equal to 4 447 international dollars [to be exact – 1990 Geary – Khamis international purchasing power parity {PPP} dollars]) was considerably higher than the Western European average (\$3 687), whereas in Australia and New Zealand (\$5 157 and \$5 152 respectively) it was higher than in the most prosperous Western European countries of that time. Note that now Australia is still a major agrarian and raw material source, though in the present-day for China rather than Western Europe. In the meantime the average level of life/per capita GDP in Australia (\$34 396 [2005 PPP dollars]) is till now a few times higher than in the workshop of the present-day world, China.

¹⁰² Such processes contributed to the economic development in the 19th century too, though the transfer of industrial production was not so wide-spread. However, in the 19th century one may note similar processes with respect to the agricultural production. In this century, as a result of explosive urbanization, the share of agriculture in the Western European GDP declined, whereas

diffusion (greatly facilitated by the opening of international borders for the movement of capitals) one can observe a transfer of a substantial part of the World System core industries to the World System periphery. On the other hand, many developing countries have applied a lot of efforts of their own to achieve their industrialization.

Causes of the change of economic balance of forces in the world. Now summarize the points indicating that the convergence was a virtually inevitable result of the globalization process.

1. *Development of new technologies led to the situation when the technologies of older generations became cheaper and cheaper.* The transition of the Western economies to new technologies connected with the production of highly skilled services (in conditions of scarcity and high costs of their labor [as well as high ecological standards]) demanded the transfer of the old industries to the periphery. The transfer of those industries led to the rise of the peripheral countries (see, e.g., Grinin 2013).

2. *For the functioning of the transferred industries it was necessary to raise the level of the recipient countries in many respects.* Developing countries became production grounds (assemblage workshops, preliminary procession industries, etc.). However, such production grounds could only function in presence of a necessary minimum of infrastructure, financial sector, a certain qualification of workers (implying the elimination of illiteracy and some development of secondary and higher education) and so on. The West pressed that the developing countries should develop all these.

3. *The transfer of industries launched a vigorous source of growth.* In a number of poor countries it set in motion two of their very important advantages: vast labor resources and their cheapness. As a result they did not only start producing cheap goods in great quantities – industrialization and modernization greatly accelerated in those countries. And those processes for decades (due to the rural-urban migrations) generate a rather fast economic growth.

4. *These were the unshakable globalization principles that led the West to its deindustrialization.* The very globalization principles (free trade as well as free movement of capitals) have made the process of the production transfer to those regions inevitable (see, e.g., Korotayev 2010).

the demand for food increased dramatically. This led to the fast development of market-oriented agriculture (and economy in general) in many peripheral areas (Australia, Russia, parts of India, Argentine, the American West).

5. *The West and Japan themselves gave modernization technologies to developing countries.* In order to preserve their leading positions, the Western countries actively taught the developing countries what they should do, insisted on the acceleration of their modernization; what is more, they developed strategies of such a modernization; and, through the system of international development centers, they provided them with significant help in this regard. In many countries this coincided with desires and efforts of local elites; and in many cases this resulted in impressive successes of respective countries. Success of Japan (and later “Asian Tigers”) created an effective model of catch-up development based on the fast development of the exporting sectors, and this model started diffusing (see, e.g., Grinin 2011).

6. *Cheap industrial products defeated the industry of the West.* The expansion of the importation of cheap manufactured products to the Western countries made the process of the transfer of industries to the poor countries irrepressible. Western producers failed to compete with low prices and were not ready to pay more to support their industry.

Who have found themselves in the “globalization trap”?

Let us summarize now. The transfer of industries to the developing countries has created such conditions when they started growing faster than developed states. This is hardly surprising taking into consideration the point that for a few decades industrial capacities and capitals were leaving developed countries while entering the developing ones. In addition, this was supported by active policies of the developing countries’ elites who tended to actively attract investments and technologies to their countries, to eliminate barriers in their ways.

Compare, for example, economic growth of Mexico and the USA. The transfer of industries from the latter to the former (that especially accelerated after the establishment of the North American Free Trade Area [NAFTA] in 1994) has led to the following results: between 1986 and 2012 the Mexican GDP grew 9 times (from \$129.4 billion to \$1153.3 billion); the GDP of Brazil (that also actively imported capitals and technologies) grew comparably – eight times and a half, whereas the USA GDP only grew 3.5 times (respectively from \$4 425 billion to 14 991 billion).

In the meantime the Mexican and Brazilian economies are far from being the fastest growing (and in the 1980s and the 1990s their economic and financial systems experienced serious turbulences). In the same years Malaysia and Indonesia increased their GDP about 11 times. Since 1991 (that is, since the country’s economy had become open to the importation of foreign capitals) India increased its GDP 7 times just within 20 years (whereas between 1980 and 2012 it grew about 10 times). And, finally, China between 1986 and 2012 increased its

GDP more than 27(!) times (from \$298 billion to \$8 227 billion)¹⁰³. All those figures are very impressive indeed. For comparison, between 1986 and 2012 the GDP of the United Kingdom grew 4.3 times; whereas GDP of France and Germany only grew 3.4 times (calculated on the basis of data provided in World Bank 2014 [NY.GDP.MKTP.CD]).

The developed countries could only preserve the gap through the prohibiting of the transfer of capitals, technologies and industries, through policies of high tariff barriers, that is by closing their markets from foreign goods. However, after decades when they tried to convince the developing world that the free trade is sacred, after the establishment of the WTO, it appears impossible for the developed countries to protect their markets with custom tariffs. What is more – customers in the developed countries prefer to buy foreign but cheaper goods (first these were Japanese goods; then these were Taiwanese, Chinese and Mexican ones; now these are goods from Bangladesh, Vietnam etc.).

Thus, we are dealing with a certain paradox of development. For a very long time the USA was a very active proponent of the ideology of the free trade and honest competition (for example, it constantly pressed upon such its partners as Japan that tried not to let to their markets certain goods); it initiated the creation of respective international organizations. That time it was beneficial for the USA. However, those firm rules prohibiting the creation of artificial barriers blocking cheap imports became the basis for the rationalization of technological process and the transfer of production from Europe and North America to Mexico, China and other countries. Note that the behavior of the respective Western corporations was rather rational and logical; yet, as a result the West transferred to the periphery together with the industries a substantial part of its might.

As a result of the deindustrialization of the West, the developing countries have generally profited, whereas the developed countries found themselves in the trap of low growth rates. The process of deindustrialization (and its consequences) is described rather well by Martin and Schumann (1997) who see in it a global “trap” for Europe and the USA. However, those authors pay most attention to the issue of job cuts and wealth distribution, whereas they do not notice the global change of the balance of power, because they are sure that globalization brings negative results to all the countries of the world.

These were just Western and Japanese corporations that “impregnated” Mexican, Chinese, Indian and other developing economies. Policies of the Western countries in combination with the global demographic changes (exhausting of the

¹⁰³ All the calculations have been performed on the basis of the *World Development Indicators* database (World Bank 2014).

demographic bonus combined with the population aging of the West and the demographic bonus of the East) amplified those processes. Of course, if the Western leaders of the late 1980s and 1990s could realize entirely all the consequences of the deindustrialization, they might have done something to slow down this process¹⁰⁴, however, they could hardly prevent it entirely, taking into account the powerful influence of both consumers (\approx electorate) and the financial-industrial elites. On the other hand, policies of a number of developing countries turned out to be rather successful as regards the support of industrialization and the accelerating development of those countries.¹⁰⁵ Yet, without an adequate inflow of capitals and technologies from the developed economies their success would have been rather limited. Such reforms only turn out to be successful when favorable conditions are available.

Hence, a decisive role in the weakening of the economic positions of the West in general, and the USA in particular (and, simultaneously, in the strengthening and rise of the countries of Asia and Latin America) was played precisely by the globalization. We would forecast that the process of convergence will go very unevenly, in a wavelike manner, sometimes slowing down (up to temporary reversals), sometimes accelerating. According to many forecasts, in the forthcoming decades one will observe a very significant reduction of poverty in the developing countries (according to some calculations it will decrease twice by 2030 [NIC 2012: 8]), the most notorious forms of exploitation will be eliminated, the illiteracy will be reduced very substantially, there will be serious successes as regards gender equality, and so on.¹⁰⁶ This will result in a substantial reduction of the gap between richer and poorer countries. We can also forecast in a rather confidential way the growth of the group of middle income countries (see, e.g., Korotayev *et al.* 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Korotayev, de Munck 2013; Grinin 2013; Grinin & Grinin 2013; Гринин 2013). In some respects such an equalization of incomes appears to be resembling the process of convergence as regards levels of

¹⁰⁴ Today the US administration tries to take certain steps in this direction, and Obama openly expresses his joy as regards the return of some industries to the USA.

¹⁰⁵ Note that a certain possible slowdown in the growth of developing countries turns out to be rather compatible with our idea that a new technological breakthrough within the World System (that we expect to take place in the 2030s and 2040s [see Grinin & Grinin 2013 for more detail]) will request not only a certain decrease in the gap between the developing and developed countries (the economic convergence), but also a certain decrease of this gap in the sociopolitical and administrative dimensions (sociopolitical convergence), which may hinder the economic growth of respective developing countries, especially against the background of the World System reconfiguration that is likely to be generated by those processes (see Grinin, Korotayev 2012 for more detail).

¹⁰⁶ However, in absolute figures the number of poor and illiterate people remains rather high. On the other hand, the fertility decline in the Third World is bound to contribute to the reduction of those figures.

life of different strata in various modern countries in the first two thirds of the 20th century (especially in conjunction with a rather active processes of the middle class formation).

Decline of the Leadership of the USA and the West

The discussions of an inevitable eclipse of the American might began already in the 1970s when this country confronted simultaneously political, economic, and currency crises. In the 1970s and the 1980s a number of forecasts appeared that predicted that the USA would be replaced by Japan in the role of the world economic leader (see, e.g., Vogel 1979; Kennedy 1987; Attali 1991). However, a new vigorous technological wave in the USA (that took place against the background of the economic stagnation in Japan) demonstrated the fallacy of such views. The US hegemony did not only turn out to be rather solid; what is more, it rose to a new level as a result of disintegration of the Communist block and the USSR.

However, these were just the 1990s when the number of forecasts predicting the inevitable decline of the American hegemony and the ascent of Asia to the leadership positions started growing rather rapidly (see, e.g., Thompson 1988; Attali 1991; Colson, Eckerd 1991; Frank 1998; Todd 2003; Wallerstein 1987, 2003; Kupchan 2002). First such forecasts were taken rather skeptically, or were received as a sort of expression of leftist views and anti-American moods. However, with the growth of negative tendencies in the USA and successes of Asian countries the idea of the American decline started looking more and more grounded, which provoked (depending on one's orientation) feelings of triumph or apprehension. Nowadays, taking into account the consequences of the global crises, the forecasts of the decline of the US role in the world appear to be shared by the overwhelming majority of analysts. The USA seems to have started putting up with the idea of the decline of the American hegemony – though many still seem to pin their hopes on some sort of technological or other miracle that will revive the American might (this is often expressed rather vividly in President Obama's speeches).

Thus, there is no much doubt that the USA hegemony (which has continued for more than 60 years) is coming to its end. Sooner or later the USA will not be able to remain the World System leader in the sense that has become usual for us, as a result of which the global geopolitical landscape will change rather seriously (see, e.g., Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011; Grinin 2011, 2012, 2013; Гринин 2012). On the other hand, hopes of some political scientists and economists that a sort of total collapse of the USA will take place very soon appear rather ungrounded; the relative decline of the USA will proceed gradually (and not without certain interruptions), while certain objective circumstances (including the rise of peripheral countries) will contribute to this. However, in the forthcoming two or three decades the USA will remain a sort of *primus inter pares* because of their superiority with respect to a few aspects of leadership and a certain "legality" of its

leadership role (NIC 2012: XI). In addition, one should take into account the point that the world as a whole is still interested in the continuation of the US leadership.

Some causes of the weakening of the West. How did this take place? And (what is the most important) why? Quite a number of explanations have been suggested by now. For example, “Decline of the West” may be interpreted in spirit of Oswald *Spengler (1918) or Pat Buchanan (2002)*, that is from the point of view of the theory of civilizations and the renunciation of moral imperatives.¹⁰⁷ However, this, of course, fails to account scientifically for the actual causes of the “moral degradation”. The weakening of the USA may be also regarded as the confirmation of various theories of cycles of political hegemony (e.g., Modelski 1987; Thompson 1988; Modelski, Thompson 1996; Arrighi 1994), according to which the hegemony period lasts about 100–200 years, whereas afterwards an old hegemon tends to be replaced by a new one. Indeed, no country can remain a global hegemon infinitely. However, the point is that, as we will see below, the forthcoming change of the global hegemony pattern will not mean just a “usual” replacement of the USA by a similar absolute world leader. And if there is no single absolute leader, the world will be structured in a significantly different way (see, e.g., Grinin 2010; Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011). Thus, with the eclipse of the USA the cycles of political hegemony are likely to come to their end.

It is rather natural to consider the change of geopolitical landscape as a result of mistakes and arrogance that become typical for great powers at a certain phase. Jawaharlal Nehru notes in this respect that history of nations goes through three stages: success, the consequence of success – arrogance and injustice, and as a result of this – fall (Nehru 2004 [1934]). Indeed, a very considerable number of mistakes (including rather evident ones) have been made. One may even have an impression that Western democracies tend to lose their very important quality – to make correct conclusions from their own mistakes. Some evidence in support of this statement appears to be suggested by a sort of maniac attempts to topple regimes in the Near East without a sufficient care for consequences, without taking into account experience of their involvement in Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq...

However, those very mistakes (as well as changes in behavioral patterns of elites and commoners) may be regarded as results of deeper processes that change the world (often contrary to the will of those who seem to be in the center of the events). We discussed these processes above.

¹⁰⁷ “The de-Christinization of America is a great gamble, a roll of the dice, with our civilization as the stakes. America has thrown overboard the moral compass by which the republic steered for two hundred years, and now it sails by dead reckoning” (Buchanan 2002: 198).

The World Without an Absolute Leader

Will any country be able to replace the USA? The development of the abovementioned trends connected with the weakening of the USA and the West, the growth of the significance of many developing countries and the gradual convergence of the World System core and periphery mean that at the planetary scale we are dealing not just with major changes, but rather with a radical transformation of all the structure of the global economic and political order, and an overall rather complicated reconfiguration of the world.

Yet, how will this reconfiguration proceed? First of all note that though the USA positions will be weakening, no one in the new world will be able to become its absolute leader. The idea that the position of the USA will be occupied by someone else (the most frequently proposed candidate is, of course, China) is utterly wrong. Today the USA concentrates simultaneously *almost all the aspects of leadership (political, military, financial, monetary, economic, technological, ideological, and cultural)*, whereas there is no country in the world (and there is no group of countries) that in foreseeable future will be able to monopolize so many aspects of the world leadership (this was suggested by William R. Thompson already in 1988). In addition, neither China, nor India (or any other country) will be able to afford such a heavy burden due to the lack of appropriate economic possibilities as well as political risks (at least because of the problems with poverty of substantial parts of respective populations and discontent with social problems, but also due to the lack of experience and necessary alliances, as well as ideological weakness [see Grinin, Korotayev 2010, 2011; Grinin 2011, 2013 for more detail]).

How could the future world look like? *One may expect that the forthcoming global system will have the following three characteristics: (1) changing rules and flexibility of structures of the World System, (2) activization of the struggle for allies, (3) reduction of the countries' sovereignty.* The absence of the strong absolute leader will lead to the growth of the World System flexibility as regards the search for new political foundations. The following point of view was expressed by us earlier in this respect: “The struggle for an ‘honorary’ place within the globalization and coalitions, organization and functioning of the new world order will lead to the beginning of what we have called *the epoch of new coalitions*...In the process of the search for the most stable, advantageous and adequate forms of supranational organization one may expect to observe the emergence of various and even fast changing intermediate forms when actors in global and regional political arenas will look for the most profitable and convenient blocks and agreements. However, finally some of those new alliances and coalitions may transform from temporal into permanent creating some fixed supranational forms” (Гринин 2013; Grinin 2010; Grinin, Korotayev 2010).

Thus, in the forthcoming decades one will see the emergence of a number of countries and alliances that will play leading roles in different respects; against such a background the winners might be those countries that will conduct the most active policy aimed at the formation of new blocks as well as the joining of new blocks, those countries that will be able to get the maximum number of partners in various spheres. It may be said that a country's influence will grow through "getting points" by its participation in various alliances and blocks.¹⁰⁸ For the largest actors one is likely to observe a high degree of competition as regards attempts to influence the restructuring of the international system.

Consequently, we will leave in such a world, where one can observe a more and more active search for allies and alliances (though this might be accompanied by the growth of competition in many respects); this can result in the emergence of some institutional factors of the new world order that imply the need in a greater stability (Grinin 2009, 2012). Naturally, it appears impossible to predict concrete combinations of future alliances. However, it appears possible to offer a few ideas about this. For example, we believe that scenarios suggesting the global dominance of the alliance of India and China are not realistic. However, there are some more realistic scenarios – for example, the ones with the USA and the West maneuvering between the alliances with India, China, and other large developing countries and their blocks. As a matter of fact, in recent years we have been observing the growing activity of the US foreign policy aimed at the inhibition of the Chinese influence (through the attempts to strengthen contacts with India and other Asia-Pacific actors).

All the above described processes will also lead to a certain transformation of national sovereignty that will be generally weakened due to the explicit and implicit, forced and voluntary delegating of some parts of sovereign prerogatives to various international, supranational, and global entities and arrangements (see Grinin 2008, 2012 for more detail).

The weakening of sovereignty may be accompanied by the growth of national self-consciousness and nationalist moods in some developing countries with intensifying industrialization (see Grinin 2012 for more detail). In the forthcoming decades the depth of economic links will increase, which will make a powerful influence on those developing countries (especially in Tropical Africa) whose population mostly does not feel those links yet in a substantial way. As a result, the struggle between traditionalism and globalization may intensify. In some areas conflicts and instability may grow, and whole regions may experience powerful social destabilization waves. We can observe this in the case of the Arab Spring

¹⁰⁸ This may be also done through the formation of new alliances (the emergence of the BRICs, and then the BRICS is very symptomatic in this respect).

(see, *e.g.*, Grinin, Korotayev 2012; Korotayev *et al.* 2011c), as well as in Ukraine now.

New geopolitics and the end of the epoch of stable political blocks. For many decades one of the main factors of the emergence of political alliances was the threat of war, which dictated selection of certain allies. That is why political alliances were mostly military-political. In the contemporary world the risk of the large-scale war has diminished significantly, whereas the economic interdependence between countries has increased dramatically, and it will continue to grow in the forthcoming decades. This allows to maintain that the old style of geopolitics gradually (and often insensibly) gives way to a new style of geopolitics connected with the necessity to create optimum conditions for the economic development of a state or a group of states. Features of this new geopolitics look rather vague at present, but they should become much clearer in the forthcoming decades. Let us outline a few of them.

The epoch of firm alliances and inter-allied loyalty appears to be coming to the end (a characteristic example is Washington's refusal to support Pakistan and the USA alliance with India). The selection of allies, partners and blocks will be more and more determined by rapidly changing interests and conjunctures.

States will not look for constant allies; they will rather be looking for temporary "fellow travelers" for particular occasions, trying to reach agreements simultaneously with many partners (this corresponds well to one of the principles of modern business – to have as many partners as possible). Even now many experts are concerned with the future of international system if it is only based on interests, not on certain rules (see NIC 2012).

Economic interests will be clearer expressed in the foreign policy.¹⁰⁹ Thus, economic interests of some countries may become constant, whereas political interests may be adjusted to them up to a considerable degree. Political and geopolitical principles and interests of some other states (especially larger ones) will never be dissolved in economic aspects. However, in this case different vectors of foreign policy may turn out to be pulled apart, that is, political and economic aspects of foreign policy will exist more detached from each other. And, consequently, policies will become more pragmatic than now.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ We can see this phenomenon in the issue of sanctions in respect of Russia. On the one hand, Western countries are sure that such sanctions are necessary; on the other hand, it is very difficult for them to implement really serious sanctions.

¹¹⁰ As a result both enmity and friendship may be forgotten very soon (one of salient examples is provided by Vietnam and the USA; they have forgotten their antagonism and are developing bilateral relations in a rather active way).

The epoch when the creation of economic blocks was determined to a very considerable extent by some (civilization, ideological, military-political etc.) proximity evidently passes away. Today we see a growing tendency toward the situation when close economic links do not necessarily imply any political or ideological partnership, though they may impede outbreaks of open conflicts.

Consider this using China as an example. Its political influence is growing. In which way is this taking place? China has to join various alliances or to establish with them (*e.g.*, with the ASEAN) special relations, as it tries to play there an important role. It also tries to initiate and actively support various economic agreements (*e.g.* regarding free trade with Japan and Korea). China also tries to push the RNB as an international currency (note, *e.g.*, recently signed agreements with Brazil and Australia), but to achieve this China must activate its agreements with numerous countries, simultaneously making concessions to them, and getting such concessions from them. However, notwithstanding all the active economic policy pursued by China, notwithstanding all the growth of trade with its neighbors, this did not eliminate the political (and territorial) contradictions with Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, India and so on. Let us mention another example. The US “flirtation” with India implying a virtual permission for India to possess nuclear weapons do not imply that a sort of firm allied relations have been established between the two states.

Thus, the behavior in politics is becoming closer to business strategies where the principles are always rather fluid. However, new principles of the world order may start emerging just on this fluid soil.

Conclusion

World network community?

In those historical periods when economic links between countries and regions were not as deep and indissoluble, the development of globalization needed a certain military and political hegemony that relied to a considerable extent on technological superiority of certain powers. At present the depth of economic relations has become unprecedented, which (as has already mentioned above) weakens the need in political and military hegemony in its present sense; this, of course, leads to more pragmatism in foreign policy.

The same causes will influence the process of a certain shift toward the formation of the global network community (from the contemporary hierarchical structure), within which (in addition to states and their blocks) an active role will be played by NGOs and many other actors. This process may be also regarded as one of the aspects of the leveling of degrees of economic development (this is likely to

contribute to the establishment of a new basis of global relations whose formation could facilitate the creation of conditions for the emergence of some effective global coordination center).

The movement toward the network society will contribute to the growth of the world middle class, a sort of world citizens (NIC 2012: 8–9), whose numbers, according to the Asian Development Bank, will grow with the rate of about 9% annually. And, generally, even according to conservative models, up to 2030 those numbers will grow twice – from 1 billion to two billions. We tend to agree that this is a very important megatrend (*ibid.*: 4). The idea that middle class of different countries will constitute potentially a sort of global citizenship (which gives some hope as regards the emergence of a certain solid basis of economic, cultural, and even political unity of the world) appears rather interesting and stimulating. In the 19th century intellectuals in different countries started constituting a certain unity first within Europe, and later all over the world, thus paving the way toward the development of panhuman ideas and values (which were finally proclaimed at the level of UN declarations). In a similar way the world middle class may create new possibilities for the globalization. It may be that due to this it will get new (more mature) features, moving toward political globalization of the world whose contours are not clear yet.

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Márta Fülöp

The Enthusiasm and/or the Fear Concerning the Globalization among the Post-socialist Youth : The Case of the Hungarian University Students

The globalization is one of the most frequently discussed economic, political, social and cultural phenomenon of the twenty-first century, however there are very few studies that seek to uncover how young people, the future generation of the globalizing world, perceive these processes. Most of the existing studies' target attitudes toward the economic changes and youth in Western European societies. There has been no study to investigate the perception and attitudes of young adults in the post-socialist countries; therefore the goal of the present research was to explore Hungarian university students' views. Altogether 103 respondents of two different majors (humanities and social sciences/economics) participated in the research. A closed-ended questionnaire including a semantic differential scale and a 4-point Likert-type attitude scale consisting in 30 items regarding the most common mentioned economic, political, cultural and environmental benefits and dangers of the globalization was administered.

The analysis of the data revealed that, while the participants consider the influence of the globalization on Hungary at large, they are neither fearful nor enthusiastic about its effects, however they considered their general impact slightly more negative than positive. Items expressing different aspects of the globalization resulted in five factors: decreasing differences, multiculturalism, globalization as a threat, benefits of the globalization and cultural and economic hegemony.

The university major proved to be a better predictor of the attitude towards the globalization than the gender. Students in economics evaluated the globalization significantly as being better, more exciting and useful than students of humanities. They seemed to have a more definite and elaborated picture about what is needed for success in a globalized world in terms of skills. Economics students also had higher means in Factor 4 'benefits of the globalization' and they evaluated the specific effects of the globalization more positively.

Keywords

- globalization,
- Hungarian,
- university students,
- attitude,
- identity,
- citizenship.

Globalization, internationalization and cosmopolitanism have become key concepts of the social sciences at the turn of the twenty-first century (Davies, Evans and Reid 2005). Philosophers, economists, politicians, historians, sociologists and psychologists all have something to say about it (e.g. Fukuyama 1992 ; Huntington 1996 ; Schmidt 1998 ; Bauman 1998 ; Giddens 2000 ; Arnett 2002 ; Bhagwati 2004). While their views are diverse, none of them questions, that the globalization

is one of the dominant social forces in the twenty-first century, and is inevitable and unstoppable.

According to Lieber and Weisberg (2002), the globalization is the increasing global integration of economies, information technology, the spread of a global popular culture, and other forms of human interaction. The globalization is a process by which cultures influence one another *via* trade, economic and financial interdependence worldwide, immigration and travel, telecommunication and information exchange. Young people in every part of the world are affected by the globalization; therefore many young people now grow up with a global consciousness (Arnett 2002). In the twenty-first century, the citizenship includes the global citizenship and the internalization of global values (Reimers 2006).

There have been contrasting ideas and a polarized discussion about the globalization, on the one hand, enthusiasm and on the other hand, warnings about disruptions and dangers. Fukuyama (1992) had the pro-globalization stand that secularism, liberal democracy and free markets will reduce all tensions in the world. Giddens (1990) called the globalization the corollary of the modernity and praised the advent of a 'global cosmopolitan society' (Giddens 2000). Bhagwati (2004) argues that the globalization, when properly governed, is in fact the most powerful force for the social good in the today's world. Supporters of the globalization point out that, when promoted with circumspection, the globalization can lead to higher, efficient output, lower prices and increased employment and more opportunities for entrepreneurship in all the countries involved (Sampatkumar 2007). *Via* the globalization, it is possible to build an integrated society, where differences in race, colour, gender, religion, culture or nationality will not deny anyone the opportunity to progress and succeed (Sampatkumar 2007).

However, according to Bauman (1998), promoters of the political and economic globalization seem to ignore its negative and dehumanizing effect, progressive spatial segregation, separation and exclusion. Anti-globalization ideas manifest themselves in demonstrations and organized protests. Many activists perceive the economic globalization as an instrument in the hands of multinational corporations, the sole motive of which is to increase profits to the detriment of the freedom of the individual. Anti-globalization groups, mostly consisting in young people, claim that the globalization leads to the disenfranchisement, the political and economic instability, wide disparities between developed and developing countries, and uneven distribution of wealth (Sampatkumar 2007). Multinational corporations infiltrate the political life and exert an undue influence on policymakers of nation-states, and national borders become insignificant due to transnational companies and economy (Sampatkumar 2007) and the state sovereignty becomes fragmented (Giddens 1991).

Another aspect of the globalization is related to cultural differences (Huntington 1996). While there is a view that, in the 'global village', all social, ethnic and racial divisions may disappear, there is more fear that the globalization may lead to oppositions, clashes, prejudices and misunderstandings among different groups (Herman and Dimaggio 2007). The globalizing world interconnects people from different cultural backgrounds and intercultural relations increase (Pieterse 2009). There are those who claim, like Bird and Stevens (2003), that national cultures are moving towards a certain degree of obsolescence. Due to the fact that production and consumption are operating at a global scale, and competition also functions at the worldwide level, the 'comparative areas' become reduced, dominated and dictated by the 'winners' of this process, and those who want to stay in competition are forced into this framework (Fülöp 2008). Values of the global culture are based on individualism, free market economics and democracy and include freedom of choice, individual rights, openness to change and tolerance of differences (Friedman 2000 ; Giddens 2000 ; Arnett 2002). All these are basic principles of the western democratic societies, therefore Pieterse (2009) claims that, according to the convergence principle, the globalization is a theory of Westernization or Americanization referred to as 'McDonaldization' (Ritzer 1993) or 'Disneyfication' (Lieber and Weisberg 2002).

As a counter-response to the homogenizing force of the globalization, many groups strengthen their ethnic, religious and national identities (Brown, Larson and Saraswathi 2002). Herman and Dimaggio (2007) question the notion of increasing the uniformity and the cultural imperialism as well. They argue that the globalization evokes the localization as its counterforce and in this counter reaction, the experience of uncertainty and instability of a globalizing world plays a crucial role and increases the desire for stability and safety in the form of finding local niches for the identity construction as globalization's counterforce. In other words, when the 'identity' and the self-respect of a group is threatened by a strong imposing culture, the group will start to emphasize the difference within the imposed dimensions, not to be 'channelled' into an existing competitive framework, in which losing is inevitable (Fülöp 2008).

The success of the globalization may in the future be judged by the ability to maintain cultural distinctions while creating a new understanding of the global community (Sampatkumar 2007). It also requires combining the local identity and the identity linked to the global culture, or producing a kind of integration of different sources of identity into a hybrid identity that is a combination of a variety of cultural influences (Arnett 2002). More integrative processes are needed, called 'glocalization' (Robertson 1995) instead of mutually exclusive trends of homogenization or ethnic fragmentation. In the last decade, the hybridity became a regular discourse in the popular and mainstream culture and this is the leading paradigm in relation to identity issues connected to the process of globalization (Pieterse 2009). The global multicultural citizenship and a new class of persons,

who belong to an emergent global culture, the ‘global melange’ (Pieterse 2009), may be a constructive solution to this conflict (Bird and Stevens 2003).

The globalization in the post-socialist countries: the case of the Hungarian youth

In their large scale international research *GLOBALIFE – Life courses in Globalization Process* (Blossfeld et al.’s 2005) basic assumption was that, in a globalizing world, structural conditions and social norms provide citizens less and less support in terms of choices and decisions and this results in an increasing uncertainty. In the case of young people, this uncertainty is coupled with uncertainties of the developmental process of the transition from youth to adulthood (Arnett 2002). For the post-socialist youth, this double uncertainty has been intensified in the last two decades by the ongoing transitions of its society (Róbert and Bukodi 2005).

During the last two decades, since 1989, the post-socialist citizens have had to face the challenges of not only adapting to the dramatic internal societal changes, i.e. the introduction of free market ideologies, competition, deregulation, privatization and democratic institutions, but also to the global society (Fülöp 2005). The collapse of the communist block made it possible in these countries to open up towards the West and accelerated dramatically the financial and economic interdependence with the international world. For Hungary and some other post-socialist countries, joining the European Union in 2004 was also a facet of the wider process of globalization. By the end of the twentieth century, the market economy stabilized in Hungary and as a result of this, the Hungarian young people nowadays grow up with an increasing global consciousness just like their Western European peers. English as the ‘lingua franca’ of the globalization process prevails as the most commonly spoken foreign language in the 15–25-years-old age group (almost 70 per cent) and is taught as a required subject from primary school (Szénay 2005). In terms of the Internet, 84 per cent of the Hungarian 15–29-years-old had access to it in 2008, but among the university students, this was 100 per cent (Ságvári 2009). The globalization leads in all modern societies to a decline of the national character of the economy, but this process was especially dramatic in the post-socialist Hungary. From the international commerce restricted to the socialist block before 1990, by 1997 more than 65 per cent of the enterprises were partially or totally foreign owned (Róbert and Bukodi 2005).

This means that a majority of those young people, who nowadays enter the business world in Hungary, will be employed by foreign/multinational employers and have to be able to meet the demands of this new type of global labour market. Studies on attitudes towards the globalization

There are very few empirical studies on attitudes towards the globalization in general among young people internationally. The globalization is a

multidimensional process, in other words, it is a social process that unfolds in multiple realms of existence simultaneously (Pieterse 2009). In spite of this, most of the studies addressed these aspects separately and with mainly an economic aspect (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006 ; Bhagwati 2002). Coopers & Lybrand (1997) conducted an extensive research on values among more than 1,200 business students from 30 of the world's leading universities in ten countries on five continents in an attempt to capture the cultural aspects of the globalization. They found that there is a greater similarity in values and preferences among the students of such diverse parts of the world than differences. A great majority of the respondents (78 per cent) expressed an interest in working for a global company, were positive about working for a company in the international market (73 per cent) and wanted to work with clients from different countries. The survey provided evidence that a globalization of values is taking place today and within the business community an identifiable and homogenous group is emerging, that does not share common geographic location, religion, native language or national culture, yet they share a common set of values, attitudes and norms (Bird and Stevens 2003). They are members of the emerging global culture.

Goal of the research

Psychological studies have rarely addressed the globalization directly (Arnett 2002) and empirical studies among youth on the attitude towards the globalization as a complex phenomenon are basically non-existent. There is also a lack of such studies with young people living in post-socialist societies within the European Union. Arnett (2002) calls this age group the 'emerging adults', meaning that they are mature and autonomous enough but are not yet committed to a definite way of life and open to new influences and have a vivid interest in global media, the leading edge of the globalization. At the same time, this is the age group worldwide that has a crucial role in the future process of the globalization.

Therefore the aim of the present study was to reveal the Hungarian university students' perception, and attitudes towards the globalization: if the globalization is seen as a threat, or a source of opportunities, and to what degree young people in a post-socialist society agree with the different views on the advantages and disadvantages of the globalization process.

Participants

Participants were 103 university students. Based on studies indicating an attitude difference between students of economics/business and humanities/social sciences (Hainmüller and Hiscox 2006) students of these two different majors i.e. humanities/psychology and economics were included.

Methods

An Osgood Semantic Differential task has been used to investigate the evaluative aspect of the attitude towards the globalization in general. It consisted of four different opposite terms and a 7-point scale in between them.

A questionnaire consisting in different types of closed-ended questions, an attitude scale and an evaluation scale were administered after this task. The closed-ended questions were related to the identity, the influence of the globalization, the symbols of the globalization, and the perception of the necessary qualities to be able to be successful in a globalized world. A 4-point Likert-type attitude scale consisting in 30 items, in which participants indicated their extent of agreement on each item, was also administered. Items, regarding the most common mentioned economic, political, cultural and environmental benefits and dangers of the globalization appearing in the pro and anti-globalization literature, were included. Finally, in an evaluation scale, participants had to indicate in the case of each item, if they consider the particular effect positive or negative.

Results

The nature of the influence of the globalization in general.

In the Osgood-type Semantic Differential task respondents had to judge the globalization along four adjective pairs using a 7-point scale.

Means of two of the four dimensions (good-bad and useful-harmful) differed significantly from the neutral evaluation (mean : 3.5) in the one-sample t-test ($t(105) = 2.690$; $p=0.008$ and $t(105) = 2.594$; $p = 0.011$) respectively. Participants thought the globalization as a rather bad and a rather harmful process. These dimensions strongly correlated as well ($r = 0.751$; $p = 0.000$).

There were no gender differences in these dimensions. However, significant differences could be observed according to the major of the participant. Economics students believed that the globalization is rather exciting (economics : $M = 2.90$; $SD = 1.47$; humanities : $M = 4.02$; $SD = 1.59$; $F(1;103) = 13.853$; $p = 0.000$) rather good (economics : $M = 3.38$; $SD = 1.24$; humanities : $M = 4.35$; $SD = 1.39$; $F(1;103) = 13.952$; $p = 0.000$) and rather useful (economics : $M = 3.44$; $SD = 1.09$; humanities : $M = 4.25$; $SD = 1.51$; $F(1;98.261) = 10.203$; $p = 0.002$). In terms of importance, no significant difference has been found.

Different levels of identity

Students had to put into rank order which identity (national, European, global) is the most and less important to them. The national identity was considered the most important (67 per cent of the respondents) followed by the European identity and the world citizen/global identity being the less important to an almost equal proportion of the respondents (19 per cent and 18 per cent respectively). There were no differences according to gender or study major of the participants.

The influence of the globalization on Hungary

Respondents had to indicate on a 5-point scale how much they think Hungary is affected by the globalization (1 : strongly affected to 5 : not at all affected). The mean of responses was 2.0 (SD = 0.66) indicating that the respondents believe that Hungary is largely affected by the globalization. There was no significant difference according to the gender or major of the participants.

Symbols of the globalization

Respondents had to indicate on a 4-point scale (1 : very much ; 4 : not at all) how much they consider a list of items to symbolize the globalization. Amongst all listed symbols of the globalization, the Internet was considered to be the most expressive (mean = 1.3; SD = 0.62), while Oscars/Academy Awards were judged to be less expressive (mean = 3.2 ; SD = 0.85). All symbols are listed in table 3 in descending order of expressiveness.

A significant gender difference was present in only one item : according to males, Bill Gates symbolizes the globalization significantly more than according to females ($p = 0.002$). Students of economics regarded the Internet ($p = 0.014$), the Olympic Games ($p = 0.039$) and UNICEF (economics : $p = 0.041$) to be stronger symbols of globalization than humanities students reported. While supermarkets ($p = 0.004$) and Hollywood ($p = 0.044$) were considered to symbolize the globalization more among students of humanities.

Qualities needed in a globalized world

Among the eighteen listed qualities, that can be considered necessary to be successful in a globalized world, IT skills (mean = 1.66) ; Knowledge of languages (mean = 1.7) ; Education (mean = 1.75) and learning skills (1.77) proved to be the most important, while unscrupulousness (mean = 2.67), selfishness (mean = 2.64), money-hunger (mean = 2.62) and patriotism (mean = 2.60) as the less important.

The gender difference was present in one item. Selfishness was regarded by females to be significantly more needed than by males ($p = 0.031$).

Students of economics, both males and females, considered some characteristics as highly important (mean < 1.5) in a globalized world, while students of humanities did not attribute any high significance to any characteristics (no mean under 1.5 and only one characteristic in the case of each gender has the mean under 2.00 ; openness in the case of male humanities students (mean = 1.78) and IT skills in the case of female humanities students (mean = 1.95). Female students of economics considered the cooperativity as a highly important quality in a globalized world, while male students regarded the competitiveness, as well as the cooperativity, as a very important requirement.

Effects of the globalization

In the 30-item attitude scale, the participants had to consider the economic, political, informational, ecological and cultural effects of the globalization and indicate to what extent a statement is true or false on a 4-point Likert-scale (1: strongly disagree ; 4 : strongly agree).

The statement that had the highest mean of agreement was: 'Because of the globalization it is important to nourish national traditions and make people aware of national cultural values' (mean : 3.73), indicating that the respondents consider it important to strengthen the national identity as a reaction to the globalization.

There were two items in which gender differences could be found. Men agreed more with the statement: 'As a result of the globalization, the significance of nation-states will cease and the national identity will diminish.' ($F(1;100) = 6.454$; $p = 0.013$), as well as with : 'The globalization blurs cultural differences and makes the world uniform.' ($F(1;100) = 8.282$; $p = 0.003$).

In 10 out of 30 statements, students of economics and humanities differed significantly. In eight statements, students of economics reached significantly higher means. These referred to the decreasing significance of national boundaries, increasing competition, scientific progress, knowledge of other cultures, broadening international opportunities and information flow, importance of national culture, and cooperation among nations. There were only two statements: 'Through the globalization, the capitalist view of life becomes general' and the 'environmental pollution is the result of the globalization', with which humanities students agreed more.

A maximum likelihood factor analysis was conducted with the 30 statements. After a direct Oblimin rotation, 5 factors were identified that explained 49 per cent of the total variance. The factors were named as follows: Factor 1: decreasing differences ; Factor 2: multiculturalism; Factor 3: globalization as a threat; Factor 4: benefits of the globalization; Factor 5: cultural and economic hegemony.

Gender difference was present in factor 2 'Multiculturalism', males having higher means than females (males : $M = 0.47$; $SD = 0.81$; females : $M = -0.13$; $SD = 0.79$; $F(1;87) = 9.414$; $p = 0.003$).

In terms of major, students of economics produced significantly higher means in factor 4 'Benefits of the globalization' than students of humanities (economics : $M = 0.25$; $SD = 0.87$; humanities : $M = -0.25$; $SD = 0.87$; $F(1;88) = 7.537$; $p = 0.007$).

Evaluation of the effects of the globalization

In order not to measure only the structure of the attitudes, but also their evaluative nature in addition to indicating the agreement with each statement, respondents had to evaluate each item if they found the particular effect it describes good (1) or bad (2). The most positively perceived effect of the globalization (mean between 1.01 and 1.10 [4 statements]) was its effect on the scientific progress, becoming aware of the national culture, getting to know other cultures, and broadening international opportunities. The effects, that were considered the most negative (mean between 1.90 and 1.99 [11 statements]) were in connection with the homogenization (Americanization, minor and national cultures and cultural differences disappearing), with cultures becoming more distant and people becoming alienated, with terrorism, environmental pollution and the increasing gap between poor and rich and one part of the world being exploited by the other.

In terms of gender differences females, regarded it significantly more negative: 'As a result of the globalization, the same products will be sold everywhere' ($p = 0.19$). Among students of humanities, this particular effect of the globalization was seen as significantly worse than among students of economics in the case of seven statements, while students of economics considered it significantly worse in only one.

Significant differences in the evaluation of the effects of the globalization per major: In the evaluation of each item, whether it differs significantly from indifference (mean = 1.5) was also tested. Neutral items were excluded (4 items), and a scale for positive statements (Positive Statement Scale, 12 items, Cronbach alpha = 0.721) and a scale for negative statements (Negative Statement Scale, 14 items, Cronbach alpha = 0.836) was created. There was no significant difference between the positive and negative statements in the whole sample according to the paired samples t-test. However, a gender difference was found in the Negative Statement Scale, males ($M = 2.90$; $SD = 0.46$) having larger mean than females ($M = 2.64$; $SD = 0.51$; $F(1;91) = 4.371$; $p = 0.039$). A difference was also found according to major. Economics students ($M = 2.93$; $SD = 0.36$) had higher means in the Positive Statement Scale than students of humanities ($M = 2.69$; $SD = 0.44$; $F(1;94) = 9.160$; $p = 0.003$). There was no gender and major interaction, male

students of economics as well as male students of humanities had significantly higher means in the Negative Statement Scale.

Summary

The Hungarian university students' general evaluation of the globalization was more negative than positive. According to the Semantic Differential Scale, they considered the globalization rather bad and harmful and they were rather neutral in terms of its importance and its being exciting or boring. At the same time, they considered the effect of the globalization on Hungary as large. The Hungarian (national) identity was the primary identity they indicated, followed by the European and world/global identity. Symbols that were believed to symbolize the globalization the most were related to the technology (the Internet), economics (multinational corporations, Euro) and regions (United States, European Union), while the least significance was attributed to symbols representing the global media (CNN, HBO), culture (Hollywood, Oscar/Academy Award) and sports (Olympic Games). The most important qualities, that the Hungarian university students regarded to be necessary to be successful in a globalized world were cognitive in nature (IT skills, knowledge of languages and learning skills) and the least important were those emphasizing the national identity and the patriotism and negative characteristics like money-hunger, selfishness and unscrupulousness. Items expressing different aspects of the globalization resulted in five factors: decreasing differences (Factor 1), multiculturalism (Factor 2), globalization as a threat (Factor 3), benefits of the globalization (Factor 4), and cultural and economic hegemony (Factor 5).

The evaluative aspect of the attitudinal structure reflected a balanced position. The participants' evaluation of the different effects deviated from the neutral view neither toward the positive, nor toward the negative. The most positively perceived effect of the globalization was its impact on the scientific progress and the most negative, its potential contribution to social inequalities.

On the one hand, respondents strongly agree that, due to the globalization, the national identity strengthens, i.e. the main effect is not the homogenization but the differentiation and they consider this process very positive. At the same time, the national identity and the patriotism are not seen as the pragmatically most useful qualities to be successful in a globalized world, cognitive and social skills are believed to lead more directly to a competitive advantage.

There were no major gender differences in the evaluation of the globalization in general, in the estimated extent of its effects on Hungary and in the preferred identity (i.e. Hungarian/national). Male and female participants also estimated the significance of symbols the same way, except for Bill Gates, who was considered as a stronger symbol of globalization by males than by females. There was no

difference in estimating the necessity of different characteristics needed to succeed in a globalized world but in the case of selfishness, which was considered as a necessary quality to be successful significantly more by females. There were also just slight differences regarding the different effects of the globalization. Men believed more that, due to the globalization, nation states will cease and that the globalization contributes to the uniformization. However, females regarded more negatively that, as a result of the globalization, the same products will be sold everywhere. Men agreed more with statements on the multiculturalism (Factor 2) and had a higher mean in the Negative Statements Scale than females.

While the data showed no major gender differences, the university major proved to be a better predictor of the attitude towards the globalization. Students of economics evaluated the globalization significantly better, more exciting and useful than students of humanities. While both groups considered the effect of the globalization to Hungary equally large, the globalization itself had a rather positive connotation among students of economics and a rather negative one among students of humanities. Students of economics considered the Internet, the Olympic Games and UNICEF stronger symbols of the globalization than students of humanities, while students of humanities did so in the case of Hollywood and supermarkets. Students of economics considered several qualities significantly more important to be successful in a globalized world than students of humanities. They seemed to have a more definite and elaborated picture about what is needed for success in a globalized world. Female and male economics students attributed a high necessity to IT skills, knowledge of languages, education, learning skills and cooperativity. In addition to this, male economics students, besides the cooperativity, considered the competitiveness as highly important as well. No quality was considered highly necessary by humanities students. Economics students also had higher means in Factor 4 'Benefits of the globalization'. This positive attitude was strengthened by their significantly higher means in the Positive Statement Scale.

Discussion

While the globalization is a major and probably most relevant driving force of the twenty-first century, there are basically no studies that aim to reveal how young people perceive and evaluate it as a process that happens at multiple levels i.e. in its complexity. There have been studies to reveal attitudes towards the economic effects of the globalization, also there are many studies about its cultural effects i.e. intercultural encounters, perception of migration, etc., or perception of the environmental effects of the globalization, but these levels have not been addressed simultaneously.

The collapse of the socialist block at the end of the 1980s meant, among other things, that millions of young people were suddenly exposed to a free

communication with the rest of the world in terms of free information flow, travel, exchange of ideas, etc. The globalization did not come to them gradually, but in the form of a ‘cultural shock’. There have been no studies in the post-socialist countries aiming to reveal how the present day ‘emerging adults’ view the globalization after more than two decades of the transition to market economy, democracy and freedom of information exchange.

Therefore the goal of this study was to reveal the attitudes of university students of different majors toward different aspects of the globalization in a post-socialist country, Hungary. The results showed that, among the participants of the study, the globalization is not seen as a major threat, but there is no enthusiasm about it either. Hungarian university students tend to see both the positive and the negative consequences of the globalization; they have a slightly negative, but more or less realistic and balanced view. In a recent study on attitudes towards the economic globalization among adult Chinese, Lee et al. (2009) found that respondents considered the effect of the globalization on China more positive than negative and highly educated respondents had a more positive attitude. They explained this with the position of better educated people in the society as they have more opportunities to capture the benefits of the economic globalization.

Some are arguing, that it is not the educational level that counts, but much more the level of economic knowledge. Walstad and Rebeck (2002) found that higher levels of economic knowledge, among surveyed individuals, have large positive effects on the support for free trade and trade openness, that is a key-factor in the economic globalization. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) also claim that the economic knowledge and exposure to economic ideas and information, which students of economics are gaining through their education, may play a key-role in shaping their attitudes toward a more positive view of the economic globalization. In this study, students of economics, with an expected higher position and higher income in the Hungarian society, had a more positive – however not enthusiastic – view on the globalization than the students of humanities. This is in line with previous studies with university students, in majors outside economics (i.e. English, comparative literature, sociology) that indicate more remorse toward free trade and a capitalist competitive market (Bhagwati 2002). Wolfe and Mendelsohn (2005) argue, that it is not the economic knowledge and interest, which are responsible for the difference in the attitudes toward the trade liberalization, but different values and ideology. In their Canadian study, they found that irrespective of educational level, those who trust multinational corporations and the market, who like the United States etc., are more likely to support the globalization. Ohmae (1996) asserts that in the twenty-first century people will salute the corporate flag, not the flag of the nation. The future work context in the case of the Hungarian economics students will be a global market-driven and with a high probability, that they are going to work for a joint venture or a foreign owned company, therefore their more positive attitude toward the globalization is an adaptive preparation for

their future life context. It seems that students of economics are more aware of the requirements of the globalized world in terms of qualities and are better equipped in terms of their attitudes and expectations to meet the challenges it creates.

In the present study, the gender did not prove to be a major factor in the determining attitudes towards the globalization, however, men evaluated the different aspects of the globalization altogether more negatively than women. Although the attitudes toward the globalization, as a multilevel process, were not investigated, the attitudes toward the international trade, as an economic aspect of the globalization, have been researched extensively. These studies show just the opposite relationship. Burgoon and Hiscox (2008) found that women were significantly less likely than men to support an increasing trade with foreign nations. This gender gap existed only among college-educated respondents though. They suggested that the differences among men and women in exposure to the economic ideas and information, i.e. men being more exposed, may be the source of the gender gap in the attitudes toward the trade. Results of the present study do not confirm this, as male respondents with an economics major also had a more negative view on the globalization, however, not on its economic aspects. This can be explained by Gidingel's (1995) argument, that the significant gender gap in relation to the free trade can be explained by different values, with men relying more heavily on economic considerations, such as their belief in the market, and women on social ones, such as their commitment to the welfare state. Hungarian male economics students may have more social concern than their Western counterparts.

The participants of this study were highly educated young adults of a post-socialist society. It would be very interesting to extend this investigation to professional groups of a different age and to other countries within Europe and outside Europe to gain a picture of the similarities and differences. Also political views can have a mediating effect on the attitudes towards the globalization, and this should be investigated in a forthcoming study. It should be also acknowledged, that the present study cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of the Hungarian young adults' attitudes towards the globalization. A further examination is needed, as a large body of research shows that an increased education tends to lead to more tolerant, cosmopolitan views of the world (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). These findings also raise issues with respect to the role and possible competitive disadvantage, which young people, who do not continue into higher education, will perhaps have in an increasingly globalized market.

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Endre Kiss

Constructivity and Destructivity in the Globalization.

A Background of the Problematic of Peace.

Among the international relationships, the specifically imperial relations can be distinguished through the principle of the each other guided *competition* or *rivalry* of the diverse actor-states in the framework of a paramount global *cooperation*. The attribute "imperial" is neither a random nor a traditional description, that connects with each other phenomena of similar character timeless, without any further qualification.

„Imperial” means, in our context, *a specifically new relation and condition*, that are somewhat described in Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*. It can also be understood, that the globalization can today be nearly characterized and addressed *not only through this relation*, although its increasing importance can no longer be put into question mainly somewhat after 2000. The visible validity, let alone supremacy of the imperial discourse is also therefore an excellent perspective on the globalization, because the basic sensibilities of the globalization do not define at all its significance from the beginning, on the contrary, the relevance of the order of magnitude of the imperial discourse is itself equivalent with an attribute of the respective state of the globalization.

The imperial dimensions can of course also change through the rapid development, partly in their absolute conditions, partly in their relations to the other forms of the global discourse, i.e. to these perspectives, from which the globalization can be interpreted and understood also independently. Since the *actorial* dimensions, i.e. the *action space* of the diverse protagonists in the global processes are unchanged of high importance, this actorial freedom can also on its part increase, in a striking way, the order of magnitude of the imperial dimension amongst the other dimensions. In the context of the imperial dimension, a mixture of *objective* and *subjective* actions spaces is thus arising, which *constant interweaving* can be regarded as one of the leading conditions of the globalization.

The *rapid changes in the imperial dimensions* of the process of globalization are very characteristic of this event from the beginning. It goes so far, that in the first years after 1989, the imperial dimension has not been at all thematized publicly, the euphoria of the „end of the history” promised a world, where the traditional imperial relations have become, as for ever, obsolete. The conscious *profiling* of the individual virtual or real global imperial actors is joining this

starting situation, for finally the potential imperial role does not only depend on the will of these actors.

Sometimes the introspection of the great global actors also means a *search for identity*. So, China already belonged in the first decade of the new millennium certainly to the „empires”, this appartenance revealed however as „virtual”, while it so quickly changed in the second decade, that it costs China now much effort to avert that impression, according to which the country would already be now the leading state of the globalization (or one of the states willing to lead) or intend to become as such. Other categorizations can also remain unfixed: for, somewhat the imperial major actors are by no means identical to the members of the leading international organizations, even this affirmation can be true, according to which it should be possible to enter the first leading circle of the global states (in our consciously chosen formulation: „empires”) „through invitation”.

Our thought process is concerned by this new phenomenon of the mutual competition of the global „empires”. On the one hand, it is about, we repeat it, a competition, that realizes as *secondary phenomenon* behind the phenomenon of a *multi-strata global cooperation* on the *first* line. But this phenomenon, also as a competition of all against all, is revealing quite complex and multiple. This rivalry, and we must again also emphasize this, does not call into question the validity of the reality and the relevance of the primary global cooperation. This competition of the second line adopts often the outline of asymmetrical forms.

This competition of the second line is, in its true definitions, a quite new phenomenon. Conscious of this fact, our approach of research might be selective since, for a thorough research, neither a temporal distance nor a sufficiently specific methodology are now available.

First, we concentrate on the question, *to whose expense* this struggle of the second line is led. Generally, we could already now take the thesis, transmitted to us by the historical tradition: the burdens and costs of wars and crises are transferred in the rule to the „society”, it is also not different with the „risks” of the modern industrial societies, what is finally a consequence of the state and of the great economical and financial actors. We *cannot* be satisfied with this general answer.

This rivalry on the second line includes obviously the domain of the economy, however it belongs to the methodological hypotheses of our essay, that we include economical phenomena and facts, only in this case, in the rivalry, if it can be proved about such phenomenon or such fact, that it results from conscious *strategical* reflections, i.e. from a decision, which can be certainly associated with this rivalry. It goes without saying, that this decision is, for our thought process, of a crucial importance. We can only develop and interpret this rivalry through facts,

which origin is secured. It follows, that we will have to deal with a huge number of facts, which we cannot decide the course of.

Do we take again the universal global cooperation as starting fact („first line”), it becomes then comprehensible, why this conflict can be conceived, on the „second line” also as *a war of a new type*. This rivalry is not characterized by combatting armed forces or frontal clashes. This rivalry is rather determined by the idea of weakening if possible *the* opponent (some opponents, all opponents), would it be about his *concrete*, but also *symbolic* or *virtual* weakening. If this expression has a current sense, in this new context and terrain having to be compared with no former context, we should then say, that these conflicts are oriented, in the second line, against the *hinterland* of the competitors. This means however, that the individual actors in competition do not attack the elites or the ruling class of the other actors, rather their „hinterland”, or the *everyday life* and the *conditions of reproduction* of those involved, also global „imperial” participants.

Would it be effectively the case (while we do not consider the designation „hinterland” as the optimal designation), then the *purely theoretical* question is first put, whether this phenomenon is distinguishing from the many similar phenomena of the world history, whether this phenomenon, that we have described as rivalry, concurrence in the second line, is mainly a new phenomenon.

Our answer is, that this phenomenon must be precisely also then considered, *through the fact of the globalization and the also relevant fact of the universal cooperation (the „first” line)*, necessarily as a new phenomenon, if many of its forms remind effectively very strongly of similar phenomena from the former world history.

It is quite difficult to discuss of *the facticity of these conflicts*. An economical success, the changes in the prices of raw materials, the movements of the stock exchange and of the markets can improve the positions of one actor at the expense of the other(s). These conflicts, we accept it now, do not disturb the global communication and the global cooperation (the „first line”), they are often not lived as conflicts, while they can cause concrete and violent damages. This asymmetrical war is thus also simultaneously a *silent* war, which victims or those damaged often do not know themselves, whom they fell victim to.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ An interesting confirmation of this assumption of the mutual rivalry in the second line can be so, if inside the cooperating global structure of these imperial actors other coalitions are emerging, which feel themselves closer to each other than versus the others, for this consideration seems to have already taken into account the fact, that this rivalry causes damages to the others (with the closer approach, these can certainly be moderated).

Would this assumption be right, the *Wiki-Leaks* opportunities and finally the *Snowden's* case would be considered as *anything but exceptional* phenomena or even astonishments. In reverse order, it would be precisely a surprise, if the individual involved actors would *not* listen to each other in this context. What is so disappointing in the public opinions following these scandals, is not necessarily the visible information on the state of the *business as usual*, but the indescribable lack of claim of the arguments accompanying the *declarations*, that undertake no attempt to associate this conflict in the second line with that of the first member of the cooperation. In these opinions, we find *nothing, where the contours of the new global world order would have become visible*, what we see is only the attitudes of the potential war of all against all, which were characteristic of the pre-global world. The case Snowden underlines our hypothesis, but not only in the assumption of the „normality” of mutual listening. Also the „silent” war appears here, for it was also a fact, that we assumed, maybe Snowden would be even also *kidnapped* under the peaceful circumstances of the global international life.

The assumption of this mutual rivalry of the „imperial” actors can extend also to a somewhat modified vision on arms production and commerce. This leads however also further into the experience, that the global circumstances and relationships are changing between the *politics* and the *economics* again in a new context. For, precisely the arms commerce (through its double rooting in the political and the economical) must not be differently interpreted than a moment of this competition in the second line, even if it is carried out from „purely economical” moments. The supposed and hypothetical role of victim of the *hinterland* is realizing in this context again very sharply: if these guns are needed, then this role is clear (for, no population can be today kept away from these conflicts), if not, then (and we remain now only with this *single* consequence), the costs of the arms are taken from other sections of the budget.

It is also similar with the *concurrence of the representations!* Events, such as the Olympics in China, winter Olympics in Russia or a football World Cup in Brazil, are certainly considered as rational steps (amongst others also) in the rivalry of global actors in the so-called second line of the international reality of the age of the globalization. It is however just as clear, that the costs of these mega-events of the global representations are ascribed to the account of the populations. These examples show also, that this competition of the second line is also revealing as a medium, which can appropriate to itself and instrumentalize also events, emerging totally independent on it. With a quiet conscience, we can namely assume, that if in Kuwait the discontent of the civil population is growing and is also manifesting in the public declarations, this event can be admitted as a moment in the mutual struggle of the global actors of imperial rank or is also just admitted.

The problem of the energy and energy supply shows however also a type of events, in which the decisive (intentionally guided) or random (spontaneous) actions could

hardly more distinguish from each other. In these domains, we can literally make no step, without having also any influence on other actors, what already alone, like autopoietically brings the state of the competition of the second member on the scene. This type is also that, which shows always publicly the everyday reality of this rivalry, which then – enhanced through the force of the digitalization and the approaches of a society of information – *strengthens the impression of the mutual global rivalry at the expense of the global cooperation existing already in itself.*

Peculiar sides of this mutual struggle are, if individual actors set for themselves certain coordinates, orders of magnitude and norms, that they consider them as *pain threshold* of the others in this universal and permanent conflict. So, we can for example read in the *dron* attacks, that we want to avoid to enlist in the Chinese airspace, because we assume, that China would not tolerate it. Another side of the same dimension consists in the support to the *civil-, women's* and other *social* movements on the sovereign territory of other imperial actors, in which also blurred borders of influences are established. For us, this phenomenon has the above-average importance, that such steps and opinions can apply as *indirect confirmation* of our thesis.

A very particular place is coming in this very concretely conceived conflict of the global empires of the *mass communication* and of the *mass culture*. That these be since ever already international, and can be prevented in their nature only through the force, is a fundamental fact. That this rivalry of individual global protagonists be happening in them thousands of times, is another important fundamental fact. The difficulty and simultaneously the theoretical interest of this domain consist in the quantitative infinity of this domain, in its confusion, but also not less in the considerable asymmetry, that exists under this aspect among the individual *global players*, while the American mass culture influences much more clearly the other great empires as it is the case in reverse order, even if this effect can also not be considered as *unlimited* or *unilateral*. An independent complex in this context is, that a mass culture does not only mediates the own and the other „world“, but in several genres also „works up“ and thematizes another world. On working up the essential problems of the other empire, several variations of interpretation can appear, every civilization is working on the fundamental problems of the other, like it was formerly the case in Charlie Chaplin's and Leslie Howard's films on the Third Reich or Andrzej Wajda's films on the Stalinism.

In sign of the universal rivalry of the individual civilizations, multiple and very strange phenomena can also outgrow from this problematic. This signals, in an interesting way, (as one of many phenomena) a reaction on an American film presently shot about *Che Guevara*, in which it was affirmed, „the others relate our histories“. There are however examples for that, which one global „empire“ calls into question the right to exist of the other, like it happens often, in an astonishing way, between the USA and America (for instance : America = Mars, Europe =

Venus). In this communication, some individual real dimensions of this mutual conflict of individual empires are however also thematic, like for example in the matter of relationship between Europe and North-Africa, or in the discussion about to what extent the EU interventions should support the individual member-states in other places of the world.

In this analysis, a point is also visible, that would be even not noticed from another starting point. If it is really about the responsibilities of the „*hinterland*” (we still keep so problematically this description), it becomes then soon visible, that this concept means something quite different in Europe than in all other great global units. Europe’s „base” consists of individual nation-states, that partly protect their sovereignty, partly have abandoned it. This known fact can become relevant in the new context of the competition of the global empires in the second line. If we already stay at the level of the damages, it is then already quite fundamental to expect, that they can be *unevenly* distributed only because of this fact. Here, we want to mention briefly the European politics of education and school, where the university shows surely itself (and even totally understandable) as a terrain, on which the rivalry of the individual great player (behind the comprehensive global cooperation) is running intensely. At this point, let us leave aside, whether the European politics of higher education is meaningful or not (for us: not). The chosen strategy in the conflict revealed however undoubtedly as a strategy, which disadvantages and losses are not distributed evenly among the individual states.

Up to now, we dealt with a new phenomenon of globalization, that reminds, indeed in many ways, of the traditional competition of the great powers, that must be however regarded as *new phenomenon*, because of the new basic qualities of the globalization. Now, we put the suggested question, whether this rivalry can also not be associated with that phenomenon, that we usually name as the *conflict*, or as *the rivalry of the great philosophies of life, religions or ideologies* or that has been called, just after the advent of the globalization, by Samuel S. Huntington, „clash of the civilizations”. It is obviously an attempt, and we start from the fact, that the rivalry of the global empires in the second line, as well as the clash of civilizations were originally returning to different motives and origins.

Huntington’s concept, also as *self-fulfilling prophecy*, plays a very great role in the fact, that we must put today this very concrete question of the relation of the rivalry of the global powers to the great ideological or civilizational struggles. At the beginning of the nineties, even other ways opened namely before the further development of the globalization! Huntington’s concept played also a well-identifiable role, while he reduced the new and very complex dimensions, the victory, even the *dialectics of the Modern Age* in a reactionary basic situation seeming fundamentalist.

If we think of the rivalry of the philosophies of life, religions and ideologies (practically of all that Huntington described as *clash of civilizations*), we would so spontaneously think, that only quite few ideologies take part in this great competition. It is however not the case. *In truth, there are many more ideologies in the global world, which are fighting each other and each of these ideologies has also inwards a rich differentiation*, that fights also now inside the same major ideology or religion.

The convincing impression, that Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* was a self-realizing prophecy, that influenced in its way the events, came mostly from the strange and somewhat instilling fear experience, that this „struggle” (according to Huntington or also without him) came together with that result, that every ideology or philosophy of life „fundamentalized” with consequences, i.e. in case of every individual ideology gave rise to the *more fundamentalist* or the *most fundamentalist* variation.

Thus, the fundamentalism entered a new phase of its history, with which also a new *history*, a new *sociology* and also a new *sociology of the knowledge* of the fundamentalism became necessary. A development occurred, which in a peculiar way had also moved closer to each other the individual philosophies of life or ideologies. Simultaneously, some fundamentalist thought structures became so general, that larger groups and masses, in many countries and in many sociological circles, do no longer recognize exactly the fundamentalist color of their mode of thinking and just use the fundamentalism, like they applied formerly the constructive thought structures, they use even now the fundamentalist structures to solve factual problems.

With the necessary care, we can recognize, that both universal struggles (empires + civilizations) of the great global actors are today on the way *to grow together*. In the duality of such two empires, the ideological and civilizational *clash* can show through with great ease, the difference between communism and post-communism is, for such reasons, also not made with sufficient care, while China is still classified, sometimes communist, sometimes neo-liberal in these double-level becoming confrontations (empires + ideologies). Also the eventual differences between America and Europe are looking already for „ideological” marks, where one part must always ideologically (i.e. democracy-theoretically) stand above the other, even if the criteria of this civilizational superiority are absolutely very relative and no longer show the unambiguity of the year 1989.

The imperial conflicts of second line (behind the global cooperation, that constitutes the first line) adopt in any of their constitutions always clear ideological-philosophical forms. This event reminds very clearly (as it has been declared so reluctantly in this attempt) of a state, that Huntington described in 1992 and 1993. These ideologies-philosophies of life are adopting very generally (as it

has been once pointed out) a „fundamentalist” character, what has also to be explained from this competition. It is almost alarming, that this process represents the *counter-movement* toward the development after 1945, while formerly the individual ideologies/philosophies of life became always more differentiated and demanding. No doubt, this movement is also to explain with the rivalry of the individual global empires, in which leading ideologies are often really very close to the fundamentalism, it is however to explain also with the ever decreasing role, that the intellectuals play in the process of formation of these ideological concepts.

Of course, it is not to establish exactly, at which stage this process of common growth of the imperial and ideological-philosophical competition stands, this tendency is however today already clearly visible.

This common growth carries in itself two dangers to consider seriously. The first danger is apparently „only” of intellectual nature. The correspondence-relation of an „empire” with a „civilization/philosophy of life/religion” represents such an amazing simplification of our modern and post-modern world, which must be alone identified, through the scale of this simplification, directly as the highest danger. *This simplification is somewhat as we would really think, that the Roman Empire consisted of Romans, who represented the civilization/philosophy of life/religion of the Roman Empire.*

This extreme simplification operated up to now and will, most probably in the future, also work as a *self-fulfilling prophecy*. The concrete orientation of this prophecy is already alone a negative and *self-destructive* one. If one „empire” interprets the plural, multi-strata, modern reality of the other as fundamentalism, it follows then necessarily, that the own society considers itself as fundamentalism, possibly emphasizes and supports in itself the own, fundamentalist trains.¹¹² From these virtual processes, *a concept of the enemy* occurs already each time. *Two fundamentalistically colored empires can experiment the others as „enemies”*, depending on the intensity of formation of the concept of the enemy of the own philosophy of life. No today politician is to blame for the fact that, in his fundamentalist basic ideology, every other philosophy of life is an enemy, he is, so to speak, constrained to experiment, at a certain stage of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the other as an enemy.

Another consequence of this danger of the link of the rivalry of the *empires* with the rivalry of the *ideologies* consists in the easily understandable fact, that on this basis the mechanisms of the *positive feedback* must work. The perception of this now doubled rivalry leads necessarily to the *acceleration* and *intensification* of

¹¹² That by the way such inner trains seeming fundamentalist at the age of the crisis and of the self-destructive society of indebted states occur as alone, goes even without saying.

conflicts among the individual great actors. *This rapidity can, under some circumstances, be a rapidity, to which we are not prepared and that possibly can also not be perceived in the normal everyday world.* This doubling (if not potentialization) of the global rivalry is obviously also motivated by many *real processes*.¹¹³ This unquestionable proportion of the real processes cannot mislead us about the fact, that at the stage, when this doubling (if not potentialization) of the rivalry is installing, the importance of the real moments to interpret rationally decisively regresses, the *own dynamics* of the already fundamentalistically colored doubled rivalry takes excessive proportions and can highly diminish the control on this development in certain circumstances. In other words, it looks like so, that in a positive feedback of the redoubled competition (empires + „civilizations”), the chances of the universal fundamentalists are getting always bigger, for the solidarity, the emancipation, the individualization, the information or the human rights are hardly more able to compete with a fundamentalist competition of the „civilizations”, that could win for themselves at each concrete location already the majority of the own masses.

The doubled competition in the second line (always under the universal cooperation in the globalization of the first line) can go over the *ideological war*. The question remains put, whether this war runs today or not yet. It is however certain, that the doubling of the rivalry *contains now already in itself the danger of the ideological war of a new type*.

This danger exists quite concretely in the fact, that the *launch of the civilizational struggle in the imperial rivalry* represents a *critical*, if not just an *irreversible* change.

The universal rivalry of the global „empires” (at a time, when the imperial dimension arrived already historically in the history of the globalization) is after all part of the *real* politology, is *rational* to interpret and might be even also addressed as trivial event. It is therefore of *socio-ontological* nature, even if it does not maybe please us. The truly tragic consequences of the penetration of the civilizational struggles consists in the fact, that the ideologies grant the struggle of the great empires new qualities, *they make of this struggle a new reality, a no longer controllable irrational world situation can arise from a politically and socio-ontologically „normal” situation*.

¹¹³ It is unsuccessful individuation processes, break of traditions, economic crisis, unemployment, disappointment because of political systems, that are only exacerbated by the modern social and non-social communication, so that in this acceleration they can even have archaic, modern and postmodern moments equal to their importance .

The mutual rivalry in the second line of the globalization can engage new „*double antagonisms*” through this link with the struggle of the civilizations. Since the „fundamentalization” *mutatis mutandis* is going forward in the inner life of every great empire, a confrontation between „fundamentalism” and „correct democracy” arises from these double positions, and sometimes also democratic elements are to be found in the „fundamentalism” and fundamentalist trains in the „correct democracy”.

Apart from these new simplifications, we must here point out the again very problematic side, in the fact that, while *in the „West” the anti-communism is the opposing fundamentalism N°1, in the fundamentalist „East” (i.e. in the concrete empires, we count there), the „anti-liberalism” is the concept of enemy N°1*. The juxtaposition of both these „fundamental” facts prepares considerable dangers for the further development. For, the role distribution has the common train, that neither in the „West” (in the here concerned great actors), nor in the „East” (in the here concerned great actors), the fundamentalism is the concept of enemy N°1, this contributes to another acceleration of the *dynamics*, if not of the *dialectic* of the fundamentalism.

In this relation of the „West” to the „East”, the West wanted mainly act, with the attraction force of the occidental values, on the population of the East, and also export the democratic institution. We cannot say, that the endeavours remained unsuccessful, even these efforts were however highly hindered by the arising of the *clash of civilizations*, because they have been just fully politicized and *even the clearest values of the democracy and of the emancipation could appear as imperial interests*. This concrete confrontation shows again asymmetrical trains. Thus, a *double threat* arises from the mutual influences (as rivalry of the second line even from a „normal” fact). The first is directed against the other „civilization”, without forgetting however also the other one, in which the other threat concerns the own population, if it does not understand how to take over, at its level, also the logic of the civilization struggle. In a „fundamentalist” empire, we may not behave „democratically” and in a „democratic” empire, we may not behave „fundamentalistically”, understanding these attitudes, as we just understand them concretely.

We came to the conclusion (temporary and in many ways quite hypothetical), that any fundamentalism is an organic component of the doubled global rivalry of the „empires”, that must act in a globalization (if not exclusively of „imperial” color). While we have described, at a place, the globalization as *dialectic of the modernity*, we must categorize the advance of the fundamentalism (as well vertically as also horizontally) in this doubled rivalry as *dialectics of the fundamentalism*. Like as if precisely this dialectic of the fundamentalism would appear on the scene also in the present events in Syria, if we read in a strongly worded article (*Spiegel*, 2013/22),

like „iron particles on the magnetic field, how the fighting groups are organizing on the confessional line”. It seems to us, that this observation could characterize also many other situations in the processes of the today globalization. An open confessional conflict or even a war would also come together with that incalculable damage, that we may think, that the world history would not exist and this (global) confessional war (*which is ultimately anything but confessional or civilizational*) differs in nothing from the war of the crusaders.

That we previously focused on the confrontation of the „West” and of the „East”, does not at all mean, that we had forgotten, that there are quite a lot of „imperial” and „civilizational” conflicts. The effective reality is precisely constituted of a multiplicity of these conflicts.

In this „dialectic of the fundamentalism” (which extent is, as said, temporary and hypothetical), we must sensitise, in this domain, in the direction of the „elective affinities”. In the wake of these processes, the individual empires try to find their own (old or new) civilizational ideologies, while the same movement can also start from the other end: the organizing civilizational ideologies (that can already occur at this stage also as independent institutions) also try to find their „own” empire, from which they expect, that they will play, in this concrete field, an „exclusive” role.

Has the „dialectics of the fundamentalism” effectively somewhat advanced, it is then inevitable, that the democracies be disadvantaged in this competition. In the short term, it is namely questionable, that the attraction force of the democracies, in a non-democratic society, or in a state of crisis, could resist with the demagogy or the aggressiveness of the well-organized fundamentalist pressure.

It seems to us, that the assumption of Huntington’s option of a *Clash of Civilizations* was an historical error of the „West”, mainly of the USA, for the rapid identification with this (also intellectually very weak) conception has prevented a *more constructive, more communicative* and, finally, *more human* development in the „global” space of the globalization, already the absence of another way must be considered today as a serious mistake.

The interpretation of the *terrorism* is without any doubt a consequence of this politics. This vision hides, on the one hand, the reality, at least in the sense, that this phenomenon is *not* justified by the doubling of the imperial rivalries in the second line. Drawn from this context, the terrorism can already be multiply interpreted, even if also numerous right moments can also be easily contained in these interpretations.

So, the terrorism is on the one hand immeasurably increased. On the other hand, the transformation of the such understood terrorism reveals also in a self-fulfilling

prophecy, so that at the end we can just as difficultly make the distinction between the *ideological phantom* and the *reality*, such as it has been formerly the case with the *Clash of Civilizations*. The integration of the struggle of the civilizations in the (almost obvious) rivalry of the empires of the globalization can accelerate the conflicts in the globalization also thus unexpectedly and critically.

Thus, *a dialectics of the fundamentalism realized*. It is apparently the consequence, but in the reality a not necessary consequence, if not just the contrary of the globalization itself. It may no longer be called into question, that thus a true danger appeared.

PART 4

"Die Aufgabe einer Weltkultur des Ausgleichs, getragen von einer Technik, die möglichst allen Menschen ein menschenwürdiges Leben erlauben und doch die Tragfähigkeit der irdischen Biosphäre nicht überlasten soll - diese gegenwärtig drängend aktuelle Doppelzielsetzung haben die Lebensphilosophen in unterschiedlicher Deutlichkeit gesehen. So sehr diese Aufgabenstellung fast eine Quadratur des Zirkels bedeutet, sie ist doch ein Zukunftsentwurf, zu dessen Verwirklichung es sich lohnt, alle Kräfte einzusetzen."

Ernst Oldemeyer

Ortsbestimmungen der Technik in der Lebensphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts

"The modern technology represents a particular logic and this logic necessarily becomes the dominant logic of the human life. One of the significant consequences of such a conception of technology is that the traditional 'logic' of the technology reverses itself. That is to say, the technology as a producer of mere means of human action becomes a producer of ends or meaning, or what is the same, 'means' of action determine its ends and prefigure the direction of the social change."

Nico Stehr

Theories of the Information Age

"Whereas the knowledge of the 19th and 20th century modernity was a kind of learning acquired with a view towards a humanistic or theological end, the new post-industrial knowledge of the information age is an unrestricted, seemingly uncontrollable flood of pure data."

Hans-Peter Söder

Caught in the Web? Liquid Modernity and the Fluidity of Synthetic Knowledge: Some Remarks on a Global Phenomenon

"In every tribe you would need some people who would go out, look around and bring things and ideas back home."

Rob van Kranenburg

Essay on Sharing Everything

Ernst Oldemeyer

*Ortsbestimmungen der Technik in der Lebensphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts*¹¹⁴

Technik ist ein Erzeugnis des Lebens - ein Lebens-Mittel. Wo kein Leben - in kosmischen Regionen ohne Biosphäre -, dort auch keine genuine Technik. Leben ist die notwendige, wenn auch nicht hinreichende Bedingung der Entstehung von Technik. Vor allem für die Erzeugung dessen, worauf gewöhnlich der Begriff „Technik“ beschränkt wird - das System menschlicher Artefakte und ihrer Herstellungs- und Verwendungsaktivitäten, müssen weitere, abkünftige Bedingungen erfüllt sein.

Die meisten philosophischen Bemühungen seit Platon und Aristoteles, zu einer Bestimmung des Wesens der Technik und ihrer Funktionen in der menschlichen Lebenswelt zu gelangen, haben bei solchen abkünftigen Bedingungen angesetzt. Zu ihnen gehören, aufeinander aufbauend, vor allem : (a) ein nach Versuch und Irrtumskorrektur erfolgreiches Zubereiten und Anwenden von materiellen Mitteln des Überlebens unter dem Druck widriger Naturumstände und drängender körperlicher Bedürfnisse, (b) die intuitive („geistige“) Erfindung von zweckmäßigen Werkzeugen durch Ausnutzung einer fortschreitenden Naturerkenntnis, (c) die zunehmend planmäßige Schaffung einer sich ausweitenden Kultursphäre menschlicher Kollektive im Zuge einer arbeitsteiligen Umgestaltung der je vorgefundenen Naturumwelt.

Die bekanntesten philosophischen Technikdeutungen großer Reichweite legen - so ist meine These - diese Bestimmungsfaktoren menschlicher Technik im Lichte bestimmter metaphysisch-weltanschaulicher Grundpositionen aus - auch wenn sie dieselben nicht immer ausdrücklich formulieren. Solche Standpunkte prägen weitgehend die Perspektive, unter der ein Erfahrungsbereich - hier: die Technik - in seinen Strukturen und Funktionen aufgefaßt wird. In erster Linie sind es drei *metaphysische Positionen*, die die genannten Ausgangsphänomene je in ihrem Sinne interpretiert haben: ein auf den Atomismus Leukipps und Demokrits zurückgehender *materialistischer Naturalismus* (in der Neuzeit teils im Anschluß an die vom Materie-Geist-Dualismus Descartes' abgeleitete mechanistische Wissenschaft von der Materie [res extensa], teils an den Materialismus französischer Aufklärungsphilosophen wie Holbach, La Mettrie und Helvetius vertreten), verbunden mit einem *technizistischen Utilitarismus*, wie er von Francis

¹¹⁴ In diesen Aufsatz sind in erweiterten und überarbeiteten Fassungen drei Einzelbeiträge über Henri Bergson, Nikolaj Berdjajew und Max Scheler eingegangen, die in C. Hubig/A. Huning/G. Ropohl (Hgg.) 2000, S. 76 ff., 81 ff., 325 ff., erstveröffentlicht sind.

Bacon vorgedacht wurde, ein an Platon orientierter *objektiver Idealismus* oder Ideen-Realismus (im 20. Jahrhundert z.B. vertreten von Friedrich Dessauer), ein (anthropozentrischer) *humanistischer Naturalismus* (eine Lehre vom Menschen als planmäßig handelndem Naturwesen, die, in der antiken Sophistik angelegt, vor allem im marxistischen Historischen Materialismus, im anglo-amerikanischen Pragmatismus und in der philosophischen Anthropologie des 20. Jahrhunderts, z.B. bei Arnold Gehlen, ausgebaut wurde).

Die vorliegende Studie konzentriert sich auf eine vierte metaphysische Position, die bisher als Grundlage einer eigenständigen Sichtweise der Technik wenig zur Kenntnis genommen worden ist: die Position der *Lebensphilosophie*. Es ist gebräuchlich geworden, unter diesem Stichwort die Ansätze einer Reihe von gleichsinnig arbeitenden, aber keinen Schulzusammenhang bildenden Denkern der Wende vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert zusammenzufassen.¹¹⁵ Zu ihnen gehören im engeren Sinne Wilhelm Dilthey, Henri Bergson, Georg Simmel, Ludwig Klages, Theodor Lessing, Oswald Spengler; in einem weiteren Sinne steht darüber hinaus das Denken u.a. von Leopold Ziegler, Max Scheler, Nikolaj Berdjajew, Hans Driesch, Hermann Graf Keyserling in Grundlagen dem lebensphilosophischen Ansatz nahe. Dieses Denkkonzept kann auch als fortentwickelte Spätform eines viel älteren *kosmologischen Organizismus* (einer „organologischen“¹¹⁶ oder „biomorphen“¹¹⁷ Weltsicht) verstanden werden, dessen europäische Traditionslinie von Heraklit über die Stoa, Giordano Bruno, Jacob Böhme, Leibniz bis zu Herder, Goethe und Schellings Identitätsphilosophie reicht. Im späten 19. Jahrhundert stellte insbesondere Nietzsche im Anschluß an Schopenhauer den Begriff des „Lebens“ ins Zentrum seiner Konzeption einer Welt des unablässigen Werdens. Er schlug zugleich den emphatischen, diesseitsbejahenden Ton an, der die traditionelle Anziehungskraft der platonisch-christlichen „Hinterwelten“ (eines „ewigen“ Seins) vergessen machen sollte und viele Dichter und Musiker der Jahrhundertwende inspirierte - etwa wenn er seinem Zarathustra das ekstatische Tanzlied „In dein Auge schaute ich jüngst, o Leben“ in den Mund legte¹¹⁸. Einige Jahrzehnte später sah Georg Simmel „Leben“ als den Zentralbegriff seiner Kulturepoche an, der die früher vorherrschenden Leitbegriffe im Europa des 19. und 18. Jahrhunderts abgelöst habe - etwa, zeitlich rückwärts gereiht: „Gesellschaft“, „Ich“, „Vernunft“, „Natur“.¹¹⁹

Der Begriff des Lebens erwies sich damals vor allem aus zwei Gründen als geeignet, zu einem philosophischen Grundwort zu werden. Einerseits war dem

¹¹⁵ Vgl. dazu z.B. M. Scheler 1972, S. 311 ff.; O. F. Bollnow 1958; F. Fellmann 1993

¹¹⁶ M. Scheler 1960, S. 28 ff.

¹¹⁷ M. Scheler 1960, S. 59 ff.; E. Topitsch 1972, S. 17 ff.

¹¹⁸ F. Nietzsche 1966, Bd. 2, S. 470 ff.

¹¹⁹ G. Simmel 1987, S. 152 f.

Phänomen des Lebens seit Darwin, Haeckel, Mendel, usw. intensive naturwissenschaftliche Aufmerksamkeit zuteil geworden. Mit der Entdeckung von Evolutions- und Vererbungsgesetzmäßigkeiten gab es Handhaben für eine sich als streng wissenschaftlich verstehende Biologie, das Leben als Systemeigenschaft selbstorganisierender Materie unter bestimmten Aspekten *objektiv* zu erfassen. - Andererseits war Leben aber auch eine Erscheinung, der die im 19. Jahrhundert sich konstituierenden Geisteswissenschaften und die weiterbestehenden Zweige der bewußtseinsidealistischen Philosophie großes Interesse abgewinnen konnten. Als Inbegriff des „Erlebens“ (Bewußtseins und Sich-Ausdrückens) ließ sich Leben als ein „von innen“, *subjektiv* zu verstehendes Geschehen thematisieren - ein Ansatz, der in der Tiefenpsychologie auf das Erschließen „unbewußter“ biopsychischer Regungen ausgedehnt wurde. - Schließlich konnte vom Leben und Erleben her ein Zugang zur Kommunikation zwischen Lebewesen gewonnen werden: ‘nur Leben versteht Leben’.¹²⁰

In der Einschätzung des Lebens als Zentralphänomen kündigte sich - bei einem Teil der lebensphilosophischen Autoren auch ausdrücklich - eine *veränderte Einstellung zur Natur* an, wie sie ein halbes Jahrhundert später mit den ökologischen Bestrebungen und in den „grünen“ politischen Bewegungen breitere Kreise erreichen sollte. War es im neuzeitlichen materialistischen Weltbild mit seinem technizistisch-utilitären Ethos zu einer scharfen Gegenüberstellung von Kultur und Natur gekommen, bei der die Natur vorwiegend als bloßer Gegenstand der Beobachtung und als Material der Bearbeitung und Ausbeutung angesehen wurde, so gehört der lebensphilosophische Impuls in eine Reihe von Bestrebungen, diesen Dualismus zu überwinden und zu einer ‘integrativen’ Sicht des Verhältnisses von Natur und Kultur zu gelangen.¹²¹

In den im engeren Sinne philosophischen Richtungskämpfen der Epoche lassen sich bei den genannten Autoren des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts zwei grundsätzliche Frontstellungen ausmachen : einmal gegen die (sich meist auf Kant berufende) Tendenz in der akademischen Philosophie, sich auf Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie, sowie eine rein rational begründete Ethik zu beschränken. Demgegenüber wollte die Lebensphilosophie Bewußtsein, Vernunft, Erkennen und Rationalität nicht als selbständige Prinzipien anerkennen, sondern sie als Teilfunktionen vom tieferen Grundgeschehen des Lebens her verstehen. Zum anderen setzte sich die Lebensphilosophie von einer Weltsicht ab, die sich am Vorbild der allein als exakt geltenden mathematischen Naturwissenschaften orientierte. Die auf diesen aufgebaute quantifizierende Weltbetrachtung wurde als unzureichend angesehen, Phänomene mit wesentlich qualitativen Seiten wie Leben und Bewußtsein, Personalität und Geist zu begreifen.

¹²⁰ So dem Sinne nach G. Simmel 1987, S. 164

¹²¹ Vgl. E. Oldemeyer 1983, S. 35 ff.

Mit solchen Orientierungen konnte die Lebensphilosophie zu einem geeigneten Rahmen werden, das Thema *Technik* nicht nur anthropozentrisch, sondern auch von seinen tieferliegenden Bedingungen im 'Leben' überhaupt anzugehen. Technik, so wurde nun mitunter gesehen, entwickelt sich aus Funktionen des Lebens schon auf vormenschlicher Stufe (zumindest im Tierreich). Die in der Antike angelegte Entgegensetzung von Natur (*physis*) und Kunst/Technik (*téchne*), des Von-selbst-Hervorwachsens und des Von-außen-Gestaltens (die allerdings bei Platon und Aristoteles noch keine strikte war, sondern ein komplexeres Verhältnis bildete)¹²², wurde von manchen Lebensphilosophen als nicht fruchtbar erkannt. Freilich nicht immer konsequent - und so finden sich im lebensphilosophischen Denkkontext durchaus verschiedenartige und, wie schon bei Nietzsche¹²³, ambivalente Einschätzungen des Verhältnisses von Natur und Technik in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Doch da die Technik nicht nur 'von innen her', aus dem Blickwinkel von Ingenieuren und Technologen, zum Thema gemacht wurde, ergaben sich aus der größeren Distanz von Fachfremden überraschend vielfältige, auch hellstichtig-kritische Gesichtspunkte zur enormen Gewichtsverlagerung zwischen natürlicher und technischer Lebenswelt im Laufe der Geschichte menschlicher Technik.

Die Lebensphilosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts haben keine systematischen Technikphilosophien hervorgebracht. Doch finden sich bei ihnen bemerkenswerte Versuche, den 'Ort' der Technik im Verhältnis zur Natur und innerhalb der menschlichen Kultur, unter Berücksichtigung seiner Wandlungen, zu bestimmen. Dementsprechend thematisieren die hier behandelten Texte die Technik nicht isoliert, sondern stellen diese jeweils in den Rahmen umfassenderer Lebensbezüge. Die ausgewählten Autoren haben hinsichtlich des Themas Technik kaum Bezug aufeinander genommen. Die innere Verwandtschaft ihrer Standpunkte ergibt sich aus den angedeuteten Voraussetzungen ihrer Weltsicht - bei freilich nicht unerheblichen Unterschieden im resultierenden Urteil über die Bedeutung der Technik. Daher reihe ich die folgenden sechs Skizzen nicht chronologisch aneinander - das würde in diesem Fall nicht zur Vertiefung der Einsicht beitragen. Ich ordne sie vielmehr - im Ausgang von einer ausführlicheren Darstellung der fundierenden Gedanken zu Leben und Kultur bei Georg Simmel - fortschreitend von geringerer zu größerer Vielfalt der Perspektiven an, die von den Autoren an der Technik wahrgenommen wurden, sowie nach dem Grad des Realitätssinns, den ihre Prognosen erkennen lassen. Im Anschluß an Simmel kommen dabei exemplarisch Gedanken zur Technik von Ludwig Klages, Leopold Ziegler, Henri Bergson, Nikolaj Berdjajew und Max Scheler zur Sprache. (Auf andere, etwa gleichzeitig publizierende Autoren lebensphilosophisch-anthropologischer

¹²² Vgl. E. Oldemeyer 1994, S. 136 ff.

¹²³ Vgl. E. Oldemeyer 1997, S. 151 ff.

Orientierung, bei denen sich ebenfalls erwägenswerte Gesichtspunkte zur Technik finden - wie Theodor Lessing, Hans Driesch, Alfred Weber, Ernst und Friedrich Georg Jünger, sowie Wilhelm Schapp - sei hier nur hingewiesen.)

Georg Simmel (1858-1918) hat erst in seinem letzten Lebensjahrzehnt zur lebensphilosophischen Grundlegung seines Denkens gefunden. Er war das gerade Gegenteil einer engen Spezialistennatur. Ohne ein Methodologe der Phänomenologie zu sein, öffnete er sich (im Einklang mit Husserls Maxime) von früh an weit den „Sachen selbst“, die sich zu seiner Zeit als aktuell aufdrängten. Mit seinem „empfindlichen Sensorium für zeittypische Reize, für ästhetische Neuerungen, für geistige Tendenzwenden und Orientierungsumschwünge im großstädtisch konzentrierten Lebensgefühl, für subpolitische Einstellungsänderungen und schwer greifbare, diffuse, aber verräterische Alltagsphänomene“¹²⁴ fand er über seine Berliner Vorlesungen viel Anklang bei einem bildungsbürgerlichen Publikum und stand im Austausch mit bedeutenden Künstlern und Schriftstellern. Doch hatte er mit seinen unorthodoxen Themen, die in die Soziologie und die Kulturwissenschaften übergriffen und die er in seinen späteren Jahren vorwiegend in der Form des Essays behandelte, Schwierigkeiten, bei der akademischen Zunft Anerkennung zu finden. So erhielt er erst 1914 einen Lehrstuhl an der Universität Straßburg. Von den drei Phasen seines Schaffens, die meist unterschieden werden - einer biologistisch-pragmatistisch orientierten (Hauptwerk : „Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft“, 1892/93), einer soziologisch orientierten (Hauptwerke : „Philosophie des Geldes“, 1900; „Soziologie“, 1908) und einer lebensphilosophisch orientierten Phase (Hauptschriften : „Philosophische Kultur“, 1911; „Lebensanschauung“, 1918)¹²⁵ -, sind für seine Gedanken zur Technik vor allem die zweite und die dritte wichtig. Der systematische Zusammenhang läßt sich am besten von seiner Lebensphilosophie her erkennen.

Die Formel, mit der Simmel in seinem letzten Buch „Lebensanschauung“ seine Konzeption des Lebens zusammenfaßt, läuft darauf hinaus, daß *Leben* seinem Wesen nach nicht nur „*Mehr-Leben*“ bedeutet, sondern (auf menschlicher Stufe) auch „*Mehr-als-Leben*“.¹²⁶ - *Leben* entfaltet sich, nach Simmel, auf drei Stufen¹²⁷: Als *erste* Stufe faßt er das ganz in die Rhythmik der *vormenschlichen Natur* eingebettete (pflanzliche und tierische) Leben zusammen: es produziert und reproduziert sich selbst und gelangt - im Tierreich - bereits zur Ausbildung einer „seelischen“ Innerlichkeit (Bewußtsein). - Im Menschen folgt *zweitens* ein Leben auf der Stufe des *subjektiven „Geistes“*. Es unterscheidet sich von der vorausgehenden durch die Ausbildung des reflexiven Selbstbewußtseins. Das

¹²⁴ So die treffende Charakterisierung von Simmels Geistesart durch J. Habermas 1986, S. 8

¹²⁵ Vgl. M. Landmann 1987, S. 7 f.

¹²⁶ G. Simmel 1918, S. 20 ff.

¹²⁷ G. Simmel 1918, S. 99 ff.; 1987, S. 148

Lebendige wird damit fähig, eine Distanzhaltung zu sich selbst und zur umgebenden Natur (Subjekt-Objekt-Trennung) zu erreichen, Vorbedingung einer neuartigen Produktivität: des kulturellen Schöpfertums. - Durch dieses wird die dritte Stufe konstituiert : die *Kultur*. Hier stellt das „geistige“ Leben objektive Gebilde („*objektiven Geist*“ nach Hegel) aus sich heraus, die eine vom naturhaften und subjektiv-bewußten Leben unabhängige Existenz erlangen. Diese prägen dem „strömenden“, wandlungsreichen Leben feste Formen auf, in die es sich einfügt, an denen es Gestalt gewinnt und sich selbst versteht: Sprache, soziale Institutionen und Organisationen, Wirtschaftsformen, Technik, staatliche Verfassungen und Einrichtungen, rechtliche Regelsysteme, Wissenschaften, Künste, Kanones von Werten und Moralnormen, Religionen, Weltanschauungen usw. Diese Kulturgebilde erlangen gegenüber der Lebensdynamik, aus der sie hervorgegangen sind, eine „transvitale Sonderexistenz“ mit Eigengesetzlichkeiten und einer widerständigen Beharrungskraft, die sich der weitergehenden Lebensbewegung entfremden kann.

Die Wesensart des „*Mehr-Lebens*“ - des unablässigen Vergehens von erreichten Lebensformen zugunsten des Entstehens neuer - ist diesem bereits auf der naturhaften Stufe eigen. Im Wachstum, in Metamorphosen und in der Zeugung von Nachkommen geht Leben über seinen je erlangten Zustand hinaus. Selbst Altern und Sterben bedeuten Gestaltwandel und Formaflösung, durch die neue Organisationsformen vorbereitet werden. Daher faßt Simmel auch diese Erscheinungen unter den Begriff des „Mehr-Lebens“. Mit dem Hinweis auf diese dem Leben noch gewissermaßen immanente „Selbsttranszendenz“¹²⁸ greift Simmel sowohl Schopenhauers Gedanken vom Streben nach Selbsterhaltung („Wille zum Leben“) als auch Nietzsches Gedanken vom „Willen zur Macht“ (zur Selbst- und Fremdüberwindung) als Grundmerkmale des Lebens in einer erweiterten Form auf. Für Simmel bekundet sich Mehr-Leben aber auch auf der Stufe des Bewußtseins und Selbstbewußtseins, indem das Leben hier stets über den jeweiligen Moment seiner Jetzt-Existenz ahnend, erwartend, planend in die Zukunft vorgreift und einen Vergangenheitshorizont erinnernd bewahrt.¹²⁹ Damit bezieht Simmel die Ansicht Bergsons ein, daß dem Menschen - über die fest-stellenden Akte des Intellekts hinaus - ein intuitives Wissen vom Fließen der gelebten Zeit (*durée*), von Bewegung, Veränderung und Entwicklung zugänglich sei.

Mit der Bestimmung, daß Leben sich auf der Stufe der Kultur zu „*Mehr-als-Leben*“ entfalte, geht Simmel über Nietzsche wie über Bergson hinaus, ohne doch zur metaphysischen Absolutsetzung einer rein geistigen „Hinterwelt“ zurückzukehren. Die kulturellen Gebilde sind zwar ihrer Genese nach durchaus Produkte des schöpferischen Lebensprozesses. Sie erlangen aber als vollendete

¹²⁸ G. Simmel 1918, S. 6 ff.

¹²⁹ G. Simmel ebd., S. 8 ff.

Gestalten den Charakter eines vom Leben und Erleben abgelösten Bestandes mit einer gewissen „Autonomie“, mit eigenlogischen Sinnstrukturen, die mehr oder weniger auf „Dauer“ angelegt, ja mitunter (wie z.B. bei logischen und mathematischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten) als „zeitlos“ gültig ausgewiesen sind. Leben auf der Stufe der Kultur braucht solche objektiven Formen in zweierlei Hinsicht: 1. zur Kultivierung der jeweiligen *natürlichen Lebensumwelt* durch Hege, durch Einsatz von Werkzeugen, durch Werke und Einrichtungen, die menschliches Leben schützen und erleichtern; 2. zur Kultivierung der menschlichen *Innerlichkeit*, der „Seele“, durch (soziale, moralische, ästhetische, religiöse) Riten, Sitten, Normen und Institutionen. Für Simmel liegt der eigentliche Sinn der Kultur durchaus in der zweiten Leistung¹³⁰ (womit er Ciceros Unterscheidung und Gewichtung von „*cultura agri*“ und „*cultura animi*“ aufgreift). Die Problematik in diesem Kultivierungsprozeß besteht nach Simmel darin, daß das menschliche Leben einerseits auf eine Ordnung durch stabilisierende „Formen“ angewiesen ist, andererseits sich jedoch in seinem rascheren „Weiterströmen“ von ihnen entfremdet und sich an ihnen wie an der unlebendigen Natur abarbeiten muß. Daraus ergeben sich unvermeidlich Kulturkonflikte; ja Simmel geht so weit, dem unablässig aufbrechenden Widerstreit zwischen dynamischem Leben und statischen Kulturformen - bei dem nicht nur Leben zugrunde geht, sondern auch je und je ehrwürdige Kulturgebilde zerbrochen werden, um neuen Platz zu machen - die Unausweichlichkeit einer „Tragödie“ beizumessen.¹³¹

Für diesen von Simmel herausgearbeiteten Wesenszug des Lebens, auf „Mehr-als-Leben“ angelegt, ja im Kulturzustand angewiesen zu sein, bildet die *Technik* nur *einen*, wenn auch gewichtigen Beispielbereich. Simmel hat seine Gedanken zu den Auswirkungen dieses Wesenszuges in der Kulturentwicklung nicht systematisch anhand der Technik dargestellt. Dennoch lassen sich aus verschiedenen seiner Schriften bedeutsame Einsichten zur Struktur, zu den Funktionen und den Folgen der Technik herausheben.

Der Grundansatz seiner Gedanken zur Technik ist aus der Analyse des Systems der „Werkzeuge“ und des Werkzeuggebrauchs in Simmels „Philosophie des Geldes“ (1900) ablesbar.¹³² Simmel geht von der Unterscheidung zwischen „Triebhandeln“ und „Zweckhandeln“ aus. Beide sind Lebensäußerungen, und beide kommen beim Menschen vor, aber sie haben verschiedene Strukturen und wirken sich verschieden aus. Das *Triebhandeln* ist ein „gradliniger“, „zwei-gliedriger“ Kausalvorgang: physiologisch bedingte Energiespannungen (als Ursache) drängen auf Lösung

¹³⁰ G. Simmel 1987, S. 116 ff.

¹³¹ G. Simmel 1987, ebd. sowie S. 148 ff., 171 ff.

¹³² Die hier folgenden Zitate finden sich in der „Philosophie des Geldes“ (PhG), 1907, S. 197 ff. Simmels Ausführungen knüpfen offensichtlich an die Dialektik von „Mittel“ (Werkzeug) und „Zweck“ in Hegels „Wissenschaft der Logik“ (1812-16), 2. Teil, II, 3, an.

durch ein Tun (als Wirkung), mit dem der Trieb zeitweise endet. Das *Zweckhandeln* hingegen weist eine „dreigliedrige“ Kausalität auf. Zwischen die energetischen Spannungen und die lösende Aktion schiebt sich ein Drittes: die Antizipation eines erstrebten Erfolges, die dann gleichsam rückwirkend dessen kausale Realisierung steuert. Im ersten Fall fühlen wir uns „von hinten getrieben“, im zweiten „von vorn gezogen“. „Das Essen [...] aus Hunger gehört in die erste, das Essen [...] nur um des kulinarischen Genusses willen in die zweite Kategorie“ (S. 197). Diese Einschaltung eines Bildes vom „Zweck“ überlagert als eine „teleologische“ Komponente den Kausalprozeß und erlaubt das Festhalten eines Handlungszieles über viele Zwischenschritte, während deren die erstrebte Befriedigung hinausgeschoben werden muß.

Der Übergang vom Triebhandeln zum Zweckhandeln ermöglicht den Übergang des Menschen vom Naturwesen zum Kulturwesen. Die Fähigkeit zum Zweckhandeln ist die Voraussetzung auch für das Schaffen von *Technik*. Denn „der Zweck ist seinem Wesen nach an die Tatsache des Mittels gebunden“ (S. 200), und Technik ist für Simmel *Inbegriff von Mitteln*. Für ihre Ausbildung ist entscheidend, „daß wir mit vielgliedrigen Reihen von Mitteln mehr und wesentlichere Zwecke erreichen können als mit kurzen“ (S. 202). Die Technik entwickelt sich als Teilsystem der Kultur durch zunehmendes Einschalten von Mitteln in das menschliche Handeln. Dies bedeutet ein Durchlaufen immer differenzierterer „Umwege“, um projektierte Zwecke effektiver zu erreichen (S. 203). Neben direkten Umweghandlungen durch leibliche Organe fungieren eigens geschaffene Sachmittel, die „*Werkzeuge*“, als wichtigste vermittelnde Instanzen zwischen „Subjekten“ und ihren erstrebten „Objekten“. „Wer einen Samen in die Erde steckt, um später die Frucht des Gewächses zu genießen, statt sich mit der wild wachsenden zu begnügen, handelt teleologisch [...]; wenn aber bei dieser Gelegenheit Hacke und Spaten verwendet werden, so ist [...] das subjektiv bestimmte Moment [...] dem objektiven gegenüber verlängert“. „Das Werkzeug ist das potenzierte Mittel, denn seine Form und sein Dasein ist schon durch den Zweck bestimmt“ (S. 203): es wird entdeckt oder hergestellt, ‘um zu ...’. Das gilt für die einfachsten Geräte der Handverstärkung¹³³ ebenso wie für großtechnische Systeme der Industriekultur. - Diesen Mittel- und Umwegcharakter des Werkzeugs haben nach Simmel nicht nur „Sachen“, die den Wirkungsgrad der „materiellen Produktion“ erhöhen, sondern auch soziale Institutionen, rechtlich-staatliche Einrichtungen, kirchliche Kulte und, nicht zuletzt, das Geld (S. 204).

¹³³ Gelegentlich, so im Essay „Der Henkel“ (1911), greift Simmel auch die Organprojektionsthese auf, wie sie E. Kapp 1877 vertreten hatte. An dieser Deutung des Werkzeugs als „Verlängerung“ menschlicher Organe, bei der Simmel jedoch nicht stehenbleibt, ist die lebensphilosophische Basis seines Technikdenkens gut erkennbar: der Lebensprozeß greift „über den unmittelbaren Umfang des Leibes hinaus und bezieht das ‘Werkzeug’ in sich ein“ (G. Simmel 1987, S. 98 f.).

Simmel sieht einesteils die enorme Leistungssteigerung des Zweckhandelns durch die Entwicklung der Werkzeugtechnik. Er sieht aber auch, als Kehrseite, wie sich in der Technik der von ihm angenommene „Konflikt“ zwischen Leben und kulturellen Formen auswirkt. Vor allem *ein* Wesenszug der Werkzeugwelt lasse diese mit dem „strömenden“ Leben in Widerstreit geraten: der *Funktions-wechsel zwischen Mittel und Zweck*. Das Mittel (Werkzeug), ursprünglich geschaffen, um einen projektierten Zweck zu realisieren, kann seinerseits zum Zweck werden oder eigene Zwecke generieren. - Dies liegt *erstens* an der Eigenschaft des Werkzeugs, „über seine einzelne Anwendung hinaus zu beharren“ (S. 207). Diese *Dauerhaftigkeit*, einerseits ein Vorteil, der Werkzeuge (insbesondere solche aus festem, anorganischem Material) langfristig ‘zuhanden’ sein läßt, kann andererseits zur „Fessel“ werden. In den heutigen Wohlstandsgesellschaften kennen bereits die meisten Privathaushalte das Problem, daß noch brauchbare, aber tatsächlich nie mehr verwendete „Sachen“ aller Art sich im Lauf der Zeit platzraubend anhäufen. Aus der Geschichte großer technisch-gesellschaftlicher Systeme verweist Simmel auf die Beharrungstendenz „militärischer Organisationen“: ursprünglich zur Kriegsführung geschaffen, werden sie als angebliche Kriegsverhinderungsinstrumente auf Dauer gestellt und zum Selbstzweck (S. 207, 546 f.). Noch andere Ausmaße erreicht die Problematik, wenn riesige technische „Infrastrukturen“, wie diejenigen zur Elektrizitätserzeugung durch Atomenergie, wegen unbewältigter Nebenfolgen (Entsorgung, hohes Gefahrenpotential) ihre gesellschaftliche Akzeptanz verlieren und nur mit immensem Arbeits- und Kostenaufwand wieder beseitigt werden könnten beziehungsweise in „Endlagern“ über menschlich inkommensurable Zeiträume bewacht werden müßten.

Eine *zweite*, nur scheinbar entgegengesetzte Eigenschaft, die das „dialektische“ Mittel-Zweck-Verhältnis verschärft, ist die „*eigenlogische*“ *Entwicklung* ganzer technischer Systeme. Auf diese hat Simmel besonders in seinen späten Schriften aufmerksam gemacht und damit ein Problem bezeichnet, das in der Technikphilosophie und -soziologie der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts unter den Stichworten „*Sachzwang*“, „*Sachdominanz*“ und „*technologischer Determinismus*“ zentral werden sollte.¹³⁴ Schon in der „*Philosophie des Geldes*“ hatte Simmel sich von dem bekannten Satz Francis Bacons, daß wir die Natur beherrschen, indem wir ihr gehorchen,¹³⁵ distanziert, weil er nur oberflächlich richtig sei. In der Meinung, daß von den Naturgesetzen ein „*Zwang*“ ausgehe, den wir „besiegen“ müßten, stecke noch eine „*mythologische Denkweise*“, während doch „das natürliche Geschehen [...] ganz jenseits der Alternative von Freiheit und *Zwang*“ stehe und die Naturgesetze (als bloße „*Formeln für die allein möglichen Wirksamkeiten*“ von Stoffen und Energien) ihrerseits überhaupt nicht „wirken“.

¹³⁴ z.B. bei H. Freyer 1955, H. Schelsky 1961 und H. Linde 1972. Zur Sachzwangtheorie vgl. u.a. F. Rapp 1990, S. 179 ff.

¹³⁵ F. Bacon 1962, S. 96

Demgegenüber sieht Simmel mit der Entwicklung der technischen „Sachen“ zunehmend Zwänge im kulturellen Leben Platz greifen; er spricht geradezu von einem „Aufstand der Sachen“ (statt von einem „Aufstand der Massen“ [des Proletariats])¹³⁶. „Die Maschine, die den Menschen [...] die Sklavenarbeit an der Natur abnehmen sollte, [hat] sie zu Sklaven [...] an der Maschine selbst herabgedrückt.“ Doch nicht nur „Sklaven des Produktionsprozesses“ seien wir geworden, sondern über „tausend Gewöhnungen“ und „Bedürfnisse äußerlicher Art“ auch „Sklaven der Produkte“, sagt er im Einklang mit Marx und Nietzsche. Das führe zu einem „Übergewicht der Mittel über die Zwecke“; „relative“ Errungenschaften des technischen Fortschritts würden mit „absoluter Bedeutung“ aufgeladen. Zum Beispiel ließen die „Triumphe von Telegraphie und Telephonie“ übersehen, „daß es doch wohl auf den Wert dessen ankommt, *was* man mitzuteilen“ habe, und weit weniger auf die Schnelligkeit der Übermittlung (PhG, S. 548 ff.) - eine Ansicht, die inzwischen nur noch wenig Zustimmung finden dürfte.

Diesen Ansatz hat Simmel später nur noch ausgebaut,¹³⁷ aber nicht mehr grundlegend verändert. Sein Interesse gilt nunmehr vor allem den *psychosozialen Auswirkungen* der eigengesetzlichen Entwicklungstendenzen in der Technik und den anderen sich ausdifferenzierenden Kulturgebieten (Wirtschaft, Recht, Wissenschaften, Künste, usw.): Die „immanente Logik“ der kulturellen Subsysteme zwingt den individuellen Subjekten der Kultur eine Anpassung auf, die sie ihren tieferen „seelischen“ Zielen entfremde. - Auf dem Feld der Technik besteht, nach Simmel, die Sachlogik des Fortschritts darin, daß „die Reihe der Mittel für unsere Endzwecke [...] unablässig verlängert und verdichtet wird.“ Das steigert die Effektivität technischer Systeme, führt aber zu einer ebensolchen Verlängerung der menschlichen Handlungsketten, die zu ihrer Organisation, Bedienung und Verwaltung nötig sind. Die schließliche „Unabsehbarkeit der Zweck- und Mittelreihen“ für die Individuen hat zur Folge, daß „Mittelglieder für unser Bewußtsein zu Endzwecken“ und die eigentlichen Endzwecke der „seelischen“ Kultivierung „verdrängt“ werden (IG, S. 232 ff.).

Im Bereich der Produktion ist eine der sachlogischen Konsequenzen dieser Technikentwicklung ein Grad an *Arbeitsteilung* und eines entsprechenden, „vom Leben abgeschnürten *Spezialistentums*“, der dazu führt, daß in die Herstellung eines einzelnen Produkts die Leistungen von immer mehr arbeitenden Personen einfließen, die den Gesamtprozeß der Produktion, sowie die Teilarbeiten der anderen nicht überblicken. Der Produktionsprozeß läuft sachlogisch ab,

¹³⁶ Von dem, im Anschluß an Marx und Nietzsche, 1930 noch J. Ortega y Gasset sprechen sollte.

¹³⁷ Vor allem in den Essays „Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur“ (1911), „Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur“ (1918) und „Die Krisis der Kultur“ (1918). Sie werden im Folgenden nach der Essaysammlung G. Simmel, *Das individuelle Gesetz* (IG), 1987, zitiert.

„unbekümmert darum, ob ein Subjekt das darin investierte Quantum von Geist oder Leben zu seiner eigenen Förderung wieder herausentwickeln kann“ (IG, S. 138, 145). - Im Bereich des Konsums ruft der technische „Zwang“, geschaffene Einrichtungen voll zu nutzen und durch ergänzende Glieder zu komplettieren, Angebote zahlreicher Waren hervor, die „*künstliche* und, von der Kultur der Subjekte her gesehen, sinnlose *Bedürfnisse*“ wachrufen und das Leben „mit tausend Überflüssigkeiten“ überladen (IG, S. 141, 146; Hervorhebung von E.O.).

Als weitergehende Auswirkungen dieser Technisierungsfolgen beobachtet Simmel bereits zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts typische *Veränderungen menschlicher Wahrnehmungsweisen, Verhaltensmuster und Charakterzüge*. In seinem Essay „Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben“ (1903)¹³⁸ stellt er die „*Steigerung des Nervenlebens*“ der Individuen als die wichtigste psychovitale Wandlung heraus, die eine „großstädtische“ Existenz mit sich bringt. Die Ursache sieht er darin, daß die Individuen in den Metropolen sich unablässig gegen „Übermächte der Gesellschaft, des geschichtlich Ererbten, der äußerlichen Kultur und Technik“ zu behaupten haben - statt, wie in früheren Kulturzuständen, gegen die Übermacht der Natur (BuT, S. 227 f.). Während das kleinstädtische und das Landleben noch einem naturnäheren „langsameren, gewohnteren, gleichmäßiger fließenden Rhythmus“ folgen, fordert das Großstadtleben mit der technischen Durchorganisation seiner ungleich mannigfaltigeren gesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen die Anpassung an einen ununterbrochenen Wechsel von - häufig kontrastreichen, unerwarteten - Eindrücken.

In dieser starken *Beschleunigung* des Wahrnehmungs- und Reaktionstempos, zu deren Bewältigung ein viel höherer Bewußtheitsgrad nötig ist als im Landleben, sieht Simmel den Hauptgrund für weitere psychosoziale Veränderungen im Großstadtleben. Während die ländlichen Verhaltensweisen sich mehr vom „Gefühl“ und vom „Gemüt“ lenken lassen, läuft die Verarbeitung der großstädtischen Impressionen vorwiegend über den „Verstand“ als das „am wenigsten empfindliche [...] psychische Organ“. Daher der „*intellektualistische* Charakter des großstädtischen Seelenlebens“, ein Überwiegen von „Sachlichkeit“ und „Berechnung“ in den menschlichen Beziehungen, sowie die Einordnung aller Tätigkeiten und Geschäfte „in ein festes, übersubjektives Zeitschema“ (BuT, S. 228 ff.). - Eine Folge dieser großstädtischen Rastlosigkeit ist die Entstehung einer typischen seelischen Haltung: der „*Blasiertheit*“. Sie erwächst aus einer „Unfähigkeit, auf neue Reize mit der ihnen angemessenen Energie zu reagieren“ und besteht in einer „Abstumpfung gegen die Unterschiede der Dinge“ - einem

¹³⁸ Hier zitiert nach der Essaysammlung G. Simmel, *Brücke und Tür* (BuT), 1957, S. 227 ff. Mit den „Großstädten“ sind offenkundig nicht, wie in der später üblichen Definition, alle Städte mit mehr als 100000 Einwohnern gemeint, sondern Metropolen.

„subjektiven Reflex“ zugleich der „Geldwirtschaft“, in der sich alle qualitativen Unterschiede zu quantitativen einebnen (BuT, S. 232 f.).

Mit derartigen Beobachtungen erkennt Simmel bereits vor dem Siegeszug der Massenmedien Rundfunk und Fernsehen im modernen Lebensstil Symptome dessen, was in der späteren Technik- und Medienanthropologie „*Reiz- und Informationsüberflutung*“ genannt worden ist.¹³⁹ Schon damals erscheint Simmel die Menge des durch technische Medien und Kommunikationsstätten (Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, Bücher, Kino, Reklame, Warenhäuser, Ausstellungen) an die Großstädter herangetragenen kulturellen Angebots quantitativ überwältigend. Eine „Unzahl von Kulturelementen“ erheischt Aufmerksamkeit; es reiht sich „Buch an Buch, Erfindung an Erfindung, Kunstwerk an Kunstwerk“. Der Einzelne kann diese „formlose Unendlichkeit“ weder „innerlich assimilieren“, noch „einfach ablehnen“, da sie „potentiell in die Sphäre seiner kulturellen Entwicklung“ gehört. Diese „Überladung“ mit Eindrücken führt zum „fortwährenden ‘Angeregtsein’ des Kulturmenschen“, zum flüchtigen „Kennen oder Genießen“ von Dingen, die wegen mangelnder Verarbeitung im seelischen Haushalt letztlich nur „Ballast“ sind (IG, S. 144 ff., 233). Das Ganze der Kultur, das unser individuelles Dasein bereichern und steigern sollte, bleibt so dem Rezipienten auch qualitativ weithin fremd. „Der Mangel an Definitivem [...] treibt dazu, in immer neuen Anregungen, Sensationen, äußeren Aktivitäten eine momentane Befriedigung zu suchen“. Folgen sind: „Reisemanie“, „wilde Jagd der Konkurrenz“, „Treulosigkeit auf den Gebieten des Geschmacks, der Stile, der Gesinnungen, der Beziehungen“ (PhG, S. 551). So zeigt sich das Individuum dem „Überwuchern der objektiven Kultur [...] weniger und weniger gewachsen“. Es entsteht eine „Wachstumsdifferenz“ (BuT, S. 240): die ‘Kultur der Seele’ bleibt hinter der ‘Kultur der Sachen’ weit zurück (IG, S. 234). - Damit hat Simmel an einem zentralen Beispiel vorweg erkannt, was William F. Ogburn ab 1922 zur Theorie des „*cultural lag*“, des Zurückbleibens der Entwicklung bestimmter Kulturbereiche hinter anderen, ausgebaut hat.¹⁴⁰

Bemerkenswert ist schließlich ein ‘dialektischer’ Zug des metropolitanen Lebens, den Simmel gesehen hat: es fördere ebenso sehr eine Spielart des „*Individualismus*“ wie eine Haltung des „*Kosmopolitismus*“. - Starke Arbeitsteilung und Spezialisierung der Leistungen auf dem Angebotsmarkt, die einerseits eine ganzheitliche Entfaltung der Persönlichkeitsanlagen behindern, lassen andererseits Freiraum für eine „Ausbildung persönlicher Sonderart“ bis hin zu „Extra-vaganzen des Apartseins“ als Formen des „Sich-Heraushebens“ aus der Menge der Anderen, wie sie im beengenden Sozialgefüge von Dorf und Kleinstadt nicht möglich wären (BuT, S. 235 ff.). Dazu trägt auch die - dort unbekannte - Einstellung der „Reserviertheit“ bei, die im Umgang der vielen, einander

¹³⁹ Z.B. bei A. Gehlen 1961, S. 50, 63, 71

¹⁴⁰ W. F. Ogburn 1922

unbekannten „atomisierten“ Großstadtindividuen dominiert (BuT, S. 233 ff.). - Zugleich fördert die Erweiterung des Gesichtskreises durch dichte wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Beziehungen, die über regionale und nationale Grenzen ausgreifen, in den Metropolen eine „kosmopolitische“ Haltung, in der die vielen individualisierten Einzelnen zumindest partiell übereinstimmen (BuT, S. 237 f.).

Am Beispiel der skizzierten Gedanken Simmels lassen sich Möglichkeiten und Grenzen seiner lebensphilosophischen Technikdeutung ablesen. Der Grundansatz eines „Konflikts“ zwischen „strömendem“ Leben und stabilen Kulturformen, näher: zwischen einer Anlage zur kontinuierlichen seelischen Entwicklung in den Individuen und einer Beharrlichkeit, bzw. „Eigenlogik“ der „Sachen“, führt zweifellos eine Strecke weit zu fruchtbaren Analysegesichtspunkten. Anhand dieses Leitfadens hat Simmel sowohl Strukturmerkmale als auch problematische Erscheinungen und Auswirkungen der modernen Technikentwicklung entdeckt, die im Banne des Glaubens an einen unaufhaltsamen Kulturfortschritt zuvor wenig beachtet, zumindest nicht so konkret beschrieben worden waren: - den „Umweg“-Charakter technischer Verfahren und Instrumentarien als Grundlage ihrer Effizienz¹⁴¹ ; - den Funktionswechsel zwischen Mitteln und Zwecken; - die Zunahme von ‘Sachzwängen’ mit der Vergrößerung und Vernetzung technischer Systeme; - die Vervielfachung differenzierter Techniken und eines entsprechenden Spezialistentums in den Metropolen ; - die (grundsätzlich schon von Hegel und Marx erkannte, von Simmel aber konkreter beschriebene) inflatorische Erzeugung neuer Bedürfnisse; - die Steigerung des Lebens- und Wahrnehmungstempos, die Reiz- und Informationsüberflutung, überhaupt das Zurückbleiben der Seelenkultur hinter der Sachkultur („cultural lag“), die gleichzeitige Stärkung von Individualismus und Kosmopolitismus im metropolitanen Lebensstil.

Grenzen von Simmels Sicht werden erkennbar in seiner Verabsolutierung des Grundwiderstreits Leben - Form und der von ihm abgeleiteten Konflikte. Die Vorstellung, „das Leben“ sei gleichsam genuin formarm und erhalte seine Formungen vor allem durch ‘äußere’ Kräfte, ist so nicht haltbar. Daß Leben auf allen seinen Stufen aus sich selbst formenbildend und -auflösend ist, wurde von ihm unterschätzt, die Unausweichlichkeit („Tragödie“) und Determinationskraft der kulturellen „Sachlogiken“ („dämonische Vergewaltigung“ der Menschen)¹⁴² überschätzt. Er sah nicht genügend, daß in all diese „Sachlogiken“ menschliche Bewertungen und Entscheidungen eingehen, die grundsätzlich geändert werden können.¹⁴³ In der Analyse der Mittel-Zweck-Reihen konnte er sich nicht zu der (bereits von Hegel wahrgenommenen und später in der Systemtheorie

¹⁴¹ Die „Umweg“-These wurde später von H. Sachsse 1978 aufgegriffen.

¹⁴² So die Formulierung in G. Simmel 1918, S. 94. Eine ähnliche Überschätzung noch bei H. Schelsky 1961 im Gedanken eines „technologischen Determinismus“.

¹⁴³ Vgl. F. Rapp 1990, S. 179 ff.

aufgegriffenen)¹⁴⁴ Einsicht durchringen, diese Unterscheidung sei überhaupt relativ und die Einstufung von etwas als „Mittel“ oder als „Zweck“ abhängig von der je eingenommenen Beurteilungsperspektive zu einer Hierarchie von Unter- und Oberzielen. Er hielt am Gedanken absoluter „Endzwecke“ und ‘wahrer’ Bedürfnisse der Menschen fest und berücksichtigte zu wenig, daß unter generationenlang etablierten hochkulturellen Lebensumständen eine konkrete Unterscheidung, was sinnvolle und was „sinnlose“ Bedürfnisse sind, kaum noch möglich ist. Ein solcher Unterscheidungsversuch würde schon heute ganz anders ausfallen, als zu Simmels Lebzeiten. Trotz seiner treffenden Einsicht in die Förderung eines „Kosmopolitismus“ durch die Großstadtkultur hat Simmel noch nicht wahrgenommen, daß die moderne Technik selbst geeignet sei, zu einem bedeutenden Faktor kultureller Universalisierung zu werden. Und die ökologische Problematik, die sich als Folge der Hochtechnisierung mit Umweltbelastung und Ressourcenknappheit schon zu seiner Zeit abzeichnete (siehe Ludwig Klages), hat Simmel, obwohl er ein feines Sensorium für die geistige und künstlerische Erfassung von „Landschaften“ besaß,¹⁴⁵ ebenfalls nicht in sein Denken zur Krisis der Kultur einbezogen. Doch hat er mit seinen auf Technik bezogenen Einsichten späteren technikphilosophischen und technikkritischen Ansätzen zentrale Gedanken geliefert.

Max Scheler (1874-1928), ein Schüler des idealistischen Lebensphilosophen Rudolf Eucken, schloß sich nach der Jahrhundertwende dem frühen phänomenologischen Ansatz Edmund Husserls an, der die Philosophie aus erkenntnistheoretisch verengten Fragestellungen zu einer methodischen Wesenserfassung der „Sachen selbst“ öffnen wollte. Sein wandlungsreiches Werk, das bei seinen lebensphilosophischen Grundlagen nicht stehenblieb, machte Scheler als geistig beweglichsten und spekulativ ausgreifendsten Vertreter der phänomenologischen Schule auch einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit bekannt. Vor allem die anthropologischen und wissenssoziologischen Schriften seiner Spätphase enthalten Komponenten einer eigenständigen kulturellen Ortsbestimmung der Technik und der positiven Wissenschaften. Am vollständigsten finden sich diese Komponenten in der Abhandlung „Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens“ (1924)¹⁴⁶, die den grundlegenden Teil seines Buchs „Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft“ (1926) bildet. Schelers kompakte, materialreiche, aber wenig systematische Ausführungen speziell zur Technik werden im Folgenden in fünf thesenhaften Abschnitten zusammengefaßt.

Scheler geht von dem - aus seiner *Geist-Drang-Metaphysik* hergeleiteten - „Grundgesetz“ aus, daß stets „geistig-ideenhafte und triebhaft-reale

¹⁴⁴ Z.B. bei G. Ropohl 1979, S. 115 ff.

¹⁴⁵ Siehe z.B. seinen Essay „Philosophie der Landschaft“ (1913) in BuT, S. 141 ff.

¹⁴⁶ Hier zitiert (als PSW) nach der Ausgabe in den Gesammelten Werken, Bd. 8: M. Scheler 1960

Determinationsfaktoren“, kurz „Idealfaktoren“ und „Realfaktoren“, in einem jeweils epochenspezifischen „Zusammenspiel“ das geschichtlich-gesellschaftliche Leben der Menschen bestimmen (PSW, S. 11). Damit setzt er sich vom marxistischen Historischen Materialismus (Dominanz der Realfaktoren) ebenso ab, wie vom Hegelschen historischen Idealismus (Dominanz der Idealfaktoren). Allerdings nimmt Scheler an, daß der „Geist“, Inbegriff der Idealfaktoren, keinerlei eigene Realisationskraft hat. Vom Geist her wird nur das mögliche Sosein von Kultur-Inhalten (Religion, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Kunst, Recht, Technik, usw.) entworfen, nicht aber deren wirkliches Dasein gesetzt. Erst „wo sich ‘Ideen’ [...] mit Interessen, Trieben [...] oder ‘Tendenzen’ vereinen, gewinnen sie indirekt Macht“. Sie werden durch vorbildhafte „freie Taten“ einer „kleinen Zahl“ von Pionieren verwirklicht und über die Nachahmung durch eine „große Zahl“ verbreitet (S. 21).

Realfaktoren sind für Scheler Motivationskräfte, die ursprünglich aus drei menschlichen Haupttrieben (Nahrungs-, Geschlechts- und Machttrieb) gespeist werden. Die Befriedigung und Kanalisierung dieser Triebe wird kulturell ausgestaltet in den sich differenzierenden Systemen der Wirtschaft, der Fortpflanzungs-/Abstammungsinstitutionen und der Herrschaft. Ihnen sei eine letztlich „sinnblinde“ Entwicklungskausalität eigen, gegenüber der dem Geist nur eine „hemmende oder enthemmende“, „verzögernde“ oder „beschleunigende“ Funktion zukomme (S. 22 f.). Dabei gebe es in „relativ geschlossenen Kulturprozessen“ eine *typische Folgeordnung* in der Dominanz der Realfaktoren: Auf (a) eine Periode dominanter Abstammungsverhältnisse in archaischen Kulturen auf der Basis von Geschlechterverbänden folgt (b) eine Periode der Dominanz politischer Herrschaftsverhältnisse, vorwiegend in Hochkulturen mit Staatsinstitutionen, und (c) eine Periode dominanter Wirtschaftsverhältnisse, die im Abendland mit dem Beginn des Hochkapitalismus einsetze (eine Periode, die von Karl Marx „fälschlich auf die ganze Universalgeschichte verallgemeinert“ worden sei) (S. 44 ff.).

Bezüglich der *Idealfaktoren* nimmt Scheler einen geschichtlichen Prozeß der Ausdifferenzierung relativ eigenständiger Sektoren an: Am Anfang stehen gruppenspezifische „*relativ natürliche Weltanschauungen*“, die auf „mythischem Denken und Schauen“ beruhen und mit einer „*magischen Technik*“ zur Beherrschung von Naturmächten verbunden sind (S. 60 ff., 133 ff.). - Aus ihnen bilden sich parallel drei Typen „*relativ künstlicher*“ *Weltsichten* heraus, denen drei Techniktypen entsprechen: (a) ein „Heils- oder Erlösungswissen“ (in Religionen und mystischen Strömungen), verbunden mit religiös-kultischen *Ausdrucks-, Darstellungs- und Selbstbeherrschungstechniken*, (b) ein „Bildungswissen“ (in Metaphysiken und Wesenslehren), verbunden mit verschiedenen *künstlerischen Techniken*, und (c) ein „Leistungs- oder Herrschaftswissen“ in den positiven Wissenschaften und der Mathematik, verbunden mit der *Naturbeherrschungstechnik* durch Werkzeuge, Maschinen usw., auf die der

Technikbegriff oft eingeschränkt wird (S. 29 f.). Zu jedem dieser Wissens- und Techniktypen gehören bestimmte soziale Kooperationsformen, Fachsprachen, Terminologien und Gruppenideologien (von Klassen, Berufen usw.). - Scheler sieht die Entwicklung der „relativ künstlichen“ Weltansichten als einen Prozeß *paralleler Ausdifferenzierung* von Wissens- und Technikformen an, nicht aber als einen linearen Fortschritt von einer Funktion zur anderen, etwa im Sinne des Dreistadiengesetzes von Auguste Comte, das eine Folgeordnung von theologischer, metaphysischer und positiv-wissenschaftlicher Weltansicht derart annahm, daß mit Erreichen des jeweils 'höheren' Stadiums die 'niederen' Stadien als abgetan galten (S. 10).

Von diesem gedanklichen Rahmen aus, gelangt Scheler zu spezielleren technikphilosophischen Aussagen.

1. Zur Trieb- und Motivationsbasis der Technik

„Ursprünglich zweckfreie Konstruktions-, Spiel-, Bastel- und Experimentiertriebe“ sind die Wurzel 'aller Arten von Technik' wie auch „aller positiven Wissenschaften“ (S. 66). Diese Antriebe lassen sich zurückverfolgen bis auf das Lernverhalten gemäß Versuch und Irrtumskorrektur bei höheren Wirbeltieren, das instinktive Verhaltensregulierungen überformt und damit eine erste Form „praktisch-technischer Intelligenz“ bildet. Inhaltlich äußern sich diese Antriebe in einer erhöhten Aufmerksamkeit auf „Konstantes und Regelmäßiges“, auf „sinneinheitliche“, z.B. symmetrische, Gestalten in Raum und Zeit. Diese Selektionsform bewährt sich in der Fähigkeit, Ereignisse vorherzusehen und vorauszuberechnen. Indem sich das Berechenbare als das Kontrollier- und Beherrschbare erweist, verbindet sich mit jenen Antrieben schon früh ein Macht- und Beherrschungsmotiv im Verhalten zu den Umweltgegebenheiten (S. 67 f.): „Wissen ist Macht“ (Francis Bacon).

2. Zur Beziehung von neuzeitlicher Technik und positiver Wissenschaft

Die neuzeitliche Technik ist nicht „nachträgliche 'Anwendung' einer rein theoretisch-kontemplativen Wissenschaft“, sondern „Produktionstechnik“ und „positive Wissenschaft“, sie sind beide fundiert durch die gleiche Triebbasis sowie durch ein entsprechendes Wertethos, wie es in Europa mit dem „aufstrebenden Stadtbürgertum“ zur Ausprägung gelangte. Diese Einstellung ist teils direkt auf „systematische Naturbeherrschung“ gerichtet, teils auf Erwerb eines Wissens, mittels dessen naturhafte und seelische Prozesse prinzipiell als „beherrschbar und darum lenkbar gedacht werden können“ (S. 112). Sie ersetzt die „auf ein teleologisches Formenreich“ von Qualitäten zielende „Begriffspyramide“ der Scholastik durch ein „Suchen nach quantitativ bestimmten gesetzlichen Relationen der Erscheinungen“: Naturgesetzen (S. 130). - Scheler unterscheidet ausdrücklich diese „hinter dem Rücken des Bewußtseins“ der Wissenschaftler sich auswirkende

Wertungs- und Denkstruktur des bürgerlichen Menschentyps von den vielfältig wechselnden „Motivationen und subjektiven Absichten“ der forschenden Individuen (S. 93, 113).

3. Zum Verhältnis von moderner Technik und Wirtschaft

Nicht die Bedürfnisse und Produktionsverhältnisse determinieren einseitig den Fortgang von Technik und positiver Wissenschaft (wie die ökonomische Geschichtsauffassung annahm), sondern die mit dem „Zeitalter der Erfindungen und Entdeckungen“ aufbrechende technologisch-wissenschaftliche Denkhaltung entdeckt zugleich mit Naturgesetzmäßigkeiten auch mögliche technische Aufgaben und Lösungen. Dadurch werden neue wirtschaftliche Bedürfnisse erst geweckt und industrielle Produktionsverfahren angeregt. Kapitalistische Wirtschaft und positive Wissenschaft/Technik weisen aber eine analoge Dynamik auf: dem „Willen zu grenzenlosem Erwerben“ in der Wirtschaft entspricht ein „Wille zu ‘Methoden’“, d.h. zum unbegrenzten methodischen Hervorbringen von Erkenntnissen, in den Wissenschaften. Beide produzieren ihre Waren, bzw. Wissensgüter grundsätzlich unbeschränkt „auf Vorrat“, und ein gleicher „Konkurrenzgeist“ wie zwischen Unternehmern herrscht auch zwischen Wissenschaftlern, bzw. zwischen Technikern, wofür z.B. ihr „Forschungsehrgeiz“ und ihr Bestehen auf „geistigem Eigentum“ charakteristisch sind (S. 127 ff.).

4. „Äußere“ und „innere“ Technik

Die abendländische Kultur der Neuzeit hat eine vorwiegend auf Beherrschung der „äußeren“ Natur gerichtete positive Wissenschaft und Technik hochentwickelt, im Vergleich zu der die Ausbildung einer „Seelentechnik“ (trotz Ausnahmen wie bei Ignatius von Loyola) zurückblieb. - Die asiatischen Kulturen haben demgegenüber auf dem Boden einer vorwiegend das Heils- und Bildungswissen pflegenden Einstellung ein großes Spektrum von Seelen- und Vitaltechniken zur Beherrschung der „inneren“ Natur entwickelt, während die Entfaltung der „äußeren“ Techniken zurückblieb. Das hier zugrundeliegende Prinzip der Selbstbeherrschung dient teils der Ausschaltung des Realitätsmoments der Gegenstände mit dem Ziel, eine „reine Contemplatio“ zu erreichen, teils der Erlangung einer Haltung der Leidüberwindung durch „innere Unterbindung des ‘Leidens an’ den Übeln“ (wie im Buddhismus). - Beide Typen von Technik schließen sich nicht aus, sondern ergänzen einander (S. 95 ff., 135 ff.).

5. Ausblick auf ein „Weltalter des Ausgleichs“

In dem Aufsatz „Der Mensch im Weltalter des Ausgleichs“ (1927)¹⁴⁷ hat Scheler eine mit diesem Stichwort benannte programmatische Zukunftsperspektive für wichtige Kulturbereiche skizziert. Scheler hält nach der Katastrophe des Ersten Weltkriegs die Förderung eines „Ausgleichs“ zwischen Antagonismen und Partikularismen, die die Menschheit in ihrer bisherigen Geschichte immer wieder entzweit haben, für eine drängende politische und kulturelle Aufgabe. Dieser *Ausgleich*, der keine Einebnung aller menschheitlichen Unterschiede bedeuten, sondern eine Steigerung der (individuellen und kollektiven) „geistigen“ Differenzen gestatten soll, ist einerseits ein „Ideal“, das sich nur durch „freie Selbstgestaltung“, aber nicht automatisch verwirklichen kann. Andererseits liest Scheler Indizien dafür, daß die Entwicklung zu einer solchen „universalisierenden Kräfteentspannung“ schon begonnen habe, an vielen Symptomen seiner Gegenwart ab. Sie bedürfe allerdings einer geistig-willentlichen Lenkung, damit die großen, mit ihr verbundenen Anforderungen sich zum „Heile der Menschheit“ und „mit einem Minimum von Zerstörung, Explosion, Blut und Tränen“ vollziehen (MWA, S. 150 ff.). - Im einzelnen behandelt Scheler als „langsam“ sich vollziehende Ausgleichsprozesse unter anderem: den Ausgleich der naturalen Rassenunterschiede durch Mischung in Richtung auf „eine Menschheit“, - der Mentalitätsunterschiede zwischen den großen Kulturen (bei Erhaltung ihrer geistigen „Sinn- und Wertgehalte“), - der Klassengegensätze zwischen „Ober- und Unterklassen“ in Bezug auf körperliche und geistige Arbeit, auf soziale Lage und ‘typische’ Denkweisen (Ideologien), - der Wirtschaftsformen von Kapitalismus und Sozialismus, - der Beiträge der einzelnen Nationen zur menschlichen Gesamtkultur, - der nationalen Abgrenzungen im Wirtschaftsleben (bei einem „Rückzug“ des souveränen Nationalstaats überhaupt), - von einseitigen (z.B. intellektualistischen und vitalistischen) Menschenbildern, - von ‘typisch’ männlicher und weiblicher Seelenhaltung, - von ‘typischen’ Orientierungen der Jugend und des Alters. - Alle diese Bewegungen setzen als Grundlage den internationalen „zivilisatorisch-technischen“ *Ausgleich*“ (in „positiver Wissenschaft, Technik, Staats- und Verwaltungsformen, Rechtsregeln“ usw.) voraus, der dank des „Welthandels“ weit rascher vor sich geht und die langsameren Prozesse mit seinem kumulativen Fortschritt fördert (MWA, S. 152 ff.).

Zu der anvisierten Synthese zwischen den Kulturen Europas und Asiens (Indien, China, Japan, mit dem Mittelglied der islamischen Welt) gehört für Scheler auch die *gleichgewichtige Ausbildung von „äußerer“ und „innerer“ Technik* und der mit ihnen verbundenen „Ideen vom Menschen“ in Ost und West (MWA, S. 159 ff.). Das bisherige Ungleichgewicht zwischen diesen Orientierungen in beiden Kulturkreisen stelle die Menschheit vor die Aufgabe einer „Neuverteilung der Wissenskultur und der technischen Kultur“. Denn „der abendländische, äußere Naturtechnizismus und sein Wissensorrelat [...] drohen den Menschen in einem

¹⁴⁷ In: M. Scheler, Ges. Werke, Bd. 9, 1976, S. 145-170 (zitiert als MWA)

Maße in den Mechanismus eben der Sachen, die es zu beherrschen gilt, hineinzuverwickeln, daß dieser Prozeß ohne das Gegengewicht [...] entgegengesetzt gerichteter Wissens- und Machtprinzipien [...] nur im sicheren Untergang der abendländischen Welt enden kann. Wir müssen [...] die beiden großen Prinzipien aller 'möglichen' Technik überhaupt und der ihnen korrelierten Wissensformen gleichzeitig und je abwechselnd in systematische Tätigkeit setzen, um eine sinnvolle Balance des Menschentums wiederzuerreichen“ (PSW, S. 140).

Schellers kulturphilosophische Ortsbestimmung des Technik gehört zu den perspektivenreichsten seiner Zeit. Als einer der ersten hat er die ethnologisch erforschten magisch-rituellen Komponenten archaischer Technik in Beziehung zur Entwicklung der profanen Werkzeug- und Maschinenteknik gesetzt. Seine Zurückführung dieser profanen Technik auf einen ursprünglich zweckfreien, erst sekundär sich als zweckmäßig erweisenden Basteltrieb nimmt einleuchtende Hypothesen von Arnold Gehlen und Claude Lévi-Strauss vorweg. Sein Gedanke einer parallelen Ausdifferenzierung von Wissens- und Technikformen kommt dem tatsächlichen Kulturprozeß wohl näher als einsinnige Fortschrittsschemata. Nachhaltig gewirkt hat ferner seine These, daß der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft, unabhängig von der mit ihr sich verbindenden Technik, eine Denk- und Werthaltung zugrundeliege, die sie zum Beherrschungswissen prädestiniert (Varianten finden sich u.a. beim späten Husserl, bei Heidegger und bei Habermas). Auch die Annahme einer Parallelität von kapitalistischer Wirtschaftsdynamik und moderner Technikentwicklung scheint fruchtbarer als die Behauptung einer einseitigen Abhängigkeit der einen von der anderen. Und sein - angesichts der immer noch kriegerisch explodierenden Regionalegoismen - vernünftiges Zukunftsleitbild einer ausgleichenden Synthese von spaltenden soziokulturellen Tendenzen in der Menschheit bleibt auch heute eine zentrale, längst nicht bewältigte Aufgabe.

Fragwürdig erscheint bei Scheler - neben voreilig unterstellten geschichtlichen Gesetzmäßigkeiten - die Art, wie er seinen Drang-Geist-Dualismus auf empirische Befunde anwendet. So lassen sich in Kulturprozessen „Realfaktoren“ und „Idealfaktoren“ kaum so scharf voneinander trennen, wie er es annimmt; und die naturalistische Entwicklungslogik der menschlichen Grundtriebe hat, als Motor der zunehmend komplexer werdenden zivilisatorischen Prozesse verstanden, wenig Erklärungskraft. Zudem mangelt es dem Anthropozentriker Scheler an Sinn für die ökologischen Auswirkungen der technischen Kultur. Doch hat er das Verdienst, relativ früh den Blick für weiträumige Verflechtungen der Technik mit anderen Dimensionen des Kulturprozesses geschärft und ihr eine wichtige Rolle in seiner realistischen Zukunftsvision zuerkannt zu haben.

Die oben in einigen Beispielen vorgestellten lebensphilosophischen Ortsbestimmungen der Technik zeichnen sich durch eine erstaunliche Bandbreite der Gesichtspunkte aus. Der Blickwinkel, unter dem hier die Technik wahrgenommen wird, ist deutlich weiter als im Rahmen der (zu Beginn erwähnten)

anderen metaphysischen Orientierungen. Die „großen Erzählungen“, die unter deren Leitung entworfen wurden, sind durch ihre Einseitigkeit von beschränktem Aufschlußwert: so die Erzählung vom unbegrenzten und unaufhaltsamen Fortschritt der technischen Naturbeherrschung (im materialistisch-utilitaristischen Naturalismus), so die Erzählung von einer durch vorgegebene ewige Ideen im Maß gehaltenen technischen Erfindungskraft (im objektiven Idealismus), so die Erzählung von der Geschichte der Klassenkämpfe, die in eine auf Hoch-technik beruhende klassenlose Endgesellschaft einmünden soll, oder die Erzählung vom Naturwesen Mensch, das seine „Mängel“ durch technische Organergänzungen zur „Entlastung“ im Überlebenskampf kompensiert (im humanistischen Naturalismus).

Demgegenüber gestattet es der biozentrische Blickwinkel, die Technik als ein schon vormenschlich angelegtes und in der menschlichen Kultur sich allmählich verselbständigendes Instrumentarium des Lebens in ihrer *Ambivalenz* zu sehen: als ein Instrumentarium von Verfahren und Artefakten, das daran zu messen ist, inwieweit es nicht nur dem menschlichen, sondern dem Leben überhaupt förderlich ist. Im Blick auf den umfassenden Zusammenhang der Biosphäre konnten Lebensphilosophen erkennen, daß für den technisch-zivilisatorischen Fortschritt ein Preis im außertechnischen Leben zu zahlen ist. Daher ist bei den Lebensphilosophen kein planer Fortschrittsglaube zu finden, daher stehen sie dem technizistisch gedachten „Projekt der Moderne“ kritisch bis skeptisch gegenüber. Allerdings in abgestuftem Maße: von der strikt konservativen, technikfeindlichen Einstellung eines Ludwig Klages über die ambivalenten Positionen von Simmel und Ziegler, über das Postulat eines religiösen Einstellungswandels bei Bergson und Berdjajew bis zu Schelers politisch-kultureller Aufgabenstellung, ein Weltalter des Ausgleichs herbeizuführen, das auf eine hochentwickelte äußere und innere Technik gegründet sein soll.

Unterschiede zeigen sich in der Einschätzung der Rolle des *Christentums* für die Lenkung der technischen Entwicklung und die Bewältigung ihrer Auswirkungen in Natur und Kultur. Das Spektrum reicht von der völligen Verurteilung der (angeblich) christlichen Haltung zur Natur bei Klages bis zu einer christlichen Mystik der Tat als Pendant zur notwendigen Hochtechnik bei Bergson, sowie zu einer innerweltlichen christlichen Eschatologie, die auf einer geistig-religiösen Beherrschung der Technik basiert, bei Berdjajew. Aus heutiger Sicht erscheint es zweifelhaft, ob das Christentum zum gemeinsamen Nenner einer menscheitsweiten, befriedeten und regional ausgewogenen Technokultur zu werden vermag. Die verschiedenen religiösen Weltansichten und kirchlichen Organisationen wirken in ihrer (bis auf kleine Subzirkel und Sekten) meist ganz unmystischen Gegenwartsverfassung eher polarisierend, ja, in Verbindung mit politischen Ideologien, mancherorts fördernd für einen kompromißunfähigen Fundamentalismus und Fanatismus (wie ihn Bergson und Berdjajew nicht entfernt im Sinne hatten).

Realistischer erscheint die von Scheler entworfene *politisch-kulturelle Zukunftsaufgabe* eines Ausgleichs von bestimmten entzweierenden Haupttendenzen der bisherigen Menschheitsgeschichte. Sie bezieht zwar grundsätzlich auch die metaphysisch-religiösen Sinnorientierungen in den geforderten Prozeß ein, setzt aber nicht alles auf die Karte einer primären religiösen (christlichen) Umkehr. Ähnlich wie Simmel - mit seinem Ausblick auf einen von der metropolitanen Kultur geförderten „Kosmopolitismus“ - und auch wie Bergson und Berdjajew mit ihren technikbejahenden Visionen hat Scheler geahnt, daß die moderne Technik und eine „westlich“ geprägte zivilisatorische Ausstattung kulturelle Universalisierungsinstrumente ersten Ranges werden würden. Angesichts dessen, daß sich heute die technischen Infrastrukturen der Metropolen aller Erdteile frappant angleichen und, bei allen sonstigen kulturellen Diskrepanzen, nur noch im Grad der Entwicklung unterscheiden, ist klar: die („westliche“) Hochtechnik ist - im Unterschied zur Religion - bereits weithin ein gemeinsamer Nenner für sämtliche Kulturen geworden, und die Akzeptanz der meisten ihrer Sektoren ist schon heute in aller Welt sehr hoch. Angesichts dieses Maßes an Akzeptanz (die absurderweise, zumindest in der männlichen Hälfte der Menschheit, auch einer hochgeputzten lebensfeindlichen Waffentechnik gilt) erscheinen alle generellen fundamentalistischen Ablehnungen „westlicher“ Kultur inkonsequent oder verlogen. Erst sekundär wird die Hochtechnik, wo sie weit ausgebaut ist und deutlicher erkennbar wird, daß sie nicht nur Probleme löst, sondern auch erhebliche Probleme schafft, durch „grüne“ Bewegungen in ihren natur- und (in der Folge) menschengefährdenden Auswirkungen in Frage gestellt.

Die Aufgabe einer Weltkultur des Ausgleichs, getragen von einer Technik, die möglichst allen Menschen ein menschenwürdiges Leben erlauben und doch die Tragfähigkeit der irdischen Biosphäre nicht überlasten soll - diese gegenwärtig drängend aktuelle Doppelzielsetzung haben die Lebensphilosophen in unterschiedlicher Deutlichkeit gesehen. So sehr diese Aufgabenstellung fast eine Quadratur des Zirkels bedeutet, sie ist doch ein Zukunftsentwurf, zu dessen Verwirklichung es sich lohnt, alle Kräfte einzusetzen. In einer Welt des Ausgleichs, wie sie Scheler vorschwebte, muß die regionale Vielfalt kultureller Lebensstile, die die Erde als Wohnstätte von Menschen, Tieren und Pflanzen so abwechslungsreich und farbig macht, nicht verschwinden, sondern kann durchaus in vielen Bereichen (in Sitten und Gebräuchen, Ethosformen, Künsten, Architektur, Landschaftsgestaltung, religiösen und säkularen Sinnsystemen, usw.) weitergepflegt werden.

Man möchte hoffen, daß eine Vision dieser Art die Motivation eines veränderungswilligen und zuversichtlichen Teils der Weltjugend anzuspornen vermag. Denn die Alternative: die pessimistische Kassandraprognose eines

unvermeidlichen „Zusammenpralls der Kulturen“¹⁴⁸, die ganz von den (gegenwärtig noch starken) retardierenden, partikularistischen Kräften aller Kulturkreise ausgeht, kann den Willen, einen Beitrag zur globalen Umorientierung zu leisten, nur lähmen.

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¹⁴⁸ Vgl. S. P. Huntington 1992

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Nico Stehr

Theories of the Information Age

In some way or other, any knowledge, and especially all common knowledge of identical objects, determines in many ways the specification (*Sosein*) of society. But all knowledge is ultimately also conversely determined by the society and its structure.

Max Scheler, [1924] 1990:17

It is virtually impossible to transcend the contest and the conflation of the terms information and knowledge in much of the discussion about the information age. However, in the context of an examination of some of the important theories of the information age, it is unavoidable to take up the contentious question of the meaning as well as the relation between knowledge and information. The main puzzle at this juncture of the theoretical discourse on the role of knowledge and information in social action is whether it is even possible and sensible to distinguish between them. The conceptual distinction between information and knowledge, is in any case at best relative, appears to be most difficult, if not impossible to sustain in the light of the fact that these notions are often employed as virtual equivalents.

Many dictionaries simply define the information as a certain kind of knowledge. A similar symmetry between information and knowledge is evident if one defines the information as “knowledge reduced and converted into messages that can be easily communicated among decision agents” (Dasgupta and David, 1994: 493). In other definitions of the information and knowledge, the information is simply conceptualized as a subspecies, as an element or the raw material of a number of knowledge forms. For example, the information is a codified knowledge as well as an indirect knowledge (see Borgmann, 1999: 49), or the knowledge is defined as the cumulative stock of information (Burton-Jones, 1999: 5); similarly, the knowledge in general is seen to extend to “tacit knowledge” (cf. Polanyi, 1967: 204-206) and other forms of knowledge (Dosi, 1996: 84). In short, the outcome of many efforts to define knowledge and information appears always to lead to the same result: knowledge and information become indistinguishable.

I plan to present my argument covering theories of the information age in a number of steps. First, I will describe some of the intellectual precursors that give rise to the notion that we are living in an information or knowledge age. Second, I will enumerate some of the perspectives that lead to the idea of modern societies as knowledge or information societies. Third, the usage of the term knowledge as a

capacity for action is explicated in greater detail. Forth, in the core sections of the chapter, I deal with the theory of the knowledge and the information society as well as some of its competitors such as the network society. I will present the argument that advanced societies are best conceptualized as knowledge societies, last but not least because economic growth, social change generally but also the nature of social conflicts are increasingly generated by the knowledge (Stehr, 2001; 2002). That is, knowledge does not merely open up the secrets of nature and society but is the becoming of a world.

The origins of the information/knowledge age

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), in *The Spirit of the Age*, published in 1831 after his return to England from France, where he had encountered and taken in the philosophy of history in the political thinking of the St.-Simonians and of the early Comte, affirms his conviction that the progress is possible in the society as the result of the intellectual accomplishments of his own age. But the progress and the improvement of social conditions are not, Mill argues, the outcome of an “increase in wisdom” or of the collective accomplishments of the science. They are rather linked to the general diffusion of the knowledge throughout the society.

Men may not reason, better, concerning the great questions in which the human nature is interested, but they reason more. Large subjects are discussed more, and longer, and by more minds. The discussion penetrated deeper into the society; and if greater numbers than before attained the higher degrees of intelligence, fewer grovel in that state of abject stupidity, which can only co-exist with utter apathy and sluggishness (Mill [1831] 1997 : 8).

Mill’s observations in the mid-nineteenth century, a period he regarded as an age of profound moral and political transition, and in particular his expectation that such beneficial consequences for the society as the increased individual choice for a greater number of people (and hence emancipation from “custom“) will be the result of a broader diffusion of knowledge and education but the scientific knowledge, in the narrow sense of the term, does not necessarily resonate with the idea of the modern society as a *knowledge society*.

By the same token, the notion that we have begun to live in an *information age* often refers to the same historical period, yet the notion of the information age emphasizes the growing presence of certain technical devices and tools in the society, which allow the much more rapid communication of the information and knowledge than it was the case in previous periods. Thus, in a recent exhibition devoted to the “Information Age” in the Smithsonian National Museum of American History, it is argued that the modern information age began with Samuel Morse's invention of the telegraph transmitter and receiver in 1837. It was the first

instrument to transform the information into an electrical form and to transmit it reliably over long distances (see also Darnton, 2000).

The promise of more knowledge and information cannot really be separated either from its counter image, for example from the fears and the darkness associated with a lack of knowledge or, from the allegedly mistaken or false use of knowledge even when it is available in abundance. The general point here is that much is gained from an analytical point of view that confronts a particular perspective with its opposite, its negation or competitor. Such a conscious confrontation also serves as useful reminder, that the knowledge tends to be contestable and is developed in response to contenders, that after a time may only be implicitly accessible, especially as a certain form of knowledge acquires authority and power. The mixture of fears and warnings with blessings and compliments exhibits a trait of virtually all forms of knowledge, namely its controversial nature and the fact that it was, and is, developed in opposition to other forms of knowing. The exclusion of other means and purposes is inevitable. In the case of the knowledge, the contestable context is provided, on the one hand, by arguments that question or promote the knowledge *per se* and, on the other hand, by opinions that at times differ sharply on the uses to which the knowledge ought to be put. In the contemporary society, doubts about the social consequences of the knowledge that are bound to give rise to a new field of political activity, namely the knowledge politics concerning the regulation and control of the new knowledge and technical artifacts (Stehr, 2004).

Knowledge society predecessors

In retrospect, some *ancient societies* may be described as knowledge societies. Ancient Israel, for example, was founded upon its law-like Torah-knowledge. And in the ancient Egypt, religious, astronomical and agrarian knowledge served as the organizing principle and the basis of authority. More recently, Marxist theories of society have assigned decisive importance to the (cultural) forces or means of production for societal development since “man’s understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body ... appears as the great foundation-stone of production and wealth’, so that the general knowledge becomes a direct force of production” (Marx, [1939-1941] 1973 : 705). Max Weber’s seminal inquiry into the unique features of the Western civilization stresses the pervasive use of reason to secure the methodical efficiency of the social action. The source of the rational action and, therefore of the rationalization, is located in particular intellectual devices.

The theory of the *industrial society*, as developed by Raymond Aron ([1962] 1967), which encompasses both socialist and capitalist forms of economic organization as a single social reality of industrial civilization, accentuates first and foremost the extent to which the science and the technology shape the social

organization of productive activities. Even more recent theories of the post-industrial society, in particular those of Daniel Bell, have elevated the theoretical knowledge to an axial principle of the society. That the “rational knowledge”, fabricated in one system, apparently travels with great ease and without loss across the boundaries of the social systems, for instance, from the science into the economy or the state institutions, is hardly ever questioned.

The first to employ a related term, “knowledgeable society”, appears to have been Robert E. Lane (1966:650). Lane's conception of a knowledgeable society, however, is closely tied to a particular theory of science and it reflects the excessive optimism of the 1950s and the early 1960's that the (social) science will help to bring about a society, in which the common sense has been replaced in major social institutions by the scientific reasoning. Lane argues that the members of such a knowledgeable society will be guided in their conduct, if not always consciously, by the standards of a "veridical truth".

In the late 1960s, Peter Drucker, in *The Age of Discontinuity* (1969), refers to the “knowledge society”. Drucker regards the knowledge as central to the modern society and as the foundation of its economy and of the social action. Daniel Bell also uses this term in the context of his discussion of the emergence of the *post-industrial society*, a designation he himself prefers. Bell at times uses the knowledge society interchangeably with the "post-industrial society", since he regards the knowledge as a “fundamental resource” of the post-industrial society.

The theory of the post-industrial society recognizes a particular central principle, viewed as a kind of dominant logic, which allows the observer to impose a specific conceptual order on vast societal developments of the (Western) modern society. Bell describes his theory as concerned primarily with changes in the social framework of the "society", that is, its *social structure* that analytically along with the *politics and the culture* comprises the society. The social structure of a society refers, more specifically, to its "economy, technology and the occupational system" (Bell, 1973 : 12) and the structure of the social roles. The kind of changes in the social structure, which Bell attempts to chart primarily, are those induced by the "axial principle" of his theory of the society, namely "the centrality of the theoretical knowledge” (Bell, 1973 : 14). The theoretical knowledge has a dual function. It is both source of innovation and a foundation for the politics formation in the society. For Bell, the axial principle is likened to a "director of social change" in and for the post-industrial society. The post-industrial society is no longer organized around the co-ordination of individuals and machines for the production of commodities, but around the knowledge. It is a game between persons. The post-industrial society witnesses a shift from the production of commodities to the tertiary or service sector and a corresponding decline in the pre-eminence of the occupations of the manufacturing sector of society. One important contrast, therefore, is that a desirable standard of life in the post-industrial society

is no longer defined by the quantity of goods but by the quality of life as reflected in the ready access to services and amenities such as health, education, leisure, and the arts (cf. Bell, 1973 : 166). The kind of work, that the individuals increasingly perform, requires the theoretical knowledge. The chief "resource of the post-industrial society is its scientific personnel" (Bell, 1973:221).

The knowledge referred virtually to all theories of the modern society, that elevate the knowledge to prominence, and the groups of individuals, that are seen as acquiring influence and control by means of this knowledge, tend to be conceptualized narrowly. This does not mean, however, that such a concept lacks cultural centrality and public or political influence. On the contrary, the narrower notion of knowledge and the often accompanying stress on the role of the technical innovation, that attributes enormous efficacy to the scientific and technical knowledge, resonates strongly with the dominant public as well as political conception of the knowledge, the information and its role in the society. The narrow definition of the knowledge is also testimonial to the success of the scientific community in installing a particular conception of the knowledge as the dominant public concept of knowledge. Whatever the limitations of this "scientific" conception of the knowledge, its centrality clearly reflects the diminishing social role of non-scientific conceptions of knowing and forms of knowledge.

A lot in the same way, a systematic *sociological* reflection about the nature of the "theoretical knowledge" (and its interrelation to the technology) is virtually absent from Bell's *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. The concept of knowledge found in Bell's work is formulated in deference to a philosophy of the science dominant a few decades ago that describes the knowledge as objective, truthful and in conformity with the reality. The knowledge is treated as a black box. Paradoxically, there is the tendency to overestimate the efficacy of the "objective" technical-scientific or formal knowledge. We are not offered a sociological perspective of the knowledge process. The central question about the knowledge, posed by the theory of the post-industrial society is a functionalist one: what are the consequences of the objective knowledge for both the society and the individual, and how can these results of the knowledge be apprehended? The lack of sufficient detail and scope in explicating the social role of the knowledge results in a deficit of accounts for the reasons of the growing demand for more and more knowledge in modern societies, for the ways in which the knowledge travels, for the rapidly expanding groups of individuals in the society which, in some way or another, live off the knowledge, for the many forms of knowledge considered pragmatically useful and the various effects the knowledge may have on the social relations. Since the constitutive mechanism of the "knowledge" is defined in a restrictive objectivist manner, the social, political and economic consequences, to which these theories allude tend to be confined to rather straightforward effects that include the

hope for (or the fear of) highly rationalized forms of social action. A more adequate understanding of knowledge requires that one opens the black box.

I therefore would like to introduce in greater detail a contrasting concept of knowledge that will be employed in explicating the idea of the modern society as a knowledge society.

Knowledge about knowledge

I would like to define the knowledge as a *capacity for action*. The term “knowledge” is derived from Francis Bacon’s (1581-1626) famous observation that knowledge is power (a somewhat misleading translation of Bacon’s Latin phrase : *scientia est potentia*). Bacon suggests that the knowledge derives its utility from its capacity to set something in motion. Knowledge as a symbolic “system” structures reality. Knowledge is a model *for reality*. Knowledge illuminates and is able to transform the reality. The term *potentia*, that is, *capacity*, is employed to describe the power of knowing. Knowledge is becoming. Knowledge acquires its social distinction last but not least because of its ability to transform the reality.

The knowledge, as a generalized capacity for action, acquires an *active* role in the course of the social action only under circumstances, where such an action does not follow purely stereotypical patterns, or is strictly regulated in some other fashion. The knowledge assumes a practical significance under conditions, where the social action is, for whatever reasons, based on a certain degree of freedom in the courses of action that can be chosen. Karl Mannheim ([1929] 1936 :102) defines, much in the same sense, the range of the social conduct generally, and therefore contexts in which the knowledge plays a role, as restricted to spheres of the social life, that have not been routinized and regulated completely. For, as he observes, “conduct, in the sense in which I use it, does not begin until we reach the area where the rationalization has not yet penetrated, and where we are forced to make decisions in situations, which have as yet not been subjected to regulation.” The knowledge is no reliable “commodity.” It tends to be fragile and demanding, and has built-in insecurities and uncertainties. Despite its reputation, the knowledge is virtually never uncontested. The science is in many instances incapable of offering a cognitive certainty. This is to say that the scientific discourse has been deprivatized, that it cannot offer definitive, or even true, statements (in the sense of proven causal chains) for practical purposes, but only more or less plausible and often contested assumptions, scenarios, and probabilities. Instead of being the source of a reliable trustworthy knowledge, the science becomes a source of uncertainty (Grundmann and Stehr, 2000). The uncertainty linked to scientific findings is no expression of ignorance, or of a (temporary) deficit of knowledge. Uncertainty is a constitutive feature of the knowledge, as it is of the contexts, in which the knowledge must operate.

The knowledge has of course always had a function in the social life. That the human action is knowledge-based might be regarded as an anthropological constant. Social *groups*, social *situations*, social *interaction* and social *roles* all depend on, and are mediated by the knowledge. Relations among *individuals* are based on the knowledge of each other. Indeed, if, like the interactionist tradition in the sociology, we regard such a general notion of knowledge as the foundation stone of the social interaction and the social order, we will find that the possibility of a social interaction itself is based on the situation-transcendent knowledge shared among the individuals engaging in the social action. The power, too, has frequently been based on knowledge advantages, not merely on physical strength. The societal reproduction, furthermore, is not just a physical reproduction but, in the case of humans, always cultural, that is to say, the reproduction of the knowledge.

It is precisely the enhanced social, political and economic significance of the scientific knowledge and technological artifacts in the modern society, that calls for an analysis of its essential features in terms of knowledge. More specifically, I will indicate how the economic capital – or, more precisely, the source of the economic growth and the value-adding activities – increasingly relies on the knowledge. The transformation of the structures of the modern economy on the basis of knowledge as a productive force constitutes the “material” basis and justification for designating the advanced modern society as a knowledge society.

Knowledge Societies

In this section I will explicate and explore the idea that the present-day society or, more precisely, the type of society that appears to be emerging as an industrial society gives way, is best conceptualized as a “knowledge society”. But why I regard this term as more fruitful than competing terms and approaches (such as information society or post-industrial society) requires some justification. The present-day society may be described as a knowledge society because of the penetration of all its spheres by the scientific and technical knowledge (Stehr, 1994).

Past theorists of the society provide designations for the assembly of those attributes of social relations they regarded as constitutive of the specific nature of their particular society. They therefore spoke of a capitalist, industrial or post-industrial society. It is for quite similar reasons, that one is able to label the now emerging form of society as a knowledge society since it is increasingly clear that the knowledge is the constitutive identity-defining mechanism of the modern society.

The historical emergence of knowledge societies does not occur suddenly; it does not represent a revolutionary development, but rather a gradual process, during which the defining characteristics of the society change and new traits emerge.

Even today, the demise of societies is typically as gradual as was their beginning, even if some social transformations do occur in spectacular leaps. But most major social changes continue to evolve gradually, at an uneven pace, and they become clearly visible only after the transition is already over. The proximity of our time to significant social, economic and cultural changes, however, makes it highly likely, that what is now beginning to come into view, is of extraordinary present and future significance.

Moreover, the knowledge societies do not come about as the result of some straightforward uni-modal unfolding. They are not a one-dimensional social figuration. Knowledge societies become similar by remaining or even becoming dissimilar. New technological modes of communication break down the distance between groups and individuals, while the isolation of particular regions, cities and villages remains. The world opens up and creeds, styles and commodities mingle; yet the walls between incompatible convictions about what is sacred do not come tumbling down. The meaning of time and place erodes even while boundaries are celebrated.

Until recently, the modern society was conceived primarily in terms of property and labor. Labor and property (capital) have had a long association in social, economic and political theory. The work is seen as a property and as a source of emerging property. In the Marxist tradition, the capital is objectified, encapsulated labor. On the basis of these attributes, individuals and groups were able or constrained to define their membership in the society. In the wake of their declining importance in the productive process, especially in the sense of their conventional economic attributes and manifestations, for example as "corporeal" property such as land and manual work, the social constructs of labor and property themselves are changing. While the traditional attributes of labor and property certainly have not disappeared entirely, a new principle, the "knowledge", has been added which, to an extent, challenges as well as transforms property and labor as the constitutive mechanisms of the society.

Theories of societies, depending on their constitutive principles, mirror these quintessential social mechanisms in the chosen shorthand for the historical era they claim to describe and represent. Thus, the bourgeois or capitalist society was originally viewed as a society of owners. Later it became a "laboring society", and it is now evolving into a knowledge society.

Daniel Bell (1973:346) argues, that the "symbolic" onset of the post-industrial society may be traced to the period since the end of World War II, although he admits that it would be foolish to give precise dates for the origins of these major social transformations. It was, according to Bell, in this era that a new consciousness about time and social change began to emerge. Block and Hirschhorn (1979:368), who also inquire into the knowledge, science and

technology as the new productive force of the post-industrial society, argue that a qualitative shift, which even then began to affect the economic system, has its origins in the 1920s. At least in the United States, the input of labor, time and capital had already then begun to diminish while output had started to rise. In economic terms, the knowledge had become a crucial source of (added) value. Finally, Radovan Richta (1969:276) and his colleagues date the beginning of the profound transformation of the modern society (at least of its state-socialist variety) to the profound impact of the scientific and technological revolution in the 1950s.

The society of societies

The emergence of knowledge societies signals first and foremost a radical transformation in the *structure of the economy*. Productive processes in the *industrial society* are governed by a number of factors that appear to decline in significance as preconditions for a changing and especially a growing economy: the dynamics of the supply and demand for primary products or raw materials, the dependence of employment on production, the importance of the manufacturing sector that processes primary products, the role of the manual labor and the social organization of work, the role of international trade in commodities, the function of time and place in production and of the nature of the limits to economic growth. The most common denominator of the changing economic structure is a shift away from an economy largely driven and governed by "material" inputs into the productive process and its organization, toward an economy, in which the transformations of productive and distributive processes are increasingly determined by "symbolic" or knowledge-based inputs. The development and impact of the modern information technology exemplifies these transformations (and not only in the sphere of economic activities). They include the dematerialization of the production, that represents lessened constraints on supply, lower and declining cost and a redefinition of the social functions of velocity, time and place (cf. Perez, 1985 ; Miles, Rush, Turner and Bessant, 1988).

The economy of the industrial society, in short, is primarily a *material economy* and that gradually changes into a monetary economy. Keynes' economic theory, particularly his *General Theory* (1936) reflects this transformation of the economy of the industrial society into an economy substantially affected by monetary matters. But, as a more recent evidence indicates it, the economy described by Keynes must now be understood as a *symbolic economy*. The structural changes of the economy and its dynamics increasingly reflect the fact that the *knowledge* is becoming the leading dimension in the productive process, the primary condition for its expansion and for a change in the limits to economic growth in the developed world. In the knowledge society, most of the wealth of a company is embodied in its creativity and information. In short, for the production of goods and services, with the exception of the most standardized commodities and services, factors other than "the amount of labor time or the amount of physical

capital become increasingly central" (Block, 1985:95) to the economy of advanced societies.

The focus of any sociological analysis of the modern society must therefore be the peculiar nature and function of the knowledge in social relations as well as the carriers of such a knowledge together with the resulting changes in power relations and sources of social conflict. In the sociology, however, virtually all classical theorists are proponents and even architects of scientism. This even applies to the ways, in which the knowledge is conceptualized in theories of society designed to capture the unique features of the present-day society. For example, Daniel Bell (1968: 156-157) acknowledges, that "every modern society now lives by innovation and growth, and by seeking to anticipate the future and plan ahead". Innovations are driven by theoretical discoveries, while the commitment to growth is linked to the need for planning and forecasting.

But why the knowledge or the information, despite these reflections, are supposed to play such an exposed role in the modern society, remains open or is not even raised as is the case in many contribution to the theory of the information society: "why should it be information, embracing both goods and services, that has come to dominate the world's largest and most advanced economies?" (Beniger, 1986: v). Bell is optimistic that the science (including the social science) will affirm these expectations. "The rise of macroeconomics, and the new codifications of the economic theory, now allow governments to intervene in economic matters in order to shape economic growth, redirect the allocation of resources and ... engineer a controlled recession in order to redeploy resources". Indeed, toward the end of the 1960s, Keynesian economics and interventionist economic policies appeared to have solved for the foreseeable future the problem of planning and controlling national macroeconomic developments. Yet only a few years later, the economic and governments alike bemoaned the absence of any economic policy able to deal with the problem of simultaneous unemployment and inflation. The Keynesian consensus gave rise to what may be regarded as the persisting crisis in economics and economic politics. Daniel Bell's claim that the social sciences will be able to deliver and implement ("codify") a useful practical knowledge has proved to be much too optimistic.

What justifications are there to designate the presently emerging society a knowledge society rather than a *science society* (Kreibich, 1986), an *information society* (e.g. Nora and Minc, [1978] 1980), a *postmodernization* (cf. Inglehart, 1995), the *network society* (Castells, 1996) or as *scientific-technological civilization* (Schelsky, 1961)? There are several important reasons that argue for the "knowledge society" as the term of choice. I will begin with a brief discussion of the idea that we are living in an age of the technical state or in a technological civilization before I turn to the perspective that the modern society is an information society.

The technical state

In the 1960s, both conservative and neo-Marxist thinkers conjured up the image of the impending spiritless technical state and that the society as technical rationality extends its relentless influence to all sectors of the modern life. The domination and closure achieved by the pervasive power and authority science and technology mark the beginning of a singular type of society and the end of the individual freedom and of the subjectivity. Individuals are in danger of being totally absorbed into a repressive set of productive relations and absolute domination exercised by the state with the help of new forms of control.

Two prominent accounts are representative of this perspective of the possible rise, the internal make-up and the consequences of the technical state. Herbert Marcuse's influential statement of the theme found, most fully developed, in his *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and Helmut Schelsky's (1961) thesis that the advanced industrial society is a powerful instance of "scientific civilization" as first expounded by him in a lecture in 1961 entitled "Man in the scientific civilization". Though Marcuse and Schelsky stood for radically opposed political philosophies and goals, they arrived, in their description of the social consequences of the modern science and technology, at essentially the same position. Both descriptions are self-exemplifying in that they display some of the very intellectual practices, namely universality, control and prediction, the authors otherwise castigate as representative of a scientific spirit out of control. Although Marcuse's and Schelsky's theories of the advanced society today are somewhat forgotten and rarely invoked when attention or critique turns to the key features of the modern society, especially its built-in flaws and risks, I will briefly consider their views and point to convergences with theories of the information and the network society. Among the most notable common denominators, their description of the nature of the modern technology is as an instrument of social and political action.

The modern technology represents a particular logic and this logic necessarily becomes the dominant logic of the human life. One of the significant consequences of such a conception of technology is that the traditional "logic" of the technology reverses itself. That is to say, the technology as a producer of mere means of human action becomes a producer of ends or meaning, or what is the same, "means" of action determine its ends and prefigure the direction of the social change. Schelsky describes the technology as an intellectual process that dissects varied natural objects into their elementary parts in order to re-assemble them according to the principle of the least effort or maximum efficiency. The result of the modern technological construction, therefore, is a novel product or process with artificial features and, in analogy, an artificial human being.

The reversal of the means/ends relationship is particularly noticeable in the arena of the authority or power relations in the society. More specifically, Schelsky postulates, as a decisive feature of the scientific civilization, that power relations are depersonalized; traditional relations of power between individuals and groups, as well as the legitimating belief systems in the modern society, exercise the power based on political norms and laws, and are replaced by "iron necessities" of the scientific civilization and these, which is crucial, are "not arrived at as political decisions and are incomprehensible as based on normative or ethical considerations" (Schelsky, 1961: 22). These developments imply, of course, that the democratic decision-making becomes impossible because the place of the sovereign citizen is taken by technical necessities, that make political contest and discourse superfluous. Power relations take on qualities that make them appear unassailable. Schelsky predicts a concentration and consolidation of state power, that therefore evolves into a "technical state". The state increasingly monopolizes all means of power based on the technology, the necessary financial resources and the (technical) necessity for co-ordination within its control. It follows, that such a state no longer needs politics and politicians in the conventional sense of the term because decisions are taken, or occur, in an almost automatic and self-regulated process. Therefore, the notion of the technical state converges, in significant respects, although the convergence does not signal the identity, with the analysis and the thesis of the increasing societal dominance of the technical rationality in the advanced society by a number of authors, who belong to the group of the critical theorists.

Herbert Marcuse for one observe that the scientific mind and the transformation of its knowledge into scientific-technical rationality in the advanced industrial society produce an ensemble of things and objectified social relations, which have turned the project of emancipation from the domination of nature and control into its opposite. Marcuse (1964: 146) argues, that these outcomes are inherent in pure science and that the "scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control". Outside the world of objective things and social relations, one only encounters a world of values but since they or their metaphysical basis cannot be verified, the subjective domain is not real, but is objective and weak and ultimately counts little in the affairs of life.

The power of knowledge and information

The Achilles' heels of the theory of scientific-technical civilization and of instrumental rational control, in which the "technology becomes the subject of the history", to use a formulation by Günther Anders ([1956] 1980), is the rather conventional notion of the nature of the advanced technology and technological expertise, which animates all of its utopian promises and rationalistic designs. The domination by the technology and by the technical expertise requires a degree of cognitive coherence and commonality of interest, which in fact cannot be observed

among technical experts, or in the discourse that rests on the authority of the claims scientific knowledge. Experts neither act in a unified manner, nor expertize undivided, or for that matter, will it ever be if such consensus is to emerge on a voluntaristic basis. It is important to recognize that most "technical controversies have (taken) the form of a competition between two plausible *interpretations* of a situation...and the technical expert controversy has many of the features of the theoretical controversy in the science" (Barnes, 1985 : 106). Scientists, engineers, experts and counselors are far too fragmented intellectually and display allegiances to varied groups in the society to seriously represent a stratum on the verge of a collectively dominating society. Barnes (1985: 11) concludes, that the modern society, though dominated by the science, is not ruled by scientific experts: "the expert assertions today must be expressed in a scientific/technical idiom. This is essential, just as centuries ago a religious idiom was essential. But, it no more guarantees that a scientist will be believed today than it guaranteed that a priest would be believed long ago".

A related and equally dubious assumption of the utopian designs of the impending technical state concerns the conviction, that the growth in knowledge and information occurs in patterns, which assure its orderliness and therefore prompts greater transparency and rationality of conduct in situations drenched in intelligence. However, the proliferation of the knowledge does not invariably mean the reduction of the ignorance and the increase in certainty. On the contrary, a gain in mere intelligence may well constitute an explosion in confusion, uncertainty and unpredictability. As a result, in the sphere of organizations, for example, an "increasing share of organizational resources goes to intelligence function; structural sources of intelligence failures become more prominent; doctrines of intelligence - ideas about how the knowledge should be tapped and staff services organized - become more fateful" (Wilensky, 1971:174).

The Information Society

Wiio (1985) indicates that the term "information society" was first used in a report to the Government of Japan in 1972. The suggestion, that the contemporary society is an information society frequently is an exemplar of a modern version of the technological determinism convinced that a society ought to be named after the technical device that allegedly closely controls its development. The devices are often seen as highly efficient, without flaws and as imposing their logic on the user. The discussion about the information society is typically animated by a related concern, namely that the "production, processing, and transmission of a very large amount of data about all sorts of matter – individual and national, social and commercial, economic and military" (Schiller, 1981 : 25) gives rise to fresh forms of domination and subordination. We are warned, that a new order "is being forced upon an unsuspecting world by advances in telecommunications" (Angell, 1996: 81), that individuals are increasingly paralyzed by an overload of information in the

new media or that we are in the midst of a deepening social crisis that results from inequality of access to information and from the impoverished content of information itself. Yet, every society transmits the information and in every society such dissemination is stratified. Little is said by the information society theorists about the genesis of the substance of the information, the media of communication, the changes brought about by the actual content of the information that is communicated or, for that matter, about the extent to which the information technology devices are user-defined and user-led. Nor are discussions about the information society usually concerned with questions of solidarity and authority or whether any economic effects of the spread of the communication *technologies* and information especially when defined as a material commodity or simply as “thing-like” (Schement and Curtis, 1995 : 2) cannot just as well be accommodated within a more conventional neo-classical economic discourse, namely as processes best understood in terms of long-established and familiar market and commerce-based criteria.

The Network Society

In a series of imaginative and empirically grounded studies, Manuel Castells (1966) suggested that the modern society constitutes a network society on the basis of the massive use of the information and communication technologies in all spheres of the social life. The innovations in the field of the communication and information technology represent, not unlike the 18th century industrial revolution, a fundamental change in the material structure or the forces of production, the social structure and culture of the society. The information revolution of the present-age or the transformation of the “material culture” of the modern society since the decade of the 1980s amounts to a historically new formation of the capitalism. The new society or network society, in which the state continues to occupy a decisive function, originates as the result of a new technological paradigm and therefore a dynamic process, which is propelled by information processing or informationism. In short, “in the new, informational mode of development, the source of productivity lies in the technology of the knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication” (Castells, 1996 : 17). In contrast to the notion of mass society and the nature of social control and regulation usually seen to operate in such a society, for example the presence of essentially *vertically* functioning mass media, one should also be cognizant of the development and presence of horizontally operating media and that means of media controlled by the end user.

Given Castells’ description of the network society with its essential dependence on the operation of communication technologies, the questions that arise is in what way if any does his term of “network society” differ from that of the more frequently used term of the information society? And, in what ways does Castells’ analysis differ from the straightforward assertion, that computers create a new

society (e.g. Dizard, 1997: 20)? The difference, which Castells points to and which in his own assessment constitutes a progressive conceptual step forward in our analytical understanding of the modern society and the notion of the information society in particular, operates in analogy to the distinction between “industry” and “industrial”. At first glance, such a differentiation would not appear to yield much in the way of differences. Information and informational results, Castells suggest, in distinct ways of viewing and knowing. The concept of information or, as he calls it, the “communication of knowledge” implies nothing more or less than the assertion that, information is of importance in all possible social formations or represents an anthropological attribute found in all societies. In contrast to the information, the term “informational” indicates the attribute of a specific form of the social organization, in which the information generation, processing, and transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and power, because (of the) new technological conditions emerging in this historical period (Castells, 1996: 21). The term “information”, which Castells locates as indicated on the same conceptual plane as knowledge remains but skin deep or on the surface, while the concept informational refers to the probability, that the social action is somehow effected in its inner constitution by the information or that the social organization of social conduct is transformed, based on the utilization of the information.

In what kind of Society do we live?

The close alliance of Castells’ theory of the society to the development of information and communication technologies as well as his conscious conflation of knowledge and information, make it rather difficult to detect any firm and decisive differences between the notion of an information and a network society. After all, for most observers, especially in the media, the information revolution is understood as a technical one, in the first instance. The gadgets change but not the socio-cognitive frames, the ideologies, the language of entitlements and scientific regimes. Although Castells is not a strict proponent of technological determinism, it is almost unavoidable that one discovers a number of theses in his study, that tend to resonate with the paradigm of the technological determinism, which stresses the consequences of the technical product rather than the social processes of innovation. But on the whole, there are numerous thoughtful and imaginative observations to be found in his study, for example, Castell’s insistence, that the idea of information itself reconstitutes and refashions the human activity. Nonetheless, as Alain Touraine ([1984] 1988: 104) argued convincingly, the specificity of a particular society should not hinge on a given technology : “It is just as superficial to speak of a computer society or of a plutonium society as it is of steam-engine society or an electric motor society. Nothing justifies the granting of such a privilege to a particular technology, whatever its economic importance.” But Touraine’s alternative designation of the modern society as a “*programmed society*” resonates with Castells' notion of a network society in as much as that concept also stresses the symbolic transformation. Touraine ([1984] 1988: 104)

insists, that the idea of a programmed society aptly captures changes under way in the modern society, because his imagery highlights the capacity of the society to “create models of management, production, organization, distribution, and consumption, so that such a society appears, at all its functional levels, as the product of an action exercised by the society itself.”

The notion of post-industrial society is perhaps equally ill suited to capture the realities of present-day social and economic transformations. To some extent, the term is even misleading because "industry" or manufacturing sector of the economic system of modern societies, though they are being transformed to be sure, are certainly not disappearing altogether. The decline of the industrial society is not identical with deindustrialization, as is occasionally claimed. If attention is exclusively paid to the diminishing employment in the industrial sector (Therborn, 1995: 71-72) and/or the closure and shrinkage of entire branches of the manufacturing sector, such a claim may of course be made. However, employing the conventional differentiation among economic *sectors*, the contribution of the industrial or manufacturing sector to the total output, the value added, has remained remarkably constant in the economies of most industrial countries.

As a result, interpretations of Bell's theory of post-industrial society, that refer to the “economic predominance of the service sector in contrast to the industrial and agricultural sectors” (Huntington, 1973 : 163) as one of the central features distinguishing the post-industrial society from its predecessors, identify a characteristic of the modern economy, that is not really new or fail to recognize, that the changes in the employment among sectors does not necessarily signal a change in the economic importance of sectors in terms of their contribution to GNP. It is accurate that the production in industry has changed significantly but it is not the case, that this sector has almost disappeared and has been dramatically surpassed in its importance for the overall economy. Life without “industry” is as unimaginable as life devoted to leisure only is. As a result, Alain Touraine's ([1984] 1988 : 104) conception of the post-industrial society concentrates less on the demise of the industry but on the transformation of the products generated and the consequences they assume for the society: “The passage to the post-industrial society takes place, when investment results in the production of symbolic goods, that modify values, needs, representations, far more than in the production of material goods or even of ‘services’. The industrial society transformed the mean of production; the post-industrial society changes the ends of production, that is, culture.”

In a recent analysis of cross-sectional data, which is part of a series of studies dating back to the early 1970s, on values and beliefs of the public in 43 societies representing 70 percent of the world's' population, Ronald Inglehart (1995) proposes, that the dramatic shift in the direction of the social change in the past quarter of the century is an impressive evidence that we have entered an era of

post-modernization. Its origins are to be found in the unprecedented achievement of the economic security coupled with the safety net of the welfare state, first in Western Europe and North America and then incipiently in Southeast Asia. The cultural and political feedback, that may be observed in these societies manifests itself in a decline of the authority of religion and the state, a persistence of individualism, an emphasis on non-economic values and as a shift from scarcity values to security values as well as a rejection of all forms of power.

According to Inglehart, in the political realm, the post-modernization is linked to the democratization. Finally, a diminished confidence in the social role of science and technology is noted as a characteristic attribute of the emerging post-modern worldview. Inglehart's argument about the dawn of the post-modernization gives primary weight to certain economic accomplishments, especially the achievement of the economic security for large segments of the public. The attained level of the economic security corresponds to equally unprecedented levels of subjective well-being. Precisely because the public in the advanced societies take their material existence for granted, "they are not aware of how profoundly this supposition shapes their worldview." (Inglehart 1995:385) Although Inglehart refers to a wide spectrum of cultural changes as indicative for the post-modernization, he stresses, in contrast to most other post-modernity theorists, that the economic transformations make the post-modernization possible.

Pierre Bourdieu ([1979] 1984: 55-56) offers similar observations about the cultural consequences of the growing economic well-being but refers more to shifts in life-style: "As the objective distance from necessity grows, life-style increasingly becomes the product of what Weber calls the 'stylization of life', a systematic commitment, which orients and organizes the most diverse practices – the choice of a wine or a cheese or the decoration of a holiday home in the country."

But the changes, that are more significant for the modern society and that are captured in the knowledge society perspective are developments, that occur with respect to the forms and dominance of the knowledge itself. The focus is not merely on the science, but on the relationships between the scientific knowledge and the everyday knowledge, the declarative and procedural knowledge, the knowledge and non-knowledge, and on the knowledge as a capacity for the social action.

In the context of influential recent discussions on the impact of the science on the society, for example as part of an attempt to devise an accounting scheme for its social impact (cf. Holzner, Dunn and Shahidullah, 1987), the nature of the impact of the science and technology on the social relations and the society tends to be conceptualized in a restrictive fashion as well. In most conventional accounts, science and technology are said to generate, first and foremost, if not exclusively, new but fixed types of possibilities, resources or constraints for the practical action.

There, it is believed to be an asymmetric relationship between the distinctive spheres of the social systems of science, technology and social institutions. The scientific reasoning and technology artifacts impose their logic on the social conduct and beliefs in more or less definitive ways. In some variants of the technological determinism, the general effects for the society are described as beneficial, perhaps enhancing the logic of human action, in other cases, the primary concern is much more with the destructive forces of technical and scientific rationality and therefore the extent to which the sphere of the human action – outside of science and technology – mimics its rationalized world (see Grint and Woolgar, 1997).

Concluding remarks

The concept of knowledge employed to describe various theories of the information age is much broader than is the case in most theories of the contemporary age as either a post-industrial society, a technical state, a network or an information society; and to list only a few of the multiple outcomes of knowledge as a capacity for action, an *additional* knowledge mostly generated in modern societies by the science and technology permit new forms of social action, but also eliminates old forms of action; the science and technology affects the experience of action while also assuring the "survival" (in the sense of a continued relevance) of existing forms of action, it even generates occasions, that affirm the traditional action and diminishes or adds to control regimes. The concept of scientific knowledge advanced here and therefore the idea that our era is best described as a modern knowledge society is therefore quite distant from any notion of *technological* or scientific *determinism*. Technological determinism often is part and parcel of the theory of the information, post-industrial or network society. Nonetheless, the *constraining* features of science and technology are by no means underestimated or neglected in perspectives that they describe the advanced society as a knowledge society. But in contra-distinction to most arguments in favor of the technological and scientific determinism, and the theories of the society associated with such views, the crucial point about knowledge societies is that the science and technology possess strong attributes, which allow for effective resistance to one-dimensional and homogeneous transformation and therefore efforts to concentrate or even monopolize the modern science and technology as a capacity for action. The science and technology have important enabling features, which can be harnessed not only by the already powerful : these increase the number of available strategies, heighten flexibility or limit the ability of the powerful to exercise control; by the same token, for others, such features constitute constraining forces that limit choices, reduce options, and impose penalties and risks. In short, the impact of the scientific knowledge and technical artifacts occurs within and hence is contingent upon situational constraints.

It is therefore by no means contradictory to maintain, that knowledge societies can simultaneously become more standardized and more fragile. Generally, it is important to avoid overstating the extent to which the modern science and technology are forces, which merely operate as means of control and regulation and therefore constrain the human agency and delimit the social action. They do all of these things, but there are other consequences as well. A perhaps even more significant outcome, as we will show, is exactly the "opposite", namely an increase in the essential fragility of the society. The science and technology not only enter relational fields of social action of groups, that display an interest in maintaining the status quo but they enter the domain of opposing social forces and are employed for entirely different purposes. The emergence of knowledge societies does not mean, that modern societies are becoming uniform social and intellectual entities. Knowledge as a capacity for action allows and encourages the co-existence and interdependence of historically distinct forms of social organization and thought. Knowledge societies do not spell the end of the ideology or of the irrationality. Nor is the scientific knowledge, as a cultural ensemble, merely a way of deciphering the world; it is also a model for the world.

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Hans-Peter Söder

Caught in the Web ? Liquid Modernity and the Fluidity of the Synthetic Knowledge: Some Remarks on a Global Phenomenon

It is probably dangerous to use this theory of information in fields for which it was not designed, but I think the danger will not keep people from using it.

J. C. R. Licklider (1950)

Where are we in the globalization process? Is the term globalization still applicable or useful as an explicatory description? Since the 2008 economic crisis, there are many who think of it merely as a label, a jingle that gave voice to the gold rush euphoria after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For them, the globalization is an apt catchphrase describing the economic expansionism of the late 1990s. According to this interpretation, the globalization ought to be narrowly defined, it is a description of the helter-skelter between 1991 and 2008. This understanding of the globalization, as the motto for an economic free-for-all, with all of its negative implications, is widely held. However, as globalization also implies an in-built, long-term agenda, and as the neologism *globalization* is laden with timeworn cultural baggage, it is hasty and improvident to reduce the expression to two decades of post-wall jubilation. Only recently, in the 1990s, the globalization was perceived to be carrying similar cultural weight as civilization writ large. However, as it came to be regarded as a late hybrid of civilization, it was just a matter of time before the globalization would held responsible for everything that went wrong soon thereafter: the ensuing political mayhem and the subsequent Western economic crash. It was the economist Joseph E. Stiglitz, who made this connection explicit. By making reference to *Civilization and its Discontents*, Freud's seminal book of 1930, he associated the globalization with the deleterious effect of civilization.¹⁴⁹ As Freud had pointed out, the tension between individualism and the "oceanic feeling" of being part of the whole is a fundamental feature of social interaction. In his *Globalization and its Discontents* (2002), Stiglitz makes the point that the globalization carries within it the same paradox intrinsic to civilization itself: in its care-taking role, the *globalization* is a desired state of political and social organization. However, as it concurrently restricts and threatens individual and regional identity, it is also a primary source of civil discontent (Freud's *Unbehagen*).

¹⁴⁹ See Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).

This is not the place to dwell further on the semantics of what we, today, are to understand by globalization.¹⁵⁰ As I intend to report on the emergence of the synthetic knowledge as a global phenomenon, I cannot expand on the social configuration of the globalization, nor do I plan to further investigate whether globalization is indeed a global phenomenon.¹⁵¹ It is patently clear that much more needs to be said to argue convincingly that the globalization is more than a post-modern slogan of the late 1990s. However, it is also clear that if we were to be done with the globalization, and consign it as another short-lived historical oddity to our historical curiosity chamber, we would be blind to its wider universal relevance. For instance, the progress made by the European Union in the last two decades gives evidence that the codified Western knowledge paradigms of the various nation-states have indeed been overtaken. They have been superseded by a novel trans-national logic and by new types of democratized knowledge. There is no mistaking that the nationalism of 19th and 20th century Europe has run its course. This development represents a definite historical caesura, marking off the culmination of a political development that began with the storming of the Bastille. Were we to use *globalization* merely to describe certain neo-liberal agendas, we would leave out of the account that there has been a definite paradigm shift in the post-industrial configuration of world, or at least within Western political and scientific culture. For my purposes here, it suffices to show that we have been in the midst of a double revolution, the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was an irrefutable *political* change, while the concurrent founding of the World Wide Web at CERN was an accompanying scientific revolution of great consequence.

It is no exaggeration to compare the current transformation in the sciences (from analog to digital thinking) to a Copernican Revolution. Seen from this perspective, the globalization describes not only an isolated political phenomenon in the late 20th century Europe, but also stands for a world-wide process, namely a fundamental political and scientific transformation of the contemporary society. What makes it so difficult to conceptualize the globalization is that one needs to carefully distinguish the *process* of globalization from its unique, isolated points of reference, or faults, at which social and scientific revolutions occur. Thus, one continually needs to employ a double, or binary focus: on the process, *and* on singular occurrences, such as the establishment of the Web in 1989, for example. This kind of conceptualization, where one makes use of a macro- and microscopic vision for understanding the cultural history, necessarily leads to historical blurring, or to what the philosopher Bernhard Stiegler calls “disorientation”. It is in

¹⁵⁰ For a well-rounded presentation of the various points of view see Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, eds., *The Globalization Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

¹⁵¹ If I were compelled to elaborate further on this issue, I would argue, with Horkheimer and Adorno, that cultural industries have become all-pervasive global enterprises, and that the World Wide Web can only be comprehended in terms of its own global aspirations.

this momentary historical puzzlement, that Stiegler sees Kuhnian paradigm shifts not in terms of continuous historical developments, but as a series of disruptions.

“The resulting disruption (from a Kuhnian paradigm shift), universally recognized as vital to industrial societies and as a decisive stage in the ‘globalization’ process, has been however a first step. The second step, which is taking place currently and which will only result in an increase in digital networking, will produce a new kind of temporal object: one that is *delinearizable* and *inseparable*, produced by hypervideo technologies.”¹⁵²

One of the most fascinating but also most puzzling characteristics of the globalization is its ambiguous relationship towards the knowledge. No matter how we define the knowledge, be it a static phenomenon such as “framed experience” or be it a dynamic concept such as the process where data or information is converted to wisdom, or a course of action, it seems that “the globality” of the globalization (that is its seemingly all-encompassing global ambition) is impacting the closely circumscribed, print-based world of the traditional knowledge. In the face of the unceasing exponential growth of the information technology, it is, of course, difficult to define what we mean exactly when we speak of the “traditional knowledge”. For Oswald Spengler, it is an attitude towards nature, a kind of piety (anbetende Frömmigkeit); however this piety has been evolving over the centuries: “the philosopher of antiquity ‘sees’ knowledge as did the illustrious Aristotle, the Arabian philosopher, as alchemist, is searching for the philosopher’s stone intending to possess nature’s treasures without effort, the scientist of Occident wants to subjugate the world so that it follows his beckoning.”¹⁵³

Not everyone will agree that the knowledge is a stance taken toward the nature. However, there are some, who are inclined to agree that the “knowledge”, as we used to understand it intuitively, is changing before our eyes. For one, the linear thinking of Greek logic is now being supplanted by the non-linearity of a new electric language: the language of hypertext. As it emanates from numerous points in the hyperspace, hypertext no longer follows a linear path. By virtue of its hyperlinks, it can be said to be direction-less as it allows multiple readings that could be illogical: either contradictory, or pitted against each other in other ways. On the surface, the fact that the knowledge is adaptive and that its status in the society is fluctuating and continually evolving, is no news. After all, knowledge by

¹⁵² Bernhard Stiegler, trans. Stephen Barker, *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011) 3.

¹⁵³ My translation of: „Der antike Grübler ‚schaut‘ wie die Gottheit des Aristoteles, der arabische sucht als Alchymist nach dem Zaubermittel, dem Stein der Weisen, mit dem man die Schätze der Natur mühelos in seinen Besitz bringt, der abendländische will die Welt nach seinem Willen lenken“. Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes II* (München : C.H. Beck, 1923) 622.

definition is a dynamic force. Furthermore, as Oswald Spengler argued in *The Decline of the West* (1918) and in his *Man and Technics* (1931), knowledge and technology, if they are not identical, have co-evolved.¹⁵⁴ What is new, according to Spengler, is that the *speed* of the technological innovation is outstripping our cognitive capacities and that technology is thereby in the accelerating process of emancipating itself from the human knowledge and the human involvement: “and the configuration of these machines is becoming more and more dehumanized, more ascetic, mystical, esoteric. They weave the entire earth in an unending web of fine forces, electric flows and currents. Their bodies become ever more cerebral, ever more taciturn. These wheels, cogs and levers no longer talk to us. Everything that is of consequence withdraws in its innermost center.”¹⁵⁵ In other words, it is the machine that is learning what its work is to be. And because it does its task independently, it forces us to comply with its procedures.

Oswald Spengler, one of the most astute historians of technology, predicted the advent of this pending development in 1918 when he characterized the modern technology as having a *Faustian* will to power. The goal of *Faustian Physics*, according to Spengler, is the utter mastery of nature (der Wille zur Macht über die Natur). For Spengler, the Western scientific tradition, the *scientia experimentalis*, is nothing other than a violent and hostile interrogation of the nature (die gewaltsame Befragung der Natur). The goal of the Faustian technology in Spengler’s eyes is the construction of another synthetic, man-made environment. This other world, writes Spengler, cannot itself arise solely from the spirit of technics (Geist der Technik), but can come about only through the fusion of technology and modern capitalism. This synthesis, according to Spengler, is an indication of a late stage of cultural decline.

Strangely enough, it is here, in the application of a historical dialectics, where the father of the Communism, Karl Marx, and the right wing intellectual Oswald Spengler meet. Nonetheless, the conclusions drawn by the philosophical pessimist Spengler and the left-Hegelian prophet of world revolution could not be more distinct. In his essay *Man and Technics* (1931) Spengler predicts the doomsday scenario, where man’s obsession to master the nature leads to a global ecological disaster. Conversely, Karl Marx sees this development in a more positive light. In the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), he compares the interdependence of capital and

¹⁵⁴ My translation of: „Die Technik ist so alt wie das frei im Raum bewegliche Leben überhaupt.“ Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes II* (München: C.H. Beck, 1923) 619.

¹⁵⁵ My translation of: “Und diese Maschinen werden in ihrer Gestalt immer mehr entmenschlicht, immer asketischer, mystischer, esoterischer. Sie umspinnen die Erde mit einem unendlichen Gewebe feiner Kräfte, Ströme, Spannungen. Ihr Körper wird immer geistiger, immer verschwiegener. Diese Räder, Walzen und Hebel reden nicht mehr. Alles was entscheidend ist, zieht sich ins Innere zurück.“ Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes II* (München: C.H. Beck, 1923) 625.

knowledge to Goethe's idea about world literature. In Goethe's view, the world literature was to be a future state, where the literature was globally accessible and judged on its own merits in comparison with one's own local literature. In this respect, the literary or cultural globalization is to act as a supra-national force, where urbanity and humanity is no longer a national enterprise of certain privileged *Kulturnationen*. Marx argues similarly. As the home-grown thinking comes in contact with the global thinking, its universality, reasons Marx, becomes understandable. It then transcends its own provincialism as it necessarily becomes more intertwined and interdependent: "In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature."¹⁵⁶

Neither Goethe's vision of a future world united by the literature, nor Marx's prediction of the end of the capitalism has yet come to pass. Of all things, it seems that it is the incongruous views of the iconoclast Spengler that seem to come closest to the truth. The union of capitalism and technology has created a behemoth: the information economy. Furthermore, technological enhanced learning, virtual environments for training, educational hypermedia and web-based learning are massively impacting the traditional knowledge. Whereas the knowledge of the 19th and 20th century modernity was a kind of learning acquired with a view towards a humanistic or theological end, the new post-industrial knowledge of the information age is an unrestricted, seemingly uncontrollable flood of pure data. As it is open ended and unending, data (and metadata - the data about data) is invading and colonizing the circumscribed fields of traditional knowledge.

The word *knowledge* itself is no longer the uniform Platonic abstraction of old. It is slated to become obsolete and it will soon have an archaic feel. Today "knowledge" is manifold. We now speak of knowledge engineering, and of representational and motivational knowledge.¹⁵⁷ In terms of knowledge engineering, it is the cognitive neuroscience that has emerged as the integrative revolutionary science of our time. With the help of the computing technology it promises to unify various descriptive models of cognition. In the wake of what is sometimes called the *Cognitive Revolution*, numerous knowledge creation theories

¹⁵⁶ www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto, retrieved on 02.02.2014.

¹⁵⁷ The partitioning of knowledge, in linguistic terms, begun at the conference of cognitivists at MIT in 1956; the dissection of the cognitive process itself can be said to have begun in earnest with the rise of cognitive behavioural and cognitive neuroscience in the 1980s.

are currently being put forward.¹⁵⁸ Their aim is to enrich the knowledge development by facilitating the transformation of implicit into explicit knowledge.¹⁵⁹ As knowledge is becoming user-defined, what is of foremost concern to the engineers and programmers in the learning resource labs is not only the question of how to optimize, but also how manage the ever-quickening output of the various web service technologies.

Today we no longer speak of students, but of learners, where a learner is defined as any person in the world wanting access to the knowledge. As virtual learning societies move the responsibility of learning from the individual to the system, and as they dislocate the classical localized university, the primary objective of technology-enhanced learning is the knowledge capitalization. It is in this aim of exploitation and maximal extraction, that is, in the movement toward maximum technological efficiency, where there seems to be a divergence from the civilizing aspirations of the classical knowledge. The *new* knowledge, that is E-knowledge, is a comprehension (or at least an awareness) of the world in its global dimension (where *global* implies the validity of other knowledges, such as artificial or virtual knowledge). It is trans-national in its structure as it transcends geographic boundaries as interest-free, open-source information. A central concern of E-knowledge is the knowledge management, that is to say, the organization and classification of the information. This organizing of the knowledge creates a cluster that is a new locus as it generates a novel type of public space (in terms of a Stiegler's temporal object). Like the Platonic world of ideas, it is a timeless *hyper*-space in the truest sense of the word, a computer-generated, simulated world over and beyond the actually-existing world at hand. This newly generated locality is not made by any governing body, but is engendered by the flow of electrons through the World Wide Web.

What is truly remarkable about cyberspace is the fact that it is an entirely man-made, artificial world. Faced with the loss of final frontiers, mankind has created its own space *ex nihilo*. It replicates not only a physical, but also a social and cultural space. It has the ability to mimic any kind of space, be it historical, literary or poetic. Because it is hyperreal, it is not under any one person, law or entity's control. Cyberspace is an immersive, fictional universe with its own laws and particular rules. It is synthetic, but the electrons that animate it are real. Because it exists only by the flicking of a switch, it is a hybrid space that is and is not. The

¹⁵⁸ Michael S. Gazzaniga, ed., *Conversations in Neuroscience* (Boston, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999). See especially his *Who's in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain* (New York : Harper& Collins, 2011).

¹⁵⁹ Marc Spaniol, Yiwei Cao and Ralf Klamma, „A Media Theoretical Approach to Technology Enhanced Learning in Non-technical Disciplines“ in: *Creating New Learning Experiences on a Global Scale*, Erik Duval, Ralf Klamma, Martin Wolpers, eds. (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2007) 307-321.

newly-won territory is a hyperreal domain that needs to be continually shored up. Like a natural space, it can be seized, governed, lost and colonized. A Shangri-La come true, the Web is indeed a new form of colonization. The sun never sets on this artificial empire, but there is no longer a king or queen. It cannot be bequeath to another generation. Like the universe, it is an endless space. But because the hyperspace is both a classical medium and a self-generating system, it does not qualify only, but also alters the collective perception. As Friedrich Kittler put it so bluntly in *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter* (1999), hyperspace shapes the very way we see and experience the world. In that new space, learning by doing means to move to a given virtual space (where the distinction between real and fictional experience is unclear). In computer games for example, little is left to the imagination as the boundary between fiction and reality disappears. Here the question arises how “real” an experience in a half-real world can be, if the experience does not entail suffering in real life? Training is not experience, and what happens for instance at a flight simulator, is a drill that needs to be differentiated from “real” learning. As the game theorist Jesper Juul remarked, video games are always “half-real”. They are fictional worlds with “real” rules, otherwise gaming would not be possible.¹⁶⁰ However, the meaning of “game over” has decidedly different consequences in real and virtual reality.

Given these radical changes to the way we see and experience the world around us, it is astonishing how comparatively little energy has been devoted to assess the cultural and social impact of the knowledge gained in the cyberspace. Granted, it is generally recognized that digital, or E-knowledge is a radical departure from pre-digital thinking, however, most web theorists are loath to think of the digital revolution as a radical historical advance. Jay David Bolter, for example, argues that new media, such as hypertext, is only the latest *kind* of writing in a different kind of space.¹⁶¹ Bolter’s argument merits careful attention as new technologies are often trumpeted to radically change the society. Shortly after Alexander Graham Bell invented the telephone in 1875, the *Scientific American* proclaimed the advent of a new world: “Soon it will be the rule and not the exception for business houses, indeed for the dwellings of well-to-do people as well, to be interlocked by means of telephone exchange, not merely in our cities, but in all outlying regions. The result can be nothing less than a new organization of the society...The time is close at hand when the scattered members of civilized

¹⁶⁰ Jesper Juul, *half-real: Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).

¹⁶¹ “All forms of writing are spatial, for we can only see and understand written signs as extended in a space of at least two dimensions. Each technology gives us a different space. . . . How the reader and writer understand writing is conditioned by the physical and visual character of the books the use”. Jay David Bolter, *Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991) 11.

communities will be as closely united, so far as the telephonic communication is concerned, as the various members of the body now are by the nervous system.”¹⁶²

The question if the Web is the logical continuation of the Gutenberg press, or if it is a revolutionary new type of technology that is globally impacting the world, is a major point of contention. Post-humanists such as Cary Wolfe, Joel Garreau, N. Katherine Hayles argue that we are indeed beyond the 19th and 20th century industrial modernity. Bolter’s “new writing space”, the computer (being a chiffre for digital technology), in the eyes of post- and trans-humanists, increasingly exhibits the characteristics of an augmented reality. Post- and trans-humanism is an emerging field with a wide spectrum of opinions. However, part and parcel of the post-humanism is the view that the body is a prosthesis that has fulfilled its usefulness. The body, writes the robotic researcher Hans Moravec, needs to be released from its “carnal corporation”. In this view, a post-human “is a human descendant who has been augmented to such a degree as to be no longer human.”¹⁶³ Although the post- and trans-humanism spread out over a wide spectrum in the post-modern theory, both agree at least on two points. First, there is a continuous and accelerating merging of man and machine to the point where technics and humanism are becoming indistinguishable. And second, the virtual reality created through digital simulations, machine algorithms and subversive computer games qualifies as a cybernetic system. That is to say, humans no longer control the machines that they have constructed to fit their purposes, but it is the machine, in a circular-causal relationship, that now holds sway over the human operator. In man-machine systems there is always co-organization and a specific procedural relationship. Nietzsche had already remarked that his Nansen writing ball was forcing him to write in a certain way. Now however, posthumanists assert that the virtual reality goes beyond the surface as it reaches deep into the human psyche, affecting the neurological system. Hayles calls this feedback loop a *technogenetic* intervention leading to a new evolutionary phase: *technogenesis*.¹⁶⁴ As Ihab Hassan put it most succinctly: “we need first to understand that the human form – including the human desire and all its external representation – may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred

¹⁶² Quoted by James Gleick, *The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood* (London: Harper/Collins, 2012) 191.

¹⁶³ Quoted by Oliver Krueger, “Gnosis in Cyberspace? Body, Mind and Progress in Posthumanism”, *Journal of Evolution & Technology* 14(2) August 2005:79.

¹⁶⁴ In her view digital technology, as a form of technology that we have created, will impact the creator bringing about neurological, epigenetic changes in our brains. See N. Katherine Hayles, *How we Think: Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

years of humanism may be coming to an end as the humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call post-humanism”.¹⁶⁵

Post- and trans-humanism may well be the flavor of the month in the post-postmodern theory, nonetheless it shows that the question concerning the technology has finally arrived in the humanities. We return then to my question at the beginning: what role does the new technology play in the *ideology* of the globalization? If we were to interpret the globalization as the process towards a global or world society, as the evolution of a moral imperative to eradicate the world poverty and to eliminate the educational barriers to transcend the gender politics, then the globalization is indeed a natural successor age to the project of the Enlightenment. The Modernity, as a point on the way to the idealist vision of the world enlightenment could then be interpreted, as Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck and other sociologists have proposed, as *high* or *late* modernity. However, one could also argue, that this re-Enlightenment model of the world history is caught up in a Winckelmannian and Spenglerian view of periodicity that is no longer tenable in a world made up of alternative modernities and grassroots globalization. Here, we need to work with other historical models that shun Eurocentric patterns and paradigms such as the idea of progress.

Zygmunt Bauman's notion of a *liquid modernity* elegantly skirts the issue of continuity and discontinuity by setting up another dichotomy: liquids and solids. Here it is no longer a question of antiquity, the middle ages and modernity, but of liquid time and space. Put in another way, by dissolving Kant's seemingly immutable categories of perception, by looking at the very constitution of basic matter differently, Bauman is able to view the modernity in utterly new terms. For example, *lightness* can now be introduced as a new category of perception: "Fluids travel easily. They 'flow', 'spill', 'run out', 'splash', 'pour over', 'leak', 'flood', 'spray', 'drip', 'seep', 'ooze'; unlike solids, they are not easily stopped - they pass around some obstacles, dissolve some others and bore or soak their way through others still. From the meeting with solids they emerge unscathed, while the solids they met, if they stay solid, are changed - get moist or drenched. The extraordinary mobility of fluids is what associates them with the idea of 'lightness'. . . We associate 'lightness' or 'weightlessness' with mobility and inconstancy: we know from practice that the lighter we travel the easier and faster we move. These are reasons to consider 'fluidity' or 'liquidity' as fitting metaphors when we wish to grasp the nature of the present, in many ways novel, phase in the history of the modernity."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Quoted by N. Katherine Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) 1. See Ihab Hassan, "Prometheus as Performer: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?" *The Georgia Review* (1977): 830-850. Web.

¹⁶⁶ Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000) 2.

Of course, Bauman's conceptualization of the modernity cannot easily be substantiated. We lack the conceptual tools to judge the contemporary "lightness" of being against the mobility, tempo and momentum of previous ages. The art historian Aby Warburg may perhaps be of some assistance here as he followed a similar path in his *Mnemosyne Atlas*. When he proposes that there is a fluidity of *Dionysian emotions* (connecting ancient mythology to Dürer's northern gods and to the re-emergence of antiquity in modernity), he does not show only from whence cultural memory emanates, but also how it flows, connecting image to image.¹⁶⁷

Alas, my pairing the seemingly worn out socio-political mantra of globalization with the question of how we are to conceptualize thinking and cognition in a world that is being restructured by a revolutionizing digital technology, is not an obvious approach. As the hyperlinks of the Web portend not only "the end of the line" but also "the end of authority", they mirror significant aspects of globalization (such as decentralization and local emancipation).¹⁶⁸ Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that the drive towards the best possible world needs to be continually scrutinized. As optimization is inherent to open-ended systems, the current drive towards synthetic *knowledge enhancement* is Trojan horse. It is however a short step from knowledge enhancement to human enhancement. Whatever the *knowledge* is to mean in the 21st century, we have to be clear that Wilhelm von Humboldt's notion of *Bildung* is neither consonant with the enterprise toward maximal knowledge extraction, nor with global ludology, *gamification*, or other aspects of the entertaining educational economy. If the search for "life extension" and "mind enhancement technologies" and the struggle to attain an "embodied virtuality" (Hayles) are humanistic efforts, remains to be seen.¹⁶⁹ Harmonizing one's heart with one's mind is an unquantifiable intellectual pursuit. Friedrich Schiller's ideas that education and knowledge are to be continually examined in terms of their

¹⁶⁷ Practically speaking however, Warburg's atlas can only point out that Bauman's fluidity is a necessary metaphor for explaining for the perpetuation of cultural memory. For one, modern art is loath to see itself as a later stage of a linear cultural development. As one of the most outspoken critics of contemporary art, Dieter Roelstraete, recently pointed out, that the postulate of artistic weightlessness is an ineffectual attempt by the art establishment to restore some of the intellectual gravity that art has lost in the last decades: "A quarter century on, I have come to look upon the ubiquitous requirement of "lightness" in contemporary art—lightness of all kinds: lightness of touch, lightness of materials, lightness of execution, lightness of concept—in radically different, certainly less sympathetic terms; indeed, it is precisely the unbearable lightness of much current art, its snooty cultivation of that graceful effortlessness that is the supposed hallmark of true genius, that is much more likely to irk my critical instinct these days. "Dieter Roelstraete, „The Business: On the Unbearable Lightness of Art“, *e-flux* 42 (02/2013), retrieved on 02.02. 2014.

¹⁶⁸ See Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Boston: MIT Press, 2000) 44-45.

¹⁶⁹ See the *Transhumanist Declaration*: <http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration/>, retrieved on 02.02. 2014.

usefulness towards *Menschwerdung* (personal transformation and ethical improvement) cannot yet be assessed by the artificial intelligence of machines. Humanistic and aesthetic ideas are also difficult to judge and value in themselves, in a human-machine system, especially in the rapidly emerging collaborative learning environments. In the final analysis, whatever knowledge is to mean in a split-window world of reality and virtuality, if we are mindful of Schiller's and Kierkegaard's counsel that we must overcome the cowardice of our hearts to "see" beauty, we need not worry that humanism gets lost in translation. To truly know with the heart, Blaise Pascal tells us, requires blood, sweat and tears in real life.

Rob van Kranenburg

Essay on sharing every ,thing'

- to share is to validate

(Tara Petric)

I raised the issue of animism at Ubicomp 2002 in a discussion with researchers and nobody understood that. That fact and my experience at an earlier Conference in Jonschoping on Intelligent Information Interfaces (i3) - where a speaker said that in ten years time everyone would have a Bluetooth ring and point at a tree when walking in the woods and a screen would pop up! and you would get information about that tree and I looked around and everyone seemed to be happy with that - led to my work in the past fourteen years of building Council - theinternetofthings.eu - as a way of gaining agency and becoming an influence in the actual building of it. As you know, this is happening and happening fast. I am working in an FP7 EU project¹⁷⁰ with the key stakeholders and advise Conferences worldwide on going more towards internet of neighborhoods then smart cities.¹⁷¹ So far I know we are choosing between Scylla and Charibdis. I see no way of going back towards non-wireless or non-IP connectivity. So we can either try to help to build an inclusive smart city for everyone or lay back and do nothing and then it will be a world of 500 smart cities and Mad Max in between. I have come to believe that this monitoring of items, resources and processes will lead to incredible transparency, less to zero corruption, energy management and stop wasting of food (50%) and water. But I realize these last arguments resemble Cisco's a lot.

Ten years ago I wrote :

"Every new set of techniques brings forth its own literacy: the Aristotelian protests against introducing pencil writing, may seem rather incredible now, at the time it meant nothing less than a radical change in the structures of power distribution. Overnight, a system of thought and set of grammar; an oral literacy dependent on a functionality of internal information visualization techniques and recall, was made redundant because the techniques could be externalised. Throughout Western civilization the history of memory externalisation runs parallel with the experienced disappearance of its artificial, man made, character.

¹⁷⁰ Sociotal.eu

¹⁷¹ As founder of Council, theinternetofthings.eu

An accidental disappearance, however much intrinsic to our experience, that up till now has not been deliberate. This then is the fundamental change and the design challenge that we are facing in ubicomp; the deliberate attempt of a technology to disappear as technology. In what respect will it alter our notion of the self as a more or less stable identity? Will it not provoke an identity building on the ability to change roles in communication environments? What kind of privacies lay hidden in our new connectivities ? In a mediated environment - where everything is connected to everything - it is no longer clear what is being mediated, and what mediates.”

So yes it is extremely important how we approach questions of magic, agency, a scripted serendipity (internet of things second hand ,magic’) in a database reality of ,Google Now’ and whether it will be possible at all for the younger generations to approach any non-tagged or non-micro-processed object thereby losing the very notion that that object itself resonates and ,is’ or ,acts’, being removed thus twice from what we have until perceived as reality. We also have to find a way to compensate for that loss and investigate what can be gained and what can be won in such a world.

The key element for me is that normality has been defined so strict that a lot of human behavior is falling outside of it, or at least people that have less to none filters are feeling as if they do not belong ,here’. Probably everybody at one point or another has these feelings of estrangement, but I believe that there is a group of people that feels like this on a daily basis and as a default.

They have no boundaries and find it difficult to create or have a notion of ,self’. They have to deliberately make markers on and around such a ,self’, but the truth is that they don’t really understand that need to pull strict boundaries between ,self’ and ,others’. They have grown up believing in a way that there always is a camera on them, or always someone or something present. The concept of ,alone’ to them is not existing. In my opinion this is easily explained through the notion of the tribe.

From early dawn of men we run in packs and survive in teams of about 30-50. In every tribe you would need some people who would go out, look around and bring things and ideas back home. These early innovators were balanced by other intelligences and ideally there had been a balance between the outer ends of manic boundary less and extremely focused semi autistic and the in between skillsets that build and maintained a notion of the ,real’, ,reality’ and ,normality’ that was able to sustain basic humans needs and functions. To each his place in the tribe, ideally. If however such a situation arose every body (literally) felt well. The seer was listened to and the mason build as he saw fit, thus timely shelter from the storm.

From time to time, the specialists start to build such intricate elements or the innovators bring back home such far fetched ideas that the skillsets in the middle start to adjust what is ‚normal’ and what is ‚strange’ and an evolutionary process starts changing the Zeitgeist, the ‚fashion’, the ‚customs’, in short: the ‚real’. And sometimes this process would be a rupture, a real break; war and invading tribes bringing such new world views that a new normal was imposed and the old forgotten but in stories of grandmothers and the artifacts of the time. Once, in a while such a rupture became an ontological change as in the ‚death’ of God for certain tribes. More often the notion of the normal was kept to till it was impossible to keep at the cost of burning even more seers as witches, wizards, heretics, Cathars, hippies, hackers, or any other minority group it could lay their hands on.

We are now witnessing such an ontological change, a rupture in what we perceive as normal. The Internet, Augmented Reality, the Internet of Things are all technological toolsets that have been far removed from the first tools that men used to chisel stone. The first chisel to be used on stone was a stone. It only later became a chisel. But it still did fit in someone’s hand. The feedback was intense and obvious. It was Heidegger who saw that through mechanical engineering and the Industrial Revolution it was no longer a hand applying force but a machine and hands overseeing that machine. This was the start of the substantiation of the space with before that had been of visible mediation and cause and effect. He realized that there was nothing we could do, only wait as the famous last line in *Sein und Zeit* goes. He also realized that it was a particular part of the tribe slowly taking up the notion of ‚the normal’. It was the specialists who had been crafting and dissecting and splitting things up into smaller and smaller building blocks that at first made no sense but slowly began to offer the possibility of recreating their visions as a layer on top of what the old notion of normal was not hurting it at all but slowly perfecting it, smoothing the edges of every perceivable human act. They offered convenience.

The specialist intelligence - an engineering toolset - began eating itself as it found that it had no more real boundaries. After automating work, leisure, administration, governing, it succumbed briefly to the notion of the ‚Living Lab’ but soon realized that the last territory it had to conquer was the space in between driving to work and back home: everyday life and living. Like a grin trying out faces it tried out all human forms of organization till it found the space in between where love lives and hope and shame and fear.

As this intelligence could always count on the support of the middle as it was the perfect middle, the epitaph of normal: who does not want to feel safe, happy, secure?”, the first steps towards the ultimate disciplining of the body, home, street as ‚smart city’; cameras everywhere, automated entrances to public transport, elimination of cash money, energy management as a way to fight Climate Change, children playing within line of sight of caretakers, banning of smoking (with

emerging debate on banning it in cars and homes), were not seen as invading a private space to such an extent that it was a rupture with ordinary liberal capitalist society.

One of the defining qualities of the specialist is that he needs protection. As his or her gaze is on the detail, someone has to watch his back. Industry and states provided this protection alongside with the briefings and the funds. This, however, is about to change. The obsessive worry and attention to perfectionist detail has, as we have seen with the NSA revelations, lead to an ever growing paranoia of security services as pillars of the state that can no longer be stilled by any piece of data or any snippet of information. Equally the full monitoring schemes are driving the costs of hardware, software and infrastructure so down that sharing and collaboration through open source is fostering the realization that what the SAP, Siemens and Cisco's of these world are doing is not rocket science. Their bloated balances are the result of decades of isolating data in IP, patents and copyright.

Ben van Lier showed at IoT Rotterdam (IoT day) how the Shannon paradigm of communication allowed the engineers to port 'meaning' onto a different plane that not had to be considered in their work. This explains the huge speed and convergence of efficiency intrinsic system and applications only. It also explains that we feel somehow 'stuck' in 'selling' the platform to citizens who can not articulate their need and do not see the offered services as something so amazing in the age of their own daily app agency with smartphones and companies like Google, and Facebook gradually spilling over into the real world objects. That means that only in the recent decade we realized 'meaning' had too be patched back on as semantic interoperability.

There is a parallel process running alongside this specialist expertise running amok, ocd'ing on itself in ever stronger attempts to gain control over the 'happenings' of life, as we have seen to the extent of defining the 'normal' as that sphere where every tiny detail is in process and every object on the planet is individuated either in a giant Object Name Server (GS1) or in IP to every edge (IPSO alliance) or any combination of this together with RFID and NFC resulting in every object and item being digitally approachable in the distributed local grid as well as in the 'Cloud'. That parallel process is the awakening of a combined and shared intelligence of that other outer end on the spectrum; the manic mind. It has been fueled by and has itself helped to build that open white line engulfing the planet: tcp/ip where still no King, Tyrant or Tycoon can make bytes go faster (at least for the moment). In under twenty years any mind capable of sharing has shared and fueled sharing as a new default. To keep to yourself the minimum of necessity and share all other resources with other so no one needs to be in want.

So now I want to make the case that this sharing is the new default and that this is facilitated by that very framework the specialists have build.

Stories of cooperation, self organization and sharing have been removed from the real as literary modes, not even science fiction, no: tales of wonder. A miracle! Albert Nolan writes: "the best example of Jesus' attempts to educate the people to share what they had, was the miracle of the loaves and fishes (Mk 6: 35-44 parr). This incident was interpreted by the early Church and by all the evangelists as a miracle of multiplication- although this is never explicitly said by any of them...The event itself was not a miracle of multiplication; it was a remarkable example of sharing":

"Jesus was preaching to a large gathering of men in a lonely place. It was time to stop for a while to eat. Some had no doubt brought food, others not. He and his disciples had five loaves and two fish, but they suggest that the people be told to go and 'buy themselves something to eat'. Jesus says, No, 'You give them something to eat yourselves.' They protest but he tells the people to sit down in groups of fifty and taking out the bread and the fish he tells his disciples to 'share it out'. (p.51) Now either Jesus told the others who had brought food to do the same within their group of fifty or else they, seeing Jesus and his disciples sharing their food, began, of their own accord, to open their food-baskets and to share the contents. The 'miracle' was that so many men should suddenly cease to be possessive about their food and begin to share, only to discover that there was more than enough to go round. There were, we are told, twelve baskets of scraps left over. Things do tend to 'multiply' when you share them. The first Christian community on Jerusalem made the same discovery when they tried to share their possessions...This then is what selling all your possessions means; giving up the surplus and treating nothing as your own. The result will always be that 'none of their members was ever in want' "(Acts 4:34. Jesus before Christianity, The Gospel of Liberation, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1977 p.141)

Psychologists specialized in the behaviour of larger groups of people try to explain the relative ease with which one is able to exert influence over masses by assuming "a causal force which bears on every member of an aggregate, and also for each individual there is a large number of idiosyncratic causes" (Stinchcombe, 1968: 67-68n) He continues:

"Now let us suppose that the idiosyncratic forces that we do not understand are four times as large as the systematic forces that we do understand.... As the size of the population increases from 1 to 100, the influence of the unknown individual idiosyncratic behaviour decreases from four times as large as the known part to four tenths as large as the known part. As we go to an aggregate of a million, even if we understand only the systematic one-fifth individual behaviour as assumed in the table, the part we do not understand of the aggregate behaviour decreases to less than 1 percent (0.004)."

This shows how top down power works and why scaling itself has become such an important indicator in such a system of 'success'. Imagine you want to start a project or 'do something' with your friends or neighbours, say 5 people. This means that you have to take into account before you do anything - state a goal, negotiate deliverables, or even a first date on which to meet for a kick-off - that all five people relate to huge idiosyncrasies and generic forces that have to be aligned or overcome before you can even say 'Hello'. This shows how difficult it is to 'start something'. It also explains why you are always urged to get 'bigger' and why you need to 'grow'. It is only then and through the process of getting bigger itself that the management tools can operate, lying in waiting for you to 'discover them'. To be decisive, to make a difference, to set about a course for change, is in no need of 'growth', nor in 'scaling'.

Understanding the nature of these social relations in the above terms show how difficult it is to script moments of systemic change, as hierarchical systems by the very fact that they are top down can concentrate on managing systematic forces relatively effortlessly. That which they cannot predict or control remain lone dissident, strange or abnormal voices, or 'sudden events'.

With the internet these idiosyncrasies have been able to organize and raise their weight in the ratio, and the internet of things will allow these even further, bringing the sensor network data sets individuals can handle to them on their devices. This acceleration of weak signals into clusters, organized networks and flukes cannot be managed anymore by formats that are informed by and that inform systematic forces as the nature of these forces has changed. That is the main reason why we can be here today. We are the new elite, it has to be said, and the quality of our leading or non leading will determine the chances for children that are growing up this very moment to either acquire as much as possible in terms of human and machine relationships as they want and need, or to be handicapped physically and crippled mentally by totalitarian systemic religious and capitalist beliefs of a particular subset of human beings.

The smoothness of TCP/ip, WWW, REST and API's that the younger generations are growing up in will make anything that is not running as smoothly seem 'abnormal'. So logically soon the entire workings of the current decision making structures on the planet will be seen as 'abnormal' as the force of tales of collaboration itself is claiming more and more bandwidth of the 'normal'.

The resources, that are invested in these cat and mouse fights will not longer be able to draw on the investments that have backed them for the past five hundred years, ever since the birth of the modern nation state. Large groups of citizens will soon stop paying taxes for several reasons. The first is that all the jails are full, there is no longer any stick. The second is that the transparency and open data movements are showing how badly we have been governed and how un-objective

decision-making systems in our democracies are. Most important however is that the web has facilitated sharing data, information and knowledge.

But the question remains, can we organize, and can we organize to win? In my opinion winning would mean not only breaking the state-corporation in its self-assigned provider of normality and numbering (passports and IP), but building a global country called 'country' that encompasses all intelligences, whether human, animal, hybrid and machine like. In the words of Smari McCarthy, winning means breaking the *client-server model* in technological terms (tcp/ip as open backbone plus intelligence at the edges in the neighbourhoods), in societal terms (full equality of machines, humans, animals and hybrids and concentrated hot or coldspots where every entity is free to move to and leave from) and in psychological terms (embracing all human diversity, from voice hearers¹⁷² to angel children, mongoloid to spina bifada, from bipolar to autist).

¹⁷² <http://www.intervoiceonline.org/>

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